I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this interim research paper is to give brief evaluation of the interim results of the study undertaken in the framework of the international policy fellowship on security sector reform in South East Europe and briefly to describe, evaluate and compare security sector reforms since 1989 in seven South East European countries of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro. The ultimate aim of the final research paper that is to be published in December 2002, will be to produce a comparative assessment of the types of reforms attempted, the obstacles encountered, successes achieved and reforms left undone. By comparatively assessing the experiences of the afore-mentioned countries in the area of security sector reform, the aim is to learn lessons for how to proceed with reforms in the security sector area.

This paper will also give brief evaluation of the challenges that are ahead of the countries of South East Europe in the area of security sector reform and the role that international organizations play in the process of the reform of the security sector in the South East European countries.
 

II. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Why security sector reform is important? What is it? What are its goals and instruments? What actors contribute to or impede successful security sector reform in South East Europe?

In the paper five specific areas will be investigated. The first is the definition of the concept of security sector reform. The second is the significance of security sector reform. The third is the implementation of the security sector reforms in South East European countries and the important issues concerning security sector reforms. The fourth is about the role of the international organizations in the reform of the security sector in South East Europe. The fifth is the brief evaluation of the trends of security sector reform in South East Europe.
 

1. Definition of Security Sector Reform

The word security sector reform came to be used, first by the authors with the development perspective. The first writings were concerned about the negative impact of an excessive or misdirected security sector for domestic governance. Following them, we have writings that were giving special emphasis on human rights and democratization in donor attitudes to South East European countries, which in turn raised the questions of the transparency and accountability in the security sector. In addition to this, the debates on civil-military relations have also been a source for the discussions on security sector reform.

Currently, in the study of security sector reform, there are two approaches with regard to the definition of the security sector reform. The first is concerned with those militarized formations authorized by the state to utilize force to protect the state itself and its citizens. This definition limits security sector reform to organizations such as the regular military, paramilitary police forces and the intelligence services. The second approach takes a wider view of security sector reform, defining it as those organizations and activities concerned with the provision of security.

The project follows the more precise operationalization of the term by the Stability Pact for South East Europe taking security sector to mean 'all those organizations which have authority to use, or order to the use of, force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight. It includes: (a) military and paramilitary forces; (b) intelligence services; (c) police forces, border guards and customs services; (d) judicial and penal systems; (e) civil structures that are responsible for the management and oversight of the above.'

The project takes an issue or problem driven rather than a definition or institutional driven approach to security sector reform by combining both afore-mentioned definitions. With this the author accepts that there are distinct targeted components of security sector reform, while recognizing that there are also generic crosscutting issues inherent in security sector reform that have relevance to the security sector as a whole.
 

2. The Significance of the Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform plays an important role in the following areas:

A. Enhancement of security and stability

Lack of security, for a state and for its citizens, has remained as a major obstacle to development of security sector reform in South East Europe. Of the seven Stability Pact recipients of aid, five (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro) suffered serious armed conflict during 1990s. Other Stability Pact recipients, Bulgaria and Romania, remain vulnerable to the challenges that can pose difficulties for reforming the security sector. In this context, security sector reform is an important element of the wider conflict prevention agenda and can act as an important regional confidence building measure.

B. Strengthening the state and governance structures

The effective and efficient security sector structures can enable the citizens to conduct their political, economic, social and cultural activities without being under the fear of possible violence. An effective security sector is a crucial element in the creation of the strong and viable state structures. South East European countries possess weak security governance structures as a result of political instability and economic impoverishment. This situation has not prevented those structures to be under the influence of corruption and thus, under the influence of the organized crime, leading to a reluctant judiciary, which is not able and eager to take actions against those who violate the law.

C. Economic Development

Unreformed security sector have posed difficulties and obstacles for the countries of South East Europe to further their aims of the development of the market economy. It has remained as a major factor in the overall development of the countries of the region. Inefficient and ineffective security sector causes instability and unpredictability, which in turn causes disruptions in the economic development of a country. Corruption is a likely result of the unreformed security sector, which causes inefficient allocation of the resources and undermines legitimate economic activities. Unstable economies are least likely to attract investment. The low investment damages the efforts for further reforms. Unreformed security sector is most likely to use excessive budgetary resources, which prevents the creation of the peace dividend, which can move a chunk of financial resources from the security sector to other areas, such as the economy.

D. Democratization

Unreformed security sector poses difficulties for the democratization of a country. The conflicts of 1990s in South East Europe that has resulted in the lost of the control over the part of the territories of the respected countries and to a state as well as to political and economic collapse, still have the effects on some parts of South East Europe, where a rule of law does not extend to all parts of the region. This situation, compounded by a poor governance of the security sector, has had serious repercussions to the countries’ democratization. One of the important elements of the security sector reform is the democratic control of armed forces and the creation of the transparent and accountable security sector, which are the prerequisites of a democracy. However, the inability to create an accountable and effective security sector can hinder the consolidation of the democratic control of the armed forces. Another important element is the de-politicization of the security sector actors as they may tempt to act in a partisan manner in relation to domestic politics. Mechanisms also should be in place that will prevent the attempts of some partisan factions to draw them into politics. Security sector reform and the problem of democratization, is therefore the most immediate and important challenge facing the countries of the region.

E. Euro-Atlantic integration

Security sector reform has been an important accession criterion for South East Europe countries wanting to join western institutions such as NATO and the EU. NATO particularly has been active in promoting security sector reform issues in South East Europe through its Partnership for Peace program and its Membership Action Plan. While future decisions on accession are likely to be informed as much by political reasons as by specific security sector reform successes, security sector reform remains an important factor in South East European countries’ endeavors to join NATO and EU.
 

3. Implementation of Security Sector Reform in South East Europe

Security sector reform is a process rather than an end point. International and domestic security requirements are inherently dynamic, and all states have to be able to adapt their security sectors to meet these demands effectively. Security sector reform is a continuous process, and all established democracies adapt and reform their security sector procedures in accordance with changing circumstances. However, security sector reform does make particular demands in post-authoritarian and post-conflict societies, such as the transitional democracies of South East Europe.

In these environments, there are obstacles that prevent solid democratic control of security sector actors. Security structures themselves as well as civilian structures entitled with the oversight over the security sector, have authoritarian patterns and are often deeply politicized. The security sector actors are used as key instruments of authoritarian control, and tend to be tied to the ruling parties in the government for the sake of maintenance and continuation of a certain regime and hidden interests. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro, have just emerged from an armed conflict, with their security sectors undergoing transformation from ones structured around the demands of conflict to ones more suited to a peacetime environment.

The South East European states, following the changes of 1989, undertook first generation reforms that include the establishment of new institutions, structures, and chains of responsibility for the security sector, appropriate structures for democratic control of security sector actors and their de-politicization. First generation reforms include the establishment of the principles and structures for oversight and transparency of security sector issues; empowering the parliament to oversee and approve security sector budgets; establishment of systems of parliamentary committees to scrutinize security sector policies; civilianization of security sector bureaucracies, and the de-politicization of the security sector actors. Also, a key element of first generation security sector reforms is to provide the legal ground for reforming and professionalizing security sector formations. This entails defining missions, tasks and structures for security sector actors in line with the priorities outlined in relevant legal documents such as national security concepts. In South East Europe all these first generation reforms occurred through the drafting and implementation of constitutional and legislative provisions, which clearly identified roles and responsibilities.

The time showed that the first generation reforms were not enough, what was also necessary was to undertake the second-generation reforms that are concerned with the further, consolidation of democratic control of armed forces; strengthening of the procedures of oversight and transparency; enhancing the way structures and institutions implement policy; improvements in effectiveness and efficiency in the work of the security sector; wider engagement of civil-society and creation of a strong civilian defense and security community; development of the community policing processes; enhancing the ability for effective border protection; and reforming the intelligence services.

It is the aim of this section to in brief explain in the order of sequence what all these points mean in the context of South East European security sector reforms.

A. Democratic Control of Armed Forces

The prerequisites of the principle for democratic control over the armed forces are three. First, the military can have no influence in domestic politics in order to safeguard its powers and privileges. Second, it cannot exert influence over foreign policy so as to influence the defense posture of the country. Third, it has to accept democratic control over defense policy.

The principle of the democratic control of armed forces has to be instituted within a legal framework that includes the constitution and laws. In the constitution, there should be a clear hierarchy of democratic control over the military. This involves defining the authority of the head of the State, the Head of the Government, the senior civilian responsible for military affairs, and the military establishment as a whole. Second, there has to be control through oversight. That is the function of the Parliament. The military has to respond to Parliamentary demands; there must be transparency and accountability.

The Constitutions of the respected countries of South East Europe have been solid foundation for democratic control of the armed forces. They are firm and clear. They give a clear delineation of the chain of command. In all those countries, the head of the state is a supreme commander of the armed forces. Prime ministers, defense ministers and chiefs of the general staff, have their roles defined either by constitution or by the laws on defense adopted by all the respected countries' parliaments. The constitutions and the defense laws, clearly provide provisions for the armed forces being accountable to the Parliament and being transparent to the wider public. But, most frequently encountered problem in the democratic control of armed forces in the countries of South East Europe happens in the area of its practical functioning on serious security crises. A fact that mainly has happened in the conflict-affected countries, but which also has caused serious political fragmentations in the not-conflict-affected countries such as Bulgaria and Romania. This has led to political contests or rivalries between the President, Prime Ministers, Defense Ministers, and the Parliament.

The research proves that the principle of democratic control of armed forces despite the successes in the theoretical level, in practice is still fragile due to the experienced conflicts in the region and due to the difficulties encountered with the transition process.

Despite the fact that the military in the new democracies of South East Europe has accepted civilian control, it has retained, as far as possible, old force structures, doctrine, training and infrastructure. Of the results of the field research conducted so far, shows that the civilian and military elites in South East Europe agree that civilian leaders should have the final say on whether to use force, but disagree on who should have the final say on operational decisions concerning how to use force.

The field research conducted so far also proves the assumption of the author that there is a certain political and ideological gap between the civilians and soldiers evidenced in the military treatment of the strategic goals of the respected countries, the civilian perception of the military and vice versa, the voting attitudes of the military showing great differences in their voting behavior from those of civilians, sharply different opinions for preserving the combat effectiveness of the armed forces and other evidence that show that the gap is being deepened in certain areas and in certain countries. In the non-established democracies of South East Europe, existence of gap between the military and civilian society should be a cause for concern. It should not be forgotten that the possible implication of a gap between civilians and the military are rather different from gaps with other societies.  In their history since 1989, the countries of South East Europe has not experienced military coup d’etats, however the growing gap can seed the basis for such an outcome if necessary measures are not taken to overcome the existence gap.

B. Transparency and Accountability

The concept of transparency is a state of affairs where the wider public, including the Parliament, the media and mass public, have the necessary information for the maintenance of the legitimacy of the security sector actors. Transparency is important for the civilian elite who hold the right for the control of armed forces whether they have in their disposal necessary information to make sound security policy decisions.

There is a tendency in the countries of South East Europe of a notion of transparency being confined to relations between the Ministry of Defense and the Parliament. However, communication to the wider public is an issue that has to be an integral part of the working culture of security sector actors. Information sharing significantly affects the ability of security sector actors to establish relationships with other government agencies, with the media and with society at large.

There is also an international aspect of transparency, which is about reciprocal transparency between and among governments. Based on Vienna Document 1994 (and now on the Vienna Document 1999) in the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is instituted information-exchange arrangements among the participating states, which continue to operate, as a confidence- and security-building measure. International transparency is essential to good neighborly relations.

Security sector, besides being transparent, is also accountable to the citizens’ representatives at the Parliament. Transparency is a main mean for enforcing control and accountability in public sector. Accountability means political accountability of the security sector actors for their activities to the institutions that are authorized with the oversight over the security sector. By being transparent, security sector actors fulfill a part of their accountability, as being accountable requires providing any information to the oversight institutions. Most notable practice of the accountability is consisted of submitting the annual defense budgets of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior to the Parliament.

Normatively speaking, most of the South East European countries have embraced the principles of parliamentarizm. The very meaning of the parliamentarism is providing stable and institutionalized form of citizens’ representation and influence on the main political decisions. Accountability of the executive branch to the parliament is supposed to mean (in)direct accountability of the power-bearers to the people. As a rule, in South East European countries there are formal constitutional mechanisms for legislative control and oversight of the armed forces, and in general – over the security sector.

Of the South East European countries that were lucky not to be involved in conflict were able to establish accountability more easily than the countries were affected by the conflict. The countries that were affected by the conflicts, they resisted the calls for more accountability with the justification for the protection of the national interests. They first claimed necessity first to resolve national issue, and only then to turn to democracy.

One of the weakest points of some of the South East European countries, like Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro, is the so-called question of citizenship. Ethno-nationalist systems emphasize the division between majority (dominant nation’s members) and minority (members of the other ethnic groups). Usually the military and other security forces are comprised by members of the dominant ethnic group, which makes it difficult for the minority groups to perceive them as all-national institutions. States driven by inter-ethnic tensions are not able to be security (or safety) providers for all their citizens.

In most of South East Europe even forging a democratic majority behind a given definition of national security proves difficult. The reason is that the loyalty of many people is firmly tied to their respective ethnic groups rather than to the nation-states. The larger is the rift between ethnicity and state, the weaker is the sense of national identity. This makes the concept of national security tenuous and elusive. This situation puts multi-ethnic states of the region at an inherent disadvantage vis-à-vis ethnically based states that command the deeper loyalty of the overwhelming majority of their citizens.

C. Capacity to Implement Policies and Bureaucratic Effectiveness

A related second-generation security sector reform issue concerns the capacity of security sector bureaucracies to implement policies. Capacity problems have manifested themselves in a number of ways across South East Europe. These include a failure to provide the security to the citizens; inexistence of the cooperation among the governmental structures of the same government; state structures unable and unwilling to implement security policy; and lack of expertise amongst civil servants in security sector bureaucracies.

First, the states of South East Europe, because of the their weak economies and democracies, have failed to provide the necessary minimum of economic and social security to individual citizens. This has led the people to turn to violence in order to protect their individual political and economic rights.

Second, the governmental institutions, due to the lack of the managerial cultures, do not cooperate with each other, instead they compete with each other over spheres of competence. A fact that undermines a state's legitimacy and promotes uncontrolled conflicts.

Third, in most countries in the region there is an absence of effective political elite that will show an ability to establish effective and efficient governmental structures. This leads to a lack of commitment to reform at the mid-level bureaucrats who remain unconvinced of or does not understand the rationale behind the reform process. Finally, due to the lack of experienced and well-prepared civilians that can undertake reforms, reform programs are not becoming realized.

D. Defense Intellectuals

In South East European there is an absence of civilian understanding of, expertise in and interest for defense and security issues. The development of an civilian security and defense cadre and intellectuals that have the skills and experience in security and defense issues, is a key second generation security sector reform issue.

Development of the strong community of civilian defense intellectuals that will be engaged in security sector issues is of crucial importance to security sector reform as society is a central to the legitimization of security sector actors, particularly in a democratic context. Creation of the community is also central for the public’s support for the security sector’s participation in the humanitarian and other missions that require wider public support for their successful realization and implementation. Moreover, it provides an alternative source of information on security issues for both policy makers and wider public. Furthermore, it also provides the opportunity for popular debate, discussion and criticism of security and defense issues. In addition, it can act as an important mechanism for holding other actors in the security sector to account through exposing malpractice, forming critical judgments and so on.

The countries of South East Europe have a small and fledgling community of security and defense intellectuals. However, they have recognized the need for the establishment of the strong community of the civilian security and defense, consisted of both governmental and non-governmental individuals and institutions, by launching a centers and/or faculties for security, where special education and training programs are organized for the civilians to be skilled on security defense sector management.

E. Development of the Community Policing Processes

The transitional countries of South East Europe require internal security and police reform to be designed and implemented in a way that will deepen and strengthen democratic values, increase the community policing and overcome the confidence gap between citizens and police members. In practical terms this means emphasizing both police accountability and transparency on the one hand, and on the other hand, improving police effectiveness in controlling crime. Further, community policing entails responsiveness to the community’s needs for security and assistance.

The principle of community policing gives great importance to community relations and civil society participation in police actions. Because police meet and interact with members of the public on a daily basis, and because the police possess the capacity for significant violence and are also able to deprive citizens of their liberty, therefore the police powers should be used in accordance with the law, and be subject to it through the courts. There should be structural mechanisms for the police that will include clear institutional architecture separating the police from military and state security institutions.

The police are accountable to the community that they serve. This should be achieved by regular contact with a variety of citizens, group of citizens and organizations. Accountability to the community is fundamental to the reform process in South East Europe because it will be a way to overcome the existing confidence problem between the public and the police.

Another element of the community policing is the de-centralization of the police structures. Bu decentralization we do not mean empowering the local branches of the police, instead we mean giving more powers to the locally elected authorities on the policing issues. By decentralization, there will be more accountability and transparency in the police and it will increase the community policing abilities of the police structures.

F. Enhancing the Ability of the Countries for Effective Border Protection

One of the central features of a sovereign state is its ability to control its borders and protect its territorial integrity. This issue has become increasingly important for several reasons. After the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty the Schengen co-operation is a part of the EU Justice and Home Affairs co-operation. It is also an area where lot of improvement and new and deeper co-operation is needed to be fulfilled for the candidate countries of South East Europe running for the EU membership. Another important factor is the September 11th incidents in the USA, which have increased the importance of functional border security systems.

Border guarding is a national mission that should be carried out by a special police force: This should not form part of the regular state police but neither should it belong to the national defense forces. For this reason it is suggested that border guarding is not a duty for conscripts though conscripts can be used for restricted tasks and in limited areas when necessary during the initial stages of development. Efficient implementation, continuous development and the need for a rapid reaction to the changing nature of cross-border crime require one leading authority to be responsible for the national border security. This authority should consist of one national non-military and specialized organization that is responsible for border security. This organization should operate under the auspices of either the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Justice.

The task of creating such a system now confronts the countries of SEE. Over the last 12 years, the countries of South East Europe have gradually undertaken reforms in reorganizing their structures of the border guard, changing it from a military organization with conscripted staff into a police organization with purely professional staff. Border guarding requires professionalism, and it is beyond the abilities of a military consisted of conscripts. Today the border control is a matter of law enforcement, rather than national defense. Military definition of border security - which characterized the Cold War era - is not relevant any longer given the changed security environment.

According to their border security model, countries in South East Europe can be divided into three main groups: countries possessing specialized and non-military agency for border security; countries with specialized but with not non-military agency for border security; and the countries with not-specialized and military border guard authority.

Needed reforms in the area of the border protection in South East Europe, includes: First, it is needed to shift the main responsibility of passport control from the Police to the Frontier Guard. Second, to have one national authority responsible for all borders - land, sea and border crossing points. Third, to have fewer but more functional stations than many small stations - more mobile patrols instead of buildings. Fourth, computerize of all units and premises. Other reform areas include: implementation of the Schengen visa regime; hindering smuggling, as well as arms, ammunition, narcotics and radioactive material from being illegally moved across the border; hindering criminal groups from entering territory and to guarantee the security of border area inhabitants; hindering illegal alteration of the border and to maintain border markers and installations in good order; and the establishment of effective border control.

G. Intelligence Services

Due to the enormous role that that the intelligence services have played before 1989 changes, their transformation has entailed great political, security and societal difficulties.

The countries of South East Europe, as a part of the first generation reforms, have the adopted a necessary legal framework in which intelligence services operate. This framework defines the area of responsibility of the services, the limits of their competence, the mechanisms of oversight and accountability, as well as the legal means to deal with complaints in cases of violation of rights.

However, the reform of the intelligence services have been challenging especially in the area of opening of the files and their de-politicization and civilianization. Due to the possible implications of the reform of the services, the countries of South East Europe, have adopted gradual reform of the services, which has not included their reform from all its dimensions. Some of the countries have put off the reforms for the better times. It is important for the countries of the region to undertake the reforms in the intelligence services that will be on the political level, and that will include the society as a whole. The reform of the intelligence services can help to come to terms with the burden of the past.
 

4. The Role of the International Organization in the Reforms of Security Sector in South East Europe

The Countries of the region do have variations in terms of their reforms, however, the research undertaken so far have proven that there is a regional pattern that is emerging there. And that is that the international organizations such as NATO, EU and Stability Pact for South East Europe, have played significant role to push the countries of the region for more reforms. Mainly the reforms undertaken so far, since 1989, to a certain extent have been a reflection of the requirements of the international organizations.

It is the author’s premise that for the viability and sustainability, security sector reforms shall not be imposed from above. While models of security sector organization from other countries may be useful as reference points for particular security sector reform programs, it is unlikely they will be successful if they are used as rigid blueprints for reform in the countries of South East Europe. Different historical, political, structural and social legacies create environments, which require local, context-specific strategies for reform. Imposing an externally generated blueprint for reform avoids (sometimes difficult) domestic security sector planning processes, which in themselves are a fundamental part of security sector reform more widely. Also, if the security sector reform process is not driven from within the local context then it is likely that it will remain superficial, and will not tackle the underlying problems of the security sector.

However, the experience in South East Europe shows that many efforts to reform from below failed. The countries of the region hoped that would bring in new ideas from the bottom up. But, their efforts did have some temporary successes. However, in the end, the international organizations were those pushed the real reforms.

A. The Stability Pact for South East Europe

The Stability Pact for South East Europe, with its special provisions on security sector reform and with its Working Table III on security and defense, have stimulated thinking about how to implement comprehensive reform in the security sector. Security sector reform has become a major area in the framework of the Stability Pact. The Stability Pact has helped to strengthen the concept of security sector reform and has given further option for the coordination among international organizations in the field.

Working Table III is working on reforming the security sector and create a climate of confidence and security throughout the region, including by rationalization of defense planning and spending; the general demilitarization of societies within the region; reduction of personnel and military expenditures; promoting democratic control of military; training of civilian experts on security issues; contribution to the implementation of the arms control measures; address problems caused by landmines and small arms proliferation; transparency in defense issues and other confidence building measures.

As a result of the goals set out by the Stability Pact, the work done so far includes the establishment of the Regional Center for Assistance in Mine-clearing, Training, and Testing of new Techniques and Equipment; Education and Training Center; the Bucharest Center for small arms and light weapons; Vocational Training of Unemployed Military Officers; Assistance for the Reduction of the Armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Regional Verification Center for South East Europe; Regional Aerial Observation System;  Mine Action Programme;  Multinational Police Training, Transparency in Budgeting, Police Training in handling Conflict, etc. The Task Force for Transparency on Budgeting and SSR, Multinational Engineer Task Force (ETF) and the South East Europe Security Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP) at the level of senior officials has also been established.

B. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The South East European countries have committed themselves to reform their security sectors in accordance with the provisions of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security of 1994 stipulating a comprehensive set of rules on political control, democracy and the use of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, as well as the information services and the police. The Code basically aims to ensure that the armed forces are placed, in terms of their use (both internal and external) under the authority of free institutions having democratic legitimacy, and abide by the principle of legality, democracy, neutrality, respect of human and civil rights and comply with international humanitarian law.

C. European Union (and Western European Union)

Western European Union’s status of ‘Associate Partner’ introduced in 1992, a status that apart from other 6 countries of Central Europe, is also hold by two South East European countries: Bulgaria and Romania, has provided to both countries to participate to various WEU’s activities that has had great impact on thinking about security sector reform. The adoption of a paper on ‘European Security; a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries’ in 1994-95 by WEU countries plus by Associate Partners; the WEU’s police training mission MAPE in Albania; mine-clearing training team (WEUDAM) in Croatia and other initiatives, have given to South East European associate partners of WEU, some experience of western standards and approaches to operational organization, as well as the very difficult issues of mission management and budgeting.

The closest the European Union came to involvement in security sector reform in South East Europe was in the field of PHARE assistance for the development and reform of state structures. PHARE assistance in the field of security sector reform have included support for English language teaching in the security forces; training programs for ministries of defense officials; and research activities covering comprehensive security and defense topics.

D. NATO

The NATO has played great role in the reform process in many South East European countries. NATO’s specific programs such as Partnership for Peace and Membership Action Plan have advanced the pace of reform processes. NATO's peacekeeping and multinational military exercises also, which have included the states of South East Europe in security sector activities, have helped to expose the regional security sectors' personnel to the norms and operating procedures of NATO countries.

The decision of the candidacy for membership in NATO has been a reason to speed up the reform of the security sector in South East European countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania. NATO has established preconditions and criteria for security sector reform, which have guided the reforms in those countries and which have been and continue to be key tools in both promoting and shaping relevant security sector reform efforts.

In contrast to EU, WEU and OSCE, NATO has had competence, resources, effectiveness and credibility. It is thus that NATO has come to play a leading role in this area.
 

5. Emerging Patterns - Conclusion

All the afore-mentioned factors necessitate security sector reform in the countries of South East Europe. It is the aim of the section to summarize the above points and to identify some patterns that emerge in the area of security sector reform.

First, the countries of the region have completed with the first generation reforms, and now they are in the stage of second-generation reforms.

Second, security sector reforms in South East Europe, during both, first and second generation reforms, has occurred at a time when other areas of transition – such as the introduction of market economies and wider political reform – have been more pressing priorities for governments and societies. This has meant that the political commitment and resources available for security sector reform have been limited.

Third, reforms that have taken and take place are heavily influenced by international structures.

Fourth, there are common features in terms of both the obstacles and the reform areas that the governments of South East Europe have to face. Although the countries of South East Europe differ in terms of size, economic capability, geostrategic situation and the nature of their relationships with the international structures, the path of security sector reform has followed a remarkably similar pattern in the whole region.

Fifth, a pattern that emerges after a decade of conflicts, political instability and economic difficulties, shows that the countries from the region should not wait better conditions to start security sectors reforms. The regional environment could not become friendlier without internal efforts to be taken.
 
 
 
 
 
 

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