Due to an acute sense of urgency regarding timely implementation of community initiatives, continuous pressures for securing trend-based funds, lack of experience with any methods of evaluation apart from informal ones and externally induced by Western-donors, as well as strong identification with community members and their needs, most local projects had little capacity to document, reflect upon and evaluate their work, especially in ways which would be useful to them and their counterparts in the region. Most evaluation practice was related to donors’ demands for external evaluations, which were frequently conducted by international consultants, written in English and closely linked with business-like project management and donor criteria of success and other reporting requirements.

Ten years after the emergence of the first peace initiatives, the past and present practice remains largely undocumented and uninterpreted in ways which would include the perspectives of all peacebuilding actors (stakeholders) and which would be useful to the local policy-making. In the new post-war realm, where the new government of Croatia is open to cooperation with NGOs and at least declaratively supportive of integrated approach to refugee return and post-war development, while remaining incapable of initiating the design of policies supportive of long-term peacebuilding at the community level, there is a consensus among peace activists in Croatia that documenting the past and present peace practices and their critical review are necessary for the generation of locally relevant models of community peacebuilding, which could be further developed, adapted to new settings and presented to the government. Documentation and analysis of local peacebuilding practices from the Western Balkans would provide a valuable resource for social innovation in the area of conflict transformation, which seems necessary in the light of persisting political crisis in Macedonia and status quo in Kosovo, where inter-ethnic distrust and top-down political, developmental and military solutions continue to prevail.

The intention of this research is to start filing the existent gap, by validation of contextualized evaluation criteria and their application on a dozen carefully selected grassroots projects. The findings would enable the discovery of patterns of successful practices, which can be used not only for the improvement of present projects in the border areas of Croatia, B-H, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia but also for timely integration of long-term peacebuilding strategies into the stability and development policy frameworks at the local, national and regional levels in the whole post-Yugoslav region and Southeastern Europe[1].

II.Peacebuilding from Policy-making and Activist Perspectives

Relevance: Provide an informative and analytical overview of existent peacebuilding policies (UN, OECD, EU, individual donor countries – Japan, Canada, UK) in international arena, which can be of use to policymakers in post-Yugoslav countries and can be referred to in developing policy recommendations for the post-Yugoslav national frameworks. Provide an overview of theory of peacebuilding, from the perspective of peacebuilding practitioners and related academics, with special focus on post-Yugoslav experiences.

Peacebuilding is a concept used both in policymaking and community-building arenas, referring to a wide array of efforts at all societal levels that aim to transform social relationships, structures and culture in a direction conducive to reduction of root causes of social conflicts, such as political and economic inequality, enhancement of the capacity of individuals, groups and institutions to manage emerging conflicts nonviolently and constructively.

Peacebuilding from the International Policy Perspective

A decade ago former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali introduced peacebuilding into the security framework and language of the UN, as part of his effort to reform the Organization so that it can better respond to the complexities of the post-Cold war, globalizing world. In his “Agenda for Peace” (1992), peacebuilding is considered a complementary measure to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.While peacemaking and peacekeeping primarily include efforts to open possibilities of peace negotiations, disarmament and physical separation of warring parties, peacebuilding is defined as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” and as “the construction of a new environment”, involving “sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems (that) can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation” (Ghali:92:paragraph 57). .

Peacebuilding is considered both a preventive measure for inhibiting a breakout or recurrence of violent conflict and a long-term restorative measure of strengthening social relationships resistant to violence caused by social injustices and weak democratic structures. Thus, peacebuilding represents an innovation in the UN security framework, as it takes into account a need for a long-term strategy that links conflict management and development, with the goal of systemic social change primarily carried out by local social actors, supported by external parties. In practice, however, the UN peacemaking and peacekeeping missions tend to be more frequent and more clearly defined (currently, while peacebuilding missions tend to be more complex (requiring high level of inter-agency coordination) and more rare (12 currently active)[2].

Peacebuilding is mentioned in the UN Millennium Declaration in relation to the expeditious consideration of recommendations of the “Brahimi Report” of the the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, calling for a doctrinal shift in the complex peace operations which would increase focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environment and strengthening the UN’s permanent capacity for peacebuilding, the strategic development of which is under auspices of Executive Committee for Peace Operations and the Department of Political Affairs (which has set up a Peacebuilding Support Unit).

In 1997 OECD Development Aid Committee (DAC) issued a ground-breaking policy statement Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century, which outlines a new integrated approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding by international donor community, where “helping strengthen the capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence must be seen as a foundation for sustainable development.” (OECD: 1997). The role of development assistance is considered most effective “when it is designed and timed to address the root causes of violent conflicts, as well as the precipitating factors, in ways that are relevant to local circumstances.” (OECD: 1997:2). The new approach calls for flexible, coordinated interventions into different phases of conflicts, which do not make a past mistake of neglecting the importance of long-term development assistance even in the midst of crisis and link post-conflict reconstruction with support for economic and political reforms that can eliminate some root causes of conflict. In 2001, DAC produced a supplemental set of policy guidelines Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, which focus on how to mainstream conflict prevention in policy formulation; take account of the relationship between security and development; strengthen peace processes and build partnerships with state and civil society actors; work with business to promote growth and avoid fuelling violence; and enhance donor coordination and policy coherence.

Canada, a prominent promoter of peacebuilding concept internationally, has created a Strategic Framework, which reflects a common understanding by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) of the aims and approaches to peacebuilding that will be undertaken within the inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, in order to“effectively address the peacebuilding needs of countries where violent conflict undermines sustainable development and human security”. The Strategic Framework defines peacebuilding as “effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence. Ultimately, peacebuilding aims at building human security, a concept that includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security. The pursuit of this goal in countries torn by internal conflict poses special and complex challenges. Peacebuilding may involve conflict prevention, conflict resolution, as well as various kinds of post-conflict activities. It focuses on the political and socio-economic context of conflict, rather than on the military or humanitarian aspects. It seeks to address this challenge by finding means to institutionalize the peaceful resolution of conflicts. External support for peacebuilding should supplement, not substitute, local efforts to achieve a sustainable peace.”(CIDA: 1997).

The G8Conflict Prevention Official-Level Meeting (CPOM) was set up in 2000 during

Japan's G8 presidency, resulting in a “Comprehensive Approach” to conflict prevention, which puts emphasis on integration of conflict prevention into phases of conflict (Chronological Comprehensiveness), use of a wide array of political, economic and social policy options (Comprehensiveness in Measures for Conflict Prevention), respect for human rights and protection of civilians, as well as full consideration of contextualized characteristics of each conflict and coherence of conflict preventionmeasures with policies in other fields (such as international trade and finance).(G8: 2000:1). The G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention, launched at 2000 Okinawa Summit, focus on the following areas where G8 are considered to have a comparative advantage in taking action - Small Arms and Light Weapons; Conflict and Development; Illicit Trade in Diamonds; Children in Armed Conflict and International Civil Police. In addition to progress report on Miyazaki Initiatives the 2001 Genoa Summit Conclusions include G8 Roma Initiatives On Conflict Prevention, which call for strengthening the role of women in conflict prevention, peace negotiations and post-conflict peacebuilding both at the policy and community levels as well as greater attention to the inclusion of corporate citizenship in post-conflict reconstruction efforts (G8: 2001).

The 2001 European Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention stresses the importance of an integrated approach, which revolves around the concept of structural stability. “Characteristics of structural stability are sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without to resort to conflict. All these elements need to be addressed in an integrated way. Most importantly, co-operation programmes are increasingly based on the countries’ own strategies since it is now well recognised that ownership is a condition for success, allowing for consideration of countries’ own situation, history and culture.” (European Commission: 2001:10).

In addition, the Communication explicitly mentions the beneficial role of NGOs in long-term conflict prevention and intends to strengthen its contacts and support through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights: “By virtue of their support for the development of civil society and democracy, NGOs are key actors in long-term conflict prevention. They are often present on the ground in situations where official state structures are absent. They can also function as grass roots mediators as well as reliable and neutral observers in situation where there is no international presence. Mediation activities of specialist NGOs have sometimes proved decisive in a crisis.” (European Commission: 2001:28).

Peacebuilding from the Post-Yugoslav, Peace Activist Perspective
In a brief but effective analysis of two pioneering community-based peacebuilding projects in Croatia and B-H, Paul Stubbs, UK sociologist and Goran Bozicevic, Croatian peace activist provide several suggestions relevant for conceptualization of peacebuilding in the post-Yugoslav post-war context, featured by intense internationalization and complex political, social and economic transitions. They embrace Ryan’s definition of peacebuilding as “building bridges between the parties to allow for positive and creative interaction”, which is significantly focused on “social, economic and psychological environments of ordinary people at the grassroots level.” (Bozicevic and Stubbs:1997:3), but problematize sole focus on the grassroots as potentially ‘deflecting attention from structural causality and the need for fundamental social change’. (Bozicevic and Stubbs:1997:3). Further, they affirm the relevance of Ghali’s definition of peacebuilding to the post-Yugoslav context, in particular its focus on building local peace constituencies, confidence building, creation of a vision of interdependent future as well as changing local power structures so that belligerent fractions become more marginal (Bozicevic and Stubbs:1997:3).
Bozicevic’s and Stubbs’ main point of critique of contemporary peacebuilding practice and theory is a concern that the emphasis on firmly formatted and often dislocated conflict resolution training, adhering to sets frameworks of Western knowledge, tends to marginalize the importance of direct community engagement with local power structures and creation of opportunities for locally relevant social development (Bozicevic and Stubbs: 1997).

Further, they argue for adequate examination of complex interactions between local an international social movements and nongovernmental organizations in the peacebuilding process in the post-Yugoslav region, in order to understand how the local peacebuilding practices are shaped by the cultural transfers of discourses of peace, development, politics and organizational practices between these different actors. Such analysis is a way to avoid simplistic accounts of Western imperialism in the post-Yugoslav peacebuilding context on one hand and ahistoric (mis)understandings of local civil societies’ development, as practiced by international relief agencies and NGOs, on the other.(Bozicevic and Stubbs:1997).

Finally, Bozicevic and Stubbs propose a reconceptualization of peacebuilding as “social politics,” in order to “occupy, and expand, the space between what might be termed classic social development and classic conflict resolution” both of which tend to become orthodoxies. It can be deduced that for Bozicevic and Stubbs, peacebuilding as social politics is a long-term process which engages actors from different organizational and institutional backgrounds (including local government agencies and social service providers, civil initiatives and nongovernmental organizations with different ideologies, politicians, as well a international organizations active in the local contexts) in a set of joint efforts aimed at devising locally relevant social and economic development of their communities andrelating the practices that promote social integration of the micro-level to their impact at the macro-level of social structuring and politics (Stubbs:1997:10). By putting into focus very concrete activities which at the same time generate social integration, create local space for communication of difference, explicitly address social and economic needs of the community members, and reconfigure political relations between the grassroots and the middle range leadership, Bozicevic and Stubbs reiterate Lederach’s insistence on integrated approach to peacebuilding and Fetherston’s insistence on peacebuilding as essentially political activity which transforms local-global hegemonies. However, Bozicevic and Stubbs are most resolute in advocating integration of ‘communicative action’ or ‘relational’ approach with concrete responses to and demands for addressing burning developmental needs in (post) conflict settings on part of diversely positioned, but primarily grassroots actors. (Bozicevic and Stubbs:1997).

In that context, the concept of conflict transformation can be considered as more relevant to peacebuilding than the concept of conflict resolution, the term referring to an analytical interactive method of consensus building about the nature of conflict with the objective of its elimination. Conflict transformation refers to actions, which go beyond artificially created communicative situations (workshops), separated from the realities of conflicting parties. It’s focus is on the potential for transformation of the relationships between conflicting parties, in a direction which would enable new, more just power relations as well as the creation of new social meanings that do not reproduce those social patterns and regimes of truth that were predominant before and during the acute stage of conflict (Fetherston: 1999). Through conflict transformation, negative consequences of conflict are being reduced or restored (e.g. broken relationships, losses), while the positive ones (e.g. increased social solidarity and civic responsibility) are being enhanced.US peace activist and theorist, John Paul Lederach considers conflict transformation as a twofold process of change - changes induced by conflict and further changes brought about by deliberate interventions that aim to minimize or transform negative effects of conflict and maximize those effects that provide opportunities for positive social change. “In essence, conflict transformation refers to change that can be understood in two fundamental ways – descriptively and prescriptively – across four dimensions personal, relational, structural and cultural “ (Lederach: 1997:82). The following table presents Lederach’s framework of conflict transformation, which he considers the central strategy of peacebuilding, taking place at the level of subsystem (local community) within the middle time frame of a decade. It must be noted however, that peacebuilding is a term broader than conflict transformation, for it also refers to preventive interventions focused on strengthening the overall capacity of a society to create just social conditions and communication patterns that are conducive to minimization of violent conflict.

Considering the multidimensionality of peacebuilding shaped by diverse cultural contexts and systems of power and often unpredictable dynamics of post-conflict societies in multifold transitions, it is not surprising that the search for appropriate and operational criteria and indicators of success of peacebuilding practices poses a great challenge to practitioners and theorists worldwide. As Lederach notes, even though peacebuilding practices have many points of contact with social development, which itself is difficult to translate into stable quantitative and qualitative indicators, evaluating grassroots peacebuilding is even harder, since it primarily requires discovering evidence of the qualitative change in relationships between horizontally and vertically positioned actors and the impact of these relationships on broader social structures and every-day well being of the people.

As Stubbs suggests, peacebuilding - finding the right balance between meeting broader needs after conflict, such as rebuilding physical and social infrastructure on one hand and promoting new sets of relationships that are subversive to the social order which gave birth to violence on the other -as well as its evaluation is “far more of an art than a science”, requiring a great deal of flexibility and intuition (Stubbs:1996:33). For that reason, in order to grasp the uniqueness of each local approach to peacebuilding and then develop some broad ‘rules of thumb’ about which kinds of criteria are most valuable in particular situations, there is a need for a deductive approach based on action research on different projects in different conflict situations. (Stubbs:1996:33).

As Lederach points out, criteria for evaluating success of peacebuilding activities need to focus on assessing the quality of change or sustainability of the transformative processes, which take place at different systemic levels and in different time frames of action (Lederach:1997:142). There is an apparent similarity in criteria proposed by different researchers, whose perspectives are discussed in this paper. The outlined criteria stem from Lederach’s integrated framework for peacebuilding, Stubbs’s evaluation criteria for social development in post-conflict settings, as well as Ross’s analysis of action evaluation, while Fetherston’s approach delineates the scale of transformation, where the minimal value/ scope is contestation of societal status quo and maximal value/scope is renegotiation of societal norms and practices that foster social justice (Fetherston:1998):

1. Impact on Livelihoods (Stubbs:1996)/ Capacity to Respond to Strategic Needs of the Community(Lederach:1997);

This criterion inquires into ways in which the peacebuilding intervention has contributed to the (1) alleviation of negative effects of conflict on individual lives and (2) creation of new opportunities for community members to meet those pressing needs which they have identified as instrumental to their well being. These needs primarily include subsistence, physical and psychological security but need to be defined by community members through a participatory inquiry.

Lederach frames these needs as strategic issues that the community members face and which, if un-addressed, block constructive process of desired change (Lederach:1997:144). Hence, he proposes a way of addressing a crucial obstacle to grassroots peacebuilding – immediacy of everyday survival in post-conflict settings, which may make reconciliation seem irrelevant.

Both Stubbs’ and Lederach’s definitions of the criterion put emphasis on the class and social composition of users/beneficiaries and ask questions about the involvement of and relevance of intervention to the most vulnerable and marginal groups in the community.

Perceptions of community members and other levels of society are treated as critical and principal sources of knowledge about the adequacy of impact of peacebuilding intervention on local people’s livelihoods (Lederach:1997:145; Stubbs:1996:23).

2. Impact on Social Integration /Relationships/ /Mobilization of Peace Constituents;

This is a central criterion for evaluating transformative potential of peacebuilding, since horizontal and vertical reconfiguration of relationships is the main way of creating or enlarging social space for reconciliation between conflicting social groups.

Lederach examines social integration at the level of processes of horizontal and vertical relationship building as well as at the level of mechanisms (institutions, networks) that foster vertical/horizontal integration, which themselves represent emerging social structures that can sustain reconciliation. In the examination, he poses questions about individual, group and institutional potentials for change as well as sustainability of that agency (Lederach:1997:143).

Stubbs is more specific and focuses on two critical aspects of social integration in the Croatian and B-H setting – integration of survivors of war-related forced migrations (refugees, displaced, returnees) in the local community; and identification and support for the emergence of ‘alternative community leaders’ and ‘new civil society’ who act as peace constituents that subtly ‘undercut the dominant political culture of polarization and division”, as described by Shorr and Stubbs on the case study of the UNOV project in the Muslim/Croatian divided town of Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje, Central Bosnia (Stubbs:1997:36). This is the centerpiece of the counter-hegemonic impact of grassroots peacebuilding practice, as it can give rise to the recomposition of local political structures. Shorr’s analysis is useful for grasping the essence of this crucial evaluation criterion for transformative peacebuilding:

“The project has a policy of consulting with the political leadership at every step. But before they do, they build local support for their proposed programme. The authorities are thus faced with propositions for which there is already clear desire among their own constituents. This exercise of accountability gives project a democracy-building aspect. Indeed, an official mechanism for consultation between the two sides, the Joint Education Committee, was established as a result of UNOV’s Project’s work in January 1996. The project hopes that this groundwork, especially in the education filed, will result in approval for a plan to build a youth center right on the cease-fire line[3].”(Shorr:1996, quoted in Stubbs:1996:36).

In examining the effects of social integration on a local community, it is important to include effects of peacebuilding practice on its own organizers, who are themselves at some level, “partial-insiders”, embedded in the local culture, whose individual and collective identities are shaped by the local culture, experience of conflict as well as their peacebuilding practice. These actors have their own personal and professional social networks in the communities where they act or in the broader system they seek to transform. Therefore, the evaluation of impact of peacebuilding practice on reconfigurations of their relationships and identities of its actors is an initial step in exploring its impact on social integration among other peace constituents, community and the broader social system of which it is a part.

3. Impact on local culture of peacebuilding and conflict;

This criterion is suggested in addition to the others proposed by Lederach and Stubbs and is based on the discussion of the role of culture in peacebuilding. It would examine ways in which a peacebuilding intervention has built its “theory of practice” on the understanding of the local cultural model, especially those elements of which that (1) perpetuate conflict and (2) are particularly conducive to reconciliation.

Further, it would examine whether the cultural model that the peacebuilding practice projects onto the community and thus influences the local culture contributes to sustained reconciliation. There is to my knowledge no local research specifically on the cultural aspects of peacebuilding practices in the post-Yugoslav region so there is a vast area for exploring applicability and refinement of this criterion.

1.Impact on Broader Long-Term Social Change/Social Infrastructure and Political Structures/ Transformational Capacity Responsiveness

This criterion examines effects of a specific peacebuilding practice in a local community setting on, as Lederach put it, “strategic sub-systems” – central local institutions and networks and further effects on the broader social structures, such as national institutions, organizations, networks etc. Lederach proposes three points of inquiry - level of articulation and adequacy of vision of desired change; adequate identification of those networks and institutions (sub-systems) with greatest potential and significance for change and community feedback on relevance and quality of intended changes (Lederach 1997:147). Stubbs emphasizes the need to track effects of innovative social practices initiated by peacebuilding interventions, such as volunteer-based provision of social services, establishment of community education or mediation committees, or new community based organizations, on broader social (and political) infrastructure, rather than creating parallel, substitute or disconnected service. “The question should be focused in terms of what legacy will be left when the project ends” (Stubbs:1996:22).

1.1.Transformative Capacity of the Organizational Structure for Peacebuilding

Since peacebuilding interventions take organizational forms, it is important to examine whether these organizational structures transformative potential, i.e. create social space for reconciliation, foster horizontal and vertical social integration, reconstruct social meanings through a process of communicative action (expression of different truths and dialogue on normative bases for common practice, with enough space for divergence and diversity); respect local organizational cultures and stimulate critical approach to cultural change and innovation etc. To put it in the language of peace activism – this criterion checks whether peacebuilding projects “walk the talk”, without implying that there are any organizational forms or processes which are more “true” to peacebuilding than others, especially given the importance of cultural context. Through a process of self-reflection, peacebuilding initiatives can explore the connections between their perpetually redefining goals, their values, theories of practice and actual practices, including their own organizational structures and culture.

In addition, the effects of newly created organizational structures for peacebuilding on other local institutions, organizations and social, economic, cultural practices needs to be examined. As Stubbs has pointed out in several articles, international and local nongovernmental organizations engaged in post-war relief and development in the post-Yugoslav war stricken countries, frequently can have significant effect on local economies - as they act as often principal employers offering salaries far higher than in state institutions for social service provision; and their management systems and organizational structures reproduce those of Western European or US based NGOs and even business organizations. “Complexities arise when, for example, volunteers are used as a source of ‘cheap labor’ for supranational agencies, or where foreign ‘experts’ are paid significantly more than those with local knowledge and, perhaps, more relevant qualifications” (Stubbs: 1996:32). The impact of these new organizational structures on the local environment and their actual contribution to peacebuilding is a contested and inadequately explored issue.

1.2.Impact on Peacebuilding Practices Elsewhere

Exchange of experiences and solidarity between localized peacebuilding practices, which operate in particular, dynamic cultural, social, political contexts featured by protracted conflict is a necessary prerequisite for creation of local hegemonies conducive of sustained reconciliation, that is impact of accumulated localized peacebuilding practices on the broader system, such as a national political space or global structures for peacebuilding and international relations (Fetherston: 1998). For these reasons, an additional sub-criterion is suggested which would examine the transfers of knowledge, experience and other resources between different local peacebuilding practices and specifically examine whether a given peacebuilding project has a commitment and capacity to engage in such networking.

IV. Mapping Peacebuilding in Croatia
1. Policies, Institutions, International Support and Local Practices
Relevance: Map key political issues relevant to peacebuilding (polarized political space – reformists and nationalists, reflected on approaches to cooperation with ICTY, return of refugees, minority rights). Provide overview of key policies andinstitutions relevant to community-based peacebuilding (National Security Strategy, National Development Strategy; Ministry of Reconstruction, Governmental office for NGOs, Ombudsman, local government structure and opportunities for partnerships with civil society).
List key international assistance programs relevant to community peacebuilding. The analysis should help identify gaps in current policy framework supportive of community-based peacebuilding.

Provide brief overview of local peacebuilding practices.

2. Case Studies of Local Peacebuilding Practices
Relevance: Present overview of methodology, resources used, key results of each local practice and outline need for (governmental, private, international) support if the practice were to become sustainable and fully effective.

a. Strengthening Local Capacities for Peacebuilding: The Center for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights, Osijek, Croatia

For five years, the Center for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights in Osijek, Croatia, has worked effectively to support capacity development in eight communities in Eastern and Western Slavonia through a project called “Building a Democratic Society Based on the Culture of Nonviolence.” The project promotes partnerships among a wide array of local state and non-state actors, mobilizes local peace constituents, and integrates “participatory action research” into each stage of its work from needs assessment to evaluation. The project is unique in the post-Yugoslav context as one of the most ambitiously envisioned community-based peacebuilding endeavours, undertaken by an indigenous peace organization and enriched by international, national and local partnerships.

The Center for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights was conceived in 1991 in a basement during the shelling of Osijek when the people seeking shelter there began to discuss a peacemaking civic action. The Center has grown into a network with more than 150 members, 30 full-time activists, a budget of more than $2 million and three basic programs—education, human rights, and peacebuilding. In 1998, it partnered with the Life and Peace Institute from Sweden to obtain funds from the European Union and other private funders for the “Building a Democratic Society Based on the Culture of Nonviolence” project.

The project followed on the efforts of the Erdut Peace negotiations on the status of Eastern Slavonia (autumn 1995) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES, January 1996 - January 1998). With a budget of $1 million, the project’s first phase (1998-2000) had the overall goal of “contributing to a new, nonviolent security structure in Eastern Croatia through the promotion of people’s skills and inner capacities to restore broken relationships and build a democratic society.”

The project established a network of Peace Teams, each made up of two to three local peace workers of different ethnicities, who lived in postwar communities with a multiethnic structure of inhabitants, supported by international volunteers recruited from European peace organizations. Local peace workers underwent a three-month-long residential preparation training.

After the departure of UNTAES on January 15, 1998, Peace Teams started to work in five local communities with a high risk of interethnic incidents (Tenja, Dalj, Beli Manastir, Vukovar and Oku?ani). Upon the invitation of OSCE, the work expanded to another location of high interethnic tensions and violent incidents (Berak). In May 2000, two locations across the Croatian border in Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Kolibe and Zborište, Novo Selo) were included in the project with a focus on enhancing the return of residents.

The project’s basic peacebuilding tool was the “Listening Project.” Pairs of trained listeners visited the majority of households in a given community and listened to local residents' concerns and experiences, perceptions of war, and suggestions for the future. Through more than 1,800 interviews, the teams identified specific needs and interests in each community around which to organize community mobilization and capacity building efforts. Gradually, local residents were included and appropriately trained to design, conduct, and interpret the findings of the Listening Projects in their own communities, thus creating a second tier of peace workers affiliated with the Peace Teams.

Community activities undertaken subsequent to the Listening Project included the reconstruction of public spaces (village clean-ups, tree planting, rebuilding a local cultural center); education (computer classes, peace education for teachers and students, women’s leadership programs, psychosocial support groups for war veterans); inter-religious and interethnic media and public dialogue series (youth Internet and newsletter projects, the publication of the “Culture of Peace” journal); cultural programs (the establishment of an artist colony, the week-long festival “Culture of Peace Days” in variouscommunities), social integration (humanitarian drives and visits to the poorest community members regardless of nationality; self-organized Romani initiatives and joint activities with non-Romani community members); voter education and mobilization (local get-out-the-vote campaigns linked with national mobilization efforts); and institutional change (negotiating the establishment of local peace councils in partnership with local authorities).

Through partnerships with grassroots organizations, local churches, schools, and local government authorities as well as national NGOs, the OSCE, and international development agencies, the project gained remarkable visibility and served as a catalyst for communication between socially distant groups and institutions.

Internal and external evaluations culminated in a comprehensive five-month impact assessment of the first phase of the project. It included interviews with community leaders and partners and focus groups with local residents. In 2001, the project published the book I Choose Life in both English and Croatian, representing the final narrative of the project’s first phase with evaluation findings and lessons learned regarding peacebuilding in the post-Yugoslav context—the first comprehensive report of its kind in Croatia.

The second phase of the program began in September 2001. Current funding comes from a variety of sources including the Croatian Government, Evangelic Development Service Germany, Presbyterian Church USA, Mercy Corps/USAID, Westminister Foundation for Democracy, Ecumenical Women’s Fund. The project management team is made up of former Peace Team members as well as local residents who have become resourceful peace workers themselves. In the second phase, the project is building on its earlier work by helping these local residents establish and maintain community-based organizations and initiatives (primarily war veterans’ associations, inter-religious groups, Roma associations, youth clubs, a school mediation project, peace councils).

Thus, the responsibility for community mobilization has shifted from partial outsiders (Peace Teams) to insiders (local institutions, organizations, and individuals). Capacity-building support over a two year-period will help these organizations achieve sustainability. Necessary support entails the direct provision of mentoring and training, combined with advocacy for broader institutional and donor support for the still-fragile community-based peacebuilding structure. The Peace Team in Oku?ani, for example, is negotiating full institutional support from the Croatian Ministry and County Office of Education for an emerging school mediation project run by local students and teachers.

In contrast to many peacebuilding programs conducted by international agencies that are subject to shifting mandates, this project achieved its original objective of capacity building via Peace Teams—with the promise of long-term, local sustainability for many of its associated peacebuilding initiatives.

b. and c. to be determined (Vukovar; CESI; ZAMIRNET)

Case Studies’ Policy Relevance
Relevance:outline key issues regarding sustainable support and broader impact of local practices to be considered in national and international policy elaboration.

V. Mapping Peacebuilding in Kosovo
a. Kosovo Political and Institutional Context Relevant to Peacebuilding
Relevance: Map key political issues relevant to peacebuilding (parallel, divergent political agendas- international community; Albanian political parties – predominantly nationalist; Serbian local politicians and influence of Serbian State Program – particularly acute differences regarding the process of return and minority integration and preconditions for negotiations on the final status of Kosovo). Provide overview of key policies and institutions relevant to community-based peacebuilding (UNMIK – Office of Return and Communities and Office of Community Affairs; Prime Minister’s Advisory Office on Communities and Interministerial Coordinator of Return; Office of Department for Equal Opportunities - civil service, Steiner’s benchmarks; OSCE Democratization Office; local government structure). List key international assistance programs relevant to community peacebuilding. Map key issues/challenges (lack of coordination between different institutions; lack of inclusion of local people in UNMIK decision-making, conditioning community-development funding by multiethnic cooperation, which creates superficial, pragmatic alliances; lack of independent media). Provide a basic overview of local peacebuilding practices.The analysis should help identify gaps in current policy framework supportive of community-based peacebuilding.

2. Kosovo Case Studies Local Peacebuilding Practices
Relevance: Present overview of methodology, resources used, key results of each local practice and outline need for (governmental, private, international) support if the practice were to become sustainable and fully effective.
a. Community Building Mitrovica
b. Women’s Networking (NORMA, Rjette, Serbian Women’s Network)
c. Youth and Independent media – Peace Train, URBAN FM.

b.Case Studies Policy Relevance
Relevance :outline key issues regarding sustainable support and broader impact of local practices to be considered in national and international policy formulation.

VI. Peacebuilding Experiences of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1. Mapping Peacebuilding in B-H
2. Overview of Local Peacebuilding Practices
Relevance: Present overview of methodology, resources used, key results of each local practice and outline need for (governmental, private, international) support if the practice were to become sustainable and fully effective.

a. Case Study of Human Rights Office, Tuzla
b. Case Study of Youth Center Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje
c. Case Study of HCA Youth Network Banja Luka/Tuzla (Women’s Networking in Eastern Bosnia/Community Gardens in Sarajevo)

Relevance to Policymaking

Relevance: outline key issues regarding sustainable support and broader impact of local practices to be considered in national and international policy formulation.

VI. Peacebuilding Experiences in Serbia

a.Mapping Peacebuilding in Serbia
Relevance: Map political issues, institutional and policy framework relevant to stabilization of inter-ethnic tensions in Southern Serbia and opening dialogue on war, including funding system for local initiatives, international assistance programs and minority rights legislation. Outline key local and international peacebuilding initiatives in this area.

b.Case Studies of Local Peacebuilding Practices

c.Case studies’ Policy Relevance

VII.Mapping Peacebuilding in Macedonia

[1] By Southeastern Europe, I refer to Slovenia, Croatia, Federal republic of Yugoslavia (and Kosovo), B-H, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. By post-Yugoslav region I refer to all successor states of Federal Socialist Republic Yugoslavia.

[2]The UN Mission to Kosovo and former UNTAES (UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia) in Croatia, have not been defined as peacebuilding missions, even though their scope fit within the peacebuilding framework, probably due to a strong element of‘state building’ with the UN taking a lead in setting-up provisional governance structures.

[3] Indeed, the youth center was set-up right on the cease-fire line between the two ethnically divided parts of the city later in 1996 and ha sin the meantime gained credibility and trust of both Croatian and Muslim teachers, children, parents and local politicians, despite its explicit promotion of reconciliation.