
Political Recruitment in Romania: Continuity and Change

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Party recruitment and selection processes have serious implications for how power and decision-making authority is distributed within political parties. Candidate selection reflects and defines the character of a party and its internal power struggles. The effects of recruitment, however, are not limited to intra-party politics. Party recruitment decisions shape the diversity and inclusivity of legislative bodies. They also have a major effect on how relations of accountability and responsiveness develop in a political system. Despite their importance, as a number of authors point out, selection and recruitment issues remain understudied in a comparative perspective (Norris 2005; Hazan and Rahat 2005; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008a).

This chapter contributes to improving our understanding of these issues in the context of Romania's political evolution. By systematically examining the profiles of parliamentary representatives of electorally successful parties, we seek to identify the patterns of party elite recruitment prior to and at the start of Traian Basescu's first presidential term. We argue that there has been a considerable change over time in how parties approach the problem of selecting candidates for legislative office. One of our central claims is that there has been a major shift in how the main parties of the political right, the Democratic Party (PD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL), addressed issues of party elite recruitment once Basescu assumed leadership of the PD. The defining feature of this shift is a considerable increase in the weight of one category of elite members, *Financial Sponsors*, in party leadership positions.

The chapter builds on earlier work on political recruitment in Romania (Stefan 2004), but approaches the issue from a different perspective. Candidate selection is analyzed through the prism of party needs to achieve electoral success and stay competitive in the political process. To achieve these goals, parties must complete a number of tasks, and candidate selection strategies reflect parties' decisions on how to approach the tasks. The chapter proposes a typology

that characterizes party candidates and structures an analysis of the evolution of functional profiles of party elites over time.

We begin with a short discussion of the dataset and our conceptualization of the different functional roles of party elite members. For the purposes of this study, we define party elite status as a candidate's presence in the winning portion of the electoral list and then proceed to examine how functional profiles of party elites evolved over the 1990-2004 period. We first analyze general trends and identify patterns of continuity and change. We then compare functional profiles for the separate parties and provide some explanations for observed differences. We pay special attention to the PD and demonstrate how the profile of its candidates changed dramatically in 2004. We offer a discussion of some structural and agency-based accounts of this specific change and of overall changes in party elite profiles in Romania.

What Party Candidates for Office Do: Functional Profiles

Selecting candidates is one of the key tasks that parties perform in representative democracies. Ranney (1981, 78) describes candidate selection as the "process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates." Party systems and even parties within a party system differ in how they decide on the selectorate, defined as the body that actually selects the candidates. They also differ in what powers the selectorate holds, how candidacy requirements are defined, and the extent to which candidate selection procedures are formalized (Best and Cotta 2000; Hazan and Rahat 2005; Norris 2005; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008a).

For the purposes of this study, which focuses on the types of candidates successful in the Romanian party system, we rely on a simplifying assumption often invoked in comparative research. In a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system such as the one in place in Romania during the 1990-2004 period, the party leadership generally has a high level of control over all aspects of party life, including candidate selection (Shugart 1998; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008b). We model the candidate selection process in Romania during the period analyzed as controlled by that party leadership. In discussing a given party's preferences and interests, we thus refer to the preferences and interests of its leadership. By conceptualizing parties as unitary actors we are able to focus our attention on how candidate selection contributes to achieving parties' electoral objectives. We attend here to parliamentary elections, usually represented in the literature as first-order elections because of their national importance (Reif and Schmitt 1980).

We assume that a party chooses candidates for its electoral list on a basis of the potential contributions that these individuals are expected to make to the party's electoral campaign. Parties face a number of regular tasks in the cam-

campaign period and their electoral lists are expected to reflect party decisions on how to approach these tasks. These usually include: organizing effective campaign leadership and communication of party electoral promises/positions; signaling party credibility on policy issues; securing financial resources to conduct the campaign; and enhancing ground-level voter mobilization. We seek to classify party candidates by the tasks they perform. We argue that the following types of candidates can be distinguished conceptually and, what is equally important, identified empirically with a certain degree of reliability: *National Speakers*, *Policy Experts*, *Financial Sponsors*, and *Electoral Mobilizers*. Some deputies might combine different roles and perform several tasks but there are considerable benefits to be gained from specialization. As with other types of organizations, parties benefit from a hierarchical and segmental division of labor, so the general tendency should be to specialize in executing one of the key tasks. In recognition of a popular post-communist practice of putting famous cultural and sport figures on party lists, we also designate a category for *Celebrities*. These individuals do not perform any of the above functions but might be useful because they are easily identifiable to the electorate.

Finally, to make our typology exhaustive, we include in our classification the category of *Other*. To this category belong candidates whom we were not able to assign reliably to any of the previous types. We do not expect the *Other* category to be highly populated. In party systems where selection powers are controlled by a relatively narrow group in leadership positions, we expect it to be difficult to put forward an individual as a candidate for public office with no ostensibly useful function. Places on the electoral list can be thought of as scarce and highly valuable prizes that party leaders control under closed-list electoral rules; the leaders have to use these prizes to reward those who contribute valuable services to the party.

The candidate classification scheme employed here is intended to be relevant particularly to closed-list PR electoral designs, as used for parliamentary elections in Romania. It is different from the typologies developed to study alternative electoral arrangements (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008a; Canon 1990), and from those developed to classify parliamentary roles (Muller and Saalfeld 1997; Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Esaiasson and Heidar 2000).

Not all places on the electoral list are equally valuable. Only those places that provide a candidate with realistic prospects of being elected are important both for the parties and individual candidates. There are limited benefits attached and hence few intra-party conflicts over those appearing toward the bottom of the party list of candidates. In contemporary Romania, the major parties realistically can hope, at best, that the first half of their candidate list will be elected. We assume that parties have reasonable expectations regarding the size of the winning portion of their electoral list; they usually form these expectations on the basis of pre-electoral political survey data.

Our intent is to examine how parties allocate these valuable list positions among the different categories of candidates. By displaying the patterns of cross-category allocation and analyzing how they have changed both over time and across parties we can improve our understanding of Romanian party politics in general and political recruitment in particular.

Data and Method

To determine a candidate's functional classification we rely on two kinds of information: occupational background and record of political engagement. Occupational background is operationalized as the last job a candidate held prior to being included on the party's electoral list for a given parliamentary election. There is little agreement in the literature regarding how to classify occupations. We utilize a scheme with eighteen mutually exclusive and exhaustive occupational categories that can be aggregated in a number of ways. For political engagement, we examine a candidate's record of holding elected public office and serving in party leadership positions. Occupational and political background provides a wealth of information for determining the set of candidate skills and resources that a party seeks to acquire and exploit. Appendix x-1 provides a summary of these characteristics and coding scheme used to translate them into the six functional candidate types used in this study.

The investigation is limited to the set of successful candidates, those elected to sit in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies. The data set of party elites thus consists of all Deputies. We do not consider unsuccessful candidates since we examine how parties make choices about the allocation of successful positions on electoral lists, not in analyzing how successful candidates differ from unsuccessful candidates (Norris and Lovenduski 1997). Given the effectiveness of pre-election polling, the actual parliamentary caucus of a party provides a reasonable approximation of its pre-electoral expectations about the size of the winning portion from its electoral list. Confining the study to elected Deputies adds the practical advantage regarding data availability in classifying candidates' functional type. Data on non-elected candidates are usually more limited and difficult to obtain.

Social and political background data were collected for all Deputies elected to the Romanian Chamber of Deputies during the five consecutive parliamentary terms, 1990-2007. The data set has 1,950 observations, where the unit of observation is each Deputy per parliamentary term. The coding of data is based primarily on information self-reported by the Deputies and published in the official publications of the Romanian parliament (Camera Deputatilor 2004). These data were supplemented by information from scholarly works (Stefan 2004; Roper 2004; Crowther and Roper 1996) and other published sources produced by commercial and non-governmental organizations (Rompres 1994; Asociatia Pro Democratia 2006). Of the total 1,950 observations, only 106 (5.6 percent) were missing critical data and could not be coded successfully by functional type.

The examples below provide some illustrations regarding how MPs were classified using the typology summarized in Appendix x-1. For example, Dinu Patriciu (PNL) is coded under the functional category *Financial Sponsor* for each of the three terms (1990, 1992, and 2000) that he served in the Chamber. Patriciu is one of the richest businessmen in Romania; he has been linked repeatedly to financing the campaign expenses of the PNL and other parties (Bojin 2006). Yet one need not be a businessman to be categorized as a *Sponsor*. High-level civil servants are also included because, despite their bureaucratic status, they usually are political appointees occupying top positions in resource-rich departments and are expected to provide through their agencies some material support for their parties. Similarly, managers of state enterprises are coded as *Sponsor*, being political appointees who control substantial material resources and receive high personal enumeration.

By contrast, Buruiana Aprodu Daniela (PRM) was first elected to Parliament in 1990 and has served as a member of the PRM's executive committee since 1991. Based on her seniority, she has been coded as a *National Speaker* since 2000. In addition, the June 2005 MP's Image Barometer registers 85 references and 28 media appearances for this Deputy (Camera Deputatilor 2005). Frequency of media appearances would enhance the validity of the *Speaker* indicator but no systematic record of media appearances by Deputies is available.

Trifu Romeo Marius (PD), who was president of the Sibiu county council prior to his election to Parliament in 1996, is coded as an *Electoral Mobilizer*. Adrian Severin (PSD), author of numerous studies in the fields of international economics and trade law, is a *Policy Expert*. Irina Loghin (PRM), one of the most popular Romanian singers, is coded as a *Celebrity*. Francisc-Atila Vaida (UDMR), whose biographic details indicate no political experience and specify only that he was a photographer prior to being elected to the 1996 Parliament, is coded as *Other*.


Evolution of Functional Profiles: Aggregate Picture

Presentation of the data collection and classification efforts starts with general information about the allocation of elected Deputies across the different functional categories.

As seen in Figure x-1, *Electoral Mobilizer* was the most populated category, comprising approximately one-third of all successful candidates on the party lists. The *National Speaker* and *Financial Sponsor* categories each had more than fifteen percent of successful candidates. The *Policy Expert* and *Other* categories each had more than ten percent of successful candidates. Interestingly, there were comparatively few *Celebrities*. Despite the high visibility of some *Celebrity* personalities in electoral campaigns, their relative weight among successful candidates was less than five percent. The results suggest that Romanian parties allocate a significant number of seats to individuals representing the four main functional campaign tasks described above. The fact that the largest share

of successful candidates belongs to the *Electoral Mobilizer* category is not surprising; it reflects the need for political parties to recruit and reward partisan activists engaged in local mobilization efforts.


Figure x-1: Functional Profiles of Elected Candidates
Chamber of Deputies, 1990-2004



We also examined the changing distribution among the functional categories over the 1990-to-2007 period (Figure x-2). The changes have been substantial. Party decisions regarding how to allocate highly valuable positions on the winning portion of their electoral lists have not been identical across parliamentary terms. In the first two elections, 1990 and 1992, about 60 percent of elected candidates came from only two functional categories: *Electoral Mobilizer* and *Other*. The high share of *Other* in 1990 is a reflection of the embryonic state of party system development and the transitory nature of the 1990 parliament. The share for these two categories changed in 1992: the *Mobilizer* category became much larger at the expense of *Other*, reflecting the political experience gained in the aftermath of the founding 1990 elections.

The profile of elected candidates became more diverse in subsequent parliamentary terms. In part this a function of our coding rules. We assume that seniority matters for acquiring a national level reputation and thus we code third-term MPs as *National Speaker*, which in part explains a significant redistribution between the *Mobilizer* and *Speaker* categories since the 1996 elections. Yet increased diversity in the profile of Deputies is also the result of substantive changes in party decisions about selecting candidates of certain types.

Figure x-2: Distribution of Functional Profiles by Year
Chamber of Deputies, 1990-2004



These substantive changes are best seen by comparing the *Expert* and *Sponsor* categories in Figure x-2. Over time, the share of *Expert* candidates decreased substantially: only 6 percent of elected candidates are classified as *Expert* in the 2004 elections. An opposite dynamic is registered for *Sponsor* candidates, increasing dramatically over time and peaking in 2004. In that parliament, 31.9 percent of the candidates elected to the Chamber of Deputies are classified as *Sponsor*.

The changing share of *Experts* provides an interesting illustration regarding how party recruitment decisions are influenced by what other parties do. As Figure x-2 indicates, the share of *Experts* was highest in 1996. At the start of the 1996 electoral campaign, the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR), a center-right electoral vehicle designed to compete with Social Democrats, widely advertised its intention to bring fifteen thousand policy experts into the government to address the country's most difficult problems. To make this promise appear credible, the parties that constituted the CDR put a record number of *Experts* on their electoral lists. Among the PNL candidates elected to the Chamber of Deputies, for example, the share of *Experts* was 22 percent. Interestingly, the share of *Experts* in the winning portion of the Social Democratic list also

proved to be the highest in 1996 (12 percent). The explanation is the desire to counteract and neutralize a competitor's claim, resulting in a simultaneous increase in the number of *Experts* by rival parties.

Another noticeable feature in Figure x-2 is the continuing presence of candidates classified as *Other*. Following the initial decline for this category in 1992, *Other* candidates were elected to subsequent parliaments in a proportion that varied only slightly. They constituted, for example, 10.6 percent of all candidates elected to the 1996 parliament. By definition, these candidates do not appear to have identifiable functions. It is therefore difficult to reconstruct the reasons why they appear in the winning portion of electoral lists. There are, at a minimum, two different explanations for the selection of *Other* candidates. They might be individuals who enjoy a high degree of respect in their localities due to their professional or civic activity; the party leadership seeks to recruit such people because of their reputation and disregards the fact that they lack previous political experience. The other logic suggests nepotism and clientelism as reasons for recruitment: relatives and personal cronies are placed high on electoral lists by influential party leaders. Unfortunately, we do not have context-specific data sufficient to evaluate these competing explanations.

The *Sponsor* category provides an interesting contrast as the only category that experienced a considerable increase in recent elections. This outcome was not accidental, but instead was intended by the leadership in a number of parties as a way of gaining competitive edge. This is well documented in the Romanian literature on candidate selection. Stefan (2004) reports a number of cases, primarily with regard to the Social Democrats, where businessmen with no party experience were placed high on the candidate list for the Chamber of Deputies, dislodging MPs with significant parliamentary careers. He cites one of his interviewees, a PDSR MP from a provincial district, who complained openly about the way a prominent party leader simply imposed his will and placed a high-profile businessman in the second position on the candidate list for the 2000 parliamentary elections. Our systematic analysis of data suggests that such cases are not rare.

The increase in party preferences for *Sponsors* as candidates can be seen as a reflection regarding the financing of Romanian political parties. Romanian political parties to a high degree depend on sources of finance other than the public sector (Roper 2002; Stefan 2004). The business community is widely recognized as a major contributor to party coffers. Our own analysis of party income data, based on the combined 2003 and 2004 official reports (Moraru 2004) for all electorally relevant political parties, reveals the following breakdown: state subventions account on average for 19 percent of party income, membership fees for 24 percent, donations for 49 percent, and other sources for 8 percent. The share of donations is most likely higher if one takes into account unofficial party budgets. The existence of such budgets is confirmed by estimates about party media advertisement expenditures, which often are much

higher than the parties' total declared income (Asociatia Pro Democratia 2001; 2004). As Roper, Moraru, and Iorga (2008, 150) conclude regarding political party finance in Romania: "The lack of transparency has led in certain cases to the transformation of the party's finances into a private business. This mechanism starts with the charging of 'fees' for candidates that are not reported, the obtaining of contributions that remain undeclared and the conclusion of contracts with companies owned by party members resulting in exaggerated settlements."

While the motivation of a party's leadership to prioritize *Sponsors* on the electoral lists is straightforward, the reason why successful entrepreneurs or managers seek a political career requires further elaboration. Although parties depend on business contributions in all types of political systems, in developed democracies as a rule business managers do not seek a personal presence in Parliament. They provide financial support in exchange for party promises of substantive consideration for business interests. These come either in the form of general policies that are universalistic in their application, or in the form of particularistic (clientelistic) measures designed to reward only contributors to party coffers. In either case, the exchange between parties and business groups does not involve the actual presence of business managers on electoral lists. The composition of the lower chamber of German parliament is representative of West European practices in this respect: only 3.7 percent of legislators elected in the 1994 elections, for example, were managers/employers; another 3.8 percent came from public administration. Professionals, not business people or civil servants, constitute a major source of recruitment in Germany and other established European democracies (Norris, 1997).

As we have argued elsewhere in greater detail, the disproportionately large presence of business elite members on party lists in Romania can be attributed to the specific circumstances of its democratic transition that makes the parliamentary recruitment of business elites an important feature of clientelistic exchanges (Protsyk and Matichescu 2011). Transition generated a highly uncertain legal and property environment for businesses and made them seek personalized political protection. The continuing uncertainty of the regulatory framework, plus potential weakness of legal ownership status, precludes business groups from relying predominantly on substantive consideration and mere party promises of policy support. Business groups instead seek direct representation in political decision-making bodies. Exchanging financial support for a share of parliamentary seats under party control thus becomes an important aspect of business group strategies to protect and advance their interests. Having the status of MP is especially beneficial, not only because of its general prestige and guaranteed access to policy-making, but also due to legislative provisions common in the post-communist world that grant Deputies a degree of immunity from criminal prosecution (Fish and Kroenig 2009).

Functional Profiles: Cross-Party Comparisons

Aggregate proportions can hide important variations in the candidate profiles of individual parties. Our primary interest in this section is to examine whether the trend reported earlier, the growing weight of *Sponsors*, is similar across all the main political parties. The fact that this category of candidates has grown most dramatically in recent years can have serious implications for the Romanian political system. The question now becomes, do parties that face similar competitive pressures develop similar functional profiles of their candidates?

Figure x-3: Percentage of *Sponsors* by Year and Party Chamber of Deputies, 1990-2004




Figure x-3 reports how *Sponsor* shares have changed in the separate party profiles for successful candidates over time. We omit the founding 1990 elections when parties were still in an embryonic state and provide data only for the four parties that consistently have played an important role in Romanian legislative politics: Social Democratic Party (PSD), Democratic Party (PD), National Liberal Party (PNL), and Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). As the Figure indicates, a significant increase in the number of *Sponsors* is registered only toward the end of the period analyzed and only for two of the four parties, PD and PNL.

The great increase took place in preparation for the 2004 elections, when future President Traian Basescu was taking control of the PD and assuming general leadership of the liberal forces in Romania. Aggressive recruitment of business and civil service elites can be attributed to this change of leadership within the liberal camp, given that the party leadership controls the process of electoral list formation. While Stefan (2004) illustrates the workings of this mechanism


primarily using evidence from the internal politics of the Social Democrats, our data indicate that prior to the 2004 parliamentary elections the recruitment of *Sponsors* became a more prevalent practice for liberal parties than for the PSD. Of the two liberal parties, the PNL had the largest share of *Sponsors* in its incoming 2004 class of Deputies, yet it was the PD that experienced the largest percentage increase in the number of *Sponsors* in 2004 compared to previous years.

UDMR's record of recruiting *Sponsors* is different from the record of the other parties. UDMR had a lower share of *Sponsors* on its electoral lists throughout the period analyzed, including 2004. UDMR's approach to candidate selection might reflect the special circumstances in which ethnic minority parties operate (Alonso 2007; Birnir 2007). The party had developed and maintained highly secure and stable linkages to Romania's ethnic Hungarian community. The party's near monopoly on the minority vote seems to have made the UDMR leadership less dependent on business-provided financial resources than the parties that compete in a more open electoral marketplace.

Figure x-4 presents by party the complete functional profile for successful candidates in the 2004 parliamentary elections. As anticipated, the PD and the PNL show somewhat similar cross-category distributional patterns. *Sponsor* is a mode category in both profiles. *Mobilizer* is the second and *Speaker* is the third most populated categories for both parties. The remaining categories play a minor role. However, while PD and PNL candidate selection profiles proved to be very similar for the 2004 election, it is doubtful that this distribution serves the democratic ideal. Ideally, the bulk of positions should most heavily emphasize and balance among *Electoral Mobilizers*, *National Speakers*, and *Policy Experts*. We consider these to be core party tasks in a liberal democracy. The higher percentage of *Financial Sponsors* most likely serves as a distortion, affecting both citizen representation and party competence.

The PSD and UDMR exhibit different patterns of distribution. *Mobilizer* is the dominant category in the case of the PSD, *Speaker* is the second, and *Sponsor* is only the third most populated category. The *Expert* category, although small, is relatively more populated for PSD than PD and PNL. For UDMR, the largest proportion of candidates is coded as belonging to the *Speaker* category. Given that this category is constructed to include senior MPs, its status as a mode category in the UDMR's distribution principally reflects high incumbency rates and the long political careers of the UDMR's politicians. *Mobilizer* is the second most populated category for UDMR; *Sponsor* and *Expert* categories share the position as the third most populated. Overall, the distribution of candidates across all categories over time proved to be more stable in case of the PSD and UDMR than for the liberal parties, which could be interpreted as a product of greater continuity in the internal organization of these parties.

Figure x-4: Distribution of Functional Profiles by Party
Chamber of Deputies, 2004



One distributional feature common to all four major parties reported in Figure x-4 is the relative absence of *Celebrities* in the rosters of successful candidates. *Celebrity* candidates constituted 2.8 percent (8 persons) of elected Deputies in 2004. None came from the four major political parties. It was only the smaller and less institutionalized parties that felt a need in 2004 to rely on the problematic strategy of recruiting popular artists and sportsmen in order to boost their public appeal.

Conclusion

This chapter proposed a functional categorization of candidate types that political parties recruit for legislative office and it examined how parties allocate valuable list positions across the different categories of candidates. We identified patterns of functional allocation and analyzed how these patterns have changed over time and across parties. We argued that analyzing political recruitment through the prism of the electoral campaign tasks that the parties undertake in a competitive political environment improves our understanding of the candidate selection process and its outcomes.

The chapter also suggests important differences regarding how candidate selection and recruitment is organized in Romania in comparison to developed Western European democracies. The key difference is the very significant presence in Romania of top entrepreneurial, managerial, and bureaucratic elites in the ranks of party candidates for legislative office. By contrast, recruitment in

Western Europe is dominated by candidates with long party career records and professional occupational background. Only rarely do a country's richest entrepreneurs or successful business managers trade their careers for a parliamentary mandate.

Our findings indicate that the share of *Sponsors* in the profile of successful candidates has been increasing in Romania over time. In comparison to the early 1990s, the share of *Sponsors* in the incoming classes of parliamentary deputies had almost doubled by 2000 and almost tripled by 2004. Our research shows that changes in recruitment practice by the liberal parties were primarily responsible for the overall increase of the presence of *Sponsors* in the Romania parliament. These changes are associated with Basescu's assumption of the primary leadership position within the liberal camp.

While the radical overhaul of liberal party elites undertaken by Basescu and his supporters might have been dictated by legitimate dissatisfaction with the performance of former elites, a strong reliance on *Sponsor* candidates in the ranks of the parliamentary caucus contains serious risks for the quality of democracy in Romania. Relationships between business and political elites that are too close and intertwined tend to feed into and strengthen clientelistic exchanges designed to generate particularistic benefits. Clientelistic practices undermine the party system's ability to produce universalistic policies and to structure citizen-politician linkages along programmatic lines. Similar to their Western European counterparts, Romanian liberal parties should pursue democratic, pro-market development policies intended to benefit society at large. This project might well be compromised by any heavy dependence on powerful business and bureaucratic elites as a dominant source of candidate recruitment for political office.

Romania altered its electoral law before the 2008 parliamentary elections. Further research is needed to conceptualize how the so-called uninominal reform affected the motivation and strategies of the political parties. The reform can be seen in part as an expression of societal dissatisfaction with voter-politician relationships as they have operated for more than a decade. Although the practical effects of the change so far appear to be minor (Marian and King 2010), it is necessary to investigate, both analytically and empirically, whether the reform alleviates or compounds the identified recruitment problems. In light of the findings reported above, such work would be of a considerable substantive and theoretic value.

Appendix x-1: Functional Typology for Classifying Party Candidates

<i>National Speaker</i>	Leaders/deputy leaders of parties; senior MPs (members of the Chamber of Deputies for a minimum of two terms); cabinet members; heads of national agencies.
<i>Electoral Mobilizer</i>	Regional and local level politicians (prefects; majors; county councilors); incumbent MPs whose prior work experience does not qualify them to be included into any other category; trade union leaders; professionals (lawyers, engineers, doctors, etc.) and blue collar workers with party office experience; medium and low level civil servants.
<i>Policy Expert</i>	Academics; think tank and NGO employees; diplomats.
<i>Financial Sponsor</i>	Entrepreneurs; managers of private and state enterprises; business association leaders; high-level civil servants on the national or regional level.
<i>Celebrity</i>	Culture, media, and sport professionals.
<i>Other</i>	Candidates who do not fit any of categories above (for example, a professional without any previous public or party office experience).

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