CEPS Neighbourhood Watch 19 
September 2006

Nicu Popescu

On 17 September 2006 Transnistria, a secessionist and unre­cognised entity in eastern Moldova held a referendum. Despi­te claims, it was not a referendum on independence. Its main question was asking whether Transnistrians want to become independent and subsequently join the Russian Federation.

As all other previous elections and plebiscites in the secessio­nist entity, the current referendum was neither free nor fair. Transnistria’s political system is similar to that of Belarus, with the main difference that Belarus had a change in leadership since the break up of the Soviet Union (in 1994), while Trans­nistria did not.

In addition, Transnistria’s de facto leader Igor Smirnov just re­cently declared that he will run in a few months for a fourth office as president, and that he does not intend to retire until Transnistria is recognised internationally.

Under such conditions, 97 percent of the participants at the referendum voted for unification with Russia. While the num­ber is probably exaggerated and inflated, a majority of the region’s population probably indeed supports separation from Moldova. One can never know for sure, however, because there is no independent media, no right to free assembly, no free civil society or other democratic mechanisms ensuring the expression of free will in the region. No state or interna­tional organisation recognised the referendum. The EU and candidate countries, the US, the OSCE and Ukraine have all condemned the conduct of the referendum. Russia was am­biguous. The Russian foreign ministry did not recognise the referendum but still claimed that it was an example of use of direct democracy and that it was “transparent and without significant irregularities.”

The referendum in Transnistria comes in a context when Rus­sia and the secessionist entities of the former Soviet Union – Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh are set to make maximum use of the expected independence of Kosovo and the recent separation of Montenegro from Ser­bia, as “exportable” precedents. The policy line, as it was ex­pressed by President Putin recently is that “Only fools refuse to understand that the situations in Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia have similar backgrounds. Everyone understands that we’re right”.

Certainly Transnistria’s referendum will be used diplomatically and as propaganda to claim that Transnistria’s expressed will is to separate from Moldova, and that an overwhelming part of the population supports this. The next referendum will take place in South Ossetia on 12 November.

Despite the referendum’s aims of strengthening the internatio­nal credibility of Transnistria’s separatist claims, it might have the opposite effects. First, because of the question that was asked in the referendum, Transnistria starts to transform itself from a secessionist movement willing to be independent, into an irredentist movement willing to join the Russian Federation. While recent international history knows precedents of seces­sionists being recognised as independent states, there is no such precedent of irredentism. Of course Transnistria’s hope is that Russia might make use of a 2003 law on the acceptance of other territories into Russia. But how such a law could be applied in practice is less clear.

Second, because Transnistria’s referendum was about joining Russia more than anything else, the potential diplomatic use of the “Kosovo precedent” for Transnistria (never a credible argument, anyway) is further undermined. Certainly, from the international community point of view Kosovo has more chan­ces to become an independent state, than to join Albania. No­body would support Kosovo joining Albania. But Transnistria strives exactly for a type of development that the international community will not accept for Kosovo. Thus the referendum in Transnistria in fact weakens those willing to export the “Ko­sovo precedent” to the east. For a comparison, South Ossetia’s referendum due in November, will be about independence, not about joining Russia.

The main effects of the referendum will be enhanced authori­tarianism in the run-up to the December “presidential” elec­tions in Transnistria (where Smirnov is guaranteed to win), greater self-isolation and dependence on Russia, and fewer chances for a solution in Transnistria in the medium term. Transnistria will seek to become a de facto second Kaliningrad at the border of the enlarged EU, but 1000 kilometres away from Russia. The question is how long an unrecognised autho­ritarian Kaliningrad 2 can be sustainable at the border of the enlarged EU?

Brussels, 26 September 2006.