Transparency of Budget Expenditure as an Anti-Corruption Measure:
The Case of Latvia
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Anti-corruption in Southeast Europe: first steps and policies; Center for the Study of Democracy
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The main goal of the Report is to sensitize politicians and civil society to the specific set of sources of corruption in the region.
The first part analyzes the origins of cross border corruption in the region which is seen as a result of the rise of transnational crime caused by the violent break-up of former Yugoslavia. It intends to show that regional factors significantly contribute to national-level corruption and could undermine national anti-corruption efforts.
In the second part, the report evaluates the national circumstances in which the regional factors develop. It compares the national legislation and institutional practice in a number of areas critical to anti-corruption efforts: regulatory and legal framework, institutional prerequisites, corruption in the economy, the role of civil society and media and international cooperation. The second part is ultimately a collection of contributions from watchdog organizations in the countries in Southeast Europe. In fact, the nature of regional concerns about corruption is evident in the limitations of this report – namely that the level of institutional development, policy implementation practice and international affiliations of the countries in SEE are varying to such a degree that only a “bird’s eye view” could reveal the source of common problem. This was very much in line with the USAID approach that there is a strong conceptual distinction between law enforcement approaches to corruption, which try to strengthen crime-fighting efforts, and a more holistic approach that addresses poor governance systems more broadly.
The countries covered by the RCAR included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia.
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Private interest in public tenders: no revenue, no efficiency and no social benefits; Sonin, Konstantin
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When the goods are to be publicly tendered off and it is the task of the tender officials to determine some specific characteristics of the good, their privileged status allows them to manipulate the results of the tender. In particular, if the officials are interested in getting side-transfers from bidders instead of revenue maximization, they may choose a particular pattern of characteristics to favor some particular bidder. These side transfers (bribes) may potentially become very large, especially when bidders' preferences differ substantially. In Russia and some other transition economies that have experienced a rapid privatization with vast and heterogeneous assets being privatized, this problem is particularly severe. The paper explores — both theoretically and empirically — tender procedures which involve a set of additional conditions to be satisfied by the winner. The aim is to provide a framework for understanding revenue inefficiencies inherent in many auctions and tenders held in Russia during transition.
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On the road toward a more honest society: the latest trends in anti-corruption policy in Latvia; Kalnins, Valts and Cigane, Lolita
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The study explores four topical issues in the prevention of corruption - the regulation of conflicts of interest, control over the property and income of physical persons, the role of the Bureau for Preventing and Combating Corruption (BPCC) and the development of the political party financing system. The study concludes that the law on the prevention of conflicts of interest should exclude opportunities to interpret it in a way, which allows for a conflict of interest. It is also necessary to expand the range of persons who are obliged to regularly submit declarations of property and income. With regard to party financing, the dependence of political parties on their sponsors will not diminish unless the overall amounts of party spending or political advertising are strictly limited and the BPCC imposes real control on party finances. To enhance the independence of the BPCC, it is necessary to broaden the possibilities for the general public to monitor the activities of this bureau.
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OECD Best Practices For Budget Transparency; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; Public Management Committee; PUMA/SBO(2000)6/FINAL; 15-May-2001
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The paper represents compilation of best practices of the countries – members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in relation to the state budgetary processes. The Best Practices are designed as a reference tool for Member and non-member countries to use in order to increase the degree of budget transparency in their respective countries.
Budgetary transparency, i.e. openness about policy intentions, formulation and implementation, is considered as a key element of good governance. Budget transparency is defined as the full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a timely and systematic manner.
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