Borderland or Direct Neighbourhood:

Ukraine-EU Relations in the Field of the JHA Beyond the EU Enlargement

Ukraine, seeing the European Union as an area of freedom, security and prosperity and seeking integration to the European community, nevertheless, has been too slow in transforming its institutions, economy and society for becoming a credible applicant for the EU membership. On the other hand, while having made a political decision to include countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the EU enlargement process, the EU has refrained from making a similar decision concerning Ukraine. As the conclusions of the June 2001 Geteborg summit suggest, Ukraine will become closer to the European Union shortly - at least geographically, with Ukraine's western border becoming the eastern border of the enlarged EU. And yet, it does not look like Ukraine, or its immediate neighbours to the west that are likely to join the EU in the near future, or the EU itself are fully prepared for the new situation and have a clear understanding of ways of attaching practical meaning to declarations of determination to prevent the emergence of new division lines in Europe. While the mutual intentions to develop a working relationship have been officially declared, Ukraine and the EU need to produce effective solutions to the challenges linked to the enlargement, and to involve Ukraine in the European integration processes.

In its day, Ukraine was the first among countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU ¹and join the Council of Europe. European integration (and Euro-Atlantic integration too, which later was quietly dropped from Ukraine's official language) was declared to be the government’s strategic goal. On June 11, 1998 the President of Ukraine approved the Strategy of Integration of Ukraine to the European Union² stipulating, “national interests of Ukraine require identification of Ukraine as an influential European country, full-fledged EU member”. The particular emphasis was made on the fact that as a result of the EU eastward enlargement to include Poland and Hungary Ukraine would have a common border with the EU, which "would create a principally new geopolitical situation” that requires a “clear and comprehensive definition of the foreign policy strategy concerning Ukraine's integration to the European political, economic and legal space”. The Strategy, built heavily on the Polish EU accession strategy, defined acquiring a status of the EU associated member as a top middle-term foreign policy priority and specified cooperation with the EU in the field of justice and home affairs (JHA), alongside with approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the EU legislation, economic integration and development of trade, as the principle guidelines of the integration process.

While emphasising its “European choice”, the Ukrainian leadership repeatedly expressed concerns over the reluctance of the EU to include Ukraine in the enlargement process and called for consultations on ways of minimising potential negative impacts of the EU enlargement for Ukraine, formalising and institutionalising Ukraine-EU relations in the field of JHA, foreign and security policy, military and military-technical co-operation, and, finally, reforming the system of Ukraine-EC bodies in order to enhance the effectiveness of all existing instruments in the relations between Ukraine and the EU. The proposals were formally presented as position papers and memoranda to relevant EU bodies: "Position paper for negotiations between Ukraine and the EU on minimising negative impacts connected with the EU enlargement" (early 2001), "Memorandum of Ukraine on concluding an agreement [on co-operation] between Ukraine and the EU in the field of the fight against organised crime" (at the Paris Ukraine-EU Summit on 15 September 2000), and a position paper on "Reflection of the Ukrainian side on a Joint Action Plan on Common Action between Ukraine and the EU in the Area of Justice and Home Affairs" (at the third meeting of the Co-operation Committee between Ukraine and the EC on 18 December 2000). While the EU has shown limited enthusiasm about Ukraine’s initiatives, some practical results have been achieved, though a number of questions in the Ukraine-EU relations remain open.

While the policy of European integration has been promoted as a foreign policy priority by the Ukrainian leadership and supported by a part of the political elite, it still remains far from understanding and support by the general population. Reported high percentage of supporters of the EU integration as a preferred course for Ukraine amid practical absence of public debate on the issue may indicate the lack of understanding of the nature and implication of the EU enlargement for Ukraine. According to a nationwide opinion poll results³ , 53% of the respondents agreed that "Ukraine's best hopes for the future lie with joining to Europe and the European Union" (20% "strongly agreed" and 33% "somewhat agreed"), while 26% did not share the view (16% "somewhat disagreed" and 10% "strongly disagreed" with the statement) and 20% did not know how to answer the question. Yet, European integration remains a matter of government-sponsored activities within a limited group of experts but not a matter of everyday life visible to the population. General information about the EU is lacking, and a targeted information campaign about European integration has yet to be developed. At the level of Ukraine's business and administrative-political elites, the idea of Ukraine's European integration does not enjoy broad support due to the fact that many representatives of that segment of the Ukrainian elite have their key business and financial interests outside the EU. Moreover, many of them are not prepared to comply with a number of guiding principles and membership criteria of the EU, like, for instance, the competition policy. The overall awareness of EU issues, the enlargement process and costs/benefits of integration remains critically low and has a negative impact on policy-making in the field.

This is particularly true in the field of the JHA. The complexity of the challenges faced by Ukraine, the lack of unbiased information and capacity to counter the challenges effectively, have provoked - amid increasingly frequent warnings that Ukraine risks to deteriorate into a collector for illegal migration and organized crime and growing resentment among Ukrainians of being treated as potential illegal migrants by consulates of EU states - a specific "side effect". While accurate data about correlation between illegal migration, organized crime and drug trafficking are unavailable, Ukrainian law enforcement authorities often tend to link the three phenomena in their public statements, thus, adding to increasing prejudice to representatives of "other" ethnic groups and countries in the Ukrainian society. Ukrainians themselves are affected by growing xenophobia in the EU and the candidate states where public apprehension of the influx of cheap labour, potential instability and effects of increasing heterogeneity of the population on national identity are on the rise. It is estimated that some 500 thousand illegal immigrants arrived to the EU states in 2000, compared to about 40 thousand in 1993⁴ . The influx of immigrants to Western Europe, both legal and illegal, has increased by 20 times within the last decade, and Ukraine is seen as one of the key transit territories. Some 60-70% of illegal migrants are reported to arrive to countries of Western Europe thorough Ukraine⁵ . As the western border of Ukraine becomes "harder" with the adoption of the Schengen rules by the candidate countries that border on Ukraine and the “porosity” of Ukraine’s eastern and northern borders remains, thousands of illegal migrants are likely to stay on the Ukrainian territory. Since the situation in countries that are among leading “donors” of illegal migration is unlikely to improve fast, the challenge, created by illegal migration, as well as related challenges of organized crime, trafficking in human beings and drugs are likely to remain among the main points of concern for Ukraine as well as for the EU.

The pursuit of European integration in general, and cooperation in the field of the JHA between Ukraine and the EU has been substantially hindered by the lack of a specialized agency dealt with formulating, coordinating, implementing and monitoring European integration efforts. The establishment of a ministry of European integration could have been instrumental in bridging the gap, but the idea was dropped from the agenda. On April 13 President Kuchma's press service announced the President had ordered the government and the Foreign Ministry to prepare formal proposals for the establishment of such a ministry by April 30, 2001 ⁶, "for creating effective mechanisms of implementing the strategic course towards European integration", but three months later Ukraine's new Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh announced that no such ministry would be made in the near future, and a department to deal with European integration issues would be formed within the Cabinet of Ministers⁷ . Nowadays, there is a special department of European integration within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that coordinates the state's diplomatic efforts aiming at rapprochement with Europe - but no single body and no integrated strategy for dealing with challenges in the field of the JHA. The issues of visa and migration policies, countering organized crime and trafficking are dealt with by departments at the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Security Service, the State Customs Committee, the State Committee for Border Protection, and even the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Health. As a result, some of the steps taken by different agencies are inconsistent and often contradictory, due to the lack of joint policy planning, coordination and information sharing.

An effort to improve the situation was made by the adoption of the Government's "Priorities for stimulating economic activity, savings and investment, creation of conditions for sustainable economic growth in 2002-2004". Specific tasks in the area of the JHA included the order to the Ministry of the Interior to implement a Complex Program for Preventing Crime in 2001-2005 and to draft a National Program for Prevention of Spread of Drugs and Reducing Demand for them for the Period of up to 2005. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ordered, among other things, to increase inter-departmental coordination for minimising possible - negative for Ukraine - consequences of accession of countries of Central Europe to the EU, seen primarily as introduction of the "hard border regime". Some of the steps, specified in the programs and initiatives, have already been made, but overall success will depend on consistency and continuity of the efforts.

The Challenge

Presenting the draft law "On Immigration" to the Ukrainian parliament, Verkhovna Rada, in November 2000, official representative of President Kuchma in the parliament Roman Bezsmertnyi argued that both immigration to Ukraine and transit migration through the Ukrainian territory had been growing rapidly. According to various data, the estimated number of illegal migrants from countries of Asia and Africa in the territory of Ukraine exceeds 100,000 persons. However, the figure, currently available from the borderguard and security services, reflects only the number of detained illegal migrants. According to Bezsmertnyi, the number of applications for Ukrainian citizenship increased from 5,763 in 1994 to 72,797 in 1999 ⁸. However, the number of claimants of citizenship, asylum or permanent residence permits is not the principle matter of concern. To date, only about 3,000 persons, over 1,600 of them from Afghanistan, have a formal refugee status. The problem is that while in 1991 only 148 illegal migrants were detained on the territory of Ukraine, by the end of 2000 the figure had reached 15,000 a year. According to Bezsmertnyi, at least 1,6 million illegal migrants had stayed on the territory of Ukraine, and more than 80,000 illegal migrants had been detained in 1991-1999, which cost the Ukrainian budget at least US$ 300 million a year - a substantial amount of money for a country like Ukraine. In 2001, however, the number of illegal migrants, detained on the Ukrainian territory, has been reduced by about 30 percent – presumably due to the improved border management and migration control.

In 1999-2000, illegal migrants on the Ukrainian territory became victims of 4,742 crimes and committed 1,240 crimes ⁹. Trafficking in human beings had grown into a leading “specialization” for the Ukrainian organized crime and the third most profitable activity after drug dealing and sales of stolen cars. An average cost of transporting an illegal migrant from a Middle East country to Western Europe is about $6,000.

Transit illegal migration through the Ukrainian territory is not the only matter of concern and the reason why Ukraine is included in the “black list” of countries for which the procedure of obtaining a EU visa is particularly strict. There is also a problem of illegal labour migration from Ukraine to countries of the EU and Central and Eastern Europe. It is estimated that from 60,000 up to 100,000 Ukrainians work illegally in Poland, over 40,000 in the Czech Republic and about 10,000 in Hungary ¹⁰. In addition to 8 thousand Ukrainians who hold formal permits to work in Italy, over 120 thousand Ukrainians stay in that country illegally¹¹ . Currently Ukrainian diplomats are negotiating with Italian counterparts the possibility of “legalizing” some of Ukrainians presently in that country as a part of Italy’s annual 185-thousand immigration quota in exchange for an agreement to return the illegal migrants to Ukraine. Of 303 thousand registered immigrants in Portugal, there are at least 80 thousand Ukrainian labour migrants. The real figure, however, is about three times higher, as many of Ukrainians work in the country illegally. ¹²Due to poor economic condition and slow pace of transformation, Ukraine is likely to remain a potential risk to the EU as a donor of illegal labour migrants and a transit area for organized crime.

To counter that risk and improve its prospects for European integration, Ukraine has adopted a number of legal documents designed to help it improve the situation. Presently Ukraine has a broad (though still insufficient) legal framework for countering illegal migration and organized crime: the strategy of countering illegal migration, introduced by presidential decrees “On the Complex Program of Fighting Crime for 1996-2000” (September 1996), “The Issue of Immigration Control” (February 1999), and the Program for Fighting Illegal Migration for 1999-2000, the law “On Immigration) (July 2001). Ukraine ratified the European Convention on preventing money laundering, search, arrest and confiscation of assets obtained through criminal ways, as well as a number of other conventions on fighting organized crime, and signed bilateral agreements on mutual legal assistance in countering crime with Hungary, Finland, Poland, Cyprus, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. However, Ukraine’s efforts to counter illegal migration are hindered by the lack of readmission agreements with countries of origin of illegal migrants and transit states. To cope, in mid-February 2001 the Ukrainian parliament passed a law "On Amending Some Legal Acts of Ukraine for Fighting Illegal Migration", introducing criminal liability for repeated illegal border crossing. Also, the Criminal Code (Article 19) introduced criminal liability for organising or managing trafficking in human beings. On June 7, 2001, 351 out of 450 members of the Ukrainian parliament voted in favour of the law “On Immigration” that provided for introduction of an annual immigration quota (to be specified by the government) and for the establishment of a single national executive agency for migration. On July 4 the law was signed by the president of Ukraine and came into force one month later. The new law will allow legalization of immigration status of a number of foreigners and stateless persons, for instance, those who arrived to Ukraine before March 6, 1998 under the April 1981 agreement between the USSR and Vietnam for professional training and work, or refugees from Abkhazia (Georgia) who have lived in Ukraine for at least five years. To qualify for immigration, such persons will have to apply for it within six months since the enacting of the new immigration law. Immigration will also be open for officially registered refugees, their parents, spouses and children under 18 who have lived in Ukraine for at least three years. Yet, the potential positive effect of these measures may be limited by the scope of the problem as well as by the lack of adequate response to related challenges.

“Why Bother?”

The Ukraine - EU relations, obviously, are not limited to the issues of borders, visas, countering illegal migration, trafficking, drugs and organized crime. However, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (JHA) is of immediate need and critical significance for countering the challenges, caused to stability and security by proliferation of organized crime, money laundering, smuggling, trafficking in human beings and drugs, as well as for preventing perceptions of insecurity, xenophobia and fear in Europe. Hence, cooperation in the field of the JHA has the potential of becoming one of the most effective and realistic aspects of the much-discussed Ukraine-EU "strategic partnership". The alternative, made as real as ever by the requirement that the candidate states comply fully with the Schengen regime before they actually join the EU, would be a prominent "Schengen wall" between the enlarged EU and Ukraine.

Currently Ukrainian citizens can travel visa-free to 15 countries: ten countries of the CIS (except Turkmenistan), Mongolia and four EU candidate states – Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. Although both Poland and Hungary have officially announced their decision to refrain from imposing visas on Ukrainians as long as possible, the requirement to comply with the Schengen regime and the desire of the candidate states to join the EU even on conditions of the “second-class membership” with delayed freedom of movement of labour have prompted some of the candidate states to waive previous visa-free arrangements with Ukraine. The visa regime, introduced by the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the summer of 2000, showed potential negative consequences for exchange between those countries and Ukraine. On March 1, 2001, Ukraine and Slovakia introduced a simplified visa regime that involved issuing free visas for up to 180 days to a number of categories of professionals, children and students, and half-price visas for individuals travelling within bilateral cultural exchange programs. The increase in the number of qualified staff at consulates also had a positive effect. Similarly, following the EU’s decision to move Bulgaria to the “white list” of states, Bulgaria announced the decision to impose visas on Ukrainians from June 2001 onwards, but shortly chose to postpone the step till October and make the visa regime as liberal and efficient as possible, due to consideration of potential damaging effect that the reduction of the number of Ukrainian tourists coming to Bulgaria could have on the country’s tourist industry.

The visa issue is particularly important in the context of Ukrainian-Polish relations beyond Poland’s forthcoming accession to the EU. In addition to strong historic and cultural ties, Poland’s strong position in favour of minimizing negative effects of its future EU membership on its relations with Ukraine is prompted by massive contacts at the microlevel between eastern Polish and western Ukrainian regions that amount to more than 10 million of border crossings a year and nourish a substantial part of economy at both sides of the border. The introduction of visas – even together with opening new consulates, building infrastructure and providing advanced equipment to border crossing points, arranging a selection of affordable-cost long-term visas etc. – will inevitably reduce the bilateral exchange and cost up to 60 percent of jobs in some towns ¹³. Therefore, while admitting the obligation to comply with the Schengen regime, Poland actively searches for ways of optimising the visa provisions for Ukraine and cooperating in management of their common border. Recommendations for solving the visa dilemma, offered by the Institute of Public Affairs (Poland) include modernization of border checkpoints, improving the performance of consulates and increasing the number of consular personnel to enable them to issue about 5,000 visas a day in countries of Eastern Europe, as well as introducing a variety of kinds of visas that may simplify travelling for individuals. The suggested options include introduction - prior to the EU accession for the duration of the transition period between the accession and the enacting of the Schengen regime for citizens of the new member states - of a national long-term, probably multiple visa, valid only for entry to the candidate state that issued it, and low-cost short-term single-entry visas. Multiple Schengen visas for frequent travellers, businessmen, academic professionals and residents of the border regions are also seen as a solution for maintaining intensive cross-border exchange ¹⁴.

In addition to considering ways to soften the potential shock of the would-be visa regime, Poland works toward assisting Ukraine to manage its borders better. On June 25, 2001, Ukraine and Poland signed an agreement about controlling the border jointly ¹⁵designed to facilitate cooperation between Ukrainian and Polish borderguards, allow them to use the border infrastructure more effectively by sharing the checkpoints, and enable Ukraine to reduce the number of personnel at the Western border while strengthening the Ukrainian-Russian border for countering illegal migration. Commenting on the agreement for the press, Commander of the Ukrainian Borderguard Forces Borys Oleksiyenko described it as “yet another step to Europe”. Although the agreement still has to be ratified by the two countries’ parliaments, the ratification is not expected to take long as the agreement is in the interest of both of the parties. For several months, the Ukrainian borderguards have been dismantling the remainders of the old Soviet-time barbed wire infrastructure at the western border and introducing a new job of border rangers – local inspectors who will live in villages and towns at the border and prevent the use of local paths and residents for facilitating illegal migration ¹⁶. Ukraine also prepared for reducing the number of borderguard personnel at the western border while increasing it at the eastern border. According to First Deputy Head of the State Committee for Border Protection, Head of the General Staff of the Borderguard Troops of Ukraine Pavlo Shysholin, the number of borderguards at the eastern border of Ukraine will be almost tripled shortly ¹⁷. However, it is unlikely that simple increase in numbers will make a difference.

Ukraine’s Eastern Border: A “Sister Nation” Dilemma

In tune with the declared task of facilitating Ukraine's integration to the EU and cooperation in the field of JHA, since June 2001, the Ukrainian government adopted a resolution under which citizens of all CIS states need valid foreign passports to enter Ukraine ¹⁸. Previously the mutual travel exchange was regulated by the 1992 CIS Convention which Ukraine never signed but de facto observed, and citizens of any CIS state could enter Ukraine with any document that could serve as an ID). The resolution, however, does not apply to citizens of Russia and Belarus, though it is believed that substantial proportion - up to 90 percent, according to some estimates - of illegal migrants that enter the territory of Ukraine and stay or head further to the west come from/though the territory of the Russian Federation, Belarus and south-eastern parts of the CIS. However, building “proper” borders with the Russian Federation may appear problematic at least as long as Ukraine continues to depend on Russia for almost 80% of its energy supply (and continued to be heavily indebted for them). Some time ago the news about the EU's readiness to earmark some funding for strengthening Ukraine's eastern border was brought by Ukraine's Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh from his visit to Luxembourg after a meeting with senior EU officials. ¹⁹However, many enthusiastic hopes that the burden of illegal migration on Ukraine would be reduced due to the building of strong eastern borders, vanished after the statement of Director of the Treaty and Law Department of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine Oleksandr Kupchyshyn told the press that no demarcation of the Ukrainian-Russian border was envisaged, both because it was "not on the agenda" and "technically impossible to do" ²⁰. The statement caused such a vivid reaction in the media and opinion-forming circles that had to be followed with clarification the day later, by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Oleksandr Chalyi who announced that although for the time being the Ukrainian-Russian negotiations focused on delimitation of the border, Ukraine was determined to have proper borders with all of its neighbouring states. Later on, Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko had to explain: “Kupchyshyn wanted to say something, but said something different what he did not have in mind” ²¹and that delimitation of the Ukrainian-Russian border, “agreed upon by 97 percent” would be completed by the end of 2001. “Both delimitation and demarcation will take place, as for us this is a national security issue,” Zlenko said. Given the presence of up to 2 million illegal migrants on the territory of the Russian Federation, likely to increase to some 3 million shortly unless adequate measures are taken, ²²Ukraine’s desire to establish proper border management arrangements is natural, as it affects Ukraine’s security as well as prospects for its integration with the EU.

Trying to Cope

Seeking to respond adequately to the illegal migration challenge, Ukraine introduced new provisions to its Criminal Code due to come into force on September 1, 2001, that envisages criminal liability for organizing illegal migration and trafficking in human beings. Since early 2000, the Ukrainian Security Service, the State Committee for Border Protection and the Ministry of the Interior have reported about "terminating" more than 90 illegal migration and trafficking channels and detained more than 400 organized groups of illegal migrants ²³. At least 1,300 foreigners, involved in organizing trafficking in human beings, have been deported from Ukraine. The media regularly publish information, communicated by the law enforcement agencies, about detention of groups of illegal migrants and arrests of (mostly transnational) organized criminal groups involved in trafficking hard drugs from Pakistan, India, Thailand through Russia and Ukraine to the EU countries. Last year, for instance, the media were invited to view a demonstrative burning of 624 kilos of cocaine, captured when transported through Ukraine to Belgium. Within this operation, cooperative efforts of the British, Dutch, German, Belgian, American, Ukrainian, Russian, Bulgarian and Kazakh law-enforcement agencies resulted in collection of data and prevention of the purchase or several hundred tons of raw materials used for production of synthetic drugs ²⁴. In 2000 alone, Ukraine signed 28 legal documents in the field of countering international terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and illegal migration, but efforts to counter organized crime, illegal migration and trafficking in Ukraine may be feckless unless they are directly connected with building up integrity of Ukrainian borderguards and police officers whose corruption and involvement in facilitating illegal migration and trafficking has been repeatedly admitted by law-enforcement authorities.

As fighting illegal migration was identified as a key national security concern, in 2000 the number of visas issued by Ukraine to citizens of countries regarded as potential donors of illegal migrants - Angola, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Ghana, India, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo, China, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Somalia, and Sri Lanka - migrants was radically reduced. According to head of the Consular Department of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor Kyryk, in January-June 2000 about 149,000 Ukrainian visas were issued, almost 90% of them to citizens of European countries, the USA and Canada ²⁵. By July 2001, the number of foreigners arriving to Ukraine had increased by up to 6 times. According to First Deputy Head of the State Committee for Border Protection, Head of the General Staff of the Borderguard Troops of Ukraine Pavlo Shysholin, the rapid increase in the number of visits was linked to the introduction, from July 1, 2001, of new streamlined rules of registration of foreigners in Ukraine. In 2000, the Ukrainian borderguard agency registered 28 million visits to Ukraine - not much, compared to about 280 million visits to Poland, but enough to add significance to the issue of migration. The introduction of new registration rules has substantially reduced the time a foreigner had to spend to register with a local agency of the Ministry of the Interior, according to Head of the State Committee for Border Protection, Commander of the Ukrainian borderguard troops Borys Oleksiyenko ²⁶. Until recently, the registration could take from 3-4 hours to several days, cost about $30 and caused massive dissatisfaction of foreigners who visited Ukraine. Under the new arrangements, registration directly at the border will take about 2 minutes and be free of charge. It is expected that all checkpoints at international border crossings will be fully equipped with relevant IT systems by 2003. Initiatives designed to counter illegal migration and organized crime include a joint project conventionally referred to as "The Common Border" carried out by Ukrainian law-enforcement agencies and the International Organization for Migration. The project involves joint policing of the Ukrainian-Russian, Ukrainian-Moldavian and the Ukrainian-Belarussian borders, improvement of the border infrastructure and equipment for document checks, and maintaining a common integrated database. While making the border crossing more “civilized”, measures are taken to reduce its unnecessary “porosity” that has made Ukraine an attractive transit state. A number of immigrants enter Ukraine legally - for instance, with an invitation to study at a Ukrainian college - but then head further westwards as potential illegal migrants to Western Europe. For instance, according to Shysholin, in 2000 alone two thirds of foreigners who had officially arrived to Ukraine to study at colleges and universities of Kharkiv were later detained when attempting to cross illegally Ukraine's western border ²⁷. In order to reduce opportunities for using Ukraine as a transit territory, from July 25, 2001 onwards all foreigners coming to Ukraine are required to fill out an immigration form, part of which is kept at the point of entry by the immigration authorities, and the other part is attached to the passport. According to Shysholin, the new rules, similar to the Schengen practice, will help countering illegal migration.

“Two to Tango”: How Ukraine - EU cooperation in the field of the JHA can be further enhanced?

Until recently, the EU lacked a coherent far-sighted vision of development of its relations with Ukraine in the enlargement process and beyond, and showed reluctance to search for effective ways of moving the relationship further. The situation began to change in mid-2000, after the pro-reform government made steps towards more transparency and achieved, for the first time in Ukraine's history, economic growth. During the Paris Ukraine-EU summit in September 2000 the EU agreed that Ukraine had made some progress in the pursuit of reforms and officially stated that establishment of a free trade area between Ukraine and the EU is a priority not only for Kyiv but also for Brussels. Since then Ukraine has made some significant steps in the right direction. While the EU officials still argue that the PCA and the Common Strategy of the EC on Ukraine offer ample opportunities for cooperation that should be explored at maximum and do not hurry to make any promises concerning potential changes of Ukraine's status vis-à-vis the EU, developments of the recent half-year appear to have suggested that hope for involvement in the European integration processes can be a stimulating factor for Ukraine's stability, democratisation and reform. In a comment to the International Herald Tribune President of the European Commission Romano Prodi and Prime Minister of Sweden Goran Persson argued that "Ukraine's progress should be a priority for all Europe" ²⁸and summarized: "[I]t is in the EU's interest to ensure Ukraine's favourable development" and "there is not reason at this stage to limiting further rapprochement". According to Mr. Prodi and Mr. Persson, an effective way of such "rapprochement" would be involving candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe, primarily those having common borders with Ukraine, in the EU-Ukraine projects and trilateral initiatives between member states, candidate states and Ukraine.

Even though the European Union does not regard Ukraine as a suitable candidate for accession nowadays, there are areas in which closer cooperation is possible, mutually beneficial and, hence, highly desirable. These include, primarily, the areas of a common policy of countering organized crime, a common asylum and immigration policy, and a common foreign and security policy. As Ukraine will soon border on the European Union, and provided the course towards European integration as Ukraine's strategic goal remains, it seems reasonable to take measures to facilitate integration by means of shaping Ukraine's own asylum and immigration policy and measures to counter organized crime so that to make them compatible with the EU policies. Cooperation in the field of common prevention of the spread of organized crime and trafficking is being established, and may develop successfully if more coordination and compatibility are brought into the process by both of the parties, Ukraine and the EU. It is also necessary to continue dialogue at the expert level on the issues of visa policies and develop consultations between Ukrainian and EU experts on ways of preventing negative implications of imposing a visa regime on Ukrainians by the EU candidate states.

A new quality of dialogue between Ukraine and the EU in the area of JHA may be reached within the framework of efforts taken by the Belgian Presidency to develop a network of member states and candidate states to counter organized crime, trafficking in human beings and regulate migration. In this context, the prospective EC's Action Plan for JHA for Ukraine, announced by Chris Patten at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament in March 2001 ²⁹, can contribute substantially to increasing efficacy of Ukraine's border control and customs services and reducing the flow of illegal migration through the Ukrainian territory. The initial EC funding for improving the border controls in Ukraine (and Moldova) - Euro 3.9 million - will be made available through TACIS, but it remains to be seen how effectively it will be used. The lack of a coherent integrated border management strategy and of a single body responsible for coordinating the JHA activities may have a dramatic effect on the whole effort.

So far Ukrainian officials have been arguing an a number of European fora that integration mechanisms should be used more actively to involve countries that share European principles but, for some reason, are not yet prepared for membership, and that the EU should be more explicit in responding for Ukraine's quest for a place in the enlargement process. Cooperation with the EU and the candidate states in the field of the JHA gives Ukraine an important role in the integration process that does not need to be limited to (and perceived as) that of a buffer zone, a "cordon sanitaire" or "the last barrier". When asked by officials and professionals from the EU states about the kind of assistance in the field of the JHA that Ukraine needs, Ukrainian officials routinely ask for more money for building temporary facilities for accommodating detailed illegal migrants and more money for deporting them. Priorities for Ukraine in the field of countering illegal migration have been defined as finishing the procedure of demarcation of the eastern border, finding financial resources for construction of temporary detention facilities for, and deportation of illegal immigrants, and establishment of a single executive entity to deal with migration issues. Yet, important as it is, availability of additional funding for the above purposes may help deal with the consequences but cannot remedy the cause of the problem. Opportunities for the Ukraine-EU cooperation in the field of the JHA include creation of a common information environment and information sharing for fighting organized crime, corruption and money laundering, transfer of practical experience and skills from the EU states and the candidate states to Ukraine, and EU support for development of Ukrainian border management and control infrastructure. Naturally, those steps will require substantial increase in technical and financial assistance from the EU, but benefits of successful cooperation in the field of the JHA will largely exceed the costs of the efforts.

Objectively, burdened with the forthcoming enlargement and stressed by the newly-found necessity to become more understandable and closer to its own citizens, the European Union is unlikely to change its vision of Ukraine from a "strategic partner" to a candidate state until after the first wave of enlargement takes place - and until Ukraine is ready to accept that change. The EU seems to be clear about what it does not want from Ukraine - it does not want Ukraine to transform into an unreformed donor of insecurity, instability, organized crime and illegal migration, or an integral part of an unfriendly Russia-led pact. Yet, the EU is not entirely clear about what it wants Ukraine to become, and has not been explicit enough in separating its policies towards Russia and Ukraine, and considering Ukraine outside Russia's sphere of influence. Cooperation in the field of the JHA may be an answer to the insecurity challenge and an indicator of Ukraine's readiness for a broader dialogue with the EU.

It is generally accepted that introduction of visa regimes as such does not create an effective barrier to illegal migration, drugs and organized crime. In order to maintain the integration processes in Europe and transform it into one security area, there is a need for flexible and innovative approaches to responding to common challenges. In the early 1990s, new opportunities for free movement in Central and Eastern Europe contributed substantially to overcoming historic grievances and mutual prejudice. The regional exchange and cooperation should not vanish after the EU enlargement takes place.