Building a Strategic Partnership: Overview

When asking a Ukrainian official whether Ukraine is a part of Europe one risks receiving a rather irritated advice to look at a map. Until recently, for a vacant observer the Ukraine-EU dialogue often resembled a ping-pong of statements, with Ukraine arguing "We are Europe too", referring to a daughter of the 11^th century ruler of the Kievan Rus, Yaroslav the Wise, who became a French queen, and the EU responding politely in a similar manner.

In April 2000 German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer announced that Europe should be moving towards full integration and finally forming a single federal state with common legislation, common executive bodies, and common foreign and security policy. The plans for building a common European home captured minds of politicians and brought the question "What IS Europe?" to the agenda. As the word Europe has been often used to refer to 27 states (i.e., current members of the EU plus countries in the process of accession negotiations), there has been increasingly frequent criticism of the EU for "privatizing the notion of Europe".

In Ukraine's case, the question is not limited to "geographical" and "culturological" discussions on whether or not Ukraine is a part of Europe. Rather, the question is whether Ukraine has a realistic chance to claim membership in the EU in the foreseeable future and what real steps are being made for that.

Until recently, EU's willingness to continue dialogue with Ukraine along the lines of the PCA rather than start talking about an association agreement could be expressed in much-quoted comment of EU commissioner Guenther Verheugen who described any discussions about Ukraine's potential candidacy for membership as "irresponsible" and added: "I think that anybody who thinks that Ukraine should be taken into the EU should perhaps come along with the argument that Mexico should be taken into the USA"¹. The problem is not just that Ukraine's per capita GDP is only about one-fourth of that of Slovakia and less that one-fifth of that of Hungary - some candidate states, Romania and Bulgaria are doing rather modestly in terms of their economic progress. The problem with Ukraine is that it has been too slow in transforming its institutions, economy and society to meet the accession criteria.

A Balance Sheet

In its day, Ukraine was the first among countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU in 1994 and join the Council of Europe. European integration (and Euro-Atlantic integration too, which later was quietly dropped from Ukraine's official language). However, the PCA was ratified only in 1998, when other countries of Central and Eastern Europe had already moved far ahead in their associated membership. The Ukraine-NATO Special Partnership Charter may also be listed among scarce integration achievements. On June 11, 1998 the Ukrainian President approved the Strategy of Integration of Ukraine to the European Union² that stipulated adaptation of the Ukrainian legislation to the EU standards and development of economic relations and trade with the EU and stipulated that “national interests of Ukraine require identification of Ukraine as an influential European country, full-fledged EU member”. The particular emphasis is made on the fact that as a result of the EU eastward enlargement to include Poland and Hungary Ukraine will have a common border with the EU, “which would create a principally new geopolitical situation” that requires a “clear and comprehensive definition of the foreign policy strategy concerning Ukraine's integration to the European political, economic and legal space”.

The Strategy built heavily on the Polish EU accession strategy and was seen as a mechanism of preparing Ukraine for fulfilling criteria for the EU associate membership in the near future. It set out main priorities in activities of state executive bodies for the period until 2007 year, by which conditions required for making Ukraine able to claim an EU full-pledged member status were expected to be achieved. The main foreign policy priority of Ukraine in the middle-term perspective was defined as acquiring a status of the EU associated member.

The Strategy specified the principle guidelines of the integration process as follows: 

Approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU legislation in order to “ensure development of political, business, social, cultural activities of Ukraine's nationals, economic growth of the country within the EU framework as well as would facilitate gradual improvement of the well-being, making it closer to the level existing in the EU member-states”. The planned reform of Ukraine’s legal system covered private, customs, labour, financial, tax, and intellectual property legislation as well as legislation dealing with protection of life and health, environment, consumer's rights, technical rules and standards, transport and other industries as defined in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Ukraine and the EU. The legal approximation process was expected to proceed in four stages:

• implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement,
• signing sectoral agreements,
• bringing current Ukraine's legislation up to the EU standards,
• creation of a mechanism for adaptation of Ukrainian draft legislative acts to the EU standards. 

Economical integration and development of trade relations between Ukraine and EU. According to the PCA, development of economic integration involves liberalization and synchronization in the EU and Ukraine markets opening, achievement of a harmonized trade balance, creation of a favorable investment climate in Ukraine, facilitation of access of Ukrainian goods to the EU market, measures to enhance competition and counter state protectionism. A possibility of potential mutual advantages of a free trade area was offered. The Strategy envisaged steps towards development of sectoral cooperation by means of coordination and interaction between Ukraine and EU, primarily in the fields of building trans-European transportation routes, energy generation industry and information networks. Following the PCA, the Strategy stressed prospects for cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), particularly prevention and fight against organized crime and drugs trafficking, customs cooperation, scientific and research sphere. Prospects of EU-Ukraine cooperation in the industrial and agricultural sectors, however, were vaguely defined.

Each of the government agencies was ordered to develop its own "program of development of relations with the EU", based on the Strategy of Integration. The individual programs, each designed for 18 to 24 months, were expected to be merged to comprise a "National Program of Integration". However, so far the European Union structures have not showed much enthusiasm about Ukraine's integration initiative, explicitly indicating that Ukraine should meet its obligations under the PCA first. Direct contacts between Ukrainian ministries and other central bodies of executive power and corresponding Directorates of the European Commission remain scarce. Outcomes of meetings of the body established to facilitate contacts between the Ukrainian executive branch and the EU, the Ukraine - European Communities (European Union) Cooperation Council, remain, to a large extent, limited to declarations.

Other chapters included European security dimension of integration that argued that “recognition by the European Union of considerable importance of Ukraine in creation of a new European security architecture may and shall be utilized as an important tool of realization of Ukrainian interests in the relations with the EU" though admitted that "strengthening of the security of Ukraine is linked with the achievement of the economic security and political stability in the country”. Foreign policy aspects of consolidation were seen as strengthening of the European security by means of “comprehensive integration of Ukraine into the European political, legal, economical, informational and cultural environment” and “identification of the EU policy towards Ukraine, it's separation from the EU policy towards Russia and support of the European countries and world community of the strategy of integration of Ukraine with the EU”. As a “real step” towards “rapprochement of the political position of Ukraine and the EU” the Strategy proposed “an agreement on joint positions in the UN regarding the global international issues”.

In the area of political consolidation and strengthening of democracy, the Strategy pledged “deepening of political dialogue and improvement of general environment for relations between Ukraine and the EU” in the format of  “summits, consultations on ministerial level, meetings of experts” with the aims of "safeguarding political stability both in Ukraine and on the whole European continent", "securing the peaceful development and fruitful cooperation of all the European nations", "strengthening democratic principles in the Ukrainian society”.

According to the Strategy, the task of European integration was supposed to be fulfilled jointly by a variety of actors of the executive branch, the legislature and local self-governance bodies. Thus, the Strategy provided that “The President of Ukraine shall exercise management of Ukraine's integration strategy. The Cabinet of Ministers shall provide implementation the Strategy of Ukraine's Integration to the European Union. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall implement measures in the field of political relations of Ukraine with the EU and coordination of the activities of executive power bodies in this field. The National Agency of Ukraine for Development and European Integration shall exercise interagency coordination of intersectoral economic and social cooperation between Ukraine and the EU. Other ministries and central bodies of the executive power shall ensure realization of sectoral cooperation between Ukraine and the EU, implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, shall exercise other measures according to their responsibility and tasks defined by the Strategy in order to deepen the support [for] Ukraine's integration to the EU”. The negative impact of the lack of a single body in charge of coordinating and facilitating the entire integration process (like the Committee for European Integration in Poland and similar agencies in other accession states) became even more visible as the National Agency of Ukraine for Development and European Integration was abolished in December 1999 by President Kuchma’s decree on administrative reform in indirect admittance of the Agency’s failure to perform its task adequately. Remarkably, the Strategy contained no mention of the civil society involvement and NGOs as mechanisms of citizen participation in promoting the European integration process.

As part of organizational support for integration, the Ukrainian wing of the Ukraine - EU Cooperation Council was supposed to meet regularly and assess implementation of sectoral and regional programs of cooperation with the EU to monitor the implementation of the PCA. Other efforts to facilitate integration included creation of a variety of education, employee training and professional capacity-building programs for national and local civil servants, funded by the international donor community, the European Commission included. Courses in EU institutions, legislation and decision-making process have been introduced in a number of universities and institutions of further learning. The Strategy even called for development of programs of language training for government officials and professionals involved in implementing the PCA, and for programs designed to improve the quality of instruction in EU languages at schools and colleges, but to date practical outcomes of such initiatives remain scarce.

In order to create demand for European integration, a vast information and awareness campaign was supposed to target the society. The Strategy's information and awareness component was seen as a design for a "wide scale of promotional and informational national campaign with the purpose of supporting Ukraine's integration to the EU", a way of "providing the access to the European legal, reference and other informational databases" by means of setting-up the National Data Centre (Bank) on the EU.

The fact that the declared aspirations did not find an enthusiastic response of the EU did not discourage the Ukrainian leadership. In his inaugural speech on November 30, 1999, Ukraine's newly-reelected president Leonid Kuchma announced - immediately after specifying Ukraine's key foreign policy features as "its multi-vectorness, predictability and stability, preservation of Ukraine's non-block status": "Reaffirming our European choice, we define joining the European Union as our strategic goal. Requirements to EU members in many ways coincide with the tasks to be solved in the domestic sphere. <…> Joining the EU is the matter for the prospects. <…> Ukraine's European choice <…> is dictated by concrete geopolitical realities."⁴

Yet, different, economic realities proved to matter. Nowadays, key themes related to the integration include further implementation of the PCA, financing of safety of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, closed down as part of Ukraine's commitments to the EU in December 2000, construction of compensating nuclear reactors at the Rivne NPP and the Khmelnytsky NPP, the EU's technical assistance to Ukraine in approximation of its legislation to the EU standards, prospects for Ukraine to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), recognition of Ukraine's status as a market economy (which would enable it to avoid anti-dumping investigation and receive international loans at better conditions).

The European Union is Ukraine’s main trade partner except the CIS states. Currently its share in Ukraine's total trade is 22.5% (15.4 % of imports, 14.8 % of exports). At the same time, Ukraine's share in the EU trade is negligible. In 1995 Ukraine accounted for 0.4% of EU's external exports and 0.3% of EU's imports. In 1999 this share declined to 0.3% per cent in 1999, with the share of imports remaining unchanged at 0.3%.⁴

At the end of 1999 the official Kyiv, represented by then Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk, claimed that up to 70% of Ukrainians supported the pro-European course and emphasized the need for a "political signal" that would have given new strength to Ukrainians' strife for European integration. The point was the desire of the Ukrainian leadership to see the words confirming this country's right to join the EU in the future in the text of the EU's Common Strategy on Ukraine, approved at the Helsinki summit in December 1999⁵. To that the EU officials diplomatically responded that there was no need to include the phrase in the official document, as any state situated in Europe has the right to appeal for the EU membership, while hinted that Ukraine should have first completed transition to democracy and free market. Them by the end of 1999, Ukraine had failed to meet 22 provisions of the PCA⁶ and was too far from complying with requirements for joining the WTO and, hence, from proceeding to creation of a free trade area with the EU. Yet, publicly available information about processes and results of discussions between the Ukrainian leadership and EU officials within the Ukraine-EU Committee in charge of monitoring the implementation of the PCA has been limited to declarations that the EU supports Ukraine's strife for European integration and welcome closer ties with Ukraine.

The appointment of the pro-reform Yushchenko government that was prepared to take up international advise for improving the quality of the policy process in Ukraine, making it more transparent and the government more accountable, showed new promise for supporters of Ukraine's pro-European aspirations, particularly after the launch of structural reforms and improvements in the tax collection and energy sectors resulted in substantial economic growth. At the end of May 2000 then Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko announced that his government "in fact removed 50% of [reasons for] criticism made by the EU and blocking cooperation"⁷. He referred to the favorable comments made by Jaime Gama, Foreign Minister of Portugal that then held the presidency of the EC - "The EU is satisfied with recent changes in reforming of the Ukrainian economy" - and the EC Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Chris Patten who was quoted as saying "the Ukrainian colleagues make substantial efforts to lift all questions that have complicated our cooperation". While maintaining that "the EU's position on assistance to Ukraine in this sphere is rather clear today", Victor Yushchenko admitted that "its practical filling is something different. It requires implementation of certain provisions and certain projects of legal nature. I think this will occur in the near future."⁸ The common statement issued by participants of the 3^rd meeting of the Ukraine-EU Cooperation Council also referred to "a quality rise" in bilateral relations.

Commenting on results of Victor Yushchenko's official visit to Brussels in May 2000, head of the government's group of advisors Valery Lytvytsky announced that the EU had demanded clear identification of specific forms and ways of assisting the Ukrainian government in implementation of reforms⁹ and referred to Romano Prodi's reported promise that the discussion about granting Ukraine an associated and, in due course, full membership in the EU might be realistic after Ukraine fulfilled the PCA. Although Ukraine remained rather slow implementing the PCA, recognition of its aspirations for membership was reconfirmed in the European Commission's resolution of March 15, 2001.

  “Agenda – Ukraine”: Progress Record

While emphacising its “European choice”, the Ukrainian leadership repeatedly expressed some key concerns that could be summarized as resentment of “some delays from the European side to give answer to Ukraine's proposals and to decide jointly urgent issues related to further development of bilateral relations between Ukraine and the EU”, particularly given “the fact that such a delay takes place alongside with the acceleration of the EU enlargement process” and calls for clear confirmation by the EU of Ukraine's right to join it once the country meets the requirements for membership, and for the EU support, in a mid-term perspective, of Ukraine's claim for associated membership.

Specifically, the Ukrainian leadership called for consultations on (1) ways to minimise potential negative impacts of the EU enlargement for Ukraine, primarily due to the expansion of the Schengen zone, (2) formalisation and institutionalisation, based on the PCA provisions, of Ukraine-EU relations in the field Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), (3) formalisation and institutionalisation of Ukraine-EU relations in the sphere of foreign and security policy, military and military-technical co-operation, and (4) reforming the system of Ukraine-EC bodies in order to enhance the effectiveness of all existing instruments in the relations between Ukraine and the EU.

The proposals were formally presented as position papers and memoranda to relevant EU bodies: "Position paper for negotiations between Ukraine and the EU on minimising negative impacts connected with the EU enlargement" (early 2001), "Memorandum of Ukraine on concluding an agreement [on co-operation] between Ukraine and the EU in the field of the fight against organised crime" and the Memorandum of Ukraine on "Strengthening co-operation between Ukraine and the European Union in the sphere of Foreign and Security Policy, Military and Military-and-Technical Co-operation" (at the Paris Ukraine-EU Summit on 15 September 2000), a position paper on "Reflection of the Ukrainian side on a Joint Action Plan on Common Action between Ukraine and the EU in the Area of Justice and Home Affairs" (at the third meeting of the Co-operation Committee between Ukraine and the EC on 18 December 2000), and the Memorandum of Ukraine on "Reforming joint bodies that have been set up by Ukraine and the EU in accordance with the provisions of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between European Communities and their Member-States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, of 14 June 1994".

Some practical results have been achieved. The issue of major concern for the EU, the closure of the Chornobyl NPP, has been settled. In 2000, the EU committed 430 million Euro to contribute to the Chornobyl shelter fund. Ukraine fulfilled its part of the Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and the EU and now expects the funding committed by the EU for the construction of compensating capacities at the Rivne and the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plants.

Progress in Ukraine-EU relations includes new bilateral cooperation agreements in the spheres of trade in textiles, opening access to the Ukrainian market for EU pharmaceutical products, liberalizing exports of scrap metal and introducing legislation for protection of intellectual property rights.

The security aspect of the Ukraine-EU relations has developed dynamically, as Ukraine remains an important stability factor in the Baltic - Black Sea region and contributes to the settlement of the Balkan crisis by taking part in peacekeeping operations. 

Ukraine has repeatedly stressed the potential benefits for the EU to use Ukraine's gas transportation system and electricity transportation capacities. In April 2001 Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko called on the EU to involve Ukraine more actively as "an equal participant" in projects that are designed to expand the European energy supply network¹⁰. The offer, however, did not find any enthusiastic response so far, given the plans of construction of a major gas transportation pipeline bypassing Ukraine, through Belarus and Poland, by the Russian Gazprom and a group of European corporations. Last year the Gazprom reduced the amount of gas, transported to Europe through the Ukrainian territory, by more than 7%¹¹.

Questions to be answered

A number of questions in the Ukraine-EU relations remain open. Why did Ukraine from the very start take the option that was not meant to bring it any closer to the EU - the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, while all other countries of Central and Eastern Europe succeeded in making the so-called "Europe agreements" and taking the way of associated membership? Was there any other choice? To what expend Ukraine's European integration prospects were influenced by the different goals and scopes of the two assistance programs, TACIS and PHARE? How realistic is it to make a connection between implementation of the PCA and passing on to an association agreement? No clear answer to these questions has been given so far.

In 1991-1999, the EU assistance amounted to 565 million Euros spent mainly for helping Ukraine maintain its balance of payments. The major part was technical assistance (62% of the whole earmarked in 1991-99) aiming at promoting economic reform, and produced but a limited impact. In 1993, TACIS stopped providing assistance for projects in the agrarian sector due to the lack of any visible reform in the field. Humanitarian assistance was only 14 million Euros. Five-sixths of the TACIS money was spent on supporting an exchange program for higher education, TEMPUS. It was admitted by the European Commission in 1998 that "TACIS alone can not reach significant results'. 'The benefits of implemented projects have been substantial for the individual partners, but did not lead to radical changes in the decision mechanisms."¹²

During the Paris Ukraine-EU summit in September 2000 the EU agreed that Ukraine had made some progress in the pursuit of reforms and officially stated that establishment of a free trade area between Ukraine and the EU is a priority not only for Kyiv but also for Brussels. Since then Ukraine has made some significant steps in the right direction. After the government's session on April 4, 2001, Minister of Economy Vasyl Rohovyi (recently promoted to the position of Vice Prime Minister of the new government which he will now combine with his ministerial seat) announced that Ukraine had practically completed the negotiation process on its tariff policy, a prerequisite for joining the WTO. Of 24 states that are members of the working group on the issue, Ukraine "practically agreed on tariffs" with three states, agreed 90% of issues with four other states and 70% of issues with the rest of the group¹³. According to Rohovyi, Ukraine could expect to join the WTO by the end of 2001 which would enable it to increase the amount of its exports "at least by US$ 1 billion". However, that prospect will become true only if Ukrainian government succeeds in convincing the parliament to adopt a number of bills currently under review by the legislature. The list includes the key issues of export quotas for livestock, sunflower seeds import of agricultural products and protection of intellectual property rights.

While the EU still believes that the PCA and the Common Strategy of the EC on Ukraine offer ample opportunities for cooperation that should be explored at maximum and do not hurry to make any promises concerning changes of Ukraine's status vis-à-vis the EU, developments of the recent half-year appear to have suggested to the EU officials that hope for EU integration can be a stimulating factor for Ukraine's stability, democratisation and reform. In a comment to the International Herald Tribune President of the European Commission Romano Prodi and Prime Minister of Sweden Goran Persson argued that "Ukraine's progress should be a priority for all Europe"¹⁴ routinely expressed their regret about the fall of the Yushchenko government and called on the Ukrainian leadership to continue the pursuit of reform while warning that "the EU had been closely monitoring developments in Ukraine". The traditional reference to Ukraine being "a key factor in the development and maintenance of stability in the whole of Europe", a compliment on the fact of the Chornobyl close-down, a mention of Ukraine's "geographically strategic position" and reassurance that "closer cooperation with the EU is in no way an obstacle to close, fruitful relations between Ukraine and Russia" the two EU men summed up by stating: "[I]t is in the EU's interest to ensure Ukraine's favorable development" and "there is not reason at this stage to limiting further rapprochement". Nothing, however, has been said about what exactly the EU would do to ensure that: "the speed with which we can intensify cooperation is dictated by the pace of reform". Referring to success in achieving economic growth last year, the EU stressed that "continued economic and social reform, efforts to counter organized crime and corruption and promotion of free, independent media should therefore be key concerns for elected representatives and the people as a whole." Noteworthy, so far the involvement of "elected representatives", i.e., the parliament that has very little influence on appointment of the government, in promoting Ukraine's European integration course has been negligible - which may change shortly due to the recent establishment of the Commission for European Integration within the Ukrainian parliament, Verkhovna Rada.

What exactly will Ukraine gain from the EU enlargement? According to Mr. Prodi and Mr. Persson, countries of Central and Eastern Europe who are candidates to join the EU, primarily the ones that have common borders with Ukraine, are a valuable resource for further cooperation, due to their experience of fast and radical transformation and substantial progress they have made in meeting the membership criteria. These countries may be involved in the EU-Ukraine projects and trilateral initiatives between member states, candidate states and Ukraine. "The EU initiative will convey an important message to candidate countries, to the effect that greater involvement in Ukraine will be an important asset in the accession process," the statement read. Indirectly admitting the fact that so far the EU has lacked a coherent far-sighted vision of development of its relations with Ukraine and showed reluctance to search for effective ways of moving the relationship further, the EU officials noted that "it takes two to tango" and that "while the EU and Ukraine may be out on the dance floor, both have to know the steps". Learning, making and adjusting "the steps" maybe made easier by a broad dialogue and learning from the CEE integration experience.

Government Priorities for 2001: An Action Plan?

It would be incorrect to claim that the Ukrainian leadership pays no attention to tasks related to Ukraine's declared European integration course. Yet, since the liquidation of the largely dysfunctional National Agency for Questions of European Integration by a sweeping presidential decree on administrative reform in December 1999, no "specialized" agency dealt with formulating, coordinating, implementing and monitoring European integration efforts. The establishment of a ministry (or department(?)) of European integration, announced lately by the President's chief of staff Volodymyr Lytvyn maybe instrumental in bridging the gap. Nowadays, there is a special department of European integration within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that coordinates the state's diplomatic efforts aiming at rapprochement with Europe. The Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Justice also have structures that contribute substantially to Ukraine's movement towards the EU. However, some of the steps taken by different agencies, are inconsistent and often contradictory, due to the lack of joint policy planning, coordination and information sharing. This is particularly true for the fields of visa, migration, asylum policies, different areas of which are dealt with by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Customs Committee, and even, the case of asylum policy, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Health.

An effort to improve the situation was made by the adoption of the Government's Priorities for 2001 (¹ 109--ð, March 26, 2001)¹⁵. In the list priorities, deepening and broadening of practical cooperation between Ukraine and the EU goes third after "improving the quality of life and enhancing social protection of people; human development" and "stimulating economic activity, savings and investment, creation of conditions for sustainable economic growth in 2002-2004". Specific tasks for the Ukraine - EU rapprochement include "continuing work for harmonizing provisions of the national legislation in order to contribute to free movement of people, goods, services and capitals between Ukraine and the EU in accordance with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement", "implementing organizational measures in every branch, improving the legal basis in accordance with provisions of the Program of Integration of Ukraine to the EU … and sectoral programs in order to approach the EU standards", and "improving working conditions for national subjects of economic activities - exporters by means of further liberalization of foreign economic regime with the EU".

Individual ministries and departments were given specific tasks in the area of European integration.

Ministry of the Interior was ordered to implement a Complex Program for Preventing Crime in 2001-2005 and to draft a National Program for Prevention of Spread of Drugs and Reducing Demand for Them for the Period of up to 2005.

Ministry of Justice was to continue approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU standards.

Ministry of Economy was ordered to "bring the trade legislation in line with the GATT/WTO requirements; complete the negotiation process with member states of the working group and prepare a draft protocol on Ukraine's accession to the WTO to be signed" as well as "to take measures for ensuring quota-free exports of Ukraine's light industry goods to the EU and for the review of the Ukraine-EU agreement on export of metal products" (and also warn Ukrainian metal producers about possible anti-dumping and anti-protectionism investigations). The ministry was also expected to settle "all problem issues in the sphere of trade and investment within the implementation of provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and the EU" and develop cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Also, it was supposed to launch operation of the first part of the Ukrainian section of the Eurasian Oil Transportation Corridor, to develop a national section of international transportation routes and start offering concessions for construction of motorways.

The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources was ordered to "introduce elements of basin management of water resources and environmental management, adapted to the EU legislation (primarily in the basin of the Dnipro river and the Black Sea) and complete its "mapping" work for delimitation and demarcation of the Ukrainian border with neighbor states.

The task, specified for the State Committee for Standardization, was to ensure implementation of the Program of Integration of Ukraine to the EU in the sphere of standardization, certification, metrology and accreditation. In particular, the State Committee for Standardization was supposed to "draft 11 normative legal acts, based on relevant European directives, and draft national standards for 859 issues in accordance with the Standardization Plan of Ukraine for 2001."

The Antimonopoly Committee, jointly with a new entity, the National Council for Development of Competition, were ordered to "ensure Ukraine's participation in international cooperation in the field of competition policy and law in order to prevent limitation of competition as a result of actions committed outside the Ukrainian territory" and cooperate with the European Commission as well as work towards ratification of the CIS Agreement on Coordinated Antimonopoly Policy and facilitate the enacting of the Agreement between the Ukrainian and Russian Cabinets of Ministers on development of competition.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ordered to promote "economisation of foreign affairs" and provide diplomatic support for completing of technical procedures of Ukraine's accession to the WTO, increasing inter-departmental coordination for implementation of Ukraine's strategy of joining the EU, minimizing possible, negative for Ukraine, consequences of accession of countries of Central Europe to the EU", as well as "ensure political and diplomatic support to implementation of measures of the action plan the pursuit of medium-term provisions of Ukraine's integration to the EU".

A significant role in promoting Ukraine's European integration is given to the Foreign Ministry in the area of development of a more active trade and economic cooperation by means of creation of a free trade area, based on WTO principles, within the GUUAM, a fledging initiative of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, while simultaneously maintaining "positive dynamics of trade and economic relations with the Russian Federation and other CIS states" on the bilateral basis. The GUUAM is also seen as an integral part of ambitious projects of building transportation corridors, primarily the Eurasian Oil Transportation Corridor, INOGATE, TRACECA, creation of a transcontinental transportation and communications system and furthering cooperation between the GUUAM members states as a way of diversifying supply of energy sources.

Some of the tasks have already been accomplished. While the agreement on the free trade area was not approved, the Consular Convention between the GUUAM states was signed in June 2001¹⁶. In tune with the declared task of facilitating Ukraine's integration to the EU and cooperation in the field of JHA, since June 2001, the Ukrainian government adopted a resolution under which citizens of all CIS states except Russia and Belarus need valid foreign passports to enter Ukraine¹⁷. Previously the mutual travel exchange was regulated by the 1992 CIS Convention which Ukraine never signed but de facto observed, and citizens of any CIS state could enter Ukraine with any document that could serve as an ID). According to statistics, substantial proportion of illegal migrants that enter the territory of Ukraine and stay or head further to the west come from/though the territory of the Russian Federation and south-eastern parts of the CIS. While building proper borders with the Russian Federation may appear inconceivable at least as long as Ukraine continues to depend on Russia for almost 80% of its energy supply (and continued to be heavily indebted for them), Ukraine may receive assistance from the EU for improving technical infrastructure of its eastern border and, thus, keeping its "porosity" within reasonable limits. The news about the EU's readiness to earmark some funding for strengthening Ukraine's eastern border was brought by Ukraine's Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh from his recent visit to Luxembourg for a meeting with EU officials.¹⁸

While the policy of European integration has been promoted as a foreign policy priority by the Ukrainian leadership and supported (mostly declaratively) by a part of the political elite, it remains far from understanding and approval by the general population. Reported high percentage of supporters of the EU integration as a preferred course for Ukraine amid practical absence of public debate on the issue  may indicate the lack of understanding of the nature and implication of the EU enlargement for Ukraine.

At the level of Ukraine's business and administrative-political elites, the idea of Ukraine's European integration does not enjoy broad support due to the fact that many representatives of that segment of the Ukrainian elite have their key business and financial interests outside the EU. Moreover, many of them are not prepared to comply with a number of guiding principles and membership criteria of the EU, like, for instance, the competition policy. The overall awareness of EU issues, the Enlargement process and costs/benefits of integration remains critically low and has a negative impact on policy-making in the field.

In early May, a Ukrainian Internet news portal, popular among the policy-making community¹⁹displayed results of its online poll asking "What do you need to feel a European?" Only 1.66% of the respondents answered they needed that "Ukraine kept its membership in the Council of Europe"; 17.16% said they would feel European if Ukraine joined the EU. Other answers were as follows: "Ukraine should join NATO" (6.27%), "democratic laws should be adopted" (15.62%), "current legislation should be strictly observed" (13.96%), "our streets should be kept clean and safe" (9.82%), and "salaries should be at least equivalent to US$ 1,000). While the poll was obviously not representative of the whole Ukrainian society and covered the most "informed" group, the results are rather interesting, as they reflect views of decision-makers and opinion-formers.

Far more accurate impression about public opinion and experts’ on the EU enlargement can be obtained from an opinion poll conducted in July 2000 by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS)²⁰ to find out general  public and experts’ perceptions of the EU enlargement process and its likely impacts on Ukraine. Of 100 experts, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Presidential administration and the parliament of Ukraine, the Ministry of Economy, the National Security and Defence Council, governmental and independent think tanks. The conclusions suggest that the national decision-making elite is the strongest supporter of the idea of European integration (48%). The advocates of this course are more numerous than advocates of integration with Russia, the CIS or the USA taken together (39%). However, the Ukrainian population seems to be more supportive of the ideas of integration with the CIS and, primarily, Russia (57% support, 31% and 26% respectively), while only 29% saw relations with the EU as the top priority, the UCPES poll demonstrated.

Another major difference in perceptions of experts and the general population is that while 49%) of “ordinary” respondents believe EU is interested in Ukraine’s accession, and 31% have an opposite view, the predominant majority of experts (84%) agree that EU is increasingly sceptical about Ukraine’s prospects for full membership. As reasons for EU’s lack of interest in Ukraine’s accession, experts refer to the slow pace of democratization and economic, legal, institutional and administrative reforms in Ukraine, low quality and, hence, low competitiveness of the bulk of Ukraine-made goods and, finally, the fact that Ukraine’s share in EU’s foreign trade is only 0.42%.

What are the reasons for that disparity in attitudes among the elite and the general population? First, it reflects the fact that European integration remains a matter of government-sponsored discussion within a limited group of experts but not a matter of everyday life visible to the population. Second, general information about the EU is lacking, and a targeted information campaign about European integration has yet to be developed. According to the UCEPS study, 74% of representatives of the decision-making elite that took part in the poll describe the level of information support for the European integration course as totally inadequate. Among the general population, 28% do not have information about European integration processes at all. The proportion of those who do not have information about European integration among decision-makers and experts is “only” 7%. Meanwhile, both the elites and the general population operate myths rather than facts. The elites also appear to be reserved about prospects of opening EU markets for Ukrainian goods and services, particularly referring to politically-motivated rejections of Ukraine’s projects (like the Antonov-7X cargo aircraft) and a number of anti-dumping investigations.

According to the poll respondents, the driving forces (institutions) of the European integration process include: the President of Ukraine (31% experts, 42% population), the government (at that time, led by Victor Yushchenko, with Borys Tarasiuk as Foreign Minister) (19% experts, 11% population), NGOs (14% experts, not mentioned by population), the Ukrainian business community (12% experts, not mentioned by the population). Both experts and the population are noticeably sceptical about the role of the parliament (1% experts, 3% population). 14% of the population do not think any institution in Ukraine promotes European integration, and 30% refrain form answering the question. Yet, the predominant majority of experts (77%) believe that Ukraine’s relations with the EU have worsened, while only 12% of the population share this opinion and 45% believe development of the relations should be described as stagnation.

Experts are almost unanimous in seeing key points that weaken Ukraine’s quest for EU accession: poor economic performance and slow reform (92%); rampant corruption (90%); flawed taxation policy, lack of transparency and instability of economic legislation (90%). Far fewer are concerned with lack of democracy (54%) and lack of respect for intellectual property rights (41%). Noteworthy, only one third of experts surveyed by the UCEPS (33%) pointed to Ukraine’s excessive dependence of Russia on energy sources, and very few believe that Ukraine’s prospects for EU integration are hindered by Ukraine’s membership of the CIS. The reasons for this view may be the reluctance of Ukraine’s business-political elite to see the CIS, and primarily Russia, where most of their business interests lie, as a challenge to the EU integration course, which most of them, in their turn, see as something abstract.

Therefore, a number of Ukrainian analysts affiliated with various institutions seem to share an opinion that Ukraine’s weak position in promoting her European integration aspirations are caused by the following factors: (a) inconsistent and slow domestic reform; (b) domination of political declarations over practical implementation of Ukraine- EU documents, primarily the PCA and the Strategy of Integration of Ukraine to the EU; (c) weakness of administrative and institutional support for the European integration ambitions; (d) lack of expertise of European integration processes in the government. Key challenges are seen as lack of coordination and coherence of actions of state institutions with regards the European integration efforts and lack of public interest, awareness and support for European integration.

What can Ukraine do to make its European aspirations a reality?

First of all, pursue domestic structural, administrative and political transformation, continue harmonizing its legislation with that of the EU (which may prove a challenge indeed, given the massive, over 20,000-piece EU legislation, the fact that many of Ukraine's bills were initially built on different principles and the slow pace of approximation), make its policies consistent, abide by existing agreements and implement current programs, build up its GDP (which today amounts to only 2.5% of that of the EU) and work for integration as the national strategic goal. Ukraine should also seek to develop tripartite cooperation within the "Ukraine- accession state - EU member state" framework, keeping in mind that its integration initiatives should be also interesting to the EU and the candidate states with whom it intends to cooperate.

Arguing in favor of Ukraine's European choice, Prof. Bohdan Hawrylyshyn, adviser to the Speaker and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, member of the Rome Club and the Ukrainian Academy of Science identified an extensive list of benefits for Ukraine in all spheres: security, good governance, civic participation, economic efficiency and competitiveness, increase in living standards, ability to obtain advanced technologies through market exchange, access to European models of education, social security system, social partnership between the government, businesses and employees, profound cultural exchange.²¹ His list of challenges to Ukraine's European choice includes the poor condition of Ukraine's political institutions, primarily of the judiciary, low quality of governance and economic management, poor economic performance, the lack of a genuine pro-Ukrainian lobby in the EU, and the Russia factor. However, he believes the challenges are not insurmountable, provided Ukraine succeeds in making its legislation predictable and stable, reducing import barriers, taxes and corruption, removing preferential arrangements for some enterprises, and converting the shadow economy into the official sector. The EU, in its turn, should also be more active in assisting Ukraine in completing its transformation and coming closer to the accession goal. In particular, it should be less ambivalent about Ukraine's quest for the accession, expand its technical assistance to facilitate approximation of legislation, encourage Ukraine for implementation of the PCA, assist Ukraine in developing its foreign trade by granting it the market economy status, support its strife for associated membership of the EU and for the accession to the WTO, and allow the free trade area agreement.²² Ukraine's accession to the EU would be beneficial for the EU as well, Hawrylyshyn argues, as it has well-educated population, a network of research institutions, the world's best agricultural land, friendship agreements with all of its neighbors, remarkable interethnic peace and no imperialist or aggressive past.

Instead of Conclusions

Ukraine and the EU do not have an alternative to development of effective cooperation. When in a few years the accession of Poland and Hungary to the EU will make the EU's eastern border the western border of Ukraine, the question of whether or not the broadest cooperation is in the interests of the two parties will become simply irrelevant. Therefore, there is not reason to wait, as it is critical for both Ukraine and the EU to develop an optimum model of cooperation.

As the European Union enlarges to embrace 25, 27 or more member states, the whole system of its institutions will have to undergo dramatic reforms to adapt to the major qualitative change. On the other hand, in order to preserve and improve the fabric of the socio-economic and political entity, the European Union will have to proceed with a common socio-economic policy that would support the monetary union and the Euro, a common set of minimum socio-economic security provisions and social security, a common judicial area to counter organized crime and trafficking, a common asylum and immigration policy, and a common foreign and security policy.

Even though the European Union does not regard Ukraine as a suitable candidate for accession nowadays, there are areas in which closer cooperation is possible, mutually beneficial and, hence, highly desirable. These include, primarily, the areas of a common policy of countering organized crime, a common asylum and immigration policy, and a common foreign and security policy. As Ukraine will soon border on the European Union, and provided the course towards European integration as Ukraine's strategic goal remains, it seems reasonable to take measures to facilitate integration by means of shaping Ukraine's own asylum and immigration policy, foreign and security policies so that to make them compatible with the EU policies.

One of the questions to consider may be whether it is possible that the adoption by Ukraine of visa, border protection and migration policies similar to the Schengen arrangements may convince the EU to move Ukraine from the "black list" of countries for which strict Schengen rules apply, to the "white list" that currently includes all of the accession states except Romania and enables their citizens to travel to the Schengen zone without having to apply for visas for up to 90 days over six months²³. If introduced, the regime could substantially soften the shock that will inevitably follow the closure of the Polish-Ukrainian and, to a less extent, the Hungarian-Ukrainian border, particularly for the populations of the border regions.

Cooperation in the field of common prevention of the spread of organized crime and trafficking is being established, and may develop successfully if more coordination and compatibility are brought into the process by both of the parties, Ukraine and the EU.

Cooperation in the area of environmental protection will be made necessary by the fact that environmental pollution knows no state borders, and effects of environmental (and, particularly, technogenic) disasters in some countries in the immediate proximity of an enlarged EU will be inevitable for neighboring countries and beyond. Therefore, Ukraine - EU cooperation in setting and maintaining common environmental protection and nuclear safety standards will be both unavoidable and mutually beneficial.

The same is true about Ukraine-EU cooperation in maintaining quality and safety standards of food and other consumer products - a necessary condition for the expansion of the scope and size of trade.

About 90% of the structural changes Ukraine has to accomplish to comply with the membership criteria do not have to be linked to accession, as they need to be pursued in any case, provided the state's goal is to overcome the economic crisis and build a functioning market economy. While economic dimension of integration can be relatively clearly expressed in the form of quantitative and qualitative indicators, and claims of political rapprochement may be supported by exchange of official visits and adoption of documents, the real challenge is to ensure that the whole society (the political and civil service elite included) share common European values and work for making them a reality in Ukraine.

European integration efforts would be incomplete without measures taken to promote cultural, educational, scientific and technical integration by means of promoting awareness of Ukraine’s European cultural identity through introduction of European standards in education, science and technology, dissemination of Ukraine’s own cultural gains in the EU, and implementation of joint cultural, research and educational projects.

In the context of EU’s declared transformation “from the Union of states to the Union of regions”, regional cooperation projects leading to regional integration are of particular importance for the EU – Ukraine rapprochement, based primarily on provisions of the PCA and the European Local Government Charter and “decentralization” of the European integration efforts to the micro level: local governments, NGOs, territorial communities, with the broadest involvement of people-to-people contacts.

Since the goal of political and economic development of the EU is defined as strengthening and broadening respect for human rights and civil liberties, no considerations of Ukraine as a "buffer zone" or a "bridge" to security and stability in the region may be taken as plausible unless the country pursues large-scale political and economic transformation instead of merely declaring it.