NO COHERENT DESIRE TO MAKE INTERESTS TRANSPARENT ? |
Do
we really need think tanks ?
Potøebujeme skuteènì think tanky ? Tényleg szükségünk van think tank-ekre ? Czy naprawdê potrzebujemy think tanki ? |
Contribution to the Conference on
"REGULATING Lobby-activities in Central and Eastern Europe" Budapest, Oct 24, 2002 |
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Abstract:
Since the system of representing interests directly, behind the
closed door is well established and advocates of public scrutiny ("watchdogs")
remain relatively weak attempts to make policy process more transparent
have failed so far. Hopefully, more media attention could force interests
to ally and to be “wrapped into public interest clothes”.
Outline:
1. Natural (“Hobbesian”) state: assymetric distribution of information
and power is subjected to intensive communication among all actors.
Lobbying = legitimate communication of interests and opinions to the
specific place ("lobby" of decision making bodies) whereas corruption
(fraud, bribe) been illegitimate way of communication (trading interest
for money).
Lobbying is sometimes called advocacy when it is done in public debate
or on behalf of public interest issues (by NGOs ?)
"An idiot's guide to lobbying in the Czech republic would consist of
one word: corruption."(Candole)
2. There are different way safeguarding participation of those
concerned in policy process. An open representation through lobbying seems
to be a lesser evil than selective and exclusive participation (dire straits
of corporatism). "Good government requires input from interested parties...Lobbying
is the part of the democratic process." (O´Connor)
Transparency is the key requirement that significantly reduces temptations
of corruptive behaviour. That is why disclosure is a key principle of any
ethical codes and even legal regulation This poses a question of
non-profit lobbying/advocacy. NGOs benefitting from non-profit status should
not be used as channels bypassing other regulations - party finance, tax
evasion, cover for commercial lobbying.
3. Who are the key players and how far they are interested in transparent
law-making?
Interest groups, major corporations, sectoral associations as a key
actors in lobbying are interested in transparency only to the extent
they are forced to by public scrutiny, media. However, public interest
is not enough promoted – watchdog activities (like monitoring of voting
patterns of MPs an MGs) are underdeveloped.
Who are the targets of lobby influence - MPs, ministers, civil servants,
judges.
Flow of money is important indicator of carried interests. It is disputable
which end is easily monitored - whether through auditing od lobbying costs
often hidden in companies´ accounts as marketing, PR, etc - OR income
disclosure of decision-makers ? So far most of regulation have been target-
rather than source-oriented (personal and party finance disclosures, codes
of conduct, etc.) To subject targets of potential lobbying to public scrutiny
and bring as much transparency as possible is probably the only way
how to keep lobbying within legitimate boundaries. If not scrutinized,
lobby turns into corruption - it feeds personal bank accounts and party
finance.
4. In the Czech Republic there was no legislative initiative concerning
lobby-activities during recent decade. To be more precise - no legislation
regulates lobbyists as subjects of lobbying. Not even a single
MP asked Parliamentary Institute to prepare a research on rules of lobbying.
As an attempt to regulate objects/targets of lobbying i.e. decision makers
(MPs, members of executive) - Conflict of Interest Act has been adopted
in 1992. (Act on some measures protecting public interest and on non-compatibility
certain public appointments - Conflict of Interests Act - No. 238/1992).
Only recently - April 2002 - ALTISA International Network a Business
Leaders Forum organized a seminar on lobbying in the Czech Senate - tried
to present lobbying as a legitimate part of decision making process, argued
for open recognition of this type of activities.
Other laws that were adopted could be considered as tools that ensure
more transparency in policy process:
- Political Parties Act (424/1991) - limits scope of party
business activities, orders obligatory disclosures }annual reports deposited
in the Parliament) and introduces (through recent amendment after series
of financial scandals) a system of sponsor receipts issued by Central Bank.
- Public Procurement Act (199/1994) - obliges public agencies to use
public tenders in procurement
- Freedom of Information Act (106/1999)
5. European Lobbyists´ Code of Conduct is rather vague because it respects "national specifics" in communication (acceptance of gifts). This might lead to lowest common denominator rather than benchmarking. On the other hand Three Codes of Conduct set rather ambitious rules (no acceptance of any gifts, no fees for lectures, publications, etc.)
Conslusions:
It seems that all players are satisfied with status quo - all the interests
are being communicated directly to the decision makers. There is no demand
for public intermediary structures like policy think tanks, there is little
desire to aggregate or ally particular interests to be publicly advocated.
Expertise of existing and newly created think tanks has to be marketed
both to decision maker (as potential user of their products) and to private
interests (as potential sponsors of their activities). Parallel watchdog
initiatives might push all players to realize long term advantages and
benefits of moving towards more open and transparent policy process.
Sources:
INSIDE TRACK by James de Candole of CEC Government Relations
(accessed at www.czechpolitics.cz)
LOBBYING PRATICE: THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY HAS COME! by Christian
D. de Fouloy (accessed at europe.int)
SOME BASIC IDEAS ON DECISION-MAKING AND LOBBYING IN THE EU by Bernard
O´Connor (Liuc Papers No.47, 13.11.1997)
For a European political and administrative culture: Three Codes of
Conduct, EC Brussels
© J.Schneider, 2002/09/26