Inna Pidluska
In April 2000, the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, announced that Europe should be moving towards full integration and finally forming a single federal state with common legislation, common executive bodies, and a common foreign and security policy. His plans for building a common European home captured the minds of politicians and put onto the agenda the question "What IS Europe?" As the word Europe has often been used to refer to 27 states (current members of the EU plus countries in the process of accession negotiations), in Ukrainian political circles there has been increasingly frequent criticism of the EU for "privatising the notion of Europe".
In Ukraine's case, the question is not limited to "geographical" and "culturological" discussions on whether or not Ukraine is a part of Europe. Rather, the question is whether Ukraine has a realistic chance of claiming membership of the EU in the foreseeable future, what real steps are being made towards it, and what alternative there may be, if any, to the membership vs exclusion dichotomy.
Until recently, the EU's decision to continue dialogue with Ukraine along the lines of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), rather than start talking about an association agreement, was reflected in the much-quoted comment by EU Commissioner Guenther Verheugen that any discussions about Ukraine's potential candidacy for membership were "irresponsible", adding: "I think that anybody who thinks that Ukraine should be taken into the EU should perhaps come along with the argument that Mexico should be taken into the USA". It is not just that Ukraine's per capita GDP is only a quarter of Slovakia's and less than a fifth of Hungary's - some candidate states, like Romania and Bulgaria, are doing rather modestly in terms of their economic progress. The problem with Ukraine is that it has been too slow in transforming its institutions, economy and society to be a credible applicant. The other side of the coin is that the EU, having made a political decision to include CEE countries in the EU enlargement process and facilitate the development of institutions that would allow those countries to be fully compatible with EU institutions and practices, has refrained from making a similar decision concerning Ukraine.
A Balance Sheet
Ukraine was the first CIS country to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU, in 1994, and to join the Council of Europe. European integration (and Euro-Atlantic integration too, though this was later quietly dropped from Ukraine's official language) was declared to be the government's strategic goal. However, the PCA was ratified by the EU states only in 1998, when other CEE countries had already moved far ahead with their associate membership. While implementation of the PCA had a long way to go, on June 11 1998 the Ukrainian President approved the Strategy of Integration of Ukraine to the European Union, stating that "national interests of Ukraine require identification of Ukraine as an influential European country, full-fledged EU member". Particular emphasis was laid on the fact that as a result of the EU's eastward enlargement, Ukraine would have a common border with the EU, which "would create a principally new geopolitical situation" that required a "clear and comprehensive definition of the foreign policy strategy concerning Ukraine's integration to the European political, economic and legal space". The Strategy defined the principal requirements of the integration process as approximation of Ukrainian legislation to EU legislation, political consolidation and democracy, economic integration and the development of trade, and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, and set out the main priorities for state executive bodies for the period up to 2007, when Ukraine was expected to meet the conditions for full EU membership. The main medium-term foreign policy priority was defined as acquiring the status of an associated member of the EU.
Approximation of legislation was seen as a way to "ensure development of the political, business, social, cultural activities of Ukraine's nationals, economic growth of the country within the EU framework as well as would facilitate gradual improvement of the well-being, making it closer to the level existing in the EU member-states". The development of economic integration was expected to involve liberalisation and synchronisation in the opening up of markets in the EU and Ukraine, the achievement of a trade balance, creation of a favourable investment climate in Ukraine, facilitation of access of Ukrainian goods to the EU market, and measures to enhance competition and counter state protectionism. The Strategy envisaged sectoral cooperation primarily in the fields of trans-European transportation routes, energy generation, and information networks, and stressed cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA), particularly the prevention of and fight against organised crime and drug trafficking, customs cooperation, science and research. The security dimension of integration was covered: "Recognition by the European Union of considerable importance of Ukraine in creation of a new European security architecture may and shall be utilised as an important tool of realisation of Ukrainian interests in relations with the EU". It envisaged "comprehensive integration of Ukraine into the European political, legal, economic, information and cultural environment" and "identification of the EU policy towards Ukraine, its separation from the EU policy towards Russia, and support of the European countries and the world community of the strategy of integration of Ukraine with the EU". However, so far the EU has not shown much enthusiasm for Ukraine's integration initiative, explicitly indicating that Ukraine should meet its obligations under the PCA first. Direct contacts between Ukrainian ministries and other executive bodies and relevant Directorates of the European Commission remain scarce, and meetings of the Ukraine-EU Cooperation Council mostly produce only declarations of intent to continue discussion.
This lukewarm response did not discourage the Ukrainian leadership. In his inaugural speech on 30 November 1999 Ukraine's newly-reelected president Leonid Kuchma announced: "Reaffirming our European choice, we define joining the European Union as our strategic goal." The Strategy of integration into the EU was developed into an ambitious Programme of Integration of Ukraine to the European Union, introduced by presidential decree on 14 September 2000. A number of decrees and resolutions were adopted to facilitate approximation of Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU, and a substantial volume of reports emerged describing the technical assistance and advice given to the Ukrainian government. However, prospects for making practical steps have been largely affected by the lack of adequate institutions capable of producing the desired change.
Nowadays, key themes related to integration, in addition to prospects for EU-Ukraine cooperation in the field of JHA, include further implementation of the PCA, financing of safety measures at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, closed down as part of Ukraine's commitments to the EU in December 2000, the construction of compensating nuclear reactors at Rivne and Khmelnytsky nuclear power plants, EU technical assistance to Ukraine in aligning its legislation to EU standards, prospects for Ukrainian membership of the WTO, and recognition of Ukraine's status as a market economy.
At the end of 1999 official Kiev, represented by then Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, claimed that up to 70% of Ukrainians supported its pro-European course and emphasized the need for a "political signal" to give new strength to Ukraine' striving for European integration. The Ukrainian leadership wanted to see words confirming the country's right to join the EU in the future in the text of the EU's Common Strategy on Ukraine, approved at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. EU officials diplomatically responded that there was no need to include the phrase in the official document as any European state had the right to appeal for EU membership, at the same time hinting that Ukraine should first complete the transition to democracy and a free market. Of about 10 thousand of pieces of Ukrainian legislation, only about 400 actually meet European standards. By the end of 1999, Ukraine had failed to meet 22 provisions of the PCA and was too far from meeting the requirements for joining the WTO to proceed to the creation of a free trade area with the EU. While the EU is Ukraine's main trading partner except the CIS states, and its share in Ukraine's total trade is 22.5% (15.4 % of imports, 14.8 % of exports), Ukraine's share in EU trade is negligible. In 1995 Ukraine accounted for 0.4% of EU exports and 0.3% of imports. By 1999 the former had declined to 0.3% per cent, with the share of imports remaining unchanged at 0.3%. Yet discussions between the Ukrainian leadership and EU officials within the Ukraine-EU committee in charge of monitoring implementation of the PCA have apparently been limited to declarations that the EU supports Ukraine's striving for European integration and welcomes closer ties with Ukraine.
At the end of 1999, the appointment of the pro-reform Yushchenko government, which was prepared to take international advise on improving the quality of the policy process in Ukraine, making it more transparent and the government more accountable, showed new promise for supporters of Ukraine's pro-European aspirations, particularly after the launch of structural reforms and improvements in the tax collection and energy sectors resulted in substantial economic growth. At the end of May 2000 then Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko announced that his government "has in fact removed 50% of [the reasons for] criticism made by the EU and blocking cooperation". He referred to the favourable comments made by Jaime Gama, Foreign Minister of Portugal, then holder of the EU Presidency - "The EU is satisfied with recent changes in reform of the Ukrainian economy" - and by the EC Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Chris Patten, who was quoted as saying "The Ukrainian colleagues are making substantial efforts to resolve all questions that have complicated our cooperation". The common statement issued by participants in the third meeting of the Ukraine-EU Cooperation Council also referred to "a quality rise" in bilateral relations.
Commenting on the results of Victor Yushchenko's official visit to Brussels in May 2000, the then head of the government's group of advisors, Valery Lytvytsky, announced that the EU had demanded clear identification of specific forms and ways of assisting the Ukrainian government in implementing reforms and referred to Romano Prodi's reported promise that the discussion about granting Ukraine associated and, in due course, full membership in the EU might be realistic after Ukraine fulfilled the PCA. Although Ukraine remained rather slow in implementing the PCA, recognition of its aspirations for membership was reconfirmed in the European Commission's resolution of 15 March 2001.
"Agenda - Ukraine": Progress Report
While emphasising its "European choice", the Ukrainian leadership repeatedly expressed concerns over the reluctance of the EU to include Ukraine in the enlargement process and called for consultations on ways of minimising the potential negative impact of EU enlargement on Ukraine, formalising and institutionalising Ukraine-EU relations in the field of JHA, foreign and security policy, military and military-technical co-operation, and, finally, reforming the system of Ukraine-EC bodies in order to enhance the effectiveness of all existing instruments in relations between Ukraine and the EU. The proposals were formally presented as position papers and memoranda to relevant EU bodies: "Position paper for negotiations between Ukraine and the EU on minimising the negative impact of EU enlargement" (early 2001), "Memorandum of Ukraine on concluding an agreement [on co-operation] between Ukraine and the EU in the field of the fight against organised crime" and the Memorandum of Ukraine on "Strengthening co-operation between Ukraine and the European Union in the sphere of Foreign and Security Policy, Military and Military-Technical Co-operation" (at the Paris Ukraine-EU Summit on 15 September 2000), a position paper on "Reflection of the Ukrainian side on a Joint Action Plan on Common Action between Ukraine and the EU in the Area of Justice and Home Affairs" (at the third meeting of the Co-operation Committee between Ukraine and the EC on 18 December 2000), and the Memorandum of Ukraine on "Reforming joint bodies that have been set up by Ukraine and the EU in accordance with the provisions of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between European Communities and their Member-States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, of 14 June 1994".
Some practical results have been achieved. The issue of major concern for the EU, the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP), has been settled. In 2000, the EU committed 430 million euros as a contribution to the Chornobyl shelter fund. Ukraine fulfilled its part of the Memorandum of Understanding and now expects the funding committed by the EU for the construction of compensating capacities at the Rivne and Khmelnytsky NPPs. Progress in Ukraine-EU relations includes new bilateral cooperation agreements in the spheres of trade in textiles, opening access to the Ukrainian market for EU pharmaceutical products, liberalising exports of scrap metal and introducing legislation for the protection of intellectual property rights. The security aspect of Ukraine-EU relations has developed dynamically, as Ukraine remains an important stability factor in the Baltic - Black Sea region and contributes to the settlement of the Balkan crisis by taking part in peacekeeping operations.
Ukraine has repeatedly stressed the potential benefits for the EU of using Ukraine's gas transportation system and electricity transportation capacities. In April 2001 Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko called on the EU to involve Ukraine more actively as "an equal participant" in projects that are designed to expand the European energy supply network. The offer has not however had an enthusiastic response so far, given the plans for construction of a major gas transportation pipeline bypassing Ukraine, through Belarus and Poland, by the Russian Gazprom and a group of European corporations.
A number of questions in Ukraine-EU relations remain open. Why did Ukraine from the very start take an option that was not meant to bring it any closer to the EU - the PCA - while all the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe succeeded in making "Europe agreements" and taking the path of associate membership? Was there any other choice? To what extend were Ukraine's European integration prospects influenced by the different goals and scope of the two assistance programmes, Tacis and Phare? How realistic is it to make a connection between implementation of the PCA and passing on to an association agreement? No clear answers to these questions have been given so far.
Ukraine - EU Relations: Perceptions
While the policy of European integration has been promoted as a foreign policy priority by the Ukrainian leadership and supported (mostly declaratively) by a part of the political elite, it remains far from being understood and approved by the general population. The high reported percent of support for EU integration as a preferred course for Ukraine in the absence of any public debate on the issue may indicate a lack of understanding of the nature and implications of EU enlargement for Ukraine.
At the level of Ukraine's business and administrative-political elites, the idea of Ukraine's European integration does not enjoy broad support because many representatives of that segment of the Ukrainian elite have their key business and financial interests outside the EU. Moreover, many of them are not prepared to comply with a number of EU guiding principles and EU membership criteria such as competition policy. The overall awareness of EU issues, the enlargement process and cost/benefits of integration remains critically low and has a negative impact on policy-making in the field.
According to an opinion poll carried out in July 2000 by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS) to survey perceptions, among the general public and experts, of the EU enlargement process and its likely impact on Ukraine, the national decision-making elite was the strongest supporter of the idea of European integration (48%). The advocates of this course were more numerous than advocates of integration with Russia, the CIS or the USA taken together (39%). However, the Ukrainian population seemed to be more supportive of the idea of integration with the CIS and, primarily, Russia (57% support, 31% and 26% respectively), while only 29% saw relations with the EU as the top priority. Another major difference in perceptions between experts and the general population was that while 49% of "ordinary" respondents believed the EU was interested in Ukraine's accession, and 31% believed it was not, the predominant majority of experts (84%) agreed that the EU was increasingly sceptical about Ukraine's prospects for full membership. As reasons for the EU's lack of interest in Ukraine's accession, experts referred to the slow pace of democratisation and economic, legal, institutional and administrative reform in Ukraine, the low quality and, hence, low competitiveness of the bulk of Ukraine-made goods and, finally, the fact that Ukraine's share in EU's foreign trade was very low. According to a survey conducted by the UCEPS shortly before the September 2001 Yalta summit, 32% of Ukrainians believed that European integration was a priority for Ukraine, while 41% chose ever closer cooperation with Russia.
What are the reasons for this disparity in attitudes between the elite and the general population? First, it reflects the fact that European integration remains a matter of government-sponsored discussion within a limited group of experts but not a matter of everyday life visible to the population. Second, general information about the EU is lacking, and a targeted information campaign about European integration has yet to be developed. According to the 2000 UCEPS study, 74% of representatives of the decision-making elite who took part in the poll described the level of information provided to support the course of European integration as totally inadequate. About one third of the general population had no information about European integration processes at all. Meanwhile, both the elites and the general population operate on myths rather than facts. The elites also appear to be reserved about the prospect of opening EU markets to Ukrainian goods and services, particularly referring to politically-motivated rejections of Ukraine's projects (like the Antonov-7X cargo aircraft) and a number of anti-dumping investigations. Experts are almost unanimous in seeing key points that weaken Ukraine's quest for EU accession as poor economic performance and slow reform (92%); rampant corruption (90%); flawed taxation policy, lack of transparency and instability of economic legislation (90%). Far fewer are concerned with lack of democracy (54%) and lack of respect for intellectual property rights (41%). Interestingly, only one third of the experts surveyed by UCEPS (33%) pointed to Ukraine's excessive dependence on Russia for energy sources, and very few believed that Ukraine's prospects for EU integration were hindered by Ukraine's membership of the CIS. The reasons for this view may be the reluctance of Ukraine's business-political elite to see the CIS, and primarily Russia, where most of their business interests lie, as a challenge to Ukraine's EU integration course, which most of them, in their turn, see as something abstract.
Many Ukrainian analysts seem to share the view that Ukraine's weak position in promoting her European integration aspirations results from inconsistent and slow domestic reform; domination of political declarations over practical implementation of Ukraine-EU documents; weakness of administrative and institutional support for Ukraine's European integration ambitions; lack of expertise on European integration processes in the government. Key challenges are seen as a lack of coordination and coherence in the actions of state institutions with regard to European integration efforts and lack of institutional capacity, as well as lack of public interest, awareness and support and demand for European integration.
"Two to Tango"
During the Paris Ukraine-EU summit in September 2000 the EU agreed that Ukraine had made some progress in the pursuit of reforms and officially stated that establishment of a free trade area between Ukraine and the EU was a priority not only for Kiev but also for Brussels. Since then Ukraine has made some significant steps in the right direction. While EU officials still argue that the PCA and the EU's Common Strategy on Ukraine offer ample opportunities for cooperation that should be explored to the maximum and are in no hurry to make any promises concerning potential changes of Ukraine's status vis-a-vis the EU, developments since mid-2000 appear to suggest that hope for EU integration can be a stimulating factor for Ukraine's stability, democratisation and reform. In a comment to the International Herald Tribune on 22 May 2001 the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, and the Prime Minister of Sweden, Goran Persson, argued that "Ukraine's progress should be a priority for all Europe", routinely expressed their regret about the fall of the Yushchenko government and called on the Ukrainian leadership to continue the pursuit of reform while warning that "the EU has been closely monitoring developments in Ukraine". Following the traditional reference to Ukraine being "a key factor in the development and maintenance of stability in the whole of Europe", a compliment on the closure of Chernobyl, a mention of Ukraine's "geographically strategic position" and reassurance that "closer cooperation with the EU is in no way an obstacle to close, fruitful relations between Ukraine and Russia" the two EU men summed up by stating: "[It] is in the EU's interest to ensure Ukraine's favourable development" and "there is not reason at this stage to limit further rapprochement". Nothing, however, has been said about what exactly the EU would do to ensure that: "The speed with which we can intensify cooperation is dictated by the pace of reform".
Relations between Ukraine and the EU are believed to have reach a new stage after the Gothenburg summit, where Ukraine was mentioned for the first time in the section on the "future of the EU" instead of in the "External Affairs" part of the presidency conclusions, and the subsequent visit by Goran Persson to Kiev, marked by the declaration that the EU invited Ukraine to closer political cooperation. The EU-Ukraine Yalta summit on 11 September 2001, described by Javier Solana as a "signal of friendship", did not bring significant progress to the EU-Ukraine dialogue in terms of outlining new prospects, but referred to major issues of concern in the field of "political criteria" - free and fair elections, freedom of the press, fighting corruption - and emphasized continued assistance within the Tacis programmes and the potential for cooperation in the fields of approximation of the Ukrainian legislation to that of the EU, and in the field of JHA.
Ukraine (as well as Russia and Moldova) were invited to take part in an autumn 2001 European Conference in Brussels for the first time, to join in the discussions between EU member and candidate states on international terrorism, border controls and countering illegal migration and drugs trafficking. The invitation to take part in the conference was interpreted in Ukraine as a signal of understanding of Ukraine's major role in countering those challenges and an invitation to closer cooperation. According to Ukraine's Foreign Minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, the invitation to participate in the conference represented de facto recognition of Ukraine's right to claim membership by the EU. European integration and eventual EU membership for Ukraine was not just a foreign policy priority, but a "vitally important prerequisite for the development of our state", Zlenko said. The question, however, is Ukraine's ability to make credible proposals that would enhance the EU's interest in involving it more closely in cooperative projects, and the EU's willingness to assist Ukraine in developing the institutional capacity for making declared cooperative projects work.
A Window of Opportunity?
It is conventionally argued that EU enlargement opens up new opportunities in various fields of Ukraine-EU cooperation, but there is no clear answer to the question as to what exactly Ukraine will gain from EU enlargement. The Joint Statement of the September 2001 Ukraine-EU summit in Yalta defined those opportunities as aligning Ukraine's legislation, norms and standards as far as possible to the EU model. According to Messrs Prodi and Persson, CEE candidate countries, especially those with a common border with Ukraine, are a valuable resource for further cooperation, due to their experience of fast and radical transformation and the substantial progress they have made in meeting the membership criteria. These countries may be involved in EU-Ukraine projects and trilateral initiatives between member states, candidate states and Ukraine. "The EU initiative will convey an important message to candidate countries, to the effect that greater involvement in Ukraine will be an important asset in the accession process," the statement read. Indirectly admitting that so far the EU has lacked a coherent far-sighted vision of the development of its relations with Ukraine and shown reluctance to search for effective ways of moving the relationship on, the EU representatives noted that "it takes two to tango" and that "while the EU and Ukraine may be out on the dance floor, both have to know the steps".
An effort to improve the implementation of the PCA and to move towards practical steps was made with the adoption of the Ukrainian Government's "Priorities for stimulating economic activity, savings and investment, creation of conditions for sustainable economic growth in 2002-2004". Specific tasks for the Ukraine-EU rapprochement include "continuing work on harmonising provisions of national legislation in order to contribute to the free movement of people, goods, services and capital between Ukraine and the EU in accordance with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement", "implementing institutional measures in every branch, improving the legal basis in accordance with provisions of the Programme of Integration of Ukraine into the EU … and sectoral programmes in order to approach EU standards", and "improving working conditions for … exporters by means of further liberalisation of the foreign economic regime with the EU". Individual ministries and departments were given specific tasks in the area of European integration, and some have already been carried out. Seeking to streamline its European integration efforts, the government transformed the Ministry of Economy into the Ministry of Economy and European Integration and established a special European Integration Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But there is still a long way to go.
What more can Ukraine do to make its European aspirations a reality? First of all, pursue domestic structural, administrative and political transformation, continue harmonising its legislation with that of the EU (which may prove a challenge indeed, given the EU's massive 20,000-plus pieces of legislation, the fact that many of Ukraine's laws were initially built on different principles and the slow pace of approximation), make its policies consistent, abide by existing agreements and implement current programmes, build up its GDP (which today amounts to only 2.5% of that of the EU) and work for integration as the national strategic goal. Ukraine should also seek to develop tripartite cooperation within the "Ukraine - accession state - EU member state" framework, keeping in mind that its integration initiatives should also be of interest to the EU and the candidate states with which it intends to cooperate. Most significantly, the EU could contribute substantially to building EU-compatible institutions in Ukraine and introducing procedures that will facilitate cooperation.
In addition to expanding cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs and devising compatible policies on countering illegal migration and organised crime and common foreign and security policy, cooperation in the area of environmental protection is necessary because environmental pollution knows no state borders, and the effects of environmental (and, particularly, technogenic) disasters in some countries in the immediate proximity of an enlarged EU will inevitably be felt in neighbouring countries and beyond. Therefore, Ukraine - EU cooperation in setting and maintaining common environmental protection and nuclear safety standards will be both unavoidable and mutually beneficial. The same is true of Ukraine-EU cooperation in maintaining quality and safety standards for food and other consumer products - a necessary condition for any expansion of the scope and size of trade.
About 90% of the structural changes Ukraine has to accomplish to comply with EU membership criteria do not have to be linked to accession, as they need to be pursued in any case if the state's goal is to overcome the economic crisis and build a functioning market economy. While the economic dimension of integration can be relatively clearly expressed in the form of quantitative and qualitative indicators, and claims of political rapprochement may be supported by exchanges of official visits and the adoption of documents, the real challenge is to ensure that the whole of society (the political and civil service elite included) shares common European values and works to make them a reality in Ukraine. European integration efforts would be incomplete without measures taken to promote cultural, educational, scientific and technical rapprochement by raising awareness of Ukraine's European cultural identity through introduction of European standards in education, science and technology, the dissemination of Ukraine's own cultural achievement in the EU, and the implementation of joint cultural, research and educational projects.
In lieu of conclusions
Having many foreign policy priorities looks like having none of them clearly defined and followed. So far Ukrainian officials have been arguing in a number of European fora that integration mechanisms should be used more actively to involve countries that share European principles but, for some reason, are not yet ready for membership, and that the EU should be more explicit in responding to Ukraine's quest for a place in the enlargement process. However, calls for welcoming signs from the EU in response for Ukraine's "demonstration of its political course towards European integration" have proved to be insufficient to transform declared intentions into a coherent policy of cooperation.
The EU seems to be clear about what it does not want from Ukraine - it does not want Ukraine to turn into an unreformed black hole of insecurity and instability, or an integral part of a new Russia-led pact. Yet, the EU is not entirely clear about what it wants Ukraine to become, and has not been explicit enough in separating its policies towards Russia and Ukraine, and considering Ukraine outside Russia's sphere of influence.
When visiting Kiev in the last days of July 2001, the EU's High Commissioner for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, announced that Brussels was "satisfied" with Ukraine's pursuit of reform, but that there was still a long road ahead. In Kiev, however, routine praise for the pace of reform (which is, presumably, more evident from the outside than from the inside) and compliments on the Ukrainian government's success in re-scheduling payments to the Paris Club and reaching agreement with the World Bank and the IMF, do not sound convincing as long as the critical questions - what can be done to "soften" the new dividing lines in Europe and how can the desired outcome be achieved - remain unanswered.