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Corruption as a Symptom of Opacity and Poor Policymaking – and a Few Measures to Address These Problems
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Transparency International, The 2005 Global Corruption Barometer, December 2005
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The 2005 Global Corruption Barometer prepared for International Anti-Corruption Day 2005 reveals alarming information.
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SIGMA, Romania policy-making and co-ordination assessment, July 2004
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The report highlights a number of changes in the policy-making and co-ordination system in Romania. According to the report, there is a significant increase in the attention paid at the highest political and administrative levels to weaknesses in the system and its commitment to improve it.
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Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, and Mastruzzi, Massimo. Governance matters IV: governance indicators for 1996-2004. World bank, Policy, Research working paper; no. WPS 3630, June 2005.
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The authors present the latest update of aggregate governance indicators, together with new analysis of several issues related to the use of these measures. The governance indicators measure the following six dimensions of governance: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political instability and violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. They cover 209 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004.
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Keefer, Philip. Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed? World Bank, Policy Research working paper series; no. WPS3594, May 2005
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This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers.
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Gurgur, Tugrul; Shah, Anwar. Localization and corruption: panacea or Pandora’s box? World Bank, Policy, Research working paper; no. WPS 3486, January 2005.
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The author answers the question whether the there is a positive relation between decentralization and corruption. He presents a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically in order to isolate the role of centralized decision-making on corruption. He finds out that corruption is caused by a lack of service-orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making. Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption.
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Keefer, Philip; Vlaicu, Razvan. Democracy, credibility and clientelism. World Bank, Policy, Research working paper; no. WPS 3472, January 2005.
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The authors demonstrate that sharply different policy choices across democracies can be explained as a consequence of differences in the ability of political competitors to make credible pre-electoral commitments to voters. They identify two ways how the politicians overcome their credibility deficit: by building reputations or relying on patrons. In the second case, the authors find that targeted transfers and corruption are higher and public good provision lower than in democracies in which political competitors can make credible pre-electoral promises.
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Shah, Anwar; Thompson, Theresa. Implementing decentralized local governance: a treacherous road with potholes, detours, and road closures. World Bank, Policy Research working paper series; no. WPS3353, June 2004.
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This paper attempts to present a stylized view of the motivations and approaches used to strengthen local governance. It revisits major controversies regarding preferred approaches to obtaining a successful outcome. Key approaches examined are big push versus small steps; bottom up vs. top down; and uniform vs. asymmetric decentralization.
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Iliev, Ilia, “Public and Personal Involvement in Corruption Scandals in Bulgaria,” CPS IPS Program 2004-2005
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The paper explores the mechanism of the public scandals in Bulgaria and discusses options for filling the gap between the large amount of publicly available information on corruption, on the one hand, and the lack of resulting civic action in Bulgaria.
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