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The Learning Government Research Project: Assessing Policy Making Reform in Romania

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Abstract

Good planning and proper policy analysis to inform decision makers are important elements of policymaking reform. A functional and modern policymaking system can only work if it is supported by the proper institutional arrangements. In Romania there have been serious failures in policy management under the current government apparatus. This has been largely down to a lack of institutional capacity to manage the policy and regulatory process. Underlying causes include the absence of a systematic approach to policy formulation, institutional corruption, and a pressing need to refine and implement civil service law. Reforms started in 2003 did benefit from increased attention and support from donors. Their successes have been limited by operational problems however, especially in matching agendas and financing activities, and also the persistence of bureaucratic resistance. In order to push the reform agenda forward the government needs to train and prepare its senior staff and stimulate the involvement of competent local personnel in assistance programs. It must take full responsibility for increasing its administrative capacity, and cooperate with academics and civil society to build a community of policy analysts and policy makers. The donor community meanwhile, must establish a clear vision for their policy in Romania, offer a better design of programs, and improve advertising of their assignments.

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The views contained inside remain solely those of the author who may be contacted at craciun@policy.hu. For a fuller account of this policy research project, please visit <http://www.policy.hu/craciun/>

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Executive summary

1. Romania and its international partners have allocated significant resources to bring about fundamental change in its political and administrative system. The scope of this paper is twofold; by assessing crosscutting policymaking reforms, I explore the factors behind the success of policy transfer and institutional building sponsored by key external stakeholders. The institutional development envisaged is significant and can greatly affect Romania's credibility, stability and development in the medium and long term. The international stakeholders involved in institutional development are one of the drivers for reform, sometimes being *the only actors successfully pressing Romanian institutions for change*. Unfortunately, the *full potential of their assistance is not met*, sometimes due to the traditional problems of assistance delivery embedded in the donor programs but more importantly due to internal institutional factors related to the culture, capacity and the personnel of the Romanian public institutions.

2. Following an analysis of core documents augmenting the policy reform debate and review of several cases of technical assistance projects developed in the Romanian central administration, I come to the conclusion that if it is not properly designed and implemented *policymaking reform has little chance of transforming profound institutional and cultural constructs*. The major risk is to maintain *donor dependence* and not be able to produce enough internal pressure and demand for better policymaking. For success it is necessary to stress the synergy of action between the public sector, civil society, private sector and international actors with an emphasis on the *capacity of Romanian institutions to properly manage their own consolidation and capacity building*.

3. By identifying the critical success factors (e.g. political overview and support, competence of staff involved) I argue that technical assistance programs (widely involving consultancy activity) have to become more flexible and more orientated towards long term institutional capacity building. Special attention should be given to attract and motivate staff to work in making technical assistance meaningful and useful. By rethinking technical assistance supported reforms I propose a set of actions which can push the policymaking reform agenda forward.

1 Public sector development in transition context

Policymaking reform was never a specific topic for literature on governance issues.¹ Known as policy management, policy development or the policy process, the activities envisaged in this paper refer to the patterned activity of government in addressing public issues, regardless of the instruments used. The more generous management/sector reform assumes a holistic approach which questions the architecture of state/society relations, principles of governance and even values behind it. Policymaking reform is highly permeable to the more general debates, being at home with all the fundamental debates, e.g. Weberian vs. New Public Management (NPM) thinking, process vs. results, hierarchies vs. networks.

Along with König, I consider the socialist administration as unified, comprising all tiers of the state apparatus, with strong hierarchical controls and subordination while maintaining the intertwining of party bureaucracy and state administration, with the former having directive authority over the latter (König 1992). Goetz stresses that public governance in Central and Eastern Europe transformed itself along two paradigmatic lines; Modernization and Europeanization. These two are combined within public governance reforms, with the latter actually building upon the achievements of the former. The 'Modernist' paradigm emphasizes the need for radical reform, striving for increasing differentiation of tasks and personnel between the political and administrative parts of the executive. It also promotes administrative devolution, deconcentration and effective political decentralization. The Modernist paradigm favors the establishment of a professional non-partisan civil service and a redefinition of the tasks of public administration, with the emphasis being on legality, impartiality, objectivity, regularity and a public service ethos (Goetz 2001). Europeanization, on the other hand, emerged as a major perspective on administrative development in the region and a new paradigm beginning in the mid-1990s. According to Grabbe, Europeanization is a 'convincing' administrative paradigm with concrete instruments of influence such

¹ I am greatly indebted to several mentors, colleagues and friends who helped me a lot during this research. I would like to mention a few here: Leslie Pal, Paul D. Collins, Gary Reid, Nicolas Dubois, Ken Sigrist, Mircea Miclea, Victor Giosan, my colleagues from the GSG and the Ministry of Education, and the IPF staff and fellows. I would also like to thank several Romanian and foreign experts who offered to contribute to this research and openly shared both their positive and negative experiences of policymaking reform and consultancy work in Romania.

as benchmarking, monitoring, and the provision of legislative and institutional templates, aid and technical assistance (Grabbe 2001).

As Nunberg notes, “Central and Eastern European countries did not follow the NPM approach; the implicit systems and models adopted were the centralized hierarchies of the Weberian tradition” (Nunberg 1999: 264). The acceptance of the bureaucratic establishment by important donors, such as the European Commission and the World Bank, appears to be mainly for tactical and operational reasons, with the NPM platform being too radical for the well-enshrined administrative legalism of the post communist countries.

In Romania, policymaking reform encouraged the inclusion of NPM in public administration reform. This included stressing the importance of good planning across government, proper policy analysis to inform decision making, inter-agency functional cooperation and extensive public consultation. Yet, a functional and modern policymaking system can only work if it is supported by proper institutional arrangements, which do not seem to be in place in Romania.² Policymaking reform seems to bring about a paradigmatic clash between the New Public Management and Weberian thinking and, further, between the *policy literate reformists* and *bureaucratic conservatives*.

2 Romania: the organization of Government

Romania has a semi-presidential regime with a strong tendency towards prime-ministerialization, especially when the Prime Minister is also the head of the governing / dominant party. The Constitution gives the president a leading role in foreign affairs and security issues whilst the Prime Minister assumes full authority over economic and social affairs. Currently the number of ministries and agencies is unusually high owing to the pressures to accommodate a large number of parties and political officials seeking office (Romania has had a coalition government since 2004). This creates a serious risk of policy fragmentation and limited policy effectiveness, in the sense of *executive unreliability* as defined by Evans and Manning.³ Relations between government and parliament are

² See for example the lengthy and wide-ranging report of the World Bank (2003).

³ *Governmental unreliability* is defined as “the degree to which the broad policy commitments of the executive are either not implemented, or only partially implemented, within a reasonable timescale - or if implemented, are prone to rapid reversal” can be reduced. There are three methods by which *governmental unreliability* can be reduced: strengthening the institutional arrangements that support collegiality (collective decision-making); designing a decision-making process that forces meaningful policy tradeoffs within a realistic fiscal plan; and creating effective collegial forums (e.g., government sub-committees) in which such

tense, with the government often sidelining parliament, especially in relation to priority government activities such as European integration. Under the last two administrations, there has been a strong tendency to unify party structures with government ones, leading to a weakening of both. Depending on the number of parties in the coalition, the government decision-making system is evolving from a majoritarian to a consensual logic. The current coalition is fragile and functions on two levels, with two dominant parties and two secondary parties. Political coordination structures outside government seem to work unsatisfactorily as many political disputes/crises are spilling into government activity.⁴

Coalitions undoubtedly make the organization of government much more complex (SIGMA 1998). The Prime Minister has relatively broad authority over ministers, yet the central government structures are undeveloped, and unable to support both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet in decision-making. The first such supporting structure is the Chancellery of the Prime Minister which is, unfortunately, seeking extensive policymaking instead of policy coordination/review activity. Recently, the Chancellery has gathered several sectoral agencies under its direct coordination to form a special type of ministry, with no direct representation in the Cabinet but managing a wide set of issues and commanding a sizeable budget. The second supporting structure is the General Secretariat, a weak institution in term of policy review capacity, but capable of organizing a huge flow of documents and recently making bold steps towards reforming the policymaking process.⁵

The ministries do not share a culture of cooperation, preferring to maintain an adversarial attitude. Inter-ministerial bodies have tended to function poorly, characterized by their large number, diffuse responsibilities and lack of real output. This might well change with the recent restructuring carried out by the General Secretariat of the Government. The organization of ministry work is interesting. In order to avoid the fragmentation of ministries along party lines and to increase coordination, all coalition parties nominated one deputy minister.

deliberations can occur (Evans and Manning 2002). For an application of this concept see the comparative article on two Baltic states in Evans and Evans (2001).

4 The government change in 2004, when a right-leaning coalition replaced in government the single ruling Social Democratic Party, increased the fragmentation. Political coordination structures were never efficient in solving inner political conflicts before reaching the government level, triggering institutional crises with serious consequences for the credibility of the government. One of the most serious one was in the education sector, where the minister of education, following an insufficient budget allocation resigned in parallel with the longest strike mounted for the same reason in the last 15 years.

5 For an excellent overview on the typical coordination functions and structures at the center of government level in the region see Ben Gera (2004).

Up to now, the main result has been to lessen the policy differentiation between the coalition parties.

The responsibilities for coordinating important horizontal functions across government (including reforms) are split. The coordination of EU affairs is done at Prime Minister level, while the bulk of EU integration activity is divided between the Ministry of European Integration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Public Finances. Public Administration Reform (PAR) is coordinated from the Ministry of Administration and Interior through the Central Unit for Public Administration Reform (CUPAR), a unit which has relevant expertise but could benefit from a more central position and political clout. Policymaking reform is carried actively by the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG) through the Public Policy Unit (PPU), doubled by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. The Ministry of Finance coordinates the reform of public expenditure management but, to date, its status and achievements are unclear.

3 Failures of policy management in Romania

Romania has been under serious scrutiny during the transitional period. The large majority of observers seem to agree that the Romanian policymaking system displays all the typical pathologies of weak governance, with particular emphasis being on the lack of institutional capacity to manage the policy/regulatory process. All relevant foreign stakeholders have highlighted serious problems in the policymaking process. For example, the World Bank claimed that “in the area of public administration, a more systematic approach to policy formulation needs to be established and embodied in institutional structures and processes, and the Civil Service Law needs to be refined and implemented” (The World Bank 2004). We can agree with the UK’s Department of International Development (DFID), which argued that such problems are symptomatic for wider performance constraints within the still heavily centralized and politicized public service. Poor pay and incentive structures discourage higher caliber staff from joining and remaining with the service. According to the DFID Country Strategy Paper, “service delivery concepts are largely absent, corruption is prevalent, organizational structures and systems, and budgeting and expenditure management systems, require review” (DFID 2000: 2). Finally, better systematic linkages between policy making and budgetary processes also need to be established.

As Goetz notes, Romania displays some similar traits to fragile democracies in Latin America. These include institutional fragmentation at central level, proliferation of specialized agencies outside the main ministerial administration, a decoupling between the political and administrative parts of the executive and insufficient mechanisms for policy co-ordination and for building policy coherence at the center (Goetz 2001: 1042). Similar features are to be found in several other CEE countries.⁶

While reviewing several Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) reports, Michal Ben Gera asserts that the Romanian system for preparing, consulting, reviewing, coordinating and approving policies is characterized by weak analytical and coordination capacity and often-ignored procedures.⁷ The result is the overproduction of generally low-quality and contradictory policy and legislative outputs, leading to implementation difficulties and an enforcement deficit (Ben Gera 2004). Interestingly, the author lists various faults of the Romanian policymaking system as identified by middle and top civil servants:

Table 1 Problems of the Romanian legislative and policy-coordination processes

- Weakness/arbitrariness of political direction with respect to strategic priorities and policy direction
- Reluctance of Ministers to resolve conflicts at inter-ministerial committees and Government level (the role of parties is important here)
- Lack of policy development capacity and policy “culture” in the administration, including at the level of line ministries where the process starts
- Preparation of legal drafts normally begins without policy clarity
- Weak internal coordination within Ministries and within “sectors”, due in part to structural fragmentation, competition, and lack of clarity in assignment of responsibilities
- Formal and perfunctory inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder consultation
- Insufficient, politicized, and duplicative legal analysis and cross-checking at the central level
- Lack of central policy-coordination, and non-enforcement of procedures under the Law on Normative Acts
- Weak monitoring by the General Secretariat of the Government of implementation by Ministries

Source: Ben-Gera (2004).

⁶ For an insightful perspective on Slovak policy management system see Staronova (2002).

⁷ The most important features identified are: low capacity of the administration, high level of intra-governmental conflict, weak position of the Parliament, large number, fragmented, and insular administrative structures, weak policy capacity of political parties, weakness of the horizontal functions (Ben-Gera 2004).

With regard to political control over the administrative structure, there is political control but it tends to be a predatory one. Politicians struggle to retrieve information and expertise from the bureaucracy in order to make decisions. They are often overwhelmed and unable to keep pace with strategic and operational decisions. Top public management is usually politicized and a change in governments brings with it a change in leadership and, more worryingly, a change in the structure of the agencies. This is due to the very peculiar legal framework under which the simplest way to bring about changes in top management is to restructure the institution. The result is a lack of trust/fidelity between the two actors. Following the elections in 2004 the dominant discourse of the new political officials stressed the lack of trust of public servants towards their institutions; many of them part of questionable administrative practices and networks. The institutional response was an extension of the advisory services given to ministers and deputy ministers to partially replace the fallen-from-grace public servants.

Overall, there are growing gaps between the administrative culture of Romanian institutions, their organizational capacity and the complex pressures coming from the environment. There is sufficient evidence that Romania is insufficiently equipped for the standards of good and democratic governance required in a European administrative system.

4 Policymaking reform in Romania: dynamics, successes and limits

The policy process reform enjoyed an unexpected boost following the election in 2004. The new governing program referred to the importance of reform emphasizing the need for better policy elaboration and implementation.⁸ This meant that the reforms started in 2003 had a good chance to continue. The outgoing government had introduced reforms in response to increased criticism from international organizations although arguably without any strong feeling of ownership on its part. However, the new government has reacted promptly and given close attention to the issue.

These reforms did benefit from the increased attention and support from the major donors in Romania – DFID/WB/EC/SIGMA – and provides the background

⁸ In this program there are listed 5 principles: *transparency and communication, participation, responsibility, efficiency and coherence* (Government of Romania 2004).

example for this policy paper. There are several reasons why this reform is a good case study for exploring some of the pathologies of technical assistance in Romania.

- It is a reform that specifically targets the policy making process;
- It is a horizontal reform involving all layers and structures of the central administration, that is, the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG), the Chancellery of the Prime Minister and the line ministries;
- It was the focus for all the major Romanian donors concerning institutional development;
- It started from zero, by the establishment inside the General Secretariat of the Public Policy Unit (PPU) in late 2003, following a strong recommendation coming from the SIGMA officials;
- It challenges the existing institutional procedures and mandates;
- It is an incremental reform, building on cumulative gains and achievements.

This case offers some good practices in technical assistance. All donors communicated with each other and built their programs with previous experiences taken into account. The development resembles a snowball effect with one donor starting and others following suit when the capacity of that institution is tested and set on a right policy track. Streamlining resources from many donors brought a sense of continuity and coherence between assistance projects, incremental change and development

The DFID started to assist the GSG by offering consulting services for 'strengthening the coordination of public policy and the formulation capacities of the General Secretariat of the Government and ministries'. The consultants, together with the Prime Minister's long-time adviser on administrative reform issues, contributed to defining strategic lines for GSG -PPU activity. The fact that they were British and naturally familiarized with central government structures in UK helped the staff connect with a vibrant institutional and professional experience. The DFID also contributed some highly appreciated and useful study trips for GSG staff to virtually all the governments in CEE countries, in an attempt to institutionalize peer evaluation and learning.

The switch from the DFID to the World Bank brought maturity to the projects by formulating conditionalities around specific requirements and deadlines. The two conditions referred to the approval of new policy making procedures for government activity and the identification of monitoring indicators used for judging policymaking reform success. The World Bank involvement also integrated the GSG-Public Policy Unit into the policy review of other Bank-supported reforms such as the reform of the civil service payment system and

a revision of the corporate governance regulations. Continuity was assured by having the same senior DFID consultant continuing his work within the new World Bank project.

The EC Twinning project took a very long time to design and gain. It was further complicated by the change in the government with the EC wanting a strong political commitment for continuation of reform. The project was built on the experience of the two previous assistance projects. The EC Twinning focused on building policymaking capacity at ministry level and sorting out relations between the GSG and the Prime Minister Chancellery. It is very interesting to note the slightly surprising choice of the Latvian Department of Policy Coordination as partner, a structure which apparently combines the offices of both the GSG and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. The choice was motivated by the need to understand not only well-established models of policy coordination but to identify things that work or did not in a similar transitional/post communist situation. The project is still in its inception phase so assessment is premature.

Support from SIGMA came from the outset, influencing all the major products of the reform program. The SIGMA leadership was uncomfortable with the fact that the GSG was developing its capacities faster than the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, a structure which naturally fits a coordination role. In the end, following the redefinition of the Chancellery as a ministry, SIGMA accepted any vehicle for capacity building for policy coordination at government level.

There were some, mainly operational, problems in matching agendas and financing activities. The ideas of the donors were not always compatible, placing the host institution in a delicate position. There were also problems when the reform team started to gain more leverage in the GSG, a problematic development for the existing structures, mainly responsible with legal review of act or organization of the government meetings. Bureaucratic resistance is still a constant.

Policymaking reform was and still is a problematic reform program because it is not entirely clear what its deliverables are. The policymaking system is very complex and Romania, as we saw earlier, has problems on almost all accounts. The strategic decision was to focus on policymaking procedures in the government activities. After almost two years of preparation, the GSG put forward a Government decision (G.D. 775/2005) which essentially forces the government agencies to structure their activity around the classical policy cycle. Another novelty is the cooperation between the GSG and the line ministries on

policy documents and procedures. This marks a huge step forward in terms of building capacity for coordination at the center of government. This system will be soon in place making possible an early evaluation of its success. In the following box I present an evaluation of the policymaking reform dimensions as they were formulated in a SIGMA report (see previous box for complete reference).

Table 2 Problems of the Romanian legislative and policy-coordination processes and their status

Problem (as identified by Ben Gera, 2004)	NA
Weakness/arbitrariness of political direction	PA
Reluctance of Ministers to resolve conflicts	SA
Lack of policy development capacity and policy “culture”	UA
Preparation of legal drafts without policy clarity	SA
Weak internal coordination within Ministries and within “sectors”	PA
Lack of clarity in the assignment of responsibilities	PA
Formal and perfunctory inter-ministerial coordination	PA
Stakeholder consultation	SA
Insufficient, politicized, and duplicative legal analysis and cross-checking	SA
Lack of policy-coordination at the centre	PA
Non-enforcement of the procedures required by the Law on Normative Acts	PA
Weak monitoring by the GSG of implementation by Ministries	SA

Not addressed – NA, Partially addressed – PA, Satisfactorily addressed – SA, Unsatisfactorily addressed – UA

A key driver of this reform program is the pressure from central government on line ministries to form competent interdisciplinary teams of policy analyst/makers in order to bring coherence and technical depth in the activity of the ministry. The Ministries responded unconvincingly, placing a question mark on the capacity of the institutions to comply with the new and significantly more demanding system. This also shows the direction where further technical assistance is needed. Streamlining ministry thinking and policy making is a daunting task given the long tradition of hierarchical control and lack of delegation in decision making.

There are two possible scenarios. First, the reforms will spillover into other areas⁹ bringing more efficiency to the policy making process. This is an optimistic

⁹ For an interesting mentioning of creation of ‘islands’ or ‘enclaves’ of professionalism and technocratic excellence in CEE public administrations in a Europeanization context see Grabbe (2001: 1018).

scenario and much depends on the will of the government to support further modernization and the ability of frontrunners to disseminate the products of their work. It will probably require a mix of coercive and persuasive means, with an emphasis on dissemination inside and outside administration. The second scenario is less optimistic and presents a situation where the islands of good practice will be further isolated. Whilst they may remain better linked to each other they will be outside the main administrative and policy flows. In time, these islands will be challenged as highly skilled personnel could leave for better positions in the private sector or international administration (with Brussels-based positions the most likely destinations).

One aspect that needs to be emphasized is that policymaking reform is linked to *several other reform efforts*. The question of coordination remains serious, given the variety of actors involved and the complexity of actions required. The main reforms are the Public Administration Reform (PAR) and Public Expenditure Management. The intersections between policymaking reform and public administration reform (PAR) are numerous. PAR concentrates more on the structures while PMR focuses on processes. The two cannot succeed without each other. PAR is partially inspired by the need for better policies and seeks to identify relevant staff and institutions. One of the latest synergies created in Romania was the creation of a group of public managers¹⁰ who were sent to the line ministries following training with typical policymaking mandates (policy analysis). The extent to which they will be integrated within their destination institutions is still uncertain.

There are important intersections between policymaking reform and Public Expenditure Management Reform. There is a growing consensus that the budgeting process in Romania has to be changed. The Ministry of Finance has an adversarial relation with line ministries. There is evidence that budgeting activity is not sufficiently sensible to political inputs. The latest budgetary debates in the government have shown that the prioritization carried out at political level was not mirrored properly in the budgetary allocations. The intersection between the two reforms is obvious and vocally requested by external stakeholders such as the World Bank and the European Commission. The two reforms are at different stages in maturity, with an earlier start for the PMR part. In principle, both ministries and central government will resolve the issues of prioritization

¹⁰ The public managers are in fact graduates of a training scheme –Young Professional Scheme, a program strongly supported by the European Commission. The program placed in central and local institutions several well trained and better paid young professionals.

long before the Ministry of Finance enters the debate. The latter submits the financial ceiling, leaving the prioritization part to the ministries first and to the government afterwards. Armed with consistent political input, it will be able to assist ministries in designing balanced budgets that take into account priorities rather than the diffuse and intimidating budgetary pressures from the sectors.

Reforms to policymaking would do well to seek a view from Central and Eastern Europe, where neighboring countries may have found similar administrative challenges and possible solutions. These countries have carried out limited reforms to improve the policymaking process. Looking in the region, we can see islands of good practice. Lithuania, for example, managed to create a complete and mature strategic planning system. In some cases, the new procedures are relevant for other EU member states, as it is usually the transition countries that are following the most up-to-date developments in public management. A good example is the Estonian paperless Cabinet decision-making system. A second lesson is that administrations will enhance their capacities based on the specific challenges. Lithuania initiated its internationally-assisted reform of policy planning following a very serious budgetary crisis which highlighted the need for better planning and prioritization (SIGMA, 2004: 2). The need for reform can appear when specific challenges arise and it is the responsibility of key drivers of reform to use such occasions properly.

International donors were the only stakeholders in the policymaking reform process. Unfortunately, civil society, the press and academia were ill-prepared for such a daunting and complex effort. Civil society pressure, even though corrosive of bad policymaking practices, could not gain access to intimate processes of decision making. Academia was also ill-prepared, with a note that the involvement in the public process reform was merely individual and not institutional, mainly as a strategy of controlling exposure of decision making to outside scrutiny. Many scholars were co-opted in teams working on policy evaluation programs or legislation revisions. Yet their influence, in terms of mobilizing relevant expertise and usage in policy development, was rather volatile and vulnerable to changes of political leadership and priorities.

5 Policymaking reform: mapping donor positions

National governments do look for assistance when their capacity, including financial, is severely questioned. Donors can fill gaps of expertise and this provides most of the background for the success or failure of technical assistance. One of the most severe limitations to donor assistance in Romania is the extent to which attention to good policymaking will remain high when they step back. In this respect Romania is still a *donor-dependent* country failing to assimilate the best practices in policymaking and is not finding enough internal stakeholders to demand better policy procedures and outcomes.

Romania does receive substantial external assistance, amounting to 1.64% of GNI in 2002, which is second only to Bulgaria in transitional economies. This is overwhelmingly provided by the European Union and the World Bank (see Table 3). They have very different agendas: the EU is almost exclusively concerned with the accession agenda, notably the insertion and implementation of the *acquis* into Romanian law, while the World Bank has a development agenda oriented towards structural economic change and poverty reduction. The other major donor organization is USAID, which has recently started a project in the field of decentralization with a budget of US\$40million budget over five years. Unfortunately, when the Romanian government made important steps toward decentralization, the program was closed.

Table 3 Donor assistance to Romania – 1998-2002 (\$ million)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Net OA Receipts (\$ml)	367	387	432	648	701
WB gross disbursements	352	162	442	238	157
EU PHARE disbursements (Eur)		178	199	257	263
		(167)	(215)	(287)	(278)

Source: Net overseas aid figures from OECD/DAC statistics, WB from Romania country brief, EU from PHARE annual report. There were no significant disbursements from other EU programmes during this period. The EU and World Bank figures are gross, which explains the discrepancies with the OA net figures

While there are significant agenda differences between the large donors, the World Bank, DFID and other country donors are committed to European membership. Although there is no formal structure for overall donor coordination, there is good cooperation on public administration reform issues, and the EC is

organizing a joint government/donor coordination group in this area. The largest bilateral donors are the US, France, Germany, Netherlands, and Japan.

Even though there is no *aquis communautaire* in public administration, the European Commission Delegation in Romania did frame several requirements regarding the functioning of public institutions under the political criteria heading. The European Commission orientated its strategy to assist Romanian public institutions by funding twinning projects, involving, on the Romanian side, the Ministry of Interior and lately the GSG. Under this umbrella, the EC developed through SIGMA a baseline system, with the purpose of substantiating the monitoring and reporting process. The EC steers its assistance towards state building capacity for proper functioning inside the Union. The Open Coordination method requires a certain level of maturity.¹¹ The recent member states from CEE are apparently less ready than expected for this system.

The EU has provided plenty of direction to CEE countries through the technical assistance offered by the PHARE programme, and through the twinning programme that started in 1999. 'Twinning' is aimed at helping CEE administrative and democratic institutions to adapt to membership requirements by assimilating other European democracies experiences of policymaking and adapting their national legislation to the *acquis*. The most valuable feature of the programs is that policy transfer is done through secondment of civil servants from older EU states to the accession states. In practice, the twinning projects are implemented using extensive consultancy input and less government. For a list of PHARE projects supported by the European Commission (please see the Table 4).

The Support for improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) is a joint initiative of the European Union and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, principally financed by the European Union. SIGMA provides support to partner countries in their efforts to modernize public governance systems. It acts on important dimensions of public administration and general policy monitoring. SIGMA focuses on four sub-areas: *policy and strategic capacities; co-ordination structures; regulatory reform, including impact assessment; and management of EU integration*. It targets central government and ministries with significant horizontal functions such as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Administration and Interior. Their activity is also directed towards improving methodologies, especially on budgetary and social impact evaluation.

¹¹ For an interesting discussion see Radelli (2004).

In Romania, when assessing policy-making and co-ordination mechanisms, SIGMA uses a baseline system composed of: *coherence of the policy-making framework, inter-ministerial consultation on policy proposals, agenda planning, dispute resolution mechanisms, central co-ordination capacity, central strategic capacity, co-ordination of European affairs, involvement of the council of ministers in budget decisions, production and impact assessment of normative acts*. The yearly reports drafted by SIGMA were very valuable in helping design the strategic and operational plans for policymaking reform carried out by the GSG. For a detailed description of SIGMA recent activities in Romania (see box 5).

The World Bank approached the institutional reforms in Central and Eastern Europe with skepticism. Its usual experience in the developing countries was proven limited when it had to deal with the far more complex institutional features of the post-communist states. The efforts towards institution building arose by trying to reach other core objectives: macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization and privatization (The World Bank, 2000: 102). These strategic lines were believed to gradually increase the demand for better governance and institutional performance in the newly democratic states. The Bank's recent conceptual reorientation from supporting 'best practice' to 'good fit' has further limited the scope for pursuing a comprehensive NPM-inspired approach. The performance of technical assistance projects for institutional building is acknowledged as being generally poor. Following a process of institutional evaluation, the Bank decided to focus more on institutional building by developing core government functions and strengthening policymaking, regulatory and service delivery (as in Azerbaijan, Albania, Bulgaria, and Russia). In Romania, its attention on institution building and governance reform was also part of its broad aim to develop a culture of accountability in the public sector (The World Bank, 2004).

The most important step the World Bank took to support institutional development and governance reform was the first Programmatic Adjustment Loan (PAL), approved by the Bank's Board in August, 2004. The PAL has explicit governance and institutional development aims in the area of legal reform, civil service reform, strengthening transparency and governance through laws on declaration of assets and conflict of interest, and regulatory *reform in the energy sector*. It is worth noting that the PAL program was designed together with the EU. PAL 2 is the second in a series of three PALs designed to support the reform program up to 2007. The PAL program supports the Government's overarching

objectives of establishing solid economic growth, reducing poverty and joining the EU. With strong support from the PAL program, Romania is pursuing a broad reform agenda, including institutional, governance and economic restructuring reforms, which are anchored in the process of EU accession (see box 6). At this stage, however, we can only say that the PAL appears highly relevant for the success of the policymaking reform in Romania, yet, it is too soon to assess its efficacy (The World Bank, 2005: 26).

The UK's DFID was an important actor in the donor community until it closed its Romanian office in 2004. Even so, its activity did leave important traces in the public sector in Romania. Using a very interesting strategy, the DFID opened lots of doors for future donor intervention, especially the World Bank. The reason the DFID intervened in Romania is partly due to the fact that the government saw public administration reform and legislative measures as the basis for an independent civil service. Though advanced on some issues, progress has so far been limited, thereby leaving room for assistance. The purpose of the DFID actions (DFID, 2000: 2) was to increase the capacity of government (central, regional and local), civil society and the private sector to carry out and sustain the transition whilst ensuring that social dimensions are also properly addressed (see box 7)

By an intelligent combination of expertise and flexibility, the DFID managed to find a place in the donor landscape and become a good partner for other institutions (EC, World Bank, IMF and EBRD). The *Country Strategy Paper* set out to orient the programme on the basis of the DFID comparative advantage (Gray, 2004: 36), which includes: *flexibility, a willingness to take risks, quality of DFID advisers and quality of technical assistance*. Despite several shortcomings, the DFID's work is considered to be of great value for the Romanian central agencies.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a special actor in the process of policy making reform. Its prospective focus on democratic governance brings an inclusive dimension to policymaking reform with a focus on disadvantaged groups. The inclusion of the UNDP in our list was also due to the visionary involvement in policy planning issues assisting the Presidency of Romania. The UNDP assessment of policymaking in Romania seems very accurate: at the root of much of Romania's development and EU accession challenges is the quality of democratic governance and, particularly, the capacity to transform laws and newly created institutions into effectively implemented public policy (United Nations, 2004). Under the program *Capacity building for*

democratic governance priority area (United Nations, 2004: 4) the UNDP sought to further strengthen coordination in policy formulation and implementation in order to bring about sustainable improvements in public service delivery (see Table 8) at national and local level.

6 Factors influencing Technical assistance (TA) effectiveness

I now move to several TA projects placed in Romanian central agencies.¹² They bring very interesting perspectives on the reform processes involving policymaking. However, there are specific problems with *any* kind of assistance project. Ignorance from the political level and a de-motivating difference of income between those working on the both sides of the projects are only two reasons TA can go wrong. We can add cultural and sometimes linguistic barriers to those. From the analysis of several cases I have identified some factors which can help understand the success of consultancy services.

On the government part, there is evidence of general limited awareness on what the role of the technical assistance should be. Secondly, there is little or no institutional retrieval of assistance expertise and practices and also a limited capacity to mobilize relevant information (e.g. statistics) to give the technical assistant the opportunity to produce and deliver relevant inputs.

As a DFID report shows, the main lesson is that in small country programs the critical resource is human rather than financial (Gray, 2004: vii). Finding the best staff in terms of competence, motivation, and involvement is the key to success. On the consultancy part, there are situations where the consultants are chosen from a limited pool. This might produce problems as the consultants can have lesser relevant experience. An additional problem is when more experienced consultants lose interest in the success of the cooperation. On the government part the situation is more problematic. Every case reviewed had problems, ranging from lack of language skills to animosity towards the consultants (hidden but extremely detrimental). The analysis shows that when engaging in such

¹² The conclusions in this section are a result of reviewing several TA programs involving long term consultancy in central agencies (General Secretariat of the Government and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister: 4 projects, Ministry of Administration and Interior, including its subordinate structures: 3 projects, the Ministry of Education and Research: 2 projects, the Ministry of Finance: 1 project, the Presidency of Romania: 1 project). During the interviews several other consultancy experiences were discussed, enlarging significantly the TA central agency picture.

projects, local staff need to have significant previous preparation to understand the consultant's mandate and the nature of the contract, including deliverables. One key action in limiting resistance is to involve all relevant staff in defining the terms of references used in the procurement procedures.

When there is sincere political commitment to change TA becomes more successful. One key action is to constantly update responsible politicians with details of the project. Another scenario is when top officials use consultants against or as a replacement for civil servants. This is very detrimental for institutions but very likely in many cases. Consultants are often better prepared and enjoy more trust than a typical transition civil servant.

TA seems more successful in times of change, especially after elections. The momentum for change is greater when new people come into government. Given the prestige and general objectivity of the external experts they are the first to be consulted. As time passes, the drive for institutional and policy change naturally decreases. Contracting out before elections could be a bad idea but it is preferable if the policy issue is important and needs immediate attention.

TA seems to work better as it comes closer to the center of government. In-line ministries seem to be more opaque and resistant to change and cooperation. The horizontal ministries which have core functions in the administration of government activity such as the Ministry of Justice and especially the Ministry of Finance are the most reluctant and opaque to external advice. This is due to their specific organizational culture and also has to do with negotiation potential inside government translated to the agency-donor relations. An important factor is professional and even national pride that turns experts into adversaries. Central government institutions are more sensitive to consultants and donors in general, being much more under scrutiny from them and the public.

TA seems to work better with civil servants in their early careers (more bluntly, with younger people than the average) and holding less important positions. They are willing to learn more, but usually they do not have top management responsibilities. The consequence is that sometimes several years pass before an idea or report is used in policy thinking and execution. All the interested people should be involved in the consultancy work.

Paradoxically, TA seems to work better with 'first timers' rather than 'second' or 'third timers', in the sense that with time, the satisfaction with TA seems to decrease in institutions receiving repeat assistance. This might be a result of bad experiences towards TA. TA can create high expectations with less palpable results/gains. The question of payment is one of the hottest in terms

of success. The reaction of local staff when consultant fees become known is overwhelmingly negative. Part of the solution is to try to spread benefits, mostly non-financial, which can be tricky. Contributing to the department's library with the latest books in the field can be a gesture for opening ways for professionals and personal communication.

Related to this, TA seems to be channeled to a small number of institutions/structures who are seen as more open/professional or they have a 'reformist nature' by its mandates. An effect is the *'assistance fatigue'* when staff are overwhelmed with activities associated with TA. The other side of the coin is *donor dependence*, which can be installed if institutions are not able to function normally without outside expertise. In Romania, such cases are limited but they do challenge all stakeholders to harmonize their policies and responsibilities

TA works better when it is associated with non-conventional type of assistance usually involving various learning methods like study trips, team building and conference participation. Professional learning is most successful when it is done outside the normal work environment, inherently bureaucratic and legalistic in Romania. Learning also means a possible alteration of authority positions for those who have to learn more and quicker, the heads of departments. Taking them out of their usual work environment can be a good solution to get their attention and interest.

There is a general mood, especially amongst the more experienced Romanian staff working in TA projects, of preferring consultants from Central and Eastern Europe instead of Western ones. This is due to the fact that several national administrations from the region advanced significantly of relevant reform items. The rationale behind it is that Romanian institutions with maturity do not want to 'reinvent the wheel' and prefer peer experiences from the region. International donors might turn this into policy and promote all consultancies or consultants to be from the region.

7 Policymaking reform reloaded: lessons learned from TA analysis

Considering the elements discussed above, both on policymaking reform and the factors influencing the success of technical assistance projects, I list a few recommendations for further improvement of the policymaking reform in Romania.

The donor community should:

- Establish a clear vision of donor policy in Romania. There should be regular meetings and even common documents stating *core procedures and policies* which should be communicated to the Romanian Government and the public in order to facilitate *proper assimilation*. The donor community should be aware of the *different policy models* available on the market and *try to coordinate their delivery as not to create confusion* in the recipient institutions. It also should avoid *overlapping or competition* in assistance.
- Better assess of institutional needs and *better design of programs* is necessary. This includes *building more local capacity* for policymaking at *expert level*. Given their institutional clout, promote more actively at the political level the use of good policymaking practices. More capacity means the knowledge of Romanian experts should be operational at the end of the program (possibly spending more on training stages within the country and abroad)
- Better *advertise their assignments* as to assure a larger pool of professionals who are sufficiently competent and available to provide the consultancy services.

The Romanian Government should:

- Train and better prepare its senior staff on what technical assistance entails and what are its advantages. This should be communicated by the Romanian government (preferably the General Secretariat of the Government and / or the Chancellery of the Prime Minister) in conjunction with its public administration reform strategy and the European integration priority measures. *The National Institute for Administration should include in its offerings modules on technical assistance procedures formats and advantages.*
- Stimulate the involvement of competent Romanian staff in assistance programs.
- Create, by subcontracting to think tanks or universities, a *public policy portal* where you can gather evidence of advanced methodologies and good practices initiated in Romanian public institutions. Subsequently the Romanian government should create a *documentary center*, where all reports of such projects are kept and disseminated.
- More generally the Romanian government should not abandon both PMR and PAR reform even after gaining membership of the European Union. Romania has to perform on a more complex set of tasks after integration than before.
- It is crucial that the *Romanian government take full responsibility for increasing its administrative capacity and its ability to solve problems*. We need individual proactive strategies to link themselves to *similar institutions in Europe and engage in extensive peer cooperation*.
- Create government *policy structures and networks at ministry/agency level* which offer an interactive basis for cooperation.
- In cooperation with the academics and civil society, *build a community of policy analysts and policy makers*, to facilitate communication and the retention of gained expertise, technical and political.

Table 4 PHARE Projects Strengthening Administrative Capacity (selection)

2003	2003-005-551.04.06 Social Dialogue
	2003-005-551.04.04 Statistical system
	2003-005-551.03.04 Ministry of Public Finance
	2003-005-551.03.01 CUPAR and reform network
2002	Project 2002/000-586.03.01 Strengthening the Romanian administrative capacity to manage, monitor and assess EU financed programmes
	Project 2002/000-586.03.02 Decentralization and development of the Romanian local public administration
	Project 2002/000-586.03.03 Further institutional strengthening of the Court of Accounts
	Project 2002/000-586.03.04 Support for the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Public Finance
	Project 2002/000-586.03.05 Strengthening and extension of the SAPARD programme implementation system
2001	RO-0106.01 Strengthening the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Public Administration
	RO-0106.02 Develop an operational National Institute of Public Administration capable of educating competent civil servants
	RO-0106.03 Creating a Corps of Professional Public Managers within the Civil Service
	RO-0106.04 Design and implement mechanisms for the full application of the Civil Servants Statute Law
	RO-0106.05 Strengthening the Capacity of the Romanian Ombudsman
	RO-0106.06 Project Preparation Facility, Project Cycle Management Training and Facility for Short- and Medium-Term Twinning ("Twinning Light")
	RO0106.07 Strengthening the Romanian institutional capacity to apply the measures foreseen within the National Plan for Agriculture and Rural Development

Source: European Commission, Enlargement, Project Fiches ,http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fiche_projet/index.cfm?page=415460&c=ROMANIA

Table 5 Sigma Activities: Romania

Design of Reform	Public Administration Reform 2005 (February 2005 – ongoing)
	Public Administration Reform (November 2001 – May 2005)
External Audit and Financial Control	OLAF Anti-fraud Training Seminars (March 2005 – ongoing)
	Assistance in Drafting National Anti-Fraud Strategy and Improving Legal Framework for Recovery of EU Funds (October 2004 – August 2005)
	Peer Assistance for the Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC) and Internal Audit Systems (July 2003 - February 2005)
	Assistance in Setting up and Accreditation of SAPARD Agency and related National Fund Systems and Procedures (April 2001 – December 2003)
Legal Framework, Civil Service and Justice	Civil Service Development, 2004-2006 (October 2004 – ongoing)
	Strengthening State Civil Service Management (continued) (September 2004 – ongoing)
	Drafting ToR for 2nd phase Young Professionals Scheme (May 2004 – September 2004)
	Strengthening the State Civil Service Management System (January 2002 – September 2004)
	Drafting Fiches for Phare Assistance 2001 (Civil Service) (May 2001 – January 2002)
Policy-making and Co-ordination Capacities	Support to Policy-making: Follow-up to PM Briefing (August 2005 – ongoing)
	Support to Reform of the Centre of Government (June 2005 – ongoing)
	Briefing Future Prime Minister on PAR (November 2004 – February 2005)
	Strengthening Capacities of the Policy-Making System (October 2003 – May 2005)
	Strengthening the Administrative Capacity of the Senate (October 2003 – May 2005)
	Conference organised by the European Institute of Romania (October 2004 – November 2004)
	Review of the Administrative Capacity of Parliament (June 2001 – April 2002)
Public Expenditure Management	Feasibility and Methodology for Introducing Accrual Accounting (November – December 2001)
Public Procurement	Procurement – Enhancement of General Legal and Administrative Capacity (September 2001 – January 2002)

Source: SIGMA, Sigma Activities: Romania http://www.sigmaweb.org/document/8/0,2340,en_33638100_33638200_35045192_1_1_1_1,00.html

Table 6 World Bank Private and Public Sector Institution Building Loan Project (PPIBL) – Romania

- Comprehensive private/public sector salary survey
- Development of comprehensive court statistics and objective system for monitoring judicial performance
- Extension of review and implementation of tariff methodologies project
- Functional capacity assessment of national securities commission (CNVM) and development of multi-year building program of the banking system
- High level technical assistance in assessing the effect of privatization.
- High level technical assistance in managing the privatization process
- Implementation of the country action plan to enhance quality of financial reporting
- Intellectual property rights version 5.0
- Monitoring and implementation of the programmatic adjustment loan
- Preparing a feasibility study of proposed partial credit guarantee facility for local govt. debt
- Preparing feasibility study of proposed partial risk guarantee facility for local utility debt financed investments
- Privatization of the Romanian savings bank (CEC SA)
- Rationalization of the Romanian court system
- Senior adviser to improve the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Public Finance and line ministries for strategic management
- Services for improvement of the supervision capacity of the Romanian insurance commission
- Strengthening the coordination of public policy and formulation capacities of the General Secretariat of the Government and ministries
- Study on health financing in order to offer decision-makers actual dynamic image
- TA to the national securities commission for the development of bond market
- Technical assistance for the development of secondary mortgage market in Romania
- Technical assistance for CNVM institutional harmonization with EU and international institutions-setting up an arbitrage chamber
- Technical assistance for national roll-out of case based mechanism for hospitals financing
- Technical assistance to the National Securities Commission for public awareness campaign

Source: World Bank Romania, World Bank Private and Public Sector Institution Building Loan Project (PPIBL) <http://www.worldbank.org.ro>

Table 7 DFID assistance projects (selection)

<p>A. Sub-Period 1997/8–1999/2000</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIS 540041: Center for Improvement of Management Performance • MIS 550035: RBI Distance Learning • MIS 532001: Assistance to media • MIS 550016: OU/CODECS Training • MIS 550019: Education Reform Pre-University • MIS 555010: Emergency Services • MIS 540053: Ministry of Finance Diagnostic • MIS 542024: Support for Administration Reform • MIS 540054: SME Sector Development • MIS 542034: Romanian Auto Register • MIS 555009: General Practice Management • MIS 542041: Criminal Justice Reform • MIS 542030: Post Office Consultancy • MIS 540059: Enterprise Reform in Romania • MIS 501018: Cleaner Production
<p>B. Sub-Period 2000/1–2002/3</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MIS 540060: Local Education Finance • MIS 508001: Local and Regional Partnership • MIS 542052L Assistance to Probation • MIS 542057: Mining (Social Mitigation) • MIS 559010: Romania Social development Fund • MIS 501022: Environmental Management in Municipalities (LA21) • MIS 540065: Romania Accountancy band Audit Reform • MIS 543055: Assistance to Mine Closure • MIS 542060: Romania Child Protection • MIS 542067 Institutional Support to MOLSS • MIS 501020 Strengthening Capacity in Environmental Project \Design • Technical Assistance to the PM's office

Source: John Gray (2004) Evaluation of DFID country programmes. Country study: Romania 1997-2003

Table 8 UNDP Major programme areas 2005-2009. Capacity building for democratic governance area

UNDAF Outcome 1:		By 2009, administrative capacity is strengthened at central and local level to develop, implement and monitor sustainable policies and programs – emphasizing transparency, accountability and participation - in the areas of public service delivery, environmental governance and the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups.			
Programme component	Country Programme Outcomes	Country Programme Outputs	Output indicators	Role of Partners	Resources ('000 USD)
Capacity building for Democratic Governance	<p>1. Enhanced cross-sectoral coordination and horizontal accountability in policy formulation and implementation to support transparent and effective public service delivery at central and local levels.</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government effectiveness index (baseline: -0.54, 2000-2001, World Bank; target: -0.25) - Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) baseline: 2.8 (2003); target 4.5 - Trust in government (34%, 08/2003, CUIRS; target: 50% 	<p>1. E-govt applications functional (including ICT enhancement and institutional re-alignment centered on service delivery) in key areas of public service prioritized in consultation with the Ministry of ICT.</p> <p>2. Policy implementation streamlined, information management improved, and staff trained in key central government institutions seeking UNDP assistance.</p> <p>3. Sustainable development principles incorporated in local strategies and action plans of municipalities seeking UNDP advisory services.</p> <p>4. National strategic policy capacity developed through the establishment of a cross-institutional advisory group (permanent secretariat and thematic task-forces) involving key public institutions and civil society.</p>	<p>No. of key public institutions creating e-govt applications with UNDP support (baseline: 1; target:5)</p> <p>No. of central govt institutions benefiting from UNDP institutional capacity building (target: 4 during 2005-09)</p> <p>No. of municipalities with institutionalized consultation between local govt. and CSOs on socio-economic policies. Baseline: 10 (2003); target: 40</p> <p>Cross-institutional Strategic Support Group established with UNDP support</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ UNDP will be advocate, broker and TA provider for strategic policy formulation, implementation, cross-sectoral policy coordination and e-government. ■ Presidency and PM Office are key partners on strategic policymaking ■ Ministry of Administration and Interior leads public administration reform and decentralization ■ Ministry of ICT is main counterpart on e-government ■ Local/regional authorities are partners and beneficiaries of UNDP interventions at de-centralized level ■ Civil society provides substantive inputs to strategic policymaking ■ Netherlands has been UNDP's main bilateral donor for innovative governance interventions ■ WB and EU are the main advocates and funders of social sector reform 	<p><i>Regular:</i> 800</p> <p><i>Other:</i> 5,000</p> <p>-Govt. (including EU and WB funds): 2,000</p> <p>-TPCS: 2,000</p> <p>ITF: 400</p> <p>-Private sector: 400</p> <p><i>Regular:</i> 677</p> <p><i>Other:</i> 5,000</p> <p>-Govt. 1,500</p> <p>-TPCS: 3,000</p> <p>-ITF: 500</p>
	<p>2. Policies, legislation and implementation capacities to better protect the rights of vulnerable groups, including victims of human trafficking.</p> <p>Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -No. of human trafficking cases prosecuted. Baseline (2002): 625 investigated for human and organs trafficking; target: 1,000 -Political rights index (Freedom House: 2 in 2001-2002; target: 1) -Human rights situation (Amnesty Int'l, Human Rights Watch). Baseline: 2002 reports 	<p>1. Cooperation protocols between law enforcement authorities and civil society in fighting human trafficking developed with UNDP assistance.</p> <p>2. National anti-trafficking call-center enhanced with victim assistance, counselling and referral services.</p> <p>3. National Anti-Discrimination Council, NGOs, and other relevant public institutions strengthened to enforce anti-discrimination legislation (e.g., staff trained, exchange programs arranged, outreach and media policies developed)</p>	<p>NGO – law enforcement cooperation protocols adopted, functional and regularly reviewed/monitored</p> <p>Call center provides integrated services</p> <p>No. of institutions and organizations active in promoting human rights, benefiting from UNDP technical assistance (baseline: 3 CSOs in 2004; target: 2 public institutions and 5 CSOs)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ UNDP supports CSOs who fight discrimination, and has taken a key role in improving multi-stakeholder coordination in fighting human trafficking ■ National Anti-Discrimination Council and other public institutions will be partners and targets for UNDP support ■ Main govt. partner on anti-trafficking is Ministry of Administration and Interior ■ Other partners include members of the national inter-ministerial anti-trafficking task force, IOM, civil society ■ USAID as donor 	

Source: United Nations. Country Programme Document for Romania (2005-2009)

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