By: Jiri Schneider
International Policy Fellow 2002
Center for Policy Studies, Central European University, Budapest
Funded by Open Society Institute
The main objectives of this paper are following:
In order to meet these objectives it was necessary to create a link
between existing theoretical framework and empirical data. Following practical
questions
have been addressed:
Do rulers need expertise ? To what extent is knowledge applied when policy decisions are done ? Some politicians are experts themselves, but most of them seek advice from specialists, consultants or policy entrepreneurs. The idea of an “intellectual working in the shadow of power“ [Smith, 1991, p.xvi] is an attractive topic since Plato, Aristotle, Erasmus and Machiavelli. Bacon´s “positivist“ view of scientifically governed society (New Atlantis) is balanced by “common sense” tradition of American political philosophy that led to "anti-intellectualism...(and) suspicion of experts“[ibid., p. xvii].
Both authority and expertise is needed in policy-making. Mutual relation
between power and knowledge can be seen as shown in a following synoptic
matrix:
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A close relationship between power and knowledge reveals how prevailing “ideology”, “paradigm” or “worldview” informs the discourse on policy. However, a dynamic model of knowledge/power relations seems to be more appropriate here. Stone (2000) differentiates twelve ways of conceiving “research-policy dynamics” using various economic, sociological, political or philosophical approaches.
On one hand, governance means not only hierarchy. Power can be mediated through market and various networks. On the other hand, in the post-positivist world one cannot take for granted that knowledge does reflect an objective reality: “researchers ´construct´ the world they study and that the values, priorities, and conceptual models that they bring to their work influence the things they ´find´.” Weiss (1991, p. 37) differentiates three forms of policy research that are based on data, values and interests; information, ideology and argument. Similarly, one can trace cognitive, normative and affective dimension of political culture (by which I mean a latent pre-disposition and attitude of citizens towards actors of policy process). Thus, political culture can be used as a point of reference in comparing policy-research relationship.
„The objective of communicating with a particular audience may be a
cognitive, affective, or behavioral response. In other words, the think
tank may want to put an idea or result in the person’s mind, change his
or her attitude toward an issue, or get the person to take an action.“
Struyk (2002), p. 200.
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It is possible to describe the whole spectrum of research/policy relationship - from academic policy research (policy science) to policy analysis as a specific form of applied research that includes policy evaluation and recommendation; from knowledge of policy to knowledge in policy [see chart in Hill; 1997; p. 4].
For the purpose of the research of intermediary institutions following “working” model of policy process was developed:
The closed model reflects current political model in Visegrad countries
based on client relations and inclined to corruption. As one Czech lobbyist
stated: “Everyone knows each other and calls his or her mobile if needed.”
The second model is an open, transparent policy making model, apparently
a desired one.
Expert and intermediary bodies (“think-tanks”) might be used as tools
both in pursue of particular interests as well as in public policy formulation.
Think-tanks operate in an area circumscribe by politicians and officials,
interest groups, socioeconomic structure and political culture.
Think-tank in general means:
- an institute, corporation, or group organized for interdisciplinary
research (as in technological and social problems) -- called
also think factory - see Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
(2000)
- consultative committee: a committee of experts that
undertakes research or gives advice, especially to a government -
see Encarta® World English Dictionary [North American Edition]
© & (P) 2001 Microsoft Corp.
For the purpose of this study it is useful to define think-tanks as
independent actors in policy process:
"independent (and usually private) policy research institutes containing
people involved in studying a particular policy area or a broad range of
policy issues, actively seeking to educate or advise policy-makers and
the public through a number of channels." Stone (2000b)
“The Western view that a think-tank requires independence or autonomy
from the state, corporate, or other interests in order to be free-thinking
does not accord with experiences in other cultures” Stone (2002); p. 15688
McGann (2000) speaks somewhat cautiously about significant autonomy: “Think-tanks are “policy research organizations that have significant autonomy from government and from societal interests such as firms, interest groups, and political parties.” [p. 5]
American scholars in general tend to view think-tanks through the lens
of political market of ideas:
“(Think-tanks)...must operate in two distinct markets: a market for
funding and a market for policy advice.” [ibid]
“the growth of think-tanks can be explained by market forces that created
a demand for different brands of think-tanks that produced new products
for new markets.” [McGann (2001); p. 7].
Definition of “think-tank” is a difficult exercise [see Stone, Denham & Garnett (1998); McGann & Weaver(2000)]. The concept of think-tank is so much embedded in English that it cannot be easily transferred or translated into other political cultures.
Similarly, in most other languages it is difficult to cannot translate properly notions like policy, polity, politics. [Fiala & Schubert (2000)]
The idea nad practice of policy research is deeply rooted in Anglo-Saxon political tradition. That is why the concept of public policy and its actors is a matter of political culture in broader terms.
How do think-tanks operate ?
Think-tanks utilize methods of policy analysis in problem definition,
collection of information, devising options and recommendations, policy
evaluation. Think-tanks can be active in all phases of policy process -
from agenda setting, drafting policy proposals, creating implementation
plans to assessment of existing policies.
Think-tanks “provide an organizational link and communication bridge
between their different audiences”[Stone; 2002] , try to link policy and
ideas "at the intersection of academia and politics" [Stone; 2000],
Think-tanks serve as a source of information, conceptual thinking,
inventory in area of public administration. Through creating of multidisciplinary
network of experts and think-tanks contribute to public debate and help
to articulate public interest.
Think-tanks can be viewed as agents of change, "catalysts of thoughts
and ideas",“catalysts for ideas and actions“ (McGann). Therefore they could
be seen as ideal designers and promoters of transition policies1 in formerly
communist states in 90s.
Think-tanks operate in variety of institutional forms and legal
arrangements. Following are several ways of classification that can be
found in recent publications.
The most frequent typology is based on institutional aspects (legal form and status, principles of funding, affiliation, etc) [e.g. McGann (2000)].
Stone, Maxwell & Keating (2001) define types of think-tanks based on their research roles: contract researchers, ´in house´ researchers (attached to executive), political advisors, civil society researchers (private Think-tanks and NGOs) and disinterested research institutions. Stone (2002) is also keen to study think-tanks as parts of broader networks and communities (”epistemic communities”).
Similarly, Gellner (2000) is more interested in role of advocacy coalitions and policy brokers than in their institutional settings.
Struyk (1999) sorts think-tanks according to their origin: private institutions, new institutions created by old fellows, institutions created by public figures, attached to political party, for-profit company, “spin-off“ institution
Krastev (2000) comes out with considering target groups: government-oriented, legislation-oriented and media-oriented think-tanks.
In following table McGann's typology (academic, contract, advocacy/partisan
Think-tanks) is linked to general observation about cognitive, normative
and affective dimension of social research Weiss (1991)
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(”hybrids“, “siblings”) |
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values |
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interests |
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of interest groups |
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Meta-research - typology of methodological approach
The study of a specific area that is at the intersection of political,
academic, media, entrepreneurial and non-profit sector deserves appropriate
methodology. It is possible use an economic (welfare economics; public
choice), sociological (social structure), managerial (organizational behavior,
information processing) or philosophical approach. Research may be focused
on institutional settings of think-tanks or on policy process as such.
My approach is a selective one:
From theory to data gathering
For the purpose of my survey I selected think-tanks which are financed mostly (obviously not exclusively) from non-governmental resources and are active in major public policy areas (I did not include mono-sectoral think-tanks e.g. environmental, urban policy, etc.).
Stone (2000b) mentions that "in many cases, think-tanks are quasi-governmental or quasi-academic and lack the independence and connections to civil society usually associated with NGOs. Generally, these organisations are private bodies legally organised as charities or non-profit organisations but some are semi-governmental."
In search for information about think-tanks I made use of their annual reports, internet web sites and further available sources. Series of structured interviews were focused on organizational form, legal status, human resources, financial resources, forms of activity, political affiliation, academic profile, public impact, main target groups and clients, main areas of expertise, etc.
Interviews and data collection were not supposed to substitute existing
comprehensive databases of think-tanks already available in directories
published in 1999 by NIRA and Freedom House. These sources were obviously
of a great help in the planning phase of the project. The results of more
than 50 interviews are summarized in next chapter.
Center for Democracy and Culture (Centrum pro demokracii a kulturu
- CDK)
* publishing house and conservative-liberal think-tank founded as a
civil association in 1993. It has two branches: IPK (Institute for Politics
and Culture) and IKS (Institute of Christian Studies).
Liberal Institute (Liberální institut - LI)
* established in 1990 as a citizens' association. It provides economic
research supporting demonopolization. LI is an economic consultancy with
prominent profile in media. LI runs a F.A.Hayek Library. Although liberal
in name, LI does not publicize names of its donors.
Civic Institute (Obèanský institut - OI)
* established in 1991 as citizens' association to support conservative
ideas of free society. Its funding is one of the most transparent in the
Czech Republic, more than 85% of its income is from foreign sources. OI
consistently advocates conservative political philosophy and focuses on
agenda setting in education and the role of family.
Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education (CERGE)
* established in 1990 as autonomous institute of Charles University,
It has become prestigious school for economists throughout the region.
CERGE as an independent academic “center of excellence” produces research
papers on socio-economic issues.
Gabal Analysis & Consulting (GAC)
* private consulting company, active in policy analysis. GAC as a “contract
researcher“ bids for grants provided by government and international institutions.
Center for Economics and Politics (CEP)
* private think-tank (citizens' association) close to political party
(ODS); it was established in 1998 by V.Klaus and circle of his closest
aides as a platform for public discussion and publishing and promoting
ideas of its founder. Its role might change since V.Klaus became the Czech
President and J.Weigl, former executive director of CEP, became a head
of the Office of President.
Center for Social and Economic Strategies (CESES)
* academic think-tank subsidized by government. CESES is a prognostic
and sociological institute which produces “interdisciplinary inquiry of
possible futures”
Euro-Czech Forum (ECF)
* platform established and funded by bilateral chambers of commerce
of France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and UK. It is a lobbyist think-tank;
its purpose is to promote interests of its members especially through legislative
expertise and training and education of judiciary.
Institute for Social and Economic Analysis (ISEA)
* recently established think-tank funded mainly by Open Society Fund
Prague. It is non-partisan institute with centrist-liberal agenda.
Public Policy Institute (PPI)
* private foundation specialized on policy research management (it
was transformed from a governmental department for economic information
- est. in 1972). It has openly liberal spin, in mid-90s it served
as analytical team for SDSZ Party, later it became more independent. Recently
it has been involved in security projects (NATO Research Programmes).
Social Research Center (TARKI)
* established in 80s as a sociological institute, in 90s it has broadened
its range to public policy evaluation. TARKI is a consortium of research
institute, commercial polling company and a library of databases.
Institute of World Economy of Hungarian Academy of Sciences (IWE
HAS)
* research institute that is involved in an international network of
economic research projects. Only one half of its funding comes from the
state budget, the rest is from international organizations.
Economic Research Co. (GKI)
* private (shareholders) company specialized on economic research:
public sector finance, economic forecasting corruption, business ethics.
It works for private clients and international organizations.
Center for Social Economic Research (CASE)
* private foundation with commercial twin (CASE Consultancy Ltd.) specialized
on economic research of transition in Central and Eastern Europe
Institute of Public Affairs (ISP)
* established in 1995 as a private non-profit institute coordinating
public policy research; its independence provides flexibility in setting
agenda (funded by Batory Foundation)
Adam Smith Research Center (CAS)
* non-profit think-tank advocating liberal agenda (e.g. demonopolization,
freedom of information)` consists of small permanent staff and network
of collaborators.
Centre for Political Thought (OMP)
* small non/partisan, non-profit association focused on academic research
of liberal-conservative thinking; funded from both private and public sources.
Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS)
* private foundation transformed from MCRD (Int'l Center for Development
of Democracy); active in three areas: national security, European agenda,
Eastern policy.
Institute for Public Affairs (IVO)
* founded in 1997 as citizens' association` research programme includes
public opinion, political culture, institution building, civil society,
election process, European integration. Financed almost exclusively from
abroad
Social Policy Research Center (S.P.A.C.E.)
* originally foundation (1995), now non-profit organization specialized
on social policy research and evaluation, public policy education; financed
from 3 sources: private foreign foundations, European funds, Slovak government.
Central European Institute for Economic and Social Reforms (INEKO)
* association of NGO=”think-tank incubator”; roof organization (CPHR,
SGI, Transparency Int.-Slovakia, atd.) financed by USAID, PHARE, Open Society
Fund
Slovak Governance Institute (SGI)
* operates under umbrella of INEKO
M.E.S.A. 10
* established in 1995 as a foundation, as of 1998 citizens' association
(after stricter legislation on foundations has been enacted) with a commercial
twin (MESA Consulting Group Ltd.); active in market research and regional
development; publishes economic monthly newsletter.
Because of relatively easy legislative regulation most of
think-tanks hold a legal status of citizens´ association or private
corporation. Some of think-tanks opted for a non-profit status. Legislation
on foundations was firstly adopted in Poland (1984) and Hungary (1987).
In the Czech Republic and Slovakia there was no specific legislation on
foundations until 1997. In mid-90s legislation on public benefit organizations
(PBO) appeared in Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, transaction
costs of transforming into PBO-status appeared to be too high for some
existing think-tanks (e.g. Civic Institute).
“Think-tanks in Central and Eastern Europe must navigate through an immature legislative environment, fraught with complex formulas for determining tax exempt status and unclear ideas on what constitute publicly beneficial organizations.” [Kimball(2000); p.261]
Some experts expressed opinion that it is difficult for think-tanks
to compete with for-profit organizations. However, for commercial companies
(consultancy, opinion poll and market research companies, etc.) providing
public policy analysis there are clear limits - being critical endangers
their chances in bidding for government tenders. Hence non-profit institutions
are often affiliated to “sister” commercial company. Think-tanks usually
set up a parallel body - for profit company - to balance individual income
of researchers. This is particularly useful for economic and sociological
think-tanks which often have a „twins“: consulting or polling companies.
The mutual benefit provided through such arrangement is clear: non-profit
branch conveys an image of independence and it has access to funds assigned
for third sector; for-profit branch gets - as a by-product - additional
data necessary for policy-relevant research. However, except of socio-economic
research institutes it is uncommon to envisage such “twin” or “hybrid”
arrangements. Therefore “many of political think-tanks have developed economic
analysis wings...for consulting purposes to corporations” [Kimball (2000);
p.270]
Major foreign resources that provide funding to Central European
think-tanks are as follows:
1) private foundations (e.g. OSI, Ford Foundation, etc)
2) foreign government agencies or entrepreneurial funds (e.g. USAID,
British Know-How Fund)
3) public foundations (funded by public funds - e.g. K. Adenauer Stiftung,
F. Ebert Stiftung, etc)
4) international organizations (e.g. World Bank, IMF, OECD)
5) funds of EU (structural funds, framework programs for research a
development)
Resources ad 1)-3) have been constantly reduced in recent years. The
only remaining sources are in fact public – not private ones. EU´s
share in funding of policy research is growing. European interest in NGO
sector has grown in 90s though it has been materialized so far mostly through
German Foundations (Konrad Adenauer St., Fridrich Ebert St., etc) and not
European public funds. Regional (structural) funds require public participation
represented by local NGO participation.
As Central European countries approach European Union, naturally, more
think-tanks and NGOs seek financial resources in EU (6th Research Framework
Program, structural funds). Generally, to apply for these funds is considered
to be much more complex and bureaucratic procedure. Therefore it is not
yet enough attractive when US funding still available although in decreased
levels.
It has been relatively easy for think-tanks to operate in generous
environment (as one interviewed told bitingly: „with generous funding one
can create whatever - even civil society“). Shortage of foreign funding
creates a challenge how to substitute it with a domestic alternative.
Most of the funding is project based, think-tanks seek continuous funding for core costs (administrative staff, rent, communication, etc). If they have limited funds their personnel (researchers) have to be affiliated to either academic institution (university, faculty, academy of sciences) or for-profit institution (consultancy, financial companies). Alternative arrangement means minimal staff with volunteers running a network of certified experts or limited staff on fundraising, project management, public relations and information technology (web page) while researchers are hired on specific projects.
In principle, there are two kinds of domestic funds:
1) grants and contracts provided by public (central, regional and municipal)
budgets
“Think-tanks in Central and Eastern Europe will need to undertake consulting contracts with ministries or private businesses, or align themselves closely with political parties” [Kimball (2000); p.258-9]
2) contracts and donations from private sources - entrepreneurs, interest groups
Share of projects funded by international organizations in socio-economic
sector is lower - 20% than that in political, security area - obviously
there is more commercial activity linked with economic research
Government (public) resources contribute to 20% (economic research)
to 60% (sociological research) of projects. Economic research profits
from closeness to parallel commercial activities (market research, economic
forecast). Most of the economic and sociological institutions are commercially
oriented (shareholder companies or holdings including for profit branch)
whereas in security, foreign policy field the activities are less profit
oriented.
Most interviewed experts agreed that apart from research contracts (e.g. market research, economic forecasting, sociological polling) it is extremely difficult to raise funds for an independent policy research. Both private and public funding creates a certain degree of dependence: especially reliance on single source of funding is delicate. Contracts by World Bank, IMF or private investors) have impact on think-tanks´ organizational culture. There exists a viable model providing sufficient independence while being trustworthy for private donors: private foundations.
Central European countries are in growing need of private foundations
that would be able to raise funds domestically and that would allocate
part of them (among others) to policy think-tanks. Fundraising for charity
is easier than raising funds for advocating or researching of policy/"civic"
issues.
Sponsoring of sports, health, culture and charity is much more common
under the provision of marketing and public relations than sponsoring of
research and advocacy provided as gifts, endowments. Donors want to have
the sense of ownership.
Existing foundations have got used to generous foreign funding. In
most cases they did not specialize in domestic fundraising and providing
grants to other NGOs, but instead they have been involved in implementing
projects themselves. Few of them are prepared to focus exclusively on cultivation
of fundraising and credible allocation of funds to other institutions.
Czech NGO sector (Donors Forum, VIA Foundation, et al.) has been active
to establish philanthropic standards among Czech companies. There are no
details available about philanthropic behavior of Czech taxpayers. The
only available figure is sum, which was claimed by individual citizens
to be tax-deducted on cultural, educational, social, etc. purposes. Since
there is a 10% limit, this numbers do not represent the total sum assigned
to these purposes. It reflects only amount, which was actually deducted.
(See Table)
| Year |
1993
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1994
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1995
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1996
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1997
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1998
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1999
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2000
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| Total deducted
(mil. CZK) |
1110*)
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922
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971
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855
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927
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768
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634
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750
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No. of claimants
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82 634
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119 258
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135 684
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155 494
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176 427
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193 338
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208 480
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221 915
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Sum of tax-deducted donations has been decreasing, whereas the number
of those who apply was growing constantly.
“Think tanks attempt to influence or inform policy through intellectual argument and analysis rather than direct lobbying ...“ [Stone (2002); p. 15668]
Expectations that foreign direct investors (FDI) would move businesses
towards better standards of transparency and social responsibility proved
to be over-optimistic. Those investors who achieved intended goals have
quickly accommodated to local circumstances. Once they are in, they are
not interested neither in transparency of decision-making process nor in
financing of think-tanks. Usual incentives (e.g. tax deductions for donations)
do not provide sufficient motivation since most of the investors have been
granted with tax benefits (tax breaks or relieves) or they simply tax their
profits abroad.
“Slovakia's TT community is by far the most politicized in the region. ...[this led to a] creation of the most cooperative and close knit community of think-tanks and other NGOs in the region.” [Kimball (2000); p.265]
However, a close alliance between reform-oriented think-tanks and NGOs
in Slovakia turned into uneasy relationship upon appointment of some experts
to the government. Mesežnikov (2001) praises “correct partnership” between
state and civil society as opposed to “antagonistic relations” before 1998.
Nonetheless, as think-tanks take over responsibility for implementation
of the policies they have developed, their independence and credibility
might be in question. There appears also potential conflict of interests,
e.g.
- participation in governmental bodies supervising own projects
- bidding for government contracts after think-tank representative
becomes a member of the government or senior official
In general, a political affiliation remains a hot issue for think-tanks in Central Europe. Representatives of think-tanks try to emphasize informal relations with politicians in order to prove how influential they are. However, some of them do not hesitate to attach political labels to other think-tanks while playing down their own affiliations as non relevant as for their credibility and integrity.
We have shown that way of funding and legal status of an institution
is significant for its independence. The main concern of a think-tank is
how to be influential without losing credibility. In this chapter we describe
three models of think-tanks - academic, for-profit and non-profit. The
three models differ in relations to policy actors, in the role they play
in policy process and public space.
As we have stated above external funding is going to dwindle in coming
years. Think-tanks that do not possess assets producing sufficient yields
have to substitute foreign funding through affiliation with academic or
commercial institution. Strengths and limitations of both approaches are
shown below.
Finally, private funding of non-profit institutions (via foundations)
is explored as an alternative model providing more independence than public
resources.
The experience from Central Europe has shown that most frequent is a
combined model - e.g. economic or sociological institute closely linked
to commercial firm.
Theoretically, universities and academic institutes can be regarded
as ideal “incubators“ for interdisciplinary activities and think-tanks.
Center for public policy would offer a platform for young scholars and
analysts that would undoubtedly contribute to the quality of public debate.
However, development of academic think-tanks is confronted with several limitations:
Free-lanced policy entrepreneurship or research-based lobbying presents
another feasible option for think-tanks. A clear line between lobbyism
and consultancy is sometimes blurred especially when policy analysis is
provided to the specific customer on for-profit basis.
Some think-tanks are affiliated with interest groups (business associations,
trade unions) or political parties. Interestingly enough, large interest
groups in Central Europe - except political parties (e.g. CEP) - have not
yet set up their own think-tanks. Various interest groups invest large
sums of money to improve their image, but do not see any benefit in research
think-tanks. It is symptomatic that majority of lobbyists are members of
Association of Public Relations Agencies.
Lobbying is percieved as suspicious activity in Central Europe. Hence, impact of lobbying on legislation and policy-making undermines public trust in these processes. As one of the interviewed expressed quite concisely: “people do not trust the policy-making process”. In my opinion, policy process that is open to influence through transparent lobbying seems to be a lesser evil than selective and exclusive participation in policy process, which in the end leads to ire straits of corporatism.
"Good government requires input from interested parties...Lobbying is the part of the democratic process." (O´Connor)
Lobbying can be defined as legitimate communication of interests and opinions to the specific place ("lobby" of decision making bodies) as opposed to illegitimate way of communication (trading interest for money, corruption, fraud, bribe). In this framework, advocacy can be understood as “lobbying” on behalf of the public interest.
In the Czech Republic lobbying does not exist in legal terms. Following legislation is related to lobbying: Conflict of Interests Act (No. 238/1992), Political Parties Act (No. 424/1991), Public Procurement Act (No. 199/1994). Adopting of Freedom of Information Act (No. 106/1999) was a breakthrough; if used properly, it would contribute significantly to openness of decision-making. According to recent report monitoring corruption in the Czech Republic : “Parliament is highly vulnerable to corruption, especially through unregulated lobbying...”; “the effect of uncontrolled lobbying on the legislative process has become more serious over time” 1.
Defining ethical rules of lobbying - e.g. disclosure of interests and corresponding budgets - is definitely worth of discussion. Pressure groups are not interested in transparency of policy process and lobbyism unless there is enough public attention. Transparency is the key requirement that significantly reduces temptations of corruptive behavior. That is why disclosure is a key principle of any ethical codes and even legal regulation concerning policy-makers: members of parliament, members of the government, civil servants. Flow of money is an important indicator of carried interests. Therefore it is possible to monitor correlation of voting patterns and different forms of income, benefit and funding. Income disclosure is much more efficient tool than complicated audit of costs.
Only sustained efforts to disclose non-transparent ways of decision-making
(watchdog activities) can lead interest groups and lobbyists to engage
relatively independent expertise and policy analysis. Part of the resources
committed to lobbying would then be used for funding of think-tanks.
Think-tanks may choose to operate as public-benefit organizations.
Non-profit status provides following advantages:
1. incentives for donors (tax deductible donations, 1% tax assignation,
etc)
2. more independence provided that funds are diversified (including
private foundations)
In the U.S. non-profit status and lobbying activities2 are legally incompatible. In other words, using non-profit organization for political campaigning or lobbying is forbidden. If proper legislation and legal enforcement (to prevent a misuse) at place, third sector offers an optimal balance of independence and political influence.
“Think-tanks in Central and Eastern Europe must navigate through an immature legislative environment, fraught with complex formulas for determining tax exempt status and unclear ideas on what constitute publicly beneficial organizations.” [Kimball (2000), p.261]
Academic sphere provides more independence and prestige at expense of influence and funds available. On the other hand, policy entrepreneurs and lobbyists are less independent while enjoying better funding. Generally, for think-tanks it is desirable to combine comparative advantages of public, private and non-profit sector: authority and prestige of the public sector, managerial skills a dynamism of the private sector and transparency and credibility of the third sector. Of course, a combination of negatives should be avoided (bureaucratic manners, weak management and lack of credibility).
Foundations get most of the funds from public sector as if they were downright service provider, while lobbyists get all resources from private sector. Transactions between private and non-profit sector create the weakest link in an abstract triangle. Think-tanks situated in between sectors function as intermediaries and advocates of public interest, which assist in balancing particular interests.
Think-tanks and lobbyists compete for resources from private sector; non-profit think-tanks because of their self-interest act as lobbyists that divert some resources from private to the third sector. Non-profit think-tanks need strong private foundations as financial intermediaries that bring financial resources and prevent dependence on donors.
The following figure shows a difference between non-profit think-tanks and for-profit think-tanks working on contract for lobbyists.
In conclusion let us sum up reasons why it is desirable for think-tanks
to operate on non-profit basis:
supply of interdisciplinary expertise financed by portfolio of interest
groups through private foundations is beneficial to political culture
third sector provides necessary independence in agenda-setting and
pursuing greater openness in policy process
accepting governmental or commercial contracts is detrimental to their
independence
In previous chapters we described multiple functions of think-tanks:
“As civil society organizations think tanks play a number of critical roles, including (1) playing mediating function between the government and the public; (2) identifying, articulating, and evaluating current or emerging issues, problems or proposals; (3) transforming ideas and problems into policy issues; (4) serving as an informed and independent voice in policy debates; (5) providing a constructive forum for the exchange of ideas and information between key stakeholders in the policy formulation process.” (McGann & Weaver(2000); p.3)
Following chapter will provide other perspectives, in order to show that think-tanks can play these roles not only on national but also on European and international level.
Think-tanks as ”agents of change” (Krastev (2000)) promote and advocate reform policies based on shared best practices and know-how. In a process of „policy imitation“ (ibid) they both import ideas and export experience. Although the very idea of policy transfer can be questioned because “transfer of ideas to another social environment in itself changes their meaning and function”(Krastev (2000a), p.276)
Only independent institutions can promote a change credibly. Embedded and established experts tend to defend status quo. Lack of analytical capacities of political parties in practice leads to acceptance of policies created by direct influence of interest groups affecting state bureaucracy. Public interest is understood as an outcome of particular and individual interests aggregated through political parties, discussed in media and on various platforms. Research institutions like think-tanks provide standing platform for such discussions and contribute to the public debate by relating it to data, values and interests.
Growing importance of soft governance brought attention to networks as a way of communication complementary to hierarchical and market mechanisms. International NGOs and advocacy groups use networking as powerful instrument in pursuing their agenda. Academic networks called “epistemic communities” or “knowledge networks” facilitate common understanding of various aspects of policy and society. Think-tanks are like knots of policy networks.
“There appears to have been a growth in think tank activity at the European
level in the last two decades, perhaps simply explained by the deepening
of EU competences, the increased impact of EU policy-making on member states,
and thus a heightened awareness of all things European.” (Sherrington (2000b),
p.173)
An ability to participate in international networks multiplies options and horizons to pursue interests. Think-tanks capable of networking on European and international level increase country´s competitive edge. Analysts have observed that international governance offers new opportunities for private, non-governmental research institutions to affect policies:
“the demand for advice and expertise has grown as the EU has matured. Therefore, EU policy-making processes can provide think tanks with a variety of windows for influence. The issue then is whether such potential has been exploited” ((Sherrington (2000b), p.178)
European lobbyists have realized that they need a robust and credible research capabilities in advancing interests of their clients. No wonder that some think-tanks have become involved in interest promotion.
Think tanks aim to influence policy through analysis and argument, rather than by direct lobbying. ... However, Euro-groups that have developed think tank characteristics ... blurring the distinction between think tank and lobby group.((Sherrington (2000b), p.178)
As we have shown in previous chapters, some think-tanks (especially those involved in monitoring of existing policies) in new member countries have adjusted their financing to European funds. Hence their dependency on public funding has been growing. Think-tanks aspiring to shape European policies have to be financed not only from public resources. Some interest groups in Central Europe have realized a need for professional expertise in promoting their case and advocating their interests. However, they usually use services of well-established lobbyist-firms in Brussels instead of supporting local think-tanks.
Financing of think-tank is risky like investment into new technological start-ups. Not individual investors, bur only foundations with diversified portfolio of donors can bear such risk. On the other hand financing think-tanks means investment in highly flexible and educated human capital that can be used both in private and public sector. Think-tanks - operating either on the principle of “revolving door” or that of “career switch” - are in fact “reservoirs” (Mesežnikov) of reform-oriented experts that can increase public policy-making capacities.
In any case, think-tanks - as intermediary structures, platforms, forums,
reservoirs - can significantly contribute to the quality and transparency
of policy-making process, to the cultivation of political culture and after
all, to the growing trust in an open democratic procedures.
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