Draft Policy Paper

The world is changing rapidly, and such events as 11 September and the military action in Afghanistan and Iraq are strongly influencing the path of developments for smaller nations such as Georgia. It is important to understand their impacts, and analyze local and regional politics against this background.

Previously, I have attempted to assess the feasibility of such models for regional security system as described in the “Stability Pact for the Caucasus” proposal prepared by the Center for European Policy Studies in May 2000, as well as in its later modifications. Their main idea was “to draw on modern European models of shared sovereignty, interdependence and multi-tier governing structures.” Unfortunately, policies suggested in these models were hardly feasible, while procedures and approaches in achieving stated objectives were not realistic.

I have argued that while no parallel solution for the conflict and for regional cooperation seems to be feasible, there are certain general principles that have better prospects than seeking comprehensive regional model before the resolution of conflicts. It seems that although for each of the conflicts a comprehensive peace settlement can and should be a preferable option, due to the scale of overall damage caused by the conflict, - open-end, incremental, piecemeal approach seems to be by far more effective in dealing with regional issues. At the same time, comprehensive models, but also and rather, the principles and frameworks for regional arrangements, should be openly discussed and developed through second-trek diplomacy, through unofficial meetings of experts, researchers and NGO activists of all interested parties, preparing conceptual raw material for future progress.

Thus, my essential approach was to seek a piecemeal process for regional cooperation through effective security arrangements, European integration and relevant international involvement, with US as a key actor and mediator. Dealing with conflicts, it also seemed to be more effective to discuss first practical matters of transportation, repatriation or economic revival. It might be advantageous to declare a moratorium for discussing status issues for secessionist territories apart of general procedures and willingness to proceed (so, all external players could make a joint declaration of unacceptability of unilateral secession, as well as the unjustified use of violence), although this would not be easy to achieve with the winning parties in conflict.

Step by step approach is a realistic alternative to overall resolution when dealing with each conflict separately, but keeping the regional dimension in mind should be preferable. Summing up, my approach can be described as: piecemeal process with international mediation and guarantees at every stage; initiation broad public debate around the issue and much attention to public relations aspect, involvement of all interest groups and especially ethnic groups in the debate; gradual building on co-operational areas with special attention to economic and security aspects... (instead of preparing detailed plans on [inter]governmental level and only later informing the population), requesting the assistance of international actors in designing and implementing the security arrangement process.

The essence of the problem dealt in the present policy paper is instability, insecurity and poor governance on all institutional levels of the states of South Caucasus as the consequence of regional tensions, conflicts and mistrust between nations and ethnic groups. The paper intends to analyse how security-related policies are developed in transitional societies in their correlation to democratic processes and economic development, to explore the nature and dynamics of strategic preferences and perceptions of security threats among political élites and the population of Georgia and other parts of former Soviet periphery, South Caucasus. It is intended to investigate also the impact of international regimes and conflict prevention tools on local actors, and the impact of external policies and humanitarian/mediating interventions as geared to such arrangements, also the normative assumptions of actors both inside and outside of the specific region.

The research paper considers the conceptual basis for discussing various regional arrangement models, while the essential idea of the project is to seek for piecemeal solution to the process of regional cooperation through effective security arrangements, European integration and relevant international involvement. The stakeholders to such development are all local and foreign governments concerned with stability in the region, international organisations such as the OSCE, CoE, UNO, GUAM[1], and others concerned with regional peace and development. The geographic area directly involved is the three countries of South Caucasus in the first place, but also broader region of Black Sea/Caspian/North Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, and significant resources and technical assistance can be mobilised from various sources, but primarily from such international actors such as US and EU, for enforcing the effective cooperative model, which would imply the institutionalisation of regional arrangement process, change of attitudes among decision makers and the population, expert assessments.

Main focus on this stage is on trying to understand the dynamics of interethnic relations on the example of some troubled regions of Georgia, as the key to resolving regional tensions lies in learning how to cope with such problems.

The making of the Caucasian nations has a long story, but the events that bear immediate importance for contemporary political history of the country started in early 1800s, when the region got incorporated into the Russian Empire. Even while divided by the Russian administration into several units, conditions were created to recreate and strengthen the notion of national unity, in the case of Azerbaijan mixed with pan-Turkic sentiment, in the case of Armenia united by the mourning of the genocide. However, social-democratic ideas dominated the ideological and political arena, replacing and fighting ethnocentric nationalism and finding their social basis among virtually all layers of these predominantly still agrarian countries. It was nationalists and social-democrats who later in 1918 took control over the governments of the short-living states. In 1920-1921 the short lives of the fragile states came to end with the invasion of the Red Army, and the puppet Soviet Socialist Republics were created instead. Still, it was the three years of independence and 70 years of Soviet domination that have created conditions for remaking of the national identities that were not solely rooted in historic myths and culture but rather based on explicitly defined territory, capital city, statehood and even state language, even if these notions were rather symbolic and could not hide the full dominance of Moscow-centered decision-making in virtually all spheres of nations' lives. Alien ideology and domination never took deep roots in South Caucasus, but played highly destructive role to mores giving rise to irresponsibility, cynicism and corruption that form today sad and extremely damaging legacy of that time.

Following the Soviet perestroika, 1988 started a new wave of change in national identity and aspirations, giving hope to increase in degree of real sovereignty, and ultimately, independence, although initially only few dared to pronounce these hopes openly. At the same time the Karabakh conflict emerged as a grave harbinger of future grievances. The process of nation building moved to a new stage with independence and statehood, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Itself the painfulness and the difficulty of this process involving secessionist and civil wars, deep economic crisis and coup d’état, served to public discourse and consolidation of at least part of a nation around the ideals of sovereignty and independence. Although the first euphoric enthusiasm was soon replaced by bitterness of repeated failures and disappointments, still the nation does now exist in the sense of both formal structures and procedures and the nation-related values and objectives shared by the significant portion of the population. Transition turned out to be much more complex and painful process than expected. Independence and the new political reality got unexpectedly imposed over people that appeared unprepared to the new way of life. Democracy, an ideology, which together with market economy was cherished by the population in reality proved difficult to exercise. Difficulties abounded in all sides, among those who ruled and those to be ruled, as all were burdened with the same experience of living in totalitarian regime ideology of which was found to be more deeply rooted than presumed to be. Strong situational constrains enforced by severe social, political and economic conditions reduced social flexibility and the range of individual behavior, resulted in the polarization of society on the ground of beliefs and values. Overwhelming dominance in mass consciousness of beliefs, myths and symbols in transitional periods of history is nothing new, they played equally great role also in traditional Soviet double-think and double-talk. However, the post-Soviet reality gave new life to symbolic ways of thinking, created new fertile environment for irrationality and symbolization of political attitudes and values. This is especially true in former Soviet periphery, Caucasus, where Communist ideologems were never deeply rooted, but were rather considered as a set of the rules of the game imposed by external power, like it was only too often in its history.

Small countries essentially have to adapt to their geopolitical environment, surrounded by bigger states and having to interact with them. Those countries that are more strongly interacting with one another due to common history, geographic circumstances, or other geopolitical realities, form clusters usually designated as regions. Interaction within a region can be based on opposition of interests or actions leading to conflict, but also on common interests and co-operation, a desirable pattern for regional co-existence. How to reduce the intra-regional confrontation and make co-operative model a preferred one is a general problem in contemporary post-cold war and now also past September 11 world, with its competing globalization and de-globalization tendencies. Thus it is important to study the potential and prospects for regional cooperation from the viewpoint of its impact on the security situation, but also on political orientations and economic development. Regional development, oil and transit plans are closely linked to political aspirations and peace in the Caucasus, while cooperation and integration are the preferable alternatives to confrontational relations. It is only too natural that the nationhood, and the state, as observed in the Caucasus, have specific characteristics reflecting the immediate environment of nations’ existence, their size and position in international interaction system, and the initial conditions of nation-building such as the character of historic process of territorial organization and consolidation of a nation-state.

There arise a number of questions, as to why and how it happened that South Caucasus appeared to be the only post-Soviet region to experience disastrous conflicts and crises in such affluence (their tragism comparable maybe only to the most conspicuous cases of Tajikistan and Chechnya) but nevertheless to emerge as relatively stable para-democratic societies, even if in best cases too strongly resembling the model of “liberal authoritarianism” (A. Motyl) universally observed today in post-Soviet space.

Some of characteristics of current political patterns reflect indeed such specific phenomena as complicated multi-level ethnic consciousness and identity and other cultural differences that divide them into explicit sub-ethnicities, while at the same time certain supra-national Caucasian identity can be observed), diverse confessional structure with dominance of conservative single church, mosaical picture of multi-ethnicity causing suspicion towards compactly living minorities concentrated along national borders (with the exception of Armenia), traditional orientation towards history as a source of political argumentation, historic correlation of ethnicity with occupation and social status, pro-western orientation mixed with strong influence of Russian culture and educational tradition, Mediterranean system of kinship and ‘shame and honor’ norms, faded tradition of statehood and responsibility for the nation mixed however with strong sense of pride for national culture, combined with the internal dichotomy of ethnic superiority/inferiority that is characteristic for many a smaller nations, the role of diasporas, all these and many others mix and overlap with the Soviet legacy and the necessities of today.

Indeed, many patterns and problems of present-day reality are common for most of smaller post-Soviet states. Such are: inefficient and corrupt government controlled by an authoritarian president, anti-meritocratic personnel policies and clientelism, privatization mainly benefiting former Soviet/Party/Komsomol nomenclatura, interethnic tensions, mass impoverishment of previously well-to-do groups of population (the new poor) and enormous income gap, huge shadow economy, mass emigration, inadequate growth of police force while army is weak and kept irrelevant for power balance, absence of labor movements and trade-unions, low political participation and habitually rigged elections, major political parties united around persons not programs or ideologies, ambivalent attitude towards former patron – Russia, standstill in industrial production and dubious reforms directed by Bretton-Woods institutions with single outcome of stabilizing currency, over-concentration of power and capital in a hypertrophied capital cities, weak civil sector especially in provinces and virtual absence of grass-root community in western sense, degradation of basic social services and, finally, dramatic uncertainty of power succession.

Still, currently there are some factors and developments that distinguish socio-political reality of south Caucasian states from other similar transitional societies. While economies are dominated by mafiotic clans exploiting advantages of early amassed capital of dubious origin or family relations to top political figures, still there is much more freedom for mass media and political activity. Although kinship and informal ties play important role, regional or sub-ethnic clans also matter. In general, both the populations and the élites show strong adherence to market economy and democratic values, as demonstrated by polls. Finally, continued misery and poverty, although cause strong opposition and mistrust toward government, blamed for corruption and inefficiency, demonstrate reluctance of the population to get involved in mass manifestations or other forms of protest so common a decade ago.

For many years the Caucasian societies held resistance against deliberate and also spontaneous pressures from Russia, substantiated by absolute political dominance of the 'big brother'. Under such conditions Western culture, hardly differentiated into European and American, was considered by national élites as a potential, and favourable, counterbalance to the policies of Russification. With the independence brought by the disintegration of the USSR, this process gained strength, and the Western way of life as well as the globalisation process, are equally considered as purely positive phenomena. Few alarmist voices that are talking of the threats of homogenisation that may wipe out national distinctiveness and, ultimately, endanger the national culture are paid little attention. Western political value system, together with the traditional culture are another set considered to be alternative to the legacy of Soviet despotism, totalitarian ideologisation of life, and cynical Orwellian doubletalk. Now, ruling political élites in all states never get tired to stress their devotion to Western, democratic values and goals, however practices might differ greatly from stated values. At the same time there are some specific features such as extreme political pragmatism and opportunism that makes it impossible to judge about political ideology of an actor on the basis of his party affiliation or statements.

Key geographical location on the crossroads of communications and transportation routes from Central Asia and oil-rich Caspian region to Europe ascribes special importance to South Caucasus for western investors and powers interested in acquiring access to this geo-strategic regions, and is one of the main sources of continuously increasing, if often disappointed, attention of western states and organizations, eager to diminish Russian monopoly. At the same time, this causes suspicion and often destabilizing manipulation on Russian part, exacerbated recently by renovated war in Chechnya and Georgia’s and Azerbaijan's refusal to get directly involved in the conflict through allowing Russian forces or military supply lines. At the same time, Russia is preserving a number of military bases in Armenia and Georgia (and a radar station in Azerbaijan), all of them in sensitive locations of actual/potential conflict, and in latter case is exercising strong pressure for preserving most of them against the 1999 Istanbul agreements.

It is important to understand the most important factors that are common for post-Soviet and transitional societies of South Caucasus, those that unite the southern-Caucasian states and societies, and those that are distinguishing and dividing them, similarities and differences relevant from the viewpoint of regional politics. Of course, a number of issues are quite common throughout the region, such as weak state, democracy and economy, the sensitive issue of the succession of power, overall corruption, and many others

Unresolved conflicts in Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and heavy burden of many hundred thousands of refugees and IDPs, while apart from purely humanitarian aspects highly damaging for stability and economy, at the same time played a crucial role in political reorientation of Georgia and Azerbaijan towards the West, cut off communications and trade with the North, and in certain sense benefited their sovereignty and independence, also attracting significant international attention and assistance.

Foreign policy orientation is important reference point for nation building, strongly favoured or disfavoured by the population and the élites. For the general population, foreign orientation may have important every-day connotation. So, among many changes that were brought by the new independence is the radical reorientation from Russian language to English. Still, one of the signs of political immaturity of the Caucasian states and societies is the permanent referring to Russia as the main cause of problems or/and the clue to the solution of most of problems. Even among those who reveal hostile attitude towards former metropolis, the Russian factor serves the same role of diminishing their own responsibility for the political processes, as it is only too natural to blame the omnipresent Moscow hand in all the failures and inadequacies. Political conditions under Soviet rule were specific, characteristic for pseudo-sovereign status of Soviet republics. No important decision was made without control from Moscow, though local government had to play its special subordinate role in pan-Soviet doublethink, doubletalk and doublework. Defensive and theatrical cynicism and moral relativism, which has served so well in resisting to the dominance of Communist ideology, ruins today the capacity of Caucasians to build their own states.

There is alarming inertia and passivity in both the Caucasian societies in general and in the troubled communities in particular. Still, long-held beliefs about the meaning of homeland, society, tradition and territory in one’s life, relations between different subcultures, and expectations for the future, are undergoing a re-examination and re-appraisal. Many elements in traditional value orientation are gradually losing their authority or relevance, while other elements still retain their force. Interethnic tensions and ethno-territorial conflicts became the most noticeable part of new after-cold-war political reality, becoming a strong force of disintegration - ruining stability, prospects of development, and even elementary economic self-sufficiency in former Soviet South. Changing governments have appeared incapable or unwilling to maintain the forms of co-existence customary to the Soviet past and to formulate strategies facilitating co-existence and co-operation, while, opposite to it, some political élites have fully exploited attractiveness of nationalist or secessionist slogans for building their political careers and seizing power. Political support and commitment needed to formulate and follow sustainable peaceful strategy is not guaranteed today. It is essential but almost impossible to build partnerships between opposing parties, formulate flexible strategies and forming consensus around co-operation priorities in a situation in which political discourse is dominated by emotions, leaderships are concerned with short-term political interests and immediate benefits, while national and international institutions that would take the responsibility for co-ordinating regional peace-building process are either not working properly or are totally absent. Indeed, today some governments seem to be more open today to real compromises. The obstacles are however great.

Recent studies reveal some trends in the change of values as linked to the transformation of the society, point to persisting inertia in the society at large: changes in the mentality of the population required by societal transformation are slow to come about, while democratization is impeded also by outdated ideological stereotypes and the vague status of democratic values in current modes of thought. Even if democratic principles are supported in abstract form, often citizens are reluctant to apply these principles on practice. Also, as it was described for more general post-Soviet setting (Gibson and Duch, 1993), the mass public is committed much more strongly to “majoritarian” democratic principles, such as popular sovereignty and competitive elections, than to “minoritarian” principles, such as civil liberties and the right of dissent. Reshaping of political culture is a long and a slow process even in case of conducive to the change environment. Hence in the environment governed by the mutual distrust of political elite and citizens, where elite in practice does not want and citizens do not feel the need to change, the process of reorientation is at its best very slow.

Despite the demands posed by the change of political and economic structure and environment, cultural and political legacies hinder both élite and ordinary citizens in reorienting toward values of personal or corporate responsibility, transparency and accountability. Deeply rooted clientelism and corruption do not stimulate people in power to encourage public participation, on the other hand disillusioned ordinary citizens show apathy and accept the authority of those in power. An important corollary is that there is widespread perception of little control over decisions of government, little trust in others and low satisfaction with own life. The way out from this closed, self-reinforcing circle could be seen in the activation of politically conscious and active population and in the will of the ruling party to incorporate population in policy making. In the long run the political survival of today’s élites depends on this will as further economic hardship, high rate of inequality and consequent popular discontent may swing the pendulum of public support to reform in opposite direction. Poor economic performance and continuous insecurity and humiliation may easily undermine the still embryonic democratic political culture. While in general the younger generations of urbanites show more orientation to democratic values and more active attitude in general, as substantiated by empiric data, it is also true that under certain conditions that they may be easier mobilised by populist rhetoric and radical nationalism.

Another alarming tendency is the great gap between political élites, actively involved in governance or directing opposition politics, and the population at large, emotionally concerned but lacking skills and levers for more political participation. Unwillingness of élites to take responsibility and initiatives needed for successful democratic transformation, lack of independent and creative thinking; are further aggravated by mutual suspicion and mistrust of political élites and masses, the center and the periphery. Élites have no confidence in masses, try to avoid where possible democratic structures and procedures of decision making under the pretext of democratic immaturity of population and its lack of political knowledge and skills, or putatively due to economic hardship or external security threats. Similar attitude can be observed in relation to regional authorities, and especially to ethnic or religious minorities. Only a robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state, can resist democratic reversal and is a remedy against such tendencies. There is urgent need for development of participatory approach at all levels of governance, and to empowering individuals and communities to self-organize on the issues of protecting their interests, to create effective trade unions, consumer societies or other non-governmental structures.

Today it is fashionable to speak about the failure of south Caucasian societies to build democratic states, free of corruption and of latent instability. Still, although the changes during last few years are hardly inspiring, they are far from catastrophic. Summing up one may say that while there are many obstacles to rapid positive change in civic culture and institutions in the direction of more mature, efficient and democratic ones, the process is nevertheless on move, with younger generation showing more active and positive stance. Orientations toward the western models and values, support of market oriented reform and of civic values is good reason for moderate optimism with regards to immediate future, and for much brighter hopes in the long run.

Although all major political forces in these countries adhere, as said above, to the values of liberal democracy, it is still a long way toward building stable, sustainable, democratic and prosperous states. There are some problems where the governments have little freedom of maneuver, as other important actors are involved. In other cases the states can do a lot, even if doing little at present. However, in every case the issue of good governance is of uttermost importance for the future of the nations. The main priority for the Caucasian state-building process is to establish the conditions of mutual trust between the population at large and the governing élite, which is hardly existent today. The governments have to handle a number of inter-linked tasks before there will be progress in this direction, before the public will have confidence in the democratic processes and policy reforms undertaken by their government, and subscribe to legitimate institutions of governance. The issue of corruption, plaguing most transitional states, is maybe the most important one to start with. The second priority is the development of grass-root democracy and effective system of local and self-governance at various levels. Today the central governments abstains from passing over downward the real levers of local power, preserving the institution of appointed governors. Decentralization and democratic redistribution of power will not only serve as the most effective democracy school for the population, it will play significant role in improving now strenuous relations of the center with various minorities. At the same time, much can be done for the economic integration of the country, in the first place through securing accessibility of the markets nationwide (today it is common abuse by law enforcement and bureaucracy that preclude this) and providing incentives for effective exchange. Although there is a legacy of mistrust toward collective institutions and economic activities, there is a huge resource in using this well-probed instrument of cooperation especially in impoverished rural areas. Parallel to this, the real (interest-based) trade unions and other institutions for protection of labor and consumer rights should be promoted and supported.

Over-inflated and corrupt law enforcement has become another plague of post-soviet states. This has serious implications for all aspects of economic development and the protection of political liberties and human rights. It is also the issue were the government will have universal popular support in reform, and although there is a problem of accommodating the significant numbers of former personnel with unstable morale, international support is easily available for their retraining and adaptation. One of the less popular aspects of nation-building is nevertheless the creation of reliable, professional and loyal armies (here Armenia is at relatively advantageous position). Special attention is needed in order to reform army, abandon outdated and deeply corrupt system of conscription and shift to professional, small and effective military. Seemingly, current government favors the situation when law enforcement is more numerous and better funded than the army, probably due to more confidence in the loyalty and better control of the former and mistrust of the military. Withdrawal of Russian military bases may serve as a basis for more active involvement of the west in military reform, and certain progress in this direction is easily noticed.

However, one of the common features that is among the major sources of instability is overall impoverishment of both the population and the state in all of the three countries of the region, and even more so in the secessionist territories of Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While the population's real income had started to increase during last few years, inequality stays remarkably high or grows. International organisations may have on agenda eradication of poverty as a general objective, but for the (good) governments in South Caucasus the priorities should be less formal characteristics such as satisfaction with life, confidence in the future, and maximum reduction of the numbers and improvement of conditions of marginalised, discriminated and vulnerable. Adequate housing, healthcare access, food availability, security, education opportunities, and communication facilities should be the priorities, but by no means the only aspects of life needing attention. In general, there are two types of problems related to human poverty and vulnerability, from the viewpoint of their predominant location in present time and in future: Currently, there are poor and vulnerable in all regions of the Caucasus, although there are typological and statistical differences between regions. Also, urban poverty is typologically different from rural poverty, and show different trends. New poor, too, are different from those who were in dire situation already before independence and subsequent economic crisis. Among the most, marginally, poor and vulnerable groups of population are old lonely persons, disabled, and homeless. Homeless children as well as children of some impoverished families such as IDPs belong to the most disadvantaged groups, as apart from suffering today their disastrous situation, they are prone to disease, crime, and violence, with no access to social services such as education, and their future may be even grimmer than their current status. Many of the most poor are totally marginalised and are not covered by either humanitarian programmes or statistics.

Although the majority of poor, especially in rural areas, are not experiencing extreme hunger or food deprivation, still their diet is not balanced, monotonous and in sum dissatisfying. However, much worse is their limited access to adequate social services, healthcare and education. Extremely limited in rural areas is liquidity of existing assets and access to cash, aggravated by absence of adequate infrastructure, while absence of adequate housing may be more of a problem in urban areas, where food is also more scarce. Seasonal changes may cause oscillation in conditions of life due to power shortages, climate or need for seeds and other agro-technological investment in rural areas. One of the greatest discomforts plaguing the poor is the permanent sense of insecurity. All of them experience economic insecurity due to their dependence upon unstable and often illegal sources of income, while the salaries of those on state job or pension -–teachers, medical doctors, etc., - receive to little to cover their very basic needs, and have to resort often to various professional malpractices in order to survive. However, the poor, more than other population groups, also suffer from physical insecurity due to high crime rate, inefficiency and corruption of the law enforcement, absence of labour protection, no rule of law, but also due to their own involvement out of need in illegal, corrupt and criminal practices. This latter causes also such effects as erosion of morale, moral discomfort and alienation. Apart from subjective perception of insecurity among the population at large and the poor in particular and at greater extent, all the factors listed above contribute to objective causes of insecurity and vulnerability. Law preparedness to disasters or crises is one of the most unfortunate expressions of the resourcelessness and strategic drawbacks of the governance system.

General economic crisis is an important, but not a single cause of widespread poverty and malfunctioning of the welfare system. Political, cultural and institutional factors are of no less importance. Lack of investment in industrial production is blamed but this is a corollary of other factors – low revenues (compared to trade), no confidence in future, corruption, no protection from racket or undue harassment by taxation and law enforcement officers, political instability, unfair competition and weak anti-monopolistic instruments, poor infrastructure, lack of qualified personnel, poor managerial skills and institutional culture, low morale of the workforce. It goes beyond saying that the poor are more easily radicalised around nationalisic, fundamentalist and militant slogans, and the massive unemployment among the young people is a dangerous feedground for crime and unrest, and further gap between the new rich and the new poor may ultimately lead to a social explosion, or even worse – its diversion to a new round of interethnic hostility.

OBSTACLES TO STABILITY

Although regional stability and peaceful development are the declared goals of all influential political forces throughout South Caucasus, there are numerous obstacles to this, and the main such factors are underdeveloped participatory democracy, political infantility of élites, and the deeply rooted mutual mistrust between major actors. However, on the surface consequences of bloody conflicts

The Caucasus is a region with open conflicts and complicated security conditions. Three countries of the South Caucasus that emerged as independent sovereign states with the disintegration of the USSR are coping with various economic, social and political problems. However, the security issue remains to be one of the most central ones in this transition process, as geopolitical environment and the legacies of the past had made this region to be among the most explosive and unstable regions of the world. Even more complicated is the security situation in the North Caucasus, part of the Russian Federation, where Soviet legacy is aggravated by political and military actions of Moscow “élites, and especially by ongoing bloody violence in Chechnya.

Widespread inter-ethnic confrontation, ethnic conflict and cleansing are relatively new phenomenon in the Caucasus, notwithstanding its long history of wars and invasions. Governments have appeared incapable or unwilling to maintain the forms of co-existence customary to the Soviet past and to formulate strategies facilitating co-existence and co-operation, while, opposite to it, some political élites have fully exploited attractiveness of nationalist or secessionist slogans for building their political careers and seizing power. Political support and commitment needed to formulate and follow a sustainable peaceful strategy is not guaranteed today. It is essential but almost impossible to build partnerships between opposing parties, formulate flexible strategies and forming consensus around co-operation priorities in a situation in which national and international institutions that would take the responsibility for coordinating the regional co-operation process are not working properly or are even absent.

There are two basic internal sources of instability in the region: sense of insecurity among ethnic groups, and struggle for benefits/resources. Three main types of issues are especially sensitive from this viewpoint: demography; status and governance; and access to/control of economic resources. Any strategy aiming at resolution of a conflict should deal with these issues to be successful. If a conflict can be resolved in a sustainable way, it should change the situation into a positive sum game from all internal players, including respective political élites that often have become hostages of their own victories, and myths that they have nourished. Sides in conflict live for long time in the illusion that time is working for them, however, realising now how much they lose from the frozen status of the conflicts, experiencing major economic, demographic and political losses. Various dimensions and approaches that may lead to such transformation of the format of conflicts and their subsequent resolution are of special importance, particularly from the perspective of regional co-operation. However, above-described internal sources of instability are supplemented by the projected interests of global and regional powers into the Caucasian-Caspian region that create additional potential for instability. Governments in the region have in such conditions to pursue an aim of creating strong military potential as a necessary component of the state-building process, and at the same time maintain civilian control over the military in order to avoid possible destabilisation caused by weak government vs. strengthening power of the military. Another conflict is between the desire to allocate scare resources to the economic development, while the fears for instability and nationalist agenda support further over-funding of the military development. Existing internal or interstate conflicts are additional argument for such tendency, and there is emerging arms contest between the local players in the region, aggravated by military support of some of them by destabilising Russian effort such as the military action in Chechnya, further aggravated by the presence of Russian military bases in Georgia and Armenia.

Most of populist rhetoric is exploiting ethnic myths about legitimate rights of one or another group violated by opponents, aiming strengthening/restoration of status, or legitimization of de facto situation. Even while lacking basic knowledge of ethnology, international law, history, or linguistics, people are readily operating with argumentation, whatever biased, from these fields, in order to support popular myths interpreting situation in favor of their respective ethnic group. Conflicts with explicit winners and losers (Karabakh, Abkhazia), unlike cases with no definite winning party (Ossetia), are followed normally by massive ethnic cleansing and total reshuffling of ethno-demographic structure of the population. These conflicts are especially difficult to cope with, as the winners would by no means give up their gains (mainly in the sense of demographic balance or de facto status) and return to the status quo ante belli.

Caucasian societies display a remarkable picture of great cultural and ethno-linguistic diversity. Language and geographic descent are considerable in defining the ethnicity, and different levels may be distinguished in ethnic self-identification. It is astonishing to see how sophisticated linguistic theories or interpretations of art history may shift to the domain of public discussion and become issues causing mutual hostility and violence. Equally, parties in the conflict had and have a pragmatic or even cynical - approach to universal democratic norms and international law, appealing to and applying those norms and provisions which they find useful for themselves and ignoring others. Human rights rhetoric may serve as a disguise for extreme nationalism. Double standard is a norm when moral norms do not preclude intellectual falsification. Ethno-territorial conflicts became the most noticeable part of new after-cold-war political reality, becoming a strong force of disintegration - ruining stability, prospects of development, and even elementary economic self-sufficiency in former Soviet South. Changing governments have appeared incapable or unwilling to maintain the forms of co-existence customary to the Soviet past and to formulate strategies facilitating co-existence and co-operation, while, opposite to it, some political élites have fully exploited attractiveness of nationalist or secessionist slogans for building their political careers and seizing power. Political support and commitment needed to formulate and follow sustainable peaceful strategy is not guaranteed today. It is essential but almost impossible to build partnerships between opposing parties, formulate flexible strategies and forming consensus around co-operation priorities in a situation in which political discourse is dominated by emotions, leaderships are concerned with short-term political interests and immediate benefits, while national and international institutions that would take the responsibility for co-ordinating regional peace-building process are either not working properly or are totally absent.

The key conflict in South Caucasus seems to be the one of Mountainous Karabakh, both due to greatest strategic stakes involved, and the internal difficulty of solving it after the sad history of atrocities and mutual hatred. The situation is aggravated by the lack of flexibility of political forces that invested in nationalism and ultimate victory, but also with the victims’ complexes on both sides. Armenians deeply distrust any Turkic speaking group in their neighbourhood, never forgetting the genocide in Turkey, but also the first wave of extreme violence in Sumgait that triggered the conflict. Azeris in their turn dwell on their bitter memories of Gorbachov-time massacre in Baku (Armenians are considered as strategic forepost of the heir of the USSR – Russia, in the region, who provided huge amounts of armament to military training to Armenian army), even more bitter of their disastrous failure in the war and the atrocities committed by Armenians at Fizuli and elsewhere. Armenia, lacking freedom of strategic manoeuvre due to its landlocked location between Turkey and Azerbaijan, relies heavily on strategic partnership with Russia, trying to maintain good relations with neighbouring Iran and at the same time with the USA. However, it is more and more clear that no recovery and no stable development are possible with the solution of the conflict. However, the governments are hostages of their previous policies, and although certain steps forward were made, it is more and more clear, that neither Armenian president (himself from Karabakh, whose positions and popular support are too week since the massacre in the Armenian Parliament), nor aged Aliev (who hopes to pass over his presidency to his son Ilham) can afford radical decisions needed for the real progress in this direction, as different from export-oriented peaceful rhetoric. In the spring 2001, after a number of preliminary meetings in Paris arranged by Jacques Chirac, the hopes emerged once again when the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan made in Key West, Florida, significant progress toward achieving some conceptual convergence of viewpoints with respect to resolving the Karabakh conflict. However, soon after that it became only too clear that neither societies would accept compromise after so much hate-speeches and so many promises of final and uncompromising victory. Already three peace proposals prepared by the Minsk group of mediators had been rejected, and now the new proposal is going the same way.

Similar situation is in Abkhazia, where in spite of numerous negotiations and mediations lies the basic unwillingness of parties to conflict to find any mutually acceptable compromise. Now Aslan Abashidze, the leader of Georgia's Ajara autonomy, was delegated hold talks about Abkhazia and handle the issue. Most observers were puzzled when President Eduard Shevardnadze appointed Abashidze as his personal representative for regulating the Abkhaz conflict. A serious rival to Shevardnadze in the last presidential election, Abashidze has cultivated ties to the Russian military and the Abkhaz leadership. However, it is clear that the appointment serves some political goals totally distinct from resolving the conflict. And indeed, on 5 February, Abkhaz representatives repeated their refusal to receive a framework document developed by representatives of the UN and the Friends UN Secretary General for Georgia group - "Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" as the basis of such talks, strongly supported by UN Security Council in its resolution 1393 of 31 January 2002. The reason is that this resolution, like previous resolutions on this topic, recognizes Abkhazia's status as within the state of Georgia, which is unacceptable for Abkhasian side, even though the two key demands of the Abkhaz leadership -- that Georgian refugees cease the protest action on the Inguri bridge and that Georgian armed forces pull back from the Kodori Gorge -- were being met. So, they is no way out of the deadlock, as Abkhazians would not agree to any limitation of their sovereignty, while Georgians will never recognise the latter. At the same time the Georgians will demand the unconditional return of refugees, which may actually reverse the demographic dominance of Abkhazians after the ethnic cleansing as a result of their military victory, and this will not be accepted, until the resolution of the status issue, which cannot be resolved. So, negotiations are rather a show, as there is no inclination to come to compromise with regards to two basic issues – return of the forced migrants, IDPs, and the status.

New patterns of threats and hopes emerge in a dynamic way, reflected in change of political preferences and attitudes. The realities of the Caucasian demography and national politics were formed by centuries and legacies of multinational empires, recent totalitarianism, wars and migrations. The rapid post-Soviet changes in the South Caucasus have quite naturally affected different parts of the population and the country in different ways. They have clearly brought to the surface all the drawbacks and problems of its interethnic relations and regional development which were not so clearly pronounced or were simply hushed up before. How Caucasian societies are to reconcile today the idea of a nation-state with the aspirations of both national minorities internally and competing claims, concerns and interests of other actors that may dispute its national aspirations? Although one should realise that today the most important direction of development is in fact dependent upon the ability to resolve suspended conflicts such as in Karabakh, Prigorodnyi in North Ossetia, Chechnya, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is necessary studying the possible benefits/problems related to democratic forms of interethnic arrangement in multi-ethnic state in more peaceful conditions as well. Apart from direct importance of such work, this issue will become relevant as a central point in resolving the conflicts themselves, and besides it could be an important advocacy tool. It is necessary to study the potential and prospects for harmonising interethnic relations and their impact on the security situation, human rights and social equity, design alternative formats for such interaction and decentralisation of governance in administrative, economic and social spheres.

Most debates today revolve around the legal status of secessionist quasi-states within / vis-à-vis former metropolies. Absence of clearly formulated and widely supported strategy in resolution of the ethno-territorial conflicts is still a problem. There were unfortunately little signs until very recently that sides in conflict are actually looking for specific arrangements in a constructive way (contrary to all rhetoric about doing so). The issue of status used to be a pretext for blocking negotiations and by this preventing the return of the IDPs/refugees, which may have endangered the demographic balance that emerged after the war. The negotiation process was often only means to demonstrate their good intentions and readiness to solve the conflict along the internationally favoured terms, while there was no real will to seek compromise. Despite their frequent statements, none of the sides wanted to go at the heart of the matter and to solve the legal status problem, as they preferred to wait until better bargaining positions are secured, if no explicit gain was possible immediately. However, the standstill in the negotiations becomes more and more damaging for parties. Postponing some decisions until the time when the sides have better basis for mutual understanding while dealing with other more copable issues, designing a provisional status on the basis of the functional needs and approach, and in the meanwhile proceeding in other directions, is the viewpoint which seems to be reasonable.

Handling all these, and many other problems, is a formidable task for relatively young “democracies”. However, there is no alternative, and it is rather the point of how quickly nations will mature. Indeed, today governments seem to be more open today to real compromises. The obstacles are however great. The most important is the unwillingness of winners (in conflicts) to risk the restoration of the status quo ante belli, i.e. to return to a situation in which they would become again a minority that cannot preserve the monopoly of power in a democratic scenario of development, independently from the legal status they would achieve within the framework of the bigger states. Now, governments are hostages to their declarations and promises, while the majority of differences are, contrary to a popular opinion, not mutually exclusive but rather symbolic or terminological by nature, and could be coped with if due effort is applied. Pressures on the conflicting parties, both from without and from within, are mounting, while the leaderships, until recently demonstrating the manifest lack of will to resolve the conflict, now seem to become more flexible and compromising. The present situation cannot survive in the longer run and “the illusion of time” (L. Reychler 1994), i.e. belief that important decisions can be postponed to the distant future, is as dangerous an illusion as ever. Time is working against the interests of all sides, no party involved is to benefit from a further postponement of a peace settlement. While it is important to speculate on how and when the solution to Caucasian conflicts will be found, it may be of more immediate value to pose the question of where alternative ideas and influences that could shape the future solution will come from.

There are a number of factors that define the direction of trends in the minority situation, both internal and external. The processes of globalisation, of ideological import and dissemination of western, democratic values through global media, economic processes in the world and their impact on such projects as developing transit routes for oil and other goods from Caspian region, and on economic transition in general necessarily influence the conditions and the aspirations of national minorities. So, for example, the attitude towards oil pipelines from Caspian to Turkey underwent certain changes among Armenians in Javakheti, Georgia, shifting from total rejection to realising economic benefits. Economic hardship and cultural pressures continue to motivate many representatives of ethnic minorities to emigrate, when there is a better option, thus reducing the cultural diversity of the Caucasus at the expense of such groups as Lezghins, Talyshs, Greeks, Russian Duhobors and Molokans, urban Armenians from Tbilisi, Jews, Germans, etc. At the same time the vacuum left from emigrating communities, as in the case of Duhobors of Javakheti, may lead to immigration fluxes and sometimes to tension. Forecasts say there should be expected significant rural impoverishment and migration to urban areas due to redistribution of land. Special mechanisms should be introduces in order to cushion such processes, mainly through retraining and skills development, as well as promoting industrial production in small towns, in order to avoid additional problems caused by such processes.

Political restructuring of multi-ethnic societies of the Caucasus is on its way, whatever slowly, and minorities tend to show more interest in participating in various political parties and arrangements of different level. Until recently it would have been unrealistic in the Caucasus to try to achieve the objectives of elimination of interethnic tension and problems on a full scale. The governments were far too busy until recently coping with emergencies, such as civil uprisings, banditry, hyperinflation, hunger and cold, to be able to focus on restructuring the societal arrangements according to clear objectives of interethnic harmony in the long, or even the medium, term. Nationalism in the South Caucasus has played a certain role, but by now exhausted its potential toward creating independent states. Ethno-nationalism of exclusive type became a dangerous, self-destructive force. Nowadays, nationalism is insufficient as a source for legitimising for the government, giving way to real democratisation, participation, and economic growth. A balanced approach to civil and economic development seems appropriate in a context where neither pro-democracy nor economic policies may succeed in isolation, but should constitute a common package. Within the actual political, legal and economic environment, human capitals should be treated as an essential core to any future development that must be maintained and improved. Achieving the participation of the minority groups of the population should be secured while avoiding cheap populism. The population needs to be fully informed of decisions that impact their well-being, though it is not always able to comprehend the technicalities. The devolution of decision-making and the decentralisation of public institutions is another important aspect of the participatory approach. Both the short-term and long term effects of social innovations are to be taken into consideration. Often short-term efficiency criteria dominate development thinking while long-term social effects are typically overlooked.

New geopolitical realities, such as expansion of NATO[2] and EU to the East, Russian invasion and humanitarian catastrophe in Chechnya, and lately the war in Iraq, started to change the seemingly frozen situation. Not all aspects of political processes are easy to interpret, although their influence is great.

One of the most important developments was linked to the small territory in the neighbourhood to the zone of instability in Chechnia – Pankisi gorge, where about 8 thousand of refugees from Chechnya found asylum, mostly women and children. Russia’s accusations that the place became a hideout for Chechen warriors, although not justified by OSCE observers, was substantiated by other indications. It seems that indeed Pankisi, apart from becoming the key focus for numerous kidnappings, drugs and arms trafficking, became indeed an important political issue, and a lever of pressure on the Georgian government (including bombing of the Georgian territory by Russian aircraft). Russia demanded of the presence of its military on the Georgian side of the border failed, an currently the demand is to repatriate Chechen refugees back to Chechnya, totally inadmissible for humanitarian reasons and contradicting the international agreements on refugee status (Geneva Convention, in the first place). However the most interesting developments are linked to recent anouncement by Russian and American officials about the possibility of some Al Qaeda gunmen hiding in Pankisi. This finally led to American “Train and Equip” programme for the Georgian army[3], and actual US military presence in Georgia.

In general, there are a number of factors restricting the movement toward regional stability, security and cooperation, both external and internal. Among the main external factors are:

· Unwillingness on the part of some international actors to establish stability in the region and contrary to that, attempts of manipulation in respective direction, for the sake of some political or group interests or benefits;

· Lack of commitment among international actors who support the peace/reconciliation process; Lack of resources to make a breakthrough; Lack of co-ordination between main actors.

· Unwillingness of political élites/decision makers to change status quo and thus put their positions/careers under risk; having become hostages to their own previous policies and rhetoric, or lose career or economic benefits; Economy of conflict in general, linked to security/protection trade, drugs and arms trafficking, or control over resources, making status quo economically beneficial for some decision makers or population groups;

· Mental inertia among the élites and the population, deep roots of exclusive ethnic nationalism, intolerance and animosities; At the same time, weakness and impoverishment of the state and hence abundance of external levers of influence, political, military and economic;

· Poor governance: i.e. no conceptual thinking among governments, no team approach among them, dominance of personal/career/group interests in decision making, over-centralisation of power in capitals vs. poor control in regions or over institutions, lack of material and intellectual resources at the disposal of governments, underdeveloped state institutions such as the army or law enforcement or judiciary, poor institutional/structural organisation of governments;

· Little participation of the population in decision-making and political process, weak legal consciousness and respect to the rule of law, lack of democratic experience, skills and attitudes, susceptibility to populist/nationalist propaganda, impoverishment of the population and hence dominance of short-term economic concerns,

As professor Ronald Suny put it, “Because of the interrelations of the economic, ecological and ethnic problems in the South Caucasus, regional solutions are essential…” South Caucasus is a small region, rich in history, culture, people and natural resources. Three states of South Caucasus, due to existing tensions either between them or to internal problems within their respective territories, are yet unable to create healthy, effective and stable framework for security and co-operation, but there is no alternative to doing this at the end.

In general, there are two types of problems related to difficulty in achieving regional security, stability and co-operation from the viewpoint of their predominant location in present time and in future: a) Immediate situation and short-term-trends that require urgent political, economic or military response; and b) Long and medium-term trends and difficulties that require strategic, step-by-step development-oriented approach.

Apart to general geopolitical changes discussed above, there are some regional developments that are of great importance, such as Russian invasion and humanitarian catastrophe in Chechnya, the struggle for Caspian oil transit routes, political violence in Armenia, rising unrest in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, increased American involvement in the search for settlement in Karabakh, decline of Russian state and resource potential, but also lessons of Iraq, Afganistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo and Macedonia that are changing the map of political sympathies and perceived threats.

Gradual increase of perception of Russia as threat for stability and security, as hated father’s image of “nuclear giant but economic and moral dwarf” unable and unwilling to forget its imperial past, is now mixed with other perceptions - that of weakening power with more peaceful aspirations. While in previous years political élites in the countries of the region perceived Russia as a threat but also as a hope (e.g. for helping to solve ethno-territorial conflicts to the benefit of one or another party), revealing infantile attitude towards former metropolis, at the same time considering the West as more desirable but remote and indifferent potential supporter, now this attitude towards the West is also rapidly changing. Establishing closer links with the West becomes a reality, while Russia is losing its image of a paternal superpower, both due to demonstration of its weaknesses and its civil and moral degradation. Orientation to the West, paradoxically enough, increases at the same time the threat perception originating from Russia, which is supposed to punish renegades for orientation change.

Through globalization of media, events in even most remote regions of the world like Indonesia are forming the new understanding of internationally recognized code of behavior, but also changes the perception of threats and political options, both among the population and the élites. At the same time, all political actors are getting used to act keeping in mind how their actions will be presented by CNN and news agencies, and through them influence the international community. Nevertheless, many decisions of the policy-makers are based on vaguely formulated and understood state goals, enemy images and threat perceptions, as well as on often chaotic attempts to define possible implications of political decisions that may lead to perpetuating conflict and instability. The alternative is explicit formulation of policy priorities backed by feasibility assessments and multi-scenario planning. Correspondingly, stated goals for security-related policy are still more strongly correlated to historical mythical or irrational prejudices and beliefs, enemy images and traditional enmities, than realistic political analysis and calculation, although the slow and gradual change can be observed. Rationalization of one or another political decision often hides these irrationalities under the disguise of pseudo-objective argumentation, but these deliberately or instinctively hidden roots and fears can be revealed through indirect methods of observation.

The governments are currently considering various possibilities for introducing territorial re-arrangement and decentralisation of power gradually and carefully over a number of years. Among the options discussed today, in particular in the case of Georgia and to less extent Azerbaijan, are the prospects of federal territorial arrangements, considered to be a remedy for the countries with recent experience of still unresolved ethno-territorial conflicts and complicated security conditions. Various approaches need to be applied in needed interdisciplinary study of such possibility: legal, economic and sociological. Although one should realise that today any development in the direction of federalism is in fact dependent upon the ability to resolve suspended conflicts in Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is worth studying the possible benefits/problems related to democratic forms of territorial arrangement in multi-ethnic state. There is certain need to articulate the perceived obstacles to federal development — particularly the psychological and political obstacles — from both the country and the regional perspectives. Existing experience is that in such situations, it is essential to understand the psychological and historical issues that are intertwined with the more obvious economic, legal, and social issues. Once articulated and understood, these psychological and political issues can then be taken into consideration when developing ways to solve the economic, legal and other challenges involved. Apart from purely scientific importance, this issue will become relevant as a central point in resolving the conflicts, and besides it could be an important advocacy tool. It is important to publicly discuss the potential and prospects for federal territorial arrangement and its impact on the security situation, to design alternative formats for territorial organisation of the South Caucasian states in the direction of federal arrangement and decentralisation of governance in administrative, economic and social spheres, investigate basic principles and problems of establishing federalism from the viewpoint of its introduction under complex transitional conditions, such as federalism and financial decentralisation, financial and tax relationship between federal and regional government, federalism and national territories, reintegrating problems of Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, liquidation of totalitarian heritage. On this path one may need to study various classical and modern (symmetrical and asymmetrical) federal systems, and in particular the time-tested Spanish and Belgian traditions of federalism and the British experience of transition, and look for appropriate profiles for the Caucasus that will be well fit for its circumstances and conditions.

While no parallel resolution for the conflicts and for regional cooperation seems to be feasible, there are two general principles that I believe to have better prospects than seeking comprehensive regional model before the resolution of conflicts. It seems that although for each of the conflicts a comprehensive peace settlement can and should be a preferable option (advocated by Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, chief mediator in Key West), due to the scale of overall damage caused by the conflict, - open-end, incremental, piecemeal approach seems to be by far more effective in dealing with regional issues. At the same time, comprehensive models, but also and rather, the principles and frameworks for regional arrangements should be openly discussed and developed through second-trek diplomacy, through unofficial meetings of experts, researchers and NGO activists of all interested parties, preparing conceptual raw material for future progress. Thus, our essential approach is to seek a piecemeal solution to the process of regional cooperation through effective security arrangements, European integration and relevant international involvement, with US as a key actor and mediator. Dealing with conflicts (third parties may serve as observers, and in Karabakh case, the representatives of Karabakh at initial stage), it also seems to be more effective to discuss first practical matters of transportation, repatriation or economic revival. Probably, it may be advantageous to declare a moratorium for discussing status issues apart of general procedures and willingness to proceed (so, all external players could make a joint declaration of unacceptability of secession, as well as the unjustified use of violence), although this would not be easy to achieve with the winning parties in conflict.

In case of repatriation to Abkhazia, as a compromise these latter could accept limited repatriation to southern Abkhazia (anyway taking place) with acquiring limited voting rights, while Georgian will continue to maintain the viewpoint(justified by international law) that all IDPs have such rights independent from where they currently live. Likewise, in Karabakh, return of the IDPs to regions around Karabakh should be negotiated, in exchange for international guarantees of non-use of violence throughout the moratorium period, and protection of civil population at any time through international observers (OSCE) and peacekeeping. Thus, step by step approach is a possible alternative also when dealing with each conflict separately, but keeping the regional dimension in mind should be preferable. External players could form a joint structure to deal with all regional matters from single perspective, and as a possible framework for this could be a group provisionally called Friends of the UN Secretary General for the Caucasus, along the same line as Friends of the UN Secretary General for Georgia is now operating (informally called Friends of Georgia Group). At the same time, the countries of the region at some stage could enter a joint commission for discussing issues of common interest, such as epidemics, transborder crime and drugs trafficking, environment, etc. This may be of great importance as part of a confidence building process, as mistrust between countries and communities is the major obstacle to progress.

Among the rich ideas found in the CEPS document is the suggestion of defining a special status for the states of the South Caucasus on their way to integration to EU membership, that would be weaker than formal candidacy but require certain adjustment beyond OSCE and Council of Europe standards. As there is strong attraction toward Europe throughout the region, such status could become a very useful instrument for strengthening democratic institutions and principles. The EU could sign an agreement with all three republics on the issue that they jointly may become candidates to EU accession if certain conditions are met within say 10 year limit. This will exclude any of the republics that violate some basic principles, i.e. democratic elections, human rights, non-violence, providing thus not only virtual stick in the form of sanctions but a carrot as well. Other measures as e.g. creating special (free) economic zones under international regimes along the border line of a conflict zone (Gali region could be a perfect training ground for such ideas). But especially important may be the search for various schemes of NATO/Russia cooperation, especially in Pankisi gorge, and maybe in the zone around Karabakh.

As stated above, alternative scenarios include unsustainable status quo, i.e. maintaining unstable balance; and slowing down positive changes, or even more risky approach in getting into unilateral alliance with one of the major actors (e.g. Armenia-Russia) which is depriving the respective state of any flexibility in negotiations and freedom of manoeuvre. At the same time, no explicit disadvantages of our approach are comprehended as the idea is not any concrete solution but rather conceptual framework and direction, which good for the societies to debate even if other solutions are sought and found. However, the argument may run that a comprehensive solution is still possible and preferable, although this is contradicted by the last decade of developments. Piecemeal process with international mediation and guarantees at every stage; initiation broad public debate around the issue and much attention to public relations aspect, involvement of all interest groups and especially ethnic groups in the debate. An alternative implementation strategy in comparative perspective may be preparing detailed plans on [inter]governmental level and only later informing the population, while requesting the assistance of international actors in designing and implementing the security arrangement process

The post-cold war world, with its numerous conflicts emerging against the background of competing globalization and de-globalization trends, is confronted with the problem of how to reduce intra-regional confrontation and promote a co-operative model. It is therefore necessary to develop precise definitions, criteria and indicators for determining the nature, role and influence of the main factors contributing both to conflicts and to effective co-operation.

Widespread inter-ethnic confrontation and conflict are relatively new phenomena in the former Soviet Union. Governments are experiencing difficulty in maintaining the forms of co-existence that were customary in the Soviet past and in designing strategies to facilitate co-existence and co-operation. There is no guarantee that the political support and commitment needed to formulate and follow a sustainable strategy will be forthcoming. In a situation in which the national and international institutions that should take responsibility for co-ordinating the regional co-operation process are not working properly, or are even absent, it is essential to build partnerships, devise flexible strategies and build a consensus around co-operation priorities.

Since the end of the 1980s, ethno-territorial conflicts have become the most noticeable aspect of the new political reality in the Caucasus, ruining stability, development prospects and even elementary economic self-sufficiency. There are five zones where wars and mass violence have erupted in the region during this period: Karabakh, Tskhinvali (South Ossetia), Abkhazia, Ossetia-Ingushetia and Chechnya.

The high concentration of conflicts in the Caucasus is often ascribed to the Russian secret service, to military or political forces fomenting antagonism, or to the particular cultures of the peoples inhabiting this region, supposedly characterized by intolerance and aggressiveness. All three explanations are unsatisfactory. The inability of ethnic groups to coexist should be seen as the result of failed institutional regulations rather than inborn qualities or geopolitical factors. This does not mean that an analysis of the roots of conflict in the Caucasus should overlook the role of external manipulation (the "hidden hand" factor) or its relation to (specific) internal “spontaneous” players in the region. It is not easy to determine to what extent an analysis of the conflicts may show them to be due to primarily intrinsic, spontaneous causes or, on the contrary, the result of deliberate external decisions, in particular in a situation where there is no empirical data on the genesis of the conflicts. It is also of the utmost importance to identify the real interests of the opposing population groups, interests which differ both from the declared goals and from the particular interests of the political élites. Nor should the specific nature of the Caucasian context be either underestimated or overestimated, in particular Caucasian cultural traditions and the geostrategic importance of the region. Some aspects of the Caucasian context, which are worth considering separately, are presented below:

All conflicts, as they involve an attempt to change the political status of a particular territory, are essentially territorial in nature. All Caucasian conflicts are - in more up-to-date terminology - sovereignty conflicts. The sacred value ascribed to territory and homeland can be observed world-wide, but has particular consequences in the Caucasus, with its extremely diversified population, its vague notion of ethnic rights on a particular territory, and the persistence of the Soviet legacy (including the legacy of arbitrarily drawn borders, of forced migrations and of the myth of the titular nation). In such circumstances, conflicts on boundaries and territories tend to be rather explosive.

The availability of an external border and access to other states or areas populated by ethnically proximate people, or having an outlet to the sea, is of the utmost importance to the Caucasian peoples. It was no coincidence that one of the most sensitive aspects of the Karabakh problem was the absence of any such external border (hence the claim on the Lachin corridor). Likewise, it was significant that the Confederation of the Caucasian Peoples[4] chose Sukhumi as its capital, due to its seaside location. Russia too perceives an outlet to the sea as a very sensitive issue, especially since the dramatic shrinking of its Black Sea coastline. In so far as all the conflicts in the Caucasus are, in one way or another, linked to the traumatic loss of imperial power by Russia, this Russian perception has great importance for the region as a whole.

Many analysts, especially those from the region itself, tend to ascribe all problems and deficiencies in the policies of Caucasian governments and movements to the “Russian factor”. A critique of this position does not mean that this factor should be underestimated. Russia is indeed actively involved in all the conflicts here, not only through its peace-keepers or paratroopers, but also through the arms trade (it sells weaponry to all sides in a conflict, though it is selective as to quality and quantity), through manipulative activities involving economic levers, or through the activities of its military and intelligence services. As Olivier Roy wrote: "In the early 1990s Moscow had actively encouraged conflicts in the Caucasus while presenting itself as an honest broker between the combatants."[5] As a rule, Russian policies were inconsistent and contradictory, but they possessed incomparably greater resources than any of the local forces. All conflicts in the Caucasus are connected with the presence of Russian troops, whether these are actively participating (Chechnya, Abkhazia), performing the role of peace-keepers (Ossetia, Abkhazia), or acting as trainers and advisors (Karabakh). Greater sympathy among the Russian military and political establishments for one of the fighting sides is apparent in each of these conflicts (the retreat from Chechnya and the absence of peace-keepers in Karabakh constitute exceptions in this respect).

Current president Putin is often accused of hidden agenda and doubletalk. However, there is long-going tradition of this. The North Caucasians well remember the 1991 visit by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the region, when he promised the Ingush assistance in returning of the Prigorodny district, and when, in a second speech, he promised the Ossetians to defend them against Ingush ambitions. Not only did the very creation of the Ingush republic (without even delimiting its borders) contravene the Russian Constitution, but it was seemingly designed specifically by one of the interest groups in power to be a source of permanent tension, although hardly beneficial to Russian national interests. Such a prevalence of short-term group or individual interests over long-term strategic interests, although not unfamiliar elsewhere, dominates the political scene in the post-Soviet world. In the case of Russia, this contradiction is even more complicated by post-imperial nostalgia. Another specific illustration of Russian inconsistencies and contradictory policies was the arrest, in the early stages of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, of the leader of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus, Musa Shanibov, a former professor of Scientific Communism - allegedly for organizing military and terrorist activities on Georgian territory. The attempt to repress the Confederation turned this little-known local politician into a popular regional figure; there were certain signs (such as the clumsy way in which he was arrested and then released) that these consequences were calculated in advance, even if counter-productive to other policies.

On the one hand, the Chechen war demonstrated the possibility of successful opposition to the Russian state machinery, and hence serves as an example to radical separatists; on the other, however, it demonstrated the readiness of the Russian State to deploy immense resources to suppress such separatist movements by force. In the consciousness of the Caucasian people, Chechnya pointed to the real anti-Caucasian aggressors, and shifted previously anti-Georgian sentiments northwards. At the same time, many Georgian politicians hoped that the Chechen war would lead to a change in the Russian attitude towards the Abkhazian problem. But Russia's unwillingness or inability to resolve the Abkhaz conflict betrayed these hopes.

The Russian policy towards one or other of the ethnic groups is also a very important factor. With the exception of the Chechens, who were themselves involved in a war with Russia, all the parties involved in the Caucasian conflicts tried to solicit Russia's support, usually appealing to that country as an arbiter. Such an appeal aimed to enforce their own position in the conflict or in its settlement. Political support to Russia or to the Russian government, in the form of electoral support (for instance in North Ossetia and Ingushetia) or in the form of military bases (for instance from the Georgian side in the Abkhazian conflict), are offered in exchange for a favourable attitude from the arbiter. Such political calculations by the local élites reflect their lack of confidence in their own power. By appealing to an external arbiter they are showing their lack of any sense of responsibility for the conflicts in which they are involved. Their appeal for Russian support also shows that they overestimate Russia's potential to solve the conflicts in the Caucasus. Russia is still perceived as an external arbiter, a father-figure, whose force is decisive in the final outcome of this game. Although it could initially have played a decisive role in these conflicts, it now seems, however, to be not only unwilling but also unable to resolve them.

All the conflicts are characterized by radical demographic changes in the period before the eruption of the conflict (peaceful migration, forced deportations under Stalin) and during the conflict itself (refugees, ethnic cleansing). These demographic changes lead to perceptions of a threat and an acute sense of insecurity. An ethnic group - or its élites - may fear that a weakening of its demographic position could, in the long run, radically alter the balance of power and the redistribution of available resources to its disadvantage. Such perceptions, even if they are not confirmed by the use of force by the party whose increasing demographic potential is feared, may lead to “preventive action” and hence to violent conflict.

Demography is an important, sometimes even a decisive, issue in the effort by the traditional political élites to preserve their privileged position by increasing the "weight" of their respective ethnic group. The case of the Western Caucasian peoples - who experienced severe demographic losses after the end of the great Caucasian War in 1864, when Muslims from the Caucasus were either expelled by force or voluntarily emigrated to Turkey - is notable in this respect. The Abkhazian leadership, for instance, is attempting to attract members of their own diaspora in Turkey and the Middle East to return and repopulate the country.

The Soviet heritage - including the loose definition of the borders between federal units, the arbitrary attribution of territorial and political status to the so-called titular [sic] nations and the Stalinist ideological tradition on the nationality question (definition of "nationality", hierarchical distinction between "people" and "ethnos", etc.) - is present in all the conflicts. Symbolic acts and statements as well as all sorts of national myths are inflated in the first stage of the conflicts, while the present stage is characterized by the gradually diminishing significance of these symbolic acts, statements and myths. All parties in the conflict had and have a pragmatic - some may even say cynical - approach to universal democratic norms and international law, appealing to those norms and provisions that they find useful for themselves and ignoring others. Double standards are commonplace. As Tim Potier stated recently: "The government and people of Georgia should not be blamed for 'claiming' what international law says is rightfully If the Abkhaz were in their position, they would be doing exactly the same."[6]

The demand for exclusive rights to a specific territory by one ethnic group or another is often linked to the demand for “autochthonous” status, while only “guest” status is attributed to other groups. Such claims are generally based on an arbitrary use of historical facts. Some Georgian scholars have argued, for instance, that the Abkhazians came to Abkhazia from the North Caucasian mountains only recently. This, it is argued, is proved by the lack of an Abkhazian word for “sea”. The Abkhazian scientists in turn have selected other arguments from the scant historical information available to argue that, on the contrary, it is the Georgians who should be regarded as newcomers to a region that was part of the Abkhazian Kingdom in the Middle Ages. In the same vein, Armenians claim historical rights to Karabakh, although most sources show that the Caucasian Albanians inhabited the region. Azeri sources claim that most of the Armenians in this region are descendants of the Armenian migrants from Iran and Turkey who came to Karabakh during the 19th century, after the Russian military victories. The Azeris claim to be the descendants and heirs of the Christian Albanian population, and thus the real autochthonous inhabitants of Karabakh.

Some political claims are easier to substantiate with historical facts than others. Thus it is easily proved that there were next to no Ossetians among the population of Tskhinvali until the 1920s, or that the Ingush actually did inhabit the right bank of the Terek river before their forced deportation to Central Asia at the end of the second world war, when the territory was offered to the Ossetians (supposedly more loyal to the Soviet regime). In cases like these, the opposing party may indeed find it difficult to substantiate its political claims using historical material. The legitimacy of the whole argument based on the difference between autochthonous and immigrant peoples may also be rejected by such a party, which then tries to legitimize its political claims by a relatively more recent historic past, for example, along the following lines: "Those who are currently occupying a territory should have all the rights to it" - as in the case of the Magyars who settled in Hungary some centuries ago, or the Turks, who have occupied Constantinople since the 15th century. In both types of legitimization, history is manipulated for political reasons. The impact of such historical arguments on the public consciousness of all the ethnic groups living in the Caucasus is a strong a strong factor in the generation of conflicts.

A vaguely defined right to self-determination is the main argument in all the disputes mentioned above, with the sole exception of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict. In the case of Abkhazia, this right conflicts with the democratic principle of majority rule, but in South Ossetia, where the Ossetians constitute a majority, it does not. This is yet another demonstration of the instrumental use of historical, demographic and legal arguments in various conflicts.

Different levels may be distinguished in the ethnic self-identification of the Caucasian peoples. The Ingush and the Chechens consider that they have very distinct identities, but at the same time they stress their ethnic affinity (their languages belong to the Vainakh, or Nakh, group). They also regard themselves as Caucasians, and are ready in some cases to prove this latter identity by political or even military action. Likewise, the Abkhazians and the Circassians set great store by their ethnic proximity, as well as their Caucasian identity. The barbaric neologism currently popular in Russia, "a person of Caucasian nationality" - which reflects the general repressive, anti-Caucasian mood in that country - effectively strengthens this common identity.

Peoples who speak Turkic and Indo-European languages also have to define their place within the framework of this common Caucasian identity. Not only peoples like the above-mentioned Circassians, but also Balkars, Ossetians and Kumyks should be taken into account. These, however, are far less active in the pan-Caucasian integration processes (e.g. in the Confederation of Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus).

Another feature peculiar to the conflicts mentioned above is that they all take place between groups belonging to markedly different linguistic families (Slavic Russians/Kartvelian Georgians/Iranian Ossetians/Turkic Azeris/Vainakh Ingush and Chechens, Abkhazians of the Adygho-Abkhaz group, and Armenians). Linguistically related ethnic groups support each other, as in the case of the Ingush and Chechens, or the Abkhaz and Adyghs. This is one of the reasons why ethnogenetic theories and myths play a much greater role in the Caucasus, while the religious factor is secondary, contrary to places like the former Yugoslavia where the ethnic conflicts take place between groups that are closely related linguistically but are denominationally distinct.

The role of the religious factor in the Caucasian conflicts is commonly overestimated. Although in some cases (e.g. Chechnya, with its strong Islamic networks) religion may play a significant role, local political élites generally display a rather pragmatic manipulative attitude towards it. After his return to Georgia, Shevardnadze lost no time in getting baptized - by the more Orthodox name of Giorgi. The Abkhaz president Ardzinba promised to build a mosque in order to placate the religious feelings of his more devoted Muslim Abkhazian compatriots in Turkey. The population, meanwhile, has to a great extent lost its initial interest in religious ceremonies, revived after perestroika. Religious symbols may, however, become more powerful during a prolonged military action against opponents of a different religious creed. This happened in Chechnya, where there is a still significant Sufi tradition and where the historical memory of the 19th century jihad against the Russians is still very much alive. Now many Chechens support the introduction of shariat principles into penitentiary practice, though they may often be unable to demonstrate a basic knowledge of its fundamental principles.

The economic interests of Russian and Caucasian states and the volume of resources that they are ready to deploy in order to achieve particular political goals need to be assessed in detail. Among these are the economic interests and resources of various élites and groups - such as the arms and drug dealers, oil companies and multinationals - that have to be taken into account, together with the economic significance of decisions taken by the state administration. All these factors imply significant capital flows. The war in Chechnya has enriched some of the military, while the resources allocated to the rehabilitation of the economy have fed those economic players who were able to control this decision politically. Pipeline policies and the future redistribution of the oil-generated profits is a dominant factor in the Russian policies in Karabakh and Chechnya, and may play an increasingly important role in the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict. Russia seems to be persisting in its manipulation of ethno-territorial conflicts in order to secure its strategic economic (oil) interests.

7. The time perspective, concepts of the future and the basic interests of the population

None of the opposing sides has any feasible, realistic proposal, which may be considered a sound basis for conflict settlement, to offer the other side. Russia has no compromise to offer either, and until recently seemed not to be interested in sustainable settlements. In most cases a conflict is seen as a zero-sum game, in which the perception of both the possible negative consequences of certain factors or events for the interests of each party (in particular as regards the demographic balance between different populations on the disputed territory, or the overall balance of power), as well as possible positive consequences for the interests of the opposing party in the conflict, are largely exaggerated.

A population’s safety, prosperity and participation in governance could be described as its basic needs. This is quite a simple definition. It is, however, not easy to discuss the means of securing such basic needs. So in the case of Georgian refugees from Abkhazia, for instance, it is evident that there is no rapid solution leading to their return - to northern Abkhazia in particular - that would give them sufficient security guarantees and at the same time ensure democratic governance in Abkhazia. Only a more complex, stage by stage process can lead to a compromise acceptable to both sides. As in many other cases of conflict between "formal" democracy and "ethnic" demography, the only possible solution - albeit a slow one - involves a basic democratization process accompanied by very cautious demographic policies, linked to complete procedural transparency and an ongoing process of negotiation.

GEORGIA’S EXTERNAL ORIENTATIONS

Georgian foreign policies are closely linked to internal politics, and both are mostly real-time games. At the first sight, impression may be created that these policies are anything but planned, consistent, deliberate and conscious progress in some direction. Messages sent out by such policies are often ambiguous, and misleading. Although situation in Georgia is seemingly more complicated than in many other CIS member states, many of the problems and approaches are quite generic and hence of general interest. In order to understand the nature of Georgia’s policies, it should be clearly understood what are the factors defining them, and who are the interest or the power groups behind these. Georgia acquired its independence quite unexpectedly, and unprepared, so there were no skilled political élites other than those coming from Communist nomenclatura, secret services or komsomol, and their family clans. These were the élites that took over much of economic resources, and still control much of the political landscape. Hence, there is no well-formed and outspoken middle class, no interest groups that are able to influence foreign policies, and no tradition of strategic planning. Political parties active on the scene struggle for power and gather around certain political figures, but have no consistent political programs or clear strategies, and in their foreign policy preferences may only differ by general orientation toward the West or Russia, the latter less and less popular option nowadays. General public like the western lifestyle as presented by American movies, at the same time there is still strong legacy of ethnic nationalism and religious intolerance, but these are not yet translated into external policy preferences.

It is obvious that the single person determining political orientation and taking major decisions in foreign policy domain is Georgia’s aging president, Shevardnadze. His talents in acting in real time are extraordinary, and his ability to change the most disadvantageous situation to his benefit – legendary. However, ignoring some changes in his capacities brought by age and stress since 1998 such as less tolerance toward differing opinion or more consideration for his family interests, it should be mentioned that his greatest drawback seem to be the absence of clear-cut social values and long-term vision or consistent, holistic model of future. Political gambling is the nature of post-Soviet politics in general, and no surprise it is common also in Georgia. Ideological flexibility and soft value systems allowed many former Communist leaders, like Shevardnadze, to re-establish themselves on new post-Soviet arenas, overpowering less experienced and skilled rivals in rather specific political battles. Of course, the drawbacks of such an approach from the viewpoint of statebuilding remain considerable, whatever enticing it may be to political insiders.

However, it should not be assumed that there is no planning or strategy behind Shevardnadze’s external politics, his most successful domain, and that the approach is simply reactive to external or internal events. Shevardnadze have demonstrated more than once his ability to design complicated multi-step political intrigue, and win. Although a skilled tactician, and adapting to reality, he is also accommodating it to his goals, and many of his policies have hidden agenda, they are actually pro-active or even pre-emptive. Being a politician of significant ambition and scale, although a profound realist, by no means will he ever agree to be bossed around or manipulated for long time, if not while planning some counteraction. This is well understood by his Russian counterpart, Putin, frustrated at his inability to grapple with long-standing Chechenian problem, who has developed particular emotional rejection of Shevardnadze, to the extent of often harming political game through disdain of discussions and preferring to speak in ultimata.

According to numerous statements, there are several goals directing and defining Georgia’s foreign policies, and it seems they have real significance, although in general political statements of Georgian politicians should be considered with great caution and not easily taken for their face value. The primary objective is re-establishing Georgia’s sovereignty over secessionist Abkhazia, this statement is repeated by Shevardnadze again and again. He hopes to use international levers for peacefully resolving the conflict, and there are several reasons for his peacefulness, none of them of moral nature. Georgian army is too weak, and resources too limited to win the war, especially if the Abkhaz will again be assisted by Russia. And what international support is there going to be for such an effort? Even in the case of military victory, the problem will not be solved, as it will be very difficult to suppress resistance and win over guerrilla welfare relying on internationally acceptable approaches, while the doctrine of pre-emption can be used against its interests. The point of international approval is very important for Shevardnadze, who is still seeing himself as a political figure not restricted by the boundaries of his native country. Another important factor is Shevardnadze’s suspicion toward the military - it is not accidental that the police (he used to be a Minister of Interior before becoming the Communist leader of Georgia) was as a rule better funded and more numerous than the army, the latter kept underdeveloped until the benefits of the US sponsored Train and Equip program had changed the balance.

From now on, the word is pre-emption. US military presence in Georgia is a best example of pre-emptive approach, understood as striking first against clear threats, assertive and proactive stance towards them. While the Georgian society considered the increasingly aggressive Russian attitude toward the issue of Chechen militants in Pankisi gorge as extremely dangerous, Georgian leadership appeared able to act quickly, using the rising American geo-strategic interest in the region. While Russian hawks called for military action on Georgian territory (this was partly realised through several cases of blind bombings of the Pankisi neighbourhood, planned as psychological pressure), preferably jointly with Americans, applying Bush's new doctrine of pre-emption interpreted by Russia’s Putin to his supposed advantage, the Train and Equip program was quietly planned and implemented to the shock and frustration of Moscow military strategists. What infuriated Russian leadership most was the fact that, under the guise of fighting El-Qaeda, other strategic games were being played, which were not to Russia's advantage. Definitely, if not US interest, no such program would be carried out, but still it is obvious that Georgian leadership had demonstrated exceptional skills in achieving this move, securing long-term protection and cooperation with far-going strategic implications. This proved to be a right move after the September 17 threats by Putin to carry out pre-emptive strikes, countered by Shevardnadze’s overt reversal of attitude toward the issue and reconciliation in Chisenau. At the rhetorical level at least this "new" approach smacks of extreme submissiveness, but in reality it is taking matters into own hands. While nothing has changed in reality on strategic plane, an operation with minimum casualties was carried out in Pankisi gorge squeezing Chechen militants back to Russia, adding to her permanent headache, and deserving praise from George Bush.

Statement made in Prague by Shevardnadze, declaring the will of Georgia to enter NATO is another example of proactive action. Although it may look for an outsider like a one-person marriage at the moment, it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and apparently Georgia got credit for a goodwill gesture. While it is again clear that this statement was agreed in advance with the NATO leadership, it would be wrong to see here only submission to Western demand instead of well calculated, and well timed, action. The statement, though inevitably vague in detail, signalled a fundamental shift in the whole Georgia’s approach towards security. Although it is understood by some experts that Georgia’s membership is more like wishful thinking than a realistic plan, the benefits of such move are great, while judging by Romania’s example admission to NATO is rather a political decision than result of military and economic preparedness, and thus not impossible. Pipeline politics, although its importance should not be exaggerated, is still a strong argument to pay special attention to Georgia’s efforts and striving. In any case, Georgia has secured strong support and assistance in building its army, and in the long term its strategic future is determined. The Georgian president was clearly right in thinking that traditional approaches are far less relevant to the current security agenda than decisive move toward integration into North-Atlantic Alliance. It is also clear that pre-emption as an organising principle is necessarily the only cure for the very real security dilemmas posed for a country like Georgia, and this principle is widely applied in Georgia’s foreign policy.

The toolkit of Georgia’s security-related foreign policy is not rich, due to its limited resources. However, there are certain possibilities to develop, even if frequently on symbolic level up to date. One such tool is GUAM, a pro-western sub-grouping of four CIS countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, with unclear attitude of Uzbekistan. GUAM members planned to sign a free trade agreement, create a peacekeeping battalion to protect pipelines, and cooperate in border protection, but none of these attempts has led anywhere). Founded back in 1997 as a political, economic and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of its members and counterbalance Russian influence in the CIS, GUAM has become a forum for discussion with little practical implications, apart of being an irritant for Russia. However, with EU and NATO expansion these four states located around the Black Sea acquire special significance as new border states. While all of them share certain problems, whether it is unresolved territorial issues or overwhelming corruption, they have good chance for receiving some special status vis a vis EU, as the concept of “direct neighbourhood” did not appear to be operational. In such case, Georgia acquires important regional role, strengthened by its significance as East-West transport crossroad, while GUAM may serve as a possible mechanism to increase security in the region, especially if Bulgaria and Romania get involved. This is why Georgian leadership was particularly active in promoting GUAM, and there is still potential to be explored.

Thus, it can be summed up that Georgia’s foreign policy, while in general designed by the president himself and hardly influenced much by other decision-makers, is quite effective, often even proactive, and supported by the population. The question of wider international support is one of the fundamental dilemmas of the such approach – and this issue is addressed skilfully. Doctrine of pre-emption, although has created short-term risks and threats for Georgia, in the long run served its interests. However, as foreign policy cannot be an end by itself, failures in economic development or democratic state-building make all the success on foreign front less effective, although its influence is growing. While under conditions of scarce resources time-tested strategies of reacting to policy challenges seem obsolete and inoperative, proactive approaches are effective tools to cope with existing security problems, in the long run promoting conflict resolution and the elimination of other risks and threats.

The Abkazian population has suffered great losses in the last two centuries as a result of deportation and the artificial in-migration of other ethnic groups to its homeland. At the same time, the Soviet legacy included ingenious arrangements for maintaining the disproportionately large share of leadership offices held by the Abkhaz community. This legacy contributed to the conflagration and determined the form it would take. Specific factors which had a decisive influence on the outbreak of the war include the North Caucasian diaspora in the Near East, different evaluations of the legal aspects of the conflict (such as the right to self-determination versus the territorial integrity principle), the perception by both parties to the conflict of the righteousness of their actions, the role of regional and international organizations, the role of Cossacks in the conflict and the importance of the Russian language in Abkhazia.

The general atmosphere in Abkhazia still bears a number of immediate post-war characteristics. The population expects war to break out anew sooner or later, and consequently much discussion and public discourse concerns the prospect of the renewal of military operations. This keeps the population militarily mobilized and constitutes the strongest obstacle to constructive, development-oriented thinking, as well as to the building of civil society. In most parts of Georgia, however, the issue of Abkhazia shifted long ago to the periphery of political discussions. In spite of state propaganda, and the continual attempts by the political groups representing, or claiming to represent, the refugees (Internally Displaced Persons - IDPs) from Abkhazia, the problems of day-to-day survival or business interests preoccupy the general public far more than the prospect of war in Abkhazia. Apart from a few militants, mostly among the IDPs, the population would rather support a peaceful solution to the Abkhazian problem, although for the majority any solution that involved losing Abkhazia would be unacceptable.

Most debates today revolve around the legal status of Abkhazia within/vis-à-vis Georgia. I doubt whether it is possible - or even very important - to resolve the question of political status in the short term. Problems other than status have to be resolved in order to reduce tension. But both sides’ concerns and interests in the discussion on political status have to be properly analysed if there is to be a productive dialogue. The Abkhaz are concerned with how they will maintain control and who will guarantee their security after they have become a minority again, which will happen if the IDPs are allowed to return and take part in the political process through democratic procedures. The Abkhaz, who have won the war and - for the first time in a century - now have a favourable demographic percentage, have great difficulty in facing such prospects.

The Abkhaz side insists on equal (confederative) status with Georgia, which is unacceptable to Tbilisi. In February 1996 the Abkhaz proposed to set up a federal union with Georgia. According to Anri Jergenia, the Abkhaz “President's” special envoy, these proposals contained "elements of both a federation and a confederation". The new arrangement would include common national borders, joint activities in specific spheres and the possibility of setting up joint authorities. According to the protocol, each of the two equal sides would keep its constitution and relations between them would be regulated by a special treaty which, with the agreement of both sides, could have the force of constitutional law. Both sides would co-ordinate their foreign policies and foreign economic relations, the operation of border and customs services, power engineering, transport and communications, the environment and the guaranteeing of human and civic rights and freedoms, as well as the rights of ethnic minorities. The protocol implied that, by mutual agreement, Georgia and Abkhazia could increase the number of "co-ordinated policies".[7]

“President” Ardzinba noted that the new structure would not amount to a "classical type of federation". One should bear in mind that the Abkhaz side regards the above proposals as a compromise. According to Vladislav Ardzinba (and this is also maintained by many experts), the vast majority of the current population of Abkhazia would, in virtually every circumstance, seek closer relations with Russia than with Georgia, and Abkhazia would ideally prefer to join a Russian Federation than any Georgian equivalent.

During his inauguration speech as Georgian President (26 November 1995), Eduard Shevardnadze declared:

"We have always stated, and we are stating now, that time has determined that Georgia's state structure be shaped on a federal basis. Abkhazia will be a subject of the federation in Georgia with broad political status. It will have its own constitution, which will have to be in conformity with the constitution of a single united state. The Republic of Abkhazia will have its own parliament, supreme court, anthem, state emblem and other features of a state".[8]

In 1997, notwithstanding the more active position adopted by the UN with regard to the resolution of the conflict, the Georgian-Abkhazian negotiations reached a deadlock, despite the fact that any further delay is detrimental to all parties. The absence of a clearly formulated and widely supported strategy for the resolution of ethno-territorial conflicts is still a problem. The general unwillingness to decentralize power in Georgia proper, as well as an extremely cautious attitude towards the repatriation of the Meskhetians (Meskhetian Turks), are causing increased suspicion among the negotiating partners as to the sincerity of the liberal and federalist statements made by the Georgian government, and have led to accusations of a double standard.

Among the various options for the future status of Abkhazia that are being discussed - whether it should join Russia, Georgia or a Caucasian Confederation, or stay totally independent - for the time being there does not seem to be any alternative to finding some sort of compromise with the Tbilisi government, even if other options would be preferable to the vast majority of ethnic Abkhaz. There are unfortunately no signs that both sides are actually looking for specific arrangements in a constructive way (contrary to all their rhetoric about doing so). Russia’s attitude reduces still further the chances of finding this kind of solution: its post-war policy on Chechnya demonstrates that it is ready to deploy its still formidable resources to maintain control over the North Caucasus, and it still seems to believe that a compromise that is mutually acceptable to the Georgians and the Abkhaz would not be beneficial for Russian control over the region. Russia is, however, unlikely to decide to incorporate Abkhazia formally, while it may be ready to assist it in maintaining its de facto independence for quite a long time.

For the Abkhaz, the issue of status used to be a pretext for blocking negotiations and thereby preventing the return of the IDPs/refugees, which could have endangered the demographic balance that emerged after the war. For the Georgians, the negotiation process was only a means of demonstrating their good intentions and readiness to solve the conflict on internationally favoured terms, while there was no real will to seek a compromise. Despite their rhetoric, neither side really wanted to get to the heart of the matter and solve the problem of legal status, preferring - if no explicit gain was possible immediately - to wait until better bargaining positions were secured.

The only alternatives to a compromise between Tbilisi and Sukhumi are either military action, which would be detrimental to all and seems to be less probable, except perhaps on a limited scale (e.g. in Gali or the Kodori valley), or a further stalling of the negotiations - "neither peace nor war". This last scenario seemed to be the one preferred by all parties for several years, but it has now ceased to be so, in so far as both governments are beginning to lose control over the situation - a clear trend in 1997.

Moreover, the deadlock in the negotiations is becoming more and more damaging to both parties. Finally, it could be argued that the opinion quoted in the document presented at the beginning of this chapter - that the final determination of the legal status should not be a precondition for any other progress in the peace process - makes a good deal of sense. Postponing such a solution until a time when the sides have a better basis for mutual understanding, designing provisional status on the basis of functional needs and approaches, and proceeding in the meantime with other important issues, is a viewpoint I would fully support.

The Abkhaz side uses two main arguments to counter the Georgian demand for the refugees to return soon to Abkhazia. According to the Sochi protocols of April 1994,[9] any Georgians who took part in military action should be prohibited from returning - economic difficulties and the risk of spontaneous violence are used as a second argument against their return. Neither of these arguments is convincing. The first is incompatible with any respected legal tradition: of course, war criminals should be prosecuted notwithstanding their ethnic origin, but to instigate proceedings against all those who have carried weapons is a very different matter. It is not only unfair, as people should not be prosecuted for taking one side or another in a civil war, it is also technically impossible to have independent legal bodies check the behaviour of the entire Georgian population during the war. The argument that the economic situation is unfavourable is not a very strong one either: technical and financial terms can be agreed by both parties in order to make the return of the IDPs possible. Neither of the two arguments can be invoked in relation to the return of refugees to the Gali region, which has a homogeneous Georgian population and where the return of IDPs is already an irreversible process. According to various estimates, the number of Georgians in Gali is about as high as the number of Abkhaz in Abkhazia (the latter number continues to decrease, creating a further imbalance).

Although the Gali region has been owned alternately over the centuries by Megrelian/ Georgian and Abkhazian feudal lords, it has had almost no Abkhazian population in the 20th century. Whatever arguments the Abkhaz use regarding the Georgian presence in their homeland, there is no historical or other legitimization for discriminatory policies towards the Georgian population in this region. Nor would such policies receive any support from Abkhazia’s North Caucasian allies. Abkhaz officials will therefore have great difficulty in coping with any eruptions of violence in Gali.

The possibility of returning the Gali region to Georgian control, in exchange for peace and an acceptable political status, was discussed among the Abkhaz leadership. The opportunity for such an exchange has been lost, however, as the Georgian government no longer has to negotiate the future of Gali on the same terms as before - it just needs to wait for a more opportune moment. An attempt to create a separate Megrel nationality (out of a linguistically distinct Georgian sub-ethnic group) as a strategic alternative, which is proposed and strongly supported by a British scholar, George Hewitt, and is being implemented in practice by the Abkhaz leadership, has come too late, as the majority of the IDPs (predominantly Megrelians) have strengthened their Georgian identity after their exodus from Abkhazia.

Specific measures concerning the Georgian IDPs and people who went missing during the war could promote dialogue between Georgians and Abkhaz. A moratorium on changing the property rights of the IDPs and refugees from Abkhazia - which would in fact mean unilaterally depriving them of their property left behind in Abkhazia, until the achievement of a final solution or a special agreement - could be reciprocated on the Georgian side by long-term commitments regarding the economic development of Abkhazia. The mutual exchange of data concerning the persons reported missing during the war, as well as further collaboration in searching for them, is another area that is important for confidence-building.

Demographic relations that may benefit one side or the other is a major concern of both parties, but especially the Abkhaz. No progress achieved on the question of political status would be of much value to the Abkhaz if the pre-war demographic balance were restored. Hence most discussions on political issues, even if they are not explicitly linked to demography, have a demographic dimension that should not be underestimated in efforts to understand the motives of both parties.

The demographic position of the Abkhaz community has been progressively weakened, since the 1860s, through an immigration flow of Georgians (mainly of the Megrelian sub-ethnos), Russians and Armenians. Abkhazians felt particularly threatened by the massive immigration of Georgians that started in the 1930s, leading the proportion of Abkhazians in the total population to decline to 17 or 18 % per cent by the 1980s, when their number was about the same as that of both the Russian and Armenian communities in Abkhazia, and less than half that of the Georgians (approximately 46%).

The importance of this issue needs to be recognized in the negotiation process if real progress is to be achieved. The Abkhaz had hoped to win time after the war by slowing down the negotiations and postponing a final solution, in order to establish their position on the international scene and change the demographic balance in their favour by a massive repatriation of the diaspora Abkhaz. Their hope that these objectives would be achieved, thereby strengthening their negotiating position, has waned since then.

According to E. Wesselink, the repatriation of Abkhazians from abroad should not be expected in the near future:

"The repatriation movement never gained momentum. The number of returnees are counted in hundreds rather than in thousands. A number of delegations visited the North Caucasus around 1990 to study the prospects for repatriation programmes. The visitors were disappointed at the low standard of living in the North Caucasus. Another problem was the fact that the Abkhaz in Abkhazia appeared to be Christians and that the other North West Caucasians showed no real interest in religious teachings."[10]

Nor is there any sign of international recognition for the Abkhazian State, and even leading Chechen politicians have withdrawn their support from the Abkhazian case.[11] But even more important is the fact that the permanent threat and dire economic prospects are worsening rather than improving the ethno-demographic balance of the Abkhaz. They are emigrating, thereby voting with their feet against current policies. Already there seem to be more Georgians and Armenians than Abkhaz in Abkhazia, and this trend may not change if the approach based on playing for time continues.

While the importance of the ethno-demographic issue is at present an obstacle to reconciliation, it seems likely that it may eventually turn into a powerful stimulus in the search of compromise. One can imagine Georgians accepting or even encouraging the repatriation of diaspora Abkhaz in exchange for the gradual return of refugees, and thus a certain demographic balance could be negotiated and secured. Even if a significant repatriation process would require political stability and economic revival, the process of repatriation could start on more than a symbolic scale. But only compromises between Abkhaz and Georgians can promote such a process, and Tbilisi should be aware of this asset in the negotiations. At present, however, the Georgian political establishment is strongly opposed to the idea of Abkhazian repatriation.

Cultural insecurity, or a national community’s fear of losing its ethnic and cultural identity, is a vitally important factor in the Abkhaz attitude towards reconciliation prospects. The Abkhaz traditionally tend to lean more than the Georgians towards the Russian culture and language, and at the same time they stress their ethnic proximity to the North Caucasian groups of Adyghs and Circassians. These cultural attitudes conflict with those of the Georgians, who have a strong pro-Western bent. Such a cultural clash between the Abkhazians and Georgians was potentially exacerbated by the displacement of the strongly Russified Georgian (mostly Megrelian) population of Abkhazia to the more explicitly Georgian cultural environment.

The majority of Abkhazians, in particular the Christian population in the southern part of the region, are culturally very close to the neighbouring Megrelians, to the extent that until recently there were no clear borderlines of ethnic self-identification. Some members of a family might, for instance, consider themselves as being Georgian, while others in the same family regard themselves as Abkhaz. Pragmatic considerations play a role here. Georgians and Abkhaz share many family names. Paradoxically, some very patriotic people on both sides have the same family name. These facts generate additional mutual suspicion and lead to accusations of assimilatory policies.

Georgians, formerly the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia, generally accept the Abkhazians’ right to have their language recognized as a state language. Unlike in the past (in Gamsakhurdia's time particularly, this was not always the dominant opinion), now they also acknowledge that the Abkhazians are an "autochthonous" population, a status they do not ascribe to other ethnic groups in Abkhazia, such as Russians or Armenians. At the same time, Georgians believe that they themselves have the same right to be considered an autochthonous population there, a claim that is based on various historical arguments, such as the dominance of Georgian inscriptions on Abkhazian monasteries and other historic monuments. The Abkhaz are unwilling to accept such arguments, fearing that the re-establishment of the Georgian majority and culture in Abkhazia, without strong guarantees, could endanger the very survival of their own culture and the fate of the nation itself. The Abkhaz perceive the Russian cultural milieu as less dangerous for their own cultural survival, owing to the diversity and size of the Russian cultural arena. Many joint initiatives could be taken in the cultural field shared by Georgians and Abkhaz, to begin with, for instance, the recreation of the historic Abkhaz archives burnt in Sukhumi during the war, by providing copies of relevant documents and other materials; the restoration of libraries; co-operation in the field of education, for example in preparing text-books in the Abkhazian language, etc. Great caution, however, would be needed here on the Georgian side, due to the ever-present suspicion of Georgian cultural expansionism.

The Armenian population, which already dominated some districts before the war, is at present considered by some experts to constitute the largest community in Abkhazia. They are, however, strongly under-represented on government bodies. In the past, they generally expressed their solidarity with the Abkhazians in their struggle for secession. Some Armenians from Armenia and Karabakh took part in military action on the Abkhazian side, while the majority of the few Armenians fighting on the Georgian side during the war came from other regions of Georgia. While the Armenian government in Yerevan explicitly states its neutrality in the conflict, favouring the search for a peaceful solution, and declares its support for Georgia's territorial integrity, there used to be great sympathy for the Abkhaz case among the Armenian population and nationalist political circles in Armenia proper. According to Michael Ochs,[12] Levon Ter-Petrossyan was considered, after the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections, as a democrat, a legitimate president, and more generally "a rational guy with whom you can talk and with whom you can compromise, not a nationalist". Tbilisi was unhappy about Ter-Petrossyan's weakened position, and worried about political instability in Armenia.

In June 1997, during an official visit by the Armenian president to Georgia, Ter-Petrossyan and Shevardnadze went together to Akhalkalaki, where the Armenian president declared that the last thing Armenia needed was to have problems with Georgia regarding Akhalkalaki, which has a large Armenian minority.[13] This concern is not shared by the Dashnaks (an opposition nationalist party in Armenia), who have territorial claims against Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. From the Georgian perspective, a weakening of Ter-Petrossyan's position in Armenia would reduce his leverage on the militant, nationalist Armenian groupings.

The Abkhaz strive for closer relations with the North Caucasians, and particularly the Adyghs (including the Circassians and Kabardinians), who belong to the same linguistic group as the Abkhaz, unlike most of the other North Caucasian ethnic groups. Nevertheless, since the co-ordinated resistance to Russian conquest during the Great Caucasian War of the 19th century - in which the battle between the Russians and Abkhazians constituted the final episode - Abkhazians have developed a strong sense of a common fate and identity with the Northern Caucasus, further strengthened by their co-operative relationship with the descendants of Mohajirs (belonging to different North-Caucasian ethnic groups) in the Near East and Turkey, and also by their later attempts to join this fragile North Caucasian unity after the February Revolution of 1917. During perestroika, there was a new attempt at such a union with the creation of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus. This Confederation’s first conference took place in August 1989 in Sukhumi, regarded as the future capital of the new union. The various nationalities represented in the Confederation have no fear of being dominated by any one group - a confidence which feels very different from what they experienced throughout their history with Russia or Georgia. This explains the attractiveness of the idea of creating a multiethnic union of Caucasians, even if such a union could be considered romantic and will certainly not be easy to achieve. The Abkhaz scholar Gueorgui Otyrba has formulated this perception as follows:[14]

"The history and the destiny of Abkhazia are closely connected with those of all the peoples of the North Caucasus. Today they share a common history of suffering and oppression, of deportations and cultural destruction, and of fighting powerful enemies. They also share a determination to protect themselves against a repetition of history. They have seized the opportunity created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and by Russia's and Georgia's relative weakness, to assert their rights and bring about a situation that can provide better guarantees for their survival in the future."

The Abkhaz will therefore strive - even if this is not at the moment explicitly expressed during the negotiations - for the creation of open borders to the North Caucasus, and in particular for unhindered cultural and economic exchange with the Adyghs. For the Georgians, transparent borders are still a sensitive issue, however, as are its borders with North Ossetia, Chechnya and Daghestan. In all these cases the Georgian government has to cope with the consequences of having national minorities of the same ethnic group inhabiting both sides of a state border.

In conceiving the future of the Caucasus, Georgians stress their central - both advantageous and dangerous - position in the region and would like to secure a central role in regional politics. Georgia’s relations with most of its northern neighbours have improved significantly since the end of the Chechen war, culminating in the official visit by the Chechen president, Maskhadov, to Georgia in autumn 1997. The Georgian leadership hopes that the Western Caucasian mountain peoples will follow the example of the Chechens, who have earned considerable respect in the region, and thus ensure more neutrality in the event of renewed conflict.

The Russians control their border with Abkhazia, its coastal zone and have military bases there. Russia is also the exclusive provider of peace-keeping forces, acting formally under the aegis of the CIS. It exercises significant control over the external and internal policies of the Sukhumi government. The economic blockade imposed by Russia under Georgian political pressure conforms to the traditional pattern of Russian politics: its aim is to weaken all the parties in conflict so that it can effectively continue to play the role of arbiter in the dispute.

Russia's policies in Abkhazia, as elsewhere in the Caucasus and in the "Near Abroad" regions, are in keeping with a "post-imperialist" value system, as described by Pavel Baev:[15]

"The most distinctive feature of Russia's policies towards the other fourteen states which emerged from the rubble of the USSR is inconsistency often bordering on incomprehensibility. (...) What makes the political complexities even more striking is the quite broad consensus among Russia's political élites on the main policy goals in the so-called 'Near Abroad'. This consensus had already emerged by late 1993 and survived all the turbulent election campaigns. (...) To my mind, if a definition of Russian policy is needed or indeed possible, it is rather 'post-imperialist'; this notion refers to a declining power which tries to compensate for inevitable retreats by some new engagements, feels the need to protect compatriots left 'out there' but desperately lacks the resources to do so, and attempts to prevent spill-over from various violent conflicts while being itself a major source of instability."

From the Abkhazian perspective, the Russian presence, notwithstanding all its vacillations, constitutes the only guarantee against a catastrophic renewal of the military operation, and against the risk of losing the gains from their previous victory. This enables the Russians to manipulate Abkhazian concerns to their own advantage, but the Abkhaz cannot fully rely on Russian support, which may be withdrawn as soon as the stakes change. The Georgians, while blaming the Russian presence for prolonging the stalemate in the conflict, nevertheless expect that the Russians will sooner or later take their side.

There is a low level of market economy in Abkhazia, with most food grown for domestic consumption. Many inhabitants possess some land which is enough for their subsistence. Those who are employed in the public sector and who have not been paid for months have been given plots of land instead of wages by the government. There is some small trade, for instance between Gali and Sukhumi. Due to the CIS blockade, the import of goods - some Turkish ships travel to Sukhumi - barely meets the population’s needs.

Major export items are tangerines and other citrus fruit. The export of the surplus production of between 60,000 and 100,000 tons of citrus fruit to Russia is extremely difficult because of the semi-closure, by Russian officials, of the railway and road linking Abkhazia with Russia, while domestic industry lacks the capacity to process the crop into juice or concentrate. Other exports are nuts and scrap metal. The road system is very bad and there are few cars, though there is some public transport in the bigger towns. There is also some traffic between Gali and Zugdidi (on the Georgian side) - this has to be registered with the Gali authorities, where tax must be paid; there are also several unofficial (easier and cheaper) crossing points on the Georgian/Abkhaz border. Electric energy is more regular in Abkhazia than in most parts of Georgia, thanks to the power supply from the Inguri dam and from Russia. Widespread economic hardship, however, is driving more and more emigrants out of the region.

In the meantime, the Georgian economy is reviving and is even arousing increasing interest among potential investors, even though the current situation should not be seen through rosy-tinted glasses. Co-operation on the economic rehabilitation and development of Abkhazia could, in the event of a lasting consensus between the two opposing sides, succeed in attracting significant international resources, as is currently happening in Tskhinvali. This could prove to be the best means for combining the interests of both sides and fostering mutual understanding.

The areas of technical co-operation that serve the interests of both sides can easily be defined as soon as a framework for such discussion is created with the assistance of the UN and OSCE missions, and these may represent the best arena for the most important and difficult endeavour - building confidence between the former adversaries.

10. Physical security of citizens and the possibility of a new wave of violence

Despite the current negotiations, the possibility of new outbursts of violence remains. The Georgian and Abkhaz governments, as well as the mediators, now have to define what their reaction would be in such a situation. Although there is much discussion of the possibility of a new war, no preventive action is being taken. It is far from clear how atrocities and violent actions against the civilian population would be prevented. A discussion needs to be started on how to design mechanisms for humanitarian intervention and on the types of intervention that would be helpful in de-escalating the conflict, in order to reduce casualties and other negative consequences for the peace process.

The strong interdependence of the conflicts in the region is another very important factor to be taken into account when designing peace initiatives for Abkhazia. A future settlement may change the balance of forces in the Caucasus region. Hence a holistic approach to the region’s problems, one which takes into account its specific cultural and political features, is critical for drafting effective regional policies.

By the second half of 1997, the Sukhumi and Tbilisi governments seemed to be more open to real compromises. The obstacles are, however, great. One of the factors is external: Moscow’s unwillingness to lose this very effective lever of control over Georgian policies, and its paradoxical desire to maintain such control notwithstanding great economic losses due to the blockade of transport and communications travelling from Russia to Turkey and passing through Abkhazian territory, as well as the other benefits of having a peaceful, prosperous neighbour in the south.

Even more important is the unwillingness of the Abkhazians to risk a restoration of the status quo ante bellum, i.e., to return to a situation in which they would be a minority, unable to preserve the monopoly of power in a democratic scenario of development, regardless of the legal status they would acquire within the framework of Georgia. One of the scenarios being discussed at present is a territorial division of Abkhazia into a number of districts, in each of which either the Abkhazians or the Georgians would establish their political control. The Abkhazian government could not make such a decision, based on the "peace for territory" principle, without strong popular support. Detailed scenarios for such a process are lacking. The parties have defined no priorities or negotiable elements that could constitute a basis for a mutually acceptable compromise, and no creative approaches are being adopted in the search for such a compromise. This is partly due to the governments’ lack of political will to achieve real results, and also partly to particular group interests linked to the suspended situation of "no war - no peace". Both governments are hostages to their own declarations and promises. Great courage and political inspiration are needed to break down stereotypes and secure popular support for innovative approaches. It is vitally necessary to develop a series of detailed scenarios that would be acceptable to each side, and then work on the gradual convergence of at least some of them - this may lead to the realization that the differences in viewpoint between the former adversaries are not as great as they previously appeared to be. The majority of these differences are, contrary to popular belief, not mutually exclusive - rather, they are symbolic or terminological in nature, and could be overcome if due effort were made.

As the two conflicting parties have different priorities - for instance concerning their legal status or the return of refugees - it is quite difficult to solve individual problems when they are negotiated as part of a whole package. Hence, one of the ways of proceeding with resolving the conflict is to try to narrow the focus temporarily, breaking down the problem into a list of individual issues which are closely linked to one another, certainly, but which may nevertheless be handled and discussed separately. Only after considering these issues and coming to some agreements, or at least reaching an understanding of one another’s viewpoints, will it be possible to discuss the whole package again, in an integrated form.

Time is working against the interests of the Abkhazians, but this does not mean that either the Georgians or Russians would benefit from a further postponement of a peace settlement. Russia has actually lost - and is continuing to lose - a great deal, having been cut off from her southern transportation routes, alienated Georgia and forfeited important levers of influence in the region. But Georgia too is a loser in this zero-sum game. Apart from the human suffering caused by a prolonged conflict, fewer and fewer Georgians may be inclined to return to Abkhazia, while the uncertain future of the IDPs is posing enormous problems for the weak Georgian State. At the same time, Georgia is losing the considerable economic benefits it would enjoy with an integrated economy and a north-south transportation route.

One potential area for economic co-operation may be the prospect of transforming the Gali district into a free economic zone which would be put provisionally under an international security regime.[16] This would create a safe buffer area, preventing open military action, but it could also serve as a pilot initiative for further balanced economic co-operation. Gali is important in this respect not only because of its border location or because of its Georgian population, but also thanks to its high economic - particularly agricultural - potential. It is worth noting that, even in the current strained situation, Gali is to a certain extent already performing the role of a clearing-house and exchange market for the two sides.

I am, of course, fully aware that no concrete settlement can be reached by individuals from the two communities that are not representing their respective governments, but their proposals can contribute to a spirit of compromise, which is essential to the negotiation process. If we are able to find common ground in at least some areas, this could serve as a starting point for broader discussions. I am quite sure that almost all of the contradictions discussed are resolvable, if innovative thinking is applied, and if we try to look at the problems through the eyes of other side as well. The existing problems have to be correlated to the real, basic needs and interests of both peoples, as distinct from populist slogans and wrongly perceived interests that only lead to further confrontation. It does seem that if the intellectuals of both sides, supported by international experts and mediators, were able to formulate at least a few concrete ideas in the form of a set of declarations, this could be instrumental in establishing a co-operative approach to conflict resolution, and would help all the sides involved to see the conflict and its consequences through other eyes, instead of just their own.

A helpful instrument in proceeding further with the peace and negotiation processes could be the creation of a mixed discussion forum constituted by respected individuals from both sides. These would receive a mandate from their respective leaderships to discuss the possible terms of the conflict settlement, and would regularly inform their leaderships about progress, but would not have the authority to sign any documents or make decisions. Such a forum, moderated by international experts and assisted by the authority of organizations such as the UN or OSCE, could perform several important functions: generating and testing new ideas in a non-restrictive environment; maintaining a two-way exchange of information between the governments; working as an informal negotiating body, and as a public advocate of a peaceful solution.

While it is important to speculate about how and when the solution to the Abkhazian conflict will be found, it may be of more immediate value to pose the question of where alternative ideas and influences that could shape the future solution will come from. In broad terms, one can identify three such sources: first, political and social currents within Abkhazia/Georgia, second, Russia, including the peoples of the Northern Caucasus, and third, international institutions.

Both sides have been labouring under the illusion that time is on their side. Both are now losing, however, as a result of the deadlock in the conflict, and experiencing major economic, demographic and political losses. There can be no winners in the game they are currently playing. In the first few years after the war, the Abkhaz could hope that time would bring international recognition and the repatriation of the Abkhaz from the diaspora, but this seems less probable now. Even the support of the North Caucasians, which played an important role during the war, is not assured at present, especially that of the Vainakh peoples. In its turn, if the Georgian government too hoped to use time to strengthen its military forces decisively, secure Russian support for its case and see the impoverishment and weakening of the Sukhumi government, they must be disappointed, as there are no signs of such trends. Indeed, in the immediate post-war period the conflict helped Georgia to distance itself from Russian dominance, and develop an independent approach in its state-building. Today, when Russian strength is waning, and the Georgian State has already begun to overcome most of the difficulties besetting it at the start of independence, priorities need to be changed.

The present situation cannot continue indefinitely. Pressures on the conflicting parties, both from without and from within, are mounting, while the leaderships (who until recently demonstrated a manifest lack of will to resolve the conflict) now seem to be becoming more flexible and open to compromise. There are several possible alternative solutions - the people of Abkhazia and Georgia will decide which of them shall prevail.

Samtskhe-Javakheti region consists of an area of c. 6,400 square kilometres, representing about 9.3 percent of Georgia’s territory, and has a total population of almost 235,000. Samtskhe-Javakheti is a historical region of Georgia, which is characterised by a number of specific difficulties exacerbating the general political and socio-economic problems of Georgia. Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe districts being only two out of six districts comprising the region, very different from one another as they are, represent well many problems endemic for the whole region. In order to understand these problems, it is important to pay due attention to the key factors defining the specificity of the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, on one hand, and the specific features of each of these two districts, on the other. These can be briefly described along following lines:

Samtskhe-Javakheti is located in the Southern part of Georgia, in the Mtkvari river basin, and consists of 6 districts with regional capital in Akhaltsikhe. Geologically it is composed by predominantly volcanic structures, and prone to earthquakes.

Akhaltsikhe district, with area just slightly more than 1010 sq. km is comprised of two towns - Akhaltsikhe and Vale, and 47 villages united into 16 communities with local governments. It is located north to the Turkish border, between the southern slopes of Meskheti and northern slopes of Erusheti ranges. The town of Akhaltsikhe lies along the banks of the Potskhovi river where it joins the valley of Mtkvari. Main rivers are Mtkvari, which, after originating in Turkey, crosses the region for 40 km, also rivers of Potskhovi and its tributaries Qvabliani and Uraveli, and the smaller rivulets of Tsinubnistskali and Chvintagele. Near the village Tskaltbila there is also a thermal sulphuric spring, with two more mineral water springs in Uraveli and Tsinubani.

Climate in the Akhaltsikhe district is dry continental, with little precipitation. The region is located on the altitude from 950m (village Atskuri) to 2964m (Mta Gumbati). Average annual temperature is between 6 and 9 C^o. The winter frosts start in October and last until April. January is the coldest month of the year with average temperature of –3.8C. The hottest month is August, when temperature often reaches 40 C^o. The average annual humidity is between 65% and 75%. Annual precipitation varies between 500 and 700 mm, with maximum precipitation occurring in June (40-70 mm) and minimum in January (30-35mm). Snow cover stays between December and March.

The terrain of the district is complex, with volcanic mountains and hills, terraces, narrow valleys, small caves in the cliffy river banks, mostly with scarce vegetation - xerophytic bushes growing on the rocky slopes, sub-alpine and alpine meadows up in the hills. Rare forests are comprised by oak and carpinus caucasica, pines and firs. There are three main zones of soil varieties in the district - transitory forest, mountain forest, and meadow type. Actually, about 30% of the territory is covered with bushes and forests, and 40%, i.e. about 40 thousand ha, are agricultural lands, from which 30% are pastures and meadows and 10% are arable lands. The district is rich with mineral resources, including soft bituminous coal (Vale and Naokhrebi mines), diatomite (in Kisatibi), agate (Shurdo and Pamaj-Ziareti mines), gypsum (in Tskaltbila) and many varieties of mineral building materials.

The district is connected with Tbilisi by a highway (224km) and a railway via Borjomi. Another highway connects Akhaltsikhe also with Turkey, near the Vale cross point. Other roads are leading also to Batumi (via Goderdzi pass), Kutaisi (via Zekari pass), and Armenia (via Akhalkalaki). The length of districts’ inner (mostly gravel) roads is 290km.

Administrative district of Akhalkalaki is the biggest in Samtskhe-Javakheti, it covers 1,235 square km. Apart from the township of Akhalkalaki (known since 9th-10th cc. as located on the crossroad of the Great Silk way) - the sole urban settlement in the district located at the altitude of 1700 m, there are 21 rural communities, uniting 64 villages.

The district is situated on Javakheti volcanic highland plane at the altitude of c. 1500-2000 m, with highest elevation reaching 3304 m. The area is rich in basalt. Geotectonic composition is geologically young and rather unstable, and the area is considered as highly prone to earthquakes. In the East the district is bordered by Abul-Samsar range, while in the North it is bordered by Trialeti range. The area is rich in water resources, rivers and lakes. Apart of the biggest river Mtkvari, which flows for 18 km within the district territory, its tributaries include Paravani, Murjakhetistskali, Chaobareti and Baraleti. Small lakes can be found in almost all parts of the district, the biggest among them the lakes of Zreski and Khozapini (Kartsakhi). There are also swamps on Baraleti plain, in the vicinities of Vachiani, Okami,Suldi, Kartsakhi, and Abuli settlements.

The climate is harsh and continental, that of highland steps, characterized by cold winter with little snow and cool summer with little precipitation. January is the coldest month of the year with average temperature of –7 to –10 C. The hottest month is August, with average temperature in the range of 14-16C. Average humidity is between 70-73%, annual precipitation average varies between 500 and 700 mm. The maximum precipitation occurs in June (90-100 mm.) and minimum in January (16-25mm.). Snow cover stays on most of the territory between October and March. The soils are mostly mountain black earth. Most of the terrain is devoid of bushes, trees or forests (only 3.5% of the territory), covered predominantly by sub-alpine and alpine meadows. More than 70% of the area, i.e. 90 thousand ha, are lands of agricultural usage, about 35% of these made by pastures and hay lands, about 35% arable land, excellent for potato culture.

The district is bordering with Turkey and Armenia. From the town of Akhalkalaki, it is 30 km distance from Turkish and 50km from Armenian border. Roads are connecting Akhalkalaki with Tbilisi via Tsalka (172 km) and via Akhaltsikhe - 300 km. Distance from Akhaltsikhe is 60km, also another gravel road goes via Borjomi and Bakuriani bypassing Tabatsquri lake. There is also a railroad linking Akhalkalaki with Tbilisi via Marabda, but it is hardly operational. There is also an airfield in the neighbourhood of Akhalkalaki that is in need of reconstruction.

Samtskhe-Javakheti province, which occupies about 9.3% of Georgia's entire territory and accounts for about 4.4% of its population, is among the most ethnically non-homogeneous regions of Georgia, and some of current problems stem from this diversity. Integrating the two major ethnic groups – Armenians and Georgians, represents a major political challenge for the region. The ethnic composition is characterized by clear-cut ethnic boundaries between different settlement types, and the absence of major mixed ethnic settlements besides Akhaltsikhe: there are very few ethnic-Georgian villages within Akhalkalaki region, but in all cases the Georgian population is settled compactly and closely integrated with local Armenian majority – practically all of them speak Armenian. Similarly Armenian groups are as a rule compactly settled in the other regions that have a Georgian majority. The only truly mixed region in Samtskhe-Javakheti province is Akhaltsikhe.

Akhalkalaki district is dominated by ethnic Armenians, who make up to 95% of the district (while they make approximately 40% of the population in Samtskhe-Javakheti region), others being mostly Georgians, who are a small minority there. The population of Akhalkalaki district is between 71,000 and 76,000, although precise data is hardly available due to high migration rates and frequent cases of double or even triple citizenship, although illegal. The district centre, town of Akhalkalaki, counts about 13,000 to 15,000 residents. Armenians here mostly belong to Armenian Apostolic (Gregorian) Church, with some Cathiolics, but unlike ethnicity religion plays relatively little role in forming identity.

Part of Georgians here are resettled from Ajara in 1989, after catastrophic landslides there, and these form a small relatively young rural community, predominantly Muslim. Other Georgians, mainly Christian Orthodox, are mostly living in the town, and play little role in the society. Due to difficult economic conditions, many young males go to Russia in search of work, in many cases seasonally, returning home for the winter. This causes significant demographic disbalances, distorting the age and gender structure of the local population, aggravated further by increasing emigration to Armenia and Russia, especially of more educated and skilled young men. This partly reduces land shortages, on one hand, and helps with cash inflow through transfers, but negative consequences seem to be more conspicuous.

Significant part of the urban population in Akhalkalaki are bilingual, speaking Russian in the first place and then colloquial Armenian (often unable to read and write in that language), while in the countryside Russian is much less known. However, the overwhelming majority of Armenians in Akhalkalaki district, like as in neighbouring Ninotsminda, do not speak Georgian at all, although it is supposedly taught in schools, and show little interest in learning it. All ethnic Georgians here, in their turn, speak fairly good Armenian. In addition to the language barrier, the area is isolated from the rest of Georgia due to the lack of communication facilities and both print and broadcast media, while Georgian TV, unlike Russian and Armenian, generally cannot be received in Javakheti.

In Akhaltsikhe district with the population of about 55,000, Georgians are playing much more important role here. Relative economic prosperity of the town, its role as the administrative centre within the region and its geographic location along major communications routes, mitigate socio-economic problems and create conditions for quite effective cohabitation. Armenians in Akhaltsikhe district speak better Georgian than in Javakheti, many Armenians living there demonstrate fairly good command of it, but still even there the language skills deficiency is still a very serious problem (especially among those who live in 14 predominantly Armenian villages) have problems with speaking Georgian., leading to informational and cultural isolation.

Georgians in Samtskhe-Javakheti belong partly to Orthodox, partly to Catholic Church (apart of a small number of Ajaran settlers in Akhalkalaki district who are Sunni Muslims), but like in the case of Armenians, ethnicity and language are much more important in determining identity. Intermarriages are quite common. In Akhaltsikhe there is also a very limited number of Muslim Meskhetians[18] (up to 100), who have repatriated in recent years, but although the issue of repatriation is widely discussed, actual repatriation is insignificant. Seasonal migration and emigration is less noticeable in Akhaltsikhe district, partly due to better economic conditions and less isolation, but also because of weak tradition of seasonal migration here. The population of the town of Akhaltsikhe, which is both regional and district centre, is c. 24,000, while the second biggest town of Vale counts around 5,000 residents. Akhaltsikhe (ancient name Lomsia) has quite old urban tradition, it is mentioned as a town already in 12th century.

Samtskhe-Javakheti was historically one of the most developed regions of Georgia, and great number of cultural monuments, churches, citadels and karvasla-s (or karavan-sarays - ancient inns situated along the great silk road passing the Mtkvari valley) serve as a vocal evidence of the past glory. It differs from other parts of Georgia due to the experience of centuries of isolation and multi-ethnic and multi-confessional composition. The southern part of Samtskhe-Javakheti for some centuries belonged to Turkey, became Islamised, and partly inhabited by nomadic Turkic tribes. In the first half of the 19th c. the region was conquered by the Russian Empire, significant part of the Moslem population were pushed out to Turkey, replaced by Armenians mostly from Eastern Anatolia in Turkey. The remaining part of Muslim population (c. 100,000) were deported in 1944 by Stalin to Central Asia, never allowed to return throughout the Soviet period. The majority of them were from Akhaltsikhe, Aspindza, Adigeni districts, and about 10% from Akhalkalaki. Soviet rule left other sad trace – Southern part of Georgia along the border with Turkey was defined as so called “border zone” with special heightened security regime, which precluded any person from outside the zone to enter it without special permit. At the same time, the economic conditions were maintained artificially slightly better than in other parts of the country. This special “border” regime caused dramatic isolation, not yet overcome, and on one hand brought economic decline, but on the other kept down criminality and chaos. Due to such experience the region is more self-sufficient and is less integrated into economic, political and cultural life of other parts of the country.

With Georgia’s independence, in addition to economic decline, dramatic emergence in interethnic tension was caused by president Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist rhetoric, but never led to large-scale violence. Another important event was the Karabakh condflict. Many young Armenians from Akhalkalaki, led by patriotic feelings, have participated in the conflict, and this experience continues to play significant role in forming values and identities, and especially in strengthening anti-Moslem attitudes. The last event, causing much dissatisfaction among Akhalkalaki Armenians, was dividing of Georgia into 12 administrative regions, so that Akhalkalaki district now belongs to Samtskhe-Javakheti region with capital in Akhaltsikhe. Dissatisfaction is caused by mainly two points – the necessity to go to Akhaltsikhe in order to solve some administrative issues, and the fact that unlike Javakheti, i.e. Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts, where Armenians form absolute majority of the population and could aspire for autonomy, their average share in Samtskhe-Javakheti is much more modest, around 40%. As a result, there is ongoing demand for separating the two districts of Javakheti from Samtskhe, i.e. Akhaltsihe plus the districts of Adigeni, Aspindza and Borjomi. No actual steps have been made in that direction by the government.

Inhabitants of the two districts in question reveal quite strong adherence to traditional, patriarchal values and ways of life, strengthened by decades of isolation. This is especially noticeable among the Armenian population of Javakheti, particularly in such issues as gender roles. Women play here secondary role in the society, and hardly ever are allowed to express their opinion publicly. Compared to other regions of Georgia, there are relatively few women involved in civil sector. Now, as more and more young males go in search of work abroad, either seasonally or on permanent basis, women started to play increasingly important social roles, but also are obliged to undertake the double burden of raising the children and taking care of subsistence farming.

Both districts possess rather important cultural monuments, that may contribute to their tourist attractiveness as well: in Akhaltsikhe district among these are Sapara monastery of 10th-14th centuries, magnificent mediaeval fortresses of Akhaltsikhe and Atskuri, St. Mary church of 10th^- 16th c. in Vale; in Akhalkalaki district: Abuli church of 10th century, Baraleti church – 11th century, Akhalkalaki fortress of 11th c. subsequently renovated in 17th-18th cc., and mediaeval monastic caves of Little Samsara. Especially important cultural monument is the famous Kumurdo church of the 10th century.

Both Turkey and Islam are looked at with suspicion by both Georgian and Armenian communities in Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki. However, to certain extent respective feelings are quite different in these two ethnic communities. The Georgian inhabitants of Akhaltsikhe district to certain extent preserve historic memories of being second grade population group under Turkish Ottoman rule, and even later feeling the relative dominance of the Muslim population of the region, until their deportation in 1944. Georgians in general are suspicious of Turkey’s intentions, keeping in mind centuries of invasion by Muslim armies of neighbouring states, mainly Turkey and Iran. Such suspicious have been further aggravated during Soviet times, when the special regime of the border zone had clear function of protecting against hostile NATO member state.

Armenian population of Samtskhe-Javakheti, in its turn, is traditionally much more hostile toward Turkey, and toward any Muslim groups like Meskhetians and Azeris who are identified as closely related to Turks. The bitter memories of many cases of interethnic violence in Turkey involving Armenians, especially the bloody events of 1915, are extremely strong. Involvement of many Armenians from Samtskhe-Javakheti in military action in Karabakh further revived such hostile attitudes. It is the more so, that majority of Armenians in the region got resettled from Turkey in 19th century, and still don’t feel themselves fully comfortable on the territory, as revealed by repeated attempts to erase any remains of Georgian inscriptions on old churches and other monuments and attempts to prove their previous presence here. Due to the closeness of Turkish border this sense of insecurity is even more strengthened, also supported by the personnel of the Russian military base and Russian media.

Turkey is today the Georgia’s largest trading partner, responsible for 22% of exports and 16% of imports (Russia is the second with 21% of exports and 13% of imports). Javakheti has 80-90 km long border with Turkey, which since 1999 is guarded by Georgian Army, and can benefit from increasing trade. However, Armenians of Javakheti look at the increasing cooperation of Georgia with Turkey, and also with Azerbaijan, with great concern (e.g. Turkish military aid provided to Georgia, especially 1.27 million dollars for reconstruction of military airfield in Marneuli district, predominantly populated by ethnic Azeris). Another similar concern is the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which is supposed to increase further Turkish influence, the sole safeguard against such perceived threat believed to be the Russian military presence.

Georgia has two customs and crossing points on Turkish border – Sarpi in Ajara and one near Vale in Akhaltsikhe region. The second border crossing is by far less important due to poor condition of roads, but has significant potential for bringing benefits to the region. Today, the local population is not very happy, as heavy trucks have caused deterioration of the road, while little material benefits are coming in. Currently, the creation of still another customs outlet is discussed, with a highway connecting the district to Turkey via planned border crossing at Kartsakhi (30 km from Akhalkalakis) to be constructed.

Another even more important plan is the 287 km long railway connection of Tbilisi with Turkish town of Karsi via Akhalkalaki[19]. Kars-Tbilisi railway line project, which is expected to contribute to the improvement of economic and trade relations between Turkey and Central Asia, was included into the 2003 year investment program of the Turkish government. Project and tender works related with construction of Kars-Tbilisi railway line are expected to start in the coming weeks, with approximately 423 trillion lira of mostly foreign investment expected. Following the completion of Kars-Tbilisi railway line, railway transportation of Europe to the Caspian – Central Asian region would be via Turkey. Most of the 120 km railway line would be constructed in Turkish territories. Meanwhile, second part of Kars-Tbilisi railway line, to be completed between 2005 and 2006, is planned to reach the Black Sea port of Trabzon. The construction of the railroad will imply also radical reconstruction of the rails coming from Tbilisi and Marabda to Akhalkalaki.

However, the Kartsakhi border crossing remains closed because the road has not been constructed yet on the Georgian side and because of opposition from other regions hosting open border crossings with Turkey. At the same time, opening of Kartsakhi border-crossing and to a lesser degree crossing of railway route to Kars arouses contradicting sentiments in population and political elite, due to traditional suspicion toward Turkish intentions. On one hand these plans are viewed as promoting cooperation with Turkey and hence perceived as a threat, but on the other hand lucrative economic, part of it probably illegal, opportunities are attractive. Also, increase in transit flows through Akhalkalaki region would imply major investment in road infrastructure, but also the dismantling of illegal customs posts that have been created by local clans on the way to Armenia over the past two years, and general liberalisation of border regimes. People are afraid of increased trespassing of the border from Turkey, as there are already cases of stolen cattle and other crime committed by trespassers. It will also cause competition from cheap Turkish agricultural products.

Although Georgia and Armenia have different geopolitical orientations – the former strives to join NATO, and supported US in the war against Iraq, while the latter participates in CIS military union, and is the staunch supporter of Russian strategic agenda – both understand the importance of good neighbourhood and cooperation for their respective stability.

The position of the Armenian government with regard to the situation in Javakheti has been cautious and in several instances geared towards restraining the radical demands of the organisation Javakh. Landlocked Armenia is dependent on Georgia for its only supply route, most of which passes through Javakheti, apart from that through Iran[20]. In its turn, Georgian is occupied with other ethnic problems, and hardly would like to risk the issue of tensions in Javakheti to be activated. The mutual vulnerability of Armenia and Georgia may has played a stabilizing role with regard to Javakheti. Armenian not only officials not only abstain from any statements that may raise tensions, they do not even look favourably at the demand to divide Samtskhe-Javakheti and create separate administrative unit of Javakheti, as this may create obstacles to easy access to the sea port of Batumi in Ajara, the autonomous region neighbouring Samtskhe but not Javakheti.

Throughout the 1990s, cross-border trade with Armenia of the Samtskhe-Javakheti region and particularly of Akhalkalaki district developed more rapidly than economic relations with other parts of Georgia. Armenia’s electricity exports to Georgia, particularly during the winter, have created reciprocal dependency of Georgia on Armenia. In addition, electricity lines are constructed to transport Armenian-generated power (including power from its nuclear power station) to the Javakheti region.

A recent trend of weakening state in Armenia, where political events have led to certain de-legitimisation of presidential power and to a deterioration in relations with the military, poses certain risks for increased manipulations by extremist nationalist in Armenia, e.g. among the ranks of traditionally irredentist Dashnaktsutiun. Any deterioration of state capacity in either Armenia or Georgia may have negative repercussions for Javakheti, since cooperation between these two governments is an important factor for stability there[21].

Russia’s military are present in the region since the year of 1828 when the Russian Army led by General Paskevich ousted Ottoman forces. Currently the controversial issue of their continued stay is a very sensitive one in Georgian-Russian relations. On November 17, 1999, Russia and Georgia signed a joint declaration at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, according to which the Russian side committed itself to close two (Vaziani and Gudauta) of the four military bases by July 1, 2001, also it stipulated that in the course of the year 2000, Russia and Georgia would agree on the timing for the withdrawal of the remaining two bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. However, the ongoing negotiations have not yielded any concrete results, as Russian side insists on a 15-year-period needed for the closure of the base while the Georgians press for a 3-year-period.

The Georgia’s position over the issue and related uncertainty have produced strong concerns and tensions among Armenians of Samtskhe-Javakheti. Indeed, ethnic Georgians and Armenians in the region differ as well in their attitude toward Russia as a political and military power. While many Georgians recognise Russia’s strength and importance and safety for Georgia of maintaining good relations with her, in general this is rather a pragmatic attitude mixed with suspicion and mistrust. Armenians, in their turn, are traditionally much more pro-Russian, this attitude strengthened by fear of Turkey and the semi-mythical belief of Russian army, supposed to be best in the world, as the only guarantor of peace and security in the region. Russian language and culture are highly respected by the population of Javakheti (especially in the town of Akhalkalaki), and economic ties with Russia are also very strong. Almost every Armenian family in Javakheti would have a close kin working in Russia, and trade with Russia, as well as monetary transfers from relatives working there, make a very significant share of local economy.

Dependence on Russia is further strengthened by the presence of the military base in Akhalkalaki, host to the military unit about 3,000 strong. Nowadays, the (so called 62nd) Russian military base, where the 128th motorised infantry division is stationed, employs 30-40% of the military personnel, i.e. over 1,000, from local residents (holding in accordance to their employment rules Russian passports), mainly as contract soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) as well as service personnel in their shops and social facilities (schools, hospitals, kindergartens). Most of these employees are housed in the town of Akhalkalaki itself, in the vicinity of the Russian base, and in the two neighbouring villages of Deliska and Vachani. Local residents who are employed by the base have much higher incomes than at any state job available in the region (equivalent to 300 Lari and more paid in roubles – still another issue of discontent of the government, compared to c. 35-40 Lari paid to the state employes), in addition to many other legal and paralegal economic opportunities. By rough estimates about 7,000-8,000 people, or 13% of the population of Akhalkalaki district economically benefits from the base in one or other way. The local population sells agricultural produce to the base, is involved in trade of gasoline and shuttled Russian goods. The military hospital and schooling available at the base are also important.

Although the economic importance of the Russian base is often stressed, its actual role lies rather in political and psychological spheres. For many residents of the district, the dominant perception is that Russian military presence is the guarantee of stability and security, while its evacuation will leave them defenceless against imminent Turkish invasion across the nearby border, the belief in the real possibility of which easily wins over any rational counter-argumentation. The Russian staff at the base is doing nothing, of course, to diffuse such fears, and in many cases tries to substantiate them. Another very important, if not always fortunate, role of the base is that of provider of weapons to the population at cheap prices, and Javakheti is virtually the most heavily armed region of Georgia, apart from actual conflict zones.

Since all employees of the base hold Russian citizenship, this makes their consequent migration to Russia easy. The process is strengthened by the system providing all retired servicemen with a housing certificate, which enables its holder to purchase housing from the Russian state paying 20% of its market cost. This is the reason why almost all former servicemen have moved to Russia, evident by the fact that no Russian pensions or other post-service benefits are requested or provided locally.

To certain extent, the presence of the military base is also the major source of power for dominant clans, who currently control the trade and smuggling in oil products, to preserve their grip on dominance and these lucrative businesses. One more additional impact of the Russian presence in Akhalkalaki seems to be the weakness of the civil society here against the background of clan-based power structure and the dominance of the interests linked to either serving at the base and acquiring Russian citizenship or involvement in related economic activities, - even when compared to the neighbouring district and town of Ninotsminda, much smaller one equally dominated by Armenian majority. Not only there are much less NGOs and civil initiatives in Akhalkalaki, also international community prefers to support such initiatives in Ninotsminda.

Since 1999, Javakheti has attracted attention of international organisations, especially the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, in response to the potential closure of the Russian military base. While Armenians are unwilling to see the Russian base evacuated, Georgians are observing Russian military presence with great suspicion, fearing that both its presence and its withdrawal can serve as destabilising factors in the region. Occasional statements by some militant Russian politicians demanding to use such levers as the issue of Javakheti status in order to bring Georgia to obedience only strengthen such attitude[22].

Most part of Samtskhe-Javakheti used to belong to border zone in Soviet times. Resulting isolation, along with many negative aspects, brought also significant benefits, not only of economic nature. Relatively low criminality in the region is one of such legacies, related to remaining isolation and certain conservatism. However, more and more young people get involved in delinquent activities such as drug addiction as there is more movement and exchanges. Even the construction of Baku-Jeyhan pipeline and related land payments gave rise to racket and other crime in Akhaltsikhe region. The major problem remains in this relation high unemployment among the youth and little opportunity for satisfying leisure activities.

Still, physical security in the region is higher than in majority of other regions of Georgia. However, there are certain threats to stability and security mostly related to Javakheti, where interethnic mistrust and the presence of the Russian military base have created opportunity for accumulating weapons. The amount of illegal weapons owned by the local population of Javakheti is very high, although now exact numbers are known. Many of those residents of Javakheti who took part in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh have retained some of their weapons, but even more weapons are obtained either by buying them from the Russian military base, or smuggling them from other bases across the Georgian-Armenian border. There are indications that some paramilitary organisations such as “Parvents” are consistently acquiring not only small arms but also more heavy weaponry[23], mostly coming from the Russian base.

The fears of possible instability are mostly related to the expected withdrawal of the base, even if it is not clear when this will take place. It is possible that this may lead to increased tensions based on demands of Javakheti autonomy, or in protest to increased military cooperation with Turkey. Not only large amounts of weaponry are sold by the Russian military currently, there is the prospect of much more weapons left after the evacuation of the base - the previous experience shows that when a Russian base is about to close in any region, the sale of old weapons and ammunition increase. In addition, there is also general unwillingness on the part of Armenians of Javakheti to allow strengthening of the presence of Georgian army in the region, and some incidents demonstrating such attitudes have already taken place in the past.

Samtskhe-Javakheti in Soviet times used to be a quite well to do region. The districts of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki both enjoyed the special economic status specific for border zones, which implied higher salaries than average in the country and other benefits, huge Soviet market for local products, low prices and high employment rate. Due to the region’s geographic location and its former status as of closed military zone under the FSU, it was less integrated with other parts of Georgia, and economically more dependant on other regions of the FSU, especially Russia. During that time, many essential supplies were cheaply provided by the state, and in turn local agricultural products were sold throughout central Russia. Today, in both districts subsistence agriculture remains the main occupation in the countryside, as most industrial enterprises are closed down, with high unemployment in urban areas. Land privatisation left farmers with mostly small plots of about 1-1.5 hectares, not allowing for effective agriculture. Equally negatively production is influenced by little access to seasonal credits, poor access to markets and lack of food processing industry.

Agriculture is the main income generation means for the inhabitants. The main produce of the region is potatoes, cabbage and fruit. The livestock breeding is also developed. But the fragmentation of land, as a consequence of privatisation, lack of mechanization, problems with irrigation and realization of produce do not allow for full-fledged commercial farming, so that the production costs for some products are even higher than for imported analogues. Still, the agricultural potential of the region is significant.

Currently, official economic performance indicators in Javakheti, and Akhalkalaki in particular, are poor and getting even worse, while Akhaltsikhe district, on the contrary, is the best performer in the region. Akhaltsikhe is relatively well connected with Tbilisi by a highway via Gori, Khasuri, and Borjomi. However, in order to go to Akhalkalaki, it is easier to use the same road and then drive some 60 km of poor road, than coming by much shorter route passing via Ninotsminda and Tsalka, which is mainly gravel road in very poor condition. Indeed, the road through Tsalka, designed to connect the region with the capital, cannot be used and all traffic has to go through Akhaltsikhe and Borjomi, around the minor Caucasus range instead of across it, making for a 6-7 hour journey, depending on weather and traffic. The horrible condition of the roads, both local and of central, increases economic isolation.

In Akhaltsikhe, due to better contact with the rest of Georgia, as well as with Turkish markets, and also more natural resources and milder climate, situation is indeed somewhat better than in Akhalkalaki. Especially the construction of Baku-Jeyhan Main Export Pipeline (MEP) for transit of Caspian oil creates certain hopes and some cash inflow, mainly as a compensation for landowners where the pipeline will pass. However, industrial production continues to be very low, although previously the district was known for its mining and other mineral resources (coal in Vale and Naokhrebi, diatomite, agate - Shurdo and Pamaj-Ziareti mines, gypsum, other building materials), as well as the renowned thermal sulphuric waters (near village of Tsqaltbila), also Uraveli and Tsinubani mineral waters. There was significant production of electric engines, cheese, meat, can and wool, building materials, also a number of sawing mills. The dissolution of the Soviet economic system resulted in the closure of all bigger scale industry in the region, giving place to subsistence agriculture that is the main income generation means for the inhabitants. The main produce of the region is potatoes, cabbage and fruit, as well as dairy and meat from cattle breeding.

Travellers to Akhalkalaki notice the low living standard of the population. Incomes have dropped considerably even when compared to figures from the pervious years, especially with strengthening the border control and introduction of visa regime with Russia. This means both the general economic decline and the shift of economic activity into shadow area. Since 1990, most of factories in Akhalkalaki district have been closed down, and much of the equipment disappeared. Previously, there was large cheese and fishing industry, clothing and shoe manufacture, building materials, basalt, cement and timber processing, and even production of aerial ropeway equipment. Today, most of remaining activity consists of agricultural, fishery and livestock breeding at rather small scale, including meat, dairy, wheat and potatoes, as well as some bee-keeping, sausage, lemonade, pastry production and baking. Now only small workshops are operating producing sausages and cheese. Today, the biggest employer in the district is Russian military base.

As far as the majority of local population in Akhalkalaki are involved in subsistence agriculture, or in paralegal trade activities, there are very few businesses that are formally incorporated. However, the scale of such activities remains insufficient for any stable income, and although agriculture creates certain self-sufficiency in food, the quality of life remains very low. High level of unemployment forces large numbers of the male population to seasonally (or for more prolonged periods) migrate to Russia, often returning to their families only in the winter. Together with the presence of the Russian military base, this is a major reason for the predominance of the Russian rouble rather than the GEL on the local market. Local production, almost exclusively dependent on agriculture, has suffered greatly from the dramatic change in the pricing structure. A litre of milk, which previously could buy up to 5 litres of diesel fuel, now is only sufficient for ten times less amount of fuel.

Isolation of the Javakheti province has contributed to a profound economic decline in the Akhalkalaki region over the past decade, which was further aggravated by poor supply of affordable electricity in the region, and shrinking volume of cross-border trade and transit with Armenia and Turkey. Widespread corruption among road police prevents access to markets, as well as deterioration of irrigation systems and lack of quality seeds lead to further decline in agricultural output. Food processing is accompanied by poor sanitary conditions, especially among small private cheese producers which otherwise is excellent.[24] There are similar difficulties also with cross-border trade with Armenia, where traders are harassed by multiple (mostly illegal) customs points on the way to Armenia-Georgia border (frequently organized by the locals themselves living nearby), while poor roads also limit the scale of cross-border trade.

Many hopes are linked to the prospects of turning Samtskhe-Jaakheti into transportation hub. Akhalkalaki is an important location on the route for a prospective railroad to Kars, and a highway passing through Kartsakhi border crossing and customs site. However, the routing was chosen for the Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum pipelines so that they do not pass through Akhalkalaki district but via Borjomi, obviously for security reasons related to the presence of the Russian base. Still, these pipelines are passing through Akhaltsikhe, and are supposed to bring significant benefits to the population there. All these transportation projects will definitely contribute to the improvement of economic and trade relations between Turkey, Armenia and Georgia, and to significant flows of goods from/to Central Asian Turkish Republics. Following the completion of the Kars-Tbilisi railroad, railway transportation from Europe to the region and further to Central Asia will become fairly easy, while the second part of Kars-Tbilisi railway line, to be completed in 2006, will reach Trabzon.

Widespread poverty and lack of resources, together with general isolation from the centre cause many social problems, although mainly do not differ in any significant way from those in other parts of Georgia. These are primarily: declined and under-funded social services – healthcare and education in the first place, high unemployment, power shortages, problems with piped water and sewerage and resulting health problems, informational deficiency, little opportunity for leisure activities especially for the young, growing delinquency and little attention to disabled and vulnerable. Often basic statistics may be misleading, as in accordance to old tradition it is concentrated on inputs (such as number numbers of schools, or hospital beds), not outputs. So, there are too many schools in the region, but the pupil-teacher ratio is far from effective, while conditions are dire. School buildings are dilapidated and in urgent need for repairs. During long winter months there is difficult problem of insufficient heating, there is lack of desks so that often three children sit at one desk instead of normal two. Low incomes, subsistence economy of households and little awareness of healthy nutrition needs resulted in the highest in Georgia rate of stunting (retarded child growth due to chronic malnutrition) among the children of the Samtskhe-Javakheti region[25]. The situation is slightly alleviated by IOCC “Lunch project”[26], providing free lunch to 1-4 grades schoolchildren of the region.

In Akhalkalaki district there are 1700 teachers teaching at 69 schools, among them 59 are Armenian, 9 are Georgian and 1 is Russian. Out of 9 Georgian schools only one is in Akhalkalaki, all others are in the villages with Georgian population. Textbooks for Armenian schools are provided free of charge by Armenia, while for the Russian school - by Moscow mayor’s office. The problem is with Georgian textbooks, which are quite expensive, so that parents often cannot afford buying them. In addition, there are 7 higher education institutions although no middle level technical education facility. So, it is not the number of schools available, but rather the quality of teaching and conditions that are causing concern. Actually, only now the first initiatives assist in providing a few computers, earlier virtually unavailable. Only one library – the resource centre supported by the British Embassy functions in the district. In order to obtain high education, many of Armenian youth of Akhalkalaki would go to Yerevan to continue studies, as poor knowledge of Georgian would preclude them from studying in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities with better schools. However, the opening here of Tbilisi State University branch in September will probably have considerable impact on the situation, as it had in Akhaltsikhe.

Poverty is overwhelming. Wages and pensions still remain the main source of regular monetary income, therefore considerable dependence on them. As everywhere else, pensions are miniscule comprising only 14 lari, not received regularly. Inhabitants of Akhalkalaki district complain on the delays with pension and wage payments, amounting to 15 months of lag. Administrations of many state agencies that no more operate would not dismiss the employees being unable to pay out further accumulating debts. There are 620 lonely pensioners registered in the district, who depend on this scarce benefit for their survival.

In Akhaltsikhe district there are 864 teachers teaching at 46 schools, among them are 31 Georgian, 12 Armenian and 3 Russian. There is also a boarding school for 50 retarded children, supervised and aided by the university (TSU branch), with 18 teachers, however they rely on obsolete methodology and materials. In addition, there are three higher education institution that plays great role in the society. This is in the first place the Akhaltsikhe Branch of Tbilisi State University, opening of which has drastically changed the intellectual scene as well as demography of Akhaltsikhe[27]. University now has more than 2000 students who study at 8 departments, with 150 permanent pedagogical staff and about 40 visiting professors from Tbilisi.

Accessing proper health care treatment is not an easy task either in Samtskhe-Javakheti. Available facilities are also in poor state. In Alkaltsikhe district there operate fifteen healthcare institutions, all of them private, including three hospitals. However, no such institution exists in Akhalkalaki district to be registered by the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social. Residents of Akhalkalaki can go to the hospital in adjutant Ninotsminda, one at the military base or further on to Akhaltsikhe. However, in the case of serious health problems locals prefer to go to Armenia, where not far from the border there functions an Italian hospital known for high standards of service.

Neither in Akhalkalaki, nor in Akhaltsikhe are there many opportunities for the leisure activities for the young people. There are no cinemas, no computer or internet access, very few sports facilities, next to no libraries. As a result, increased delinquency is observed.

Civil society is only starting to develop, mostly with the assistance of the international organisations. It is not evenly developing. In Akhaltsikhe NGO community, as well as independent media, are much more numerous and active. This is due to more openness and better communications, but also partly linked to the the existence of the university (the TSU branch) which serves as a crystallisation centre for many civil initiatives, also attractive active, educated young people. In Akhalkalaki, possibly because of the location of the Russian base, international effort was much more limited than even in neighbouring and much smaller Ninotsminda. Now, however, the situation is developing. Another positive factor is the opening in Akhalkalaki of the affiliated branch of the university in Akhaltsikhe.

Many of the problems in the region stem from the overall weakness and inefficiency of the Georgian government, as well as from the scarce economic resources available in the country. However, within the framework of our study it is more useful to focus on the problems local administrations and other institutions, although of course there is a strong interlink and many common diseases. Such is definitely widely spread corruption, incompetence and the primate of personal and group interests infesting every level of governance. Another general problem is ineffective legislation, unable as yet to define clearly the prerogatives of local governments, while the status itself of the regions and the regional representative (whose personality is another factor of dissatisfaction among many inhabitants, especially in Akhalkalaki) are rather controversial concepts from the legal perspective.

Still, the situation is not quite the same in the two districts. In Akhaltsikhe, it is more similar to that existing in other regions of Georgia, as due to much less isolation local interests are intertwined with those in Tbilisi and elsewhere in Georgia, and political realities in the country have much stronger influence over the events here.

In Akhalkalaki, two leading local political movements – Javakh and Virk[28] – do not enjoy the status of political parties, as Georgian legislation precludes parties based on territorial, religious or ethnic factors. Both Virk and Javakh are advocating greater rights for the ethnic Armenian community, raising concerns about potential Turkish threat, and opposing Russian military withdrawal. Although these are having certain influence, it is the two main clans united around: the figure of the former Prosecutor-General Raisyan, the second headed by the current Governor Ambartsumyan (who has been supported by the previous President’s personal representative Baramidze). These regional clans, competing for power, control all major business interests in Javakheti (such as the sale and transit of energy resources and gasoline products, the distribution of electricity generated by mini hydropower stations, the illegal transit of goods, etc.). While the rivalling groups occupy key positions within the regional and central government, their competition has led to deep polarisation among the local elites and society.

The biggest problem in centre-periphery relations is general mutual mistrust and suspicion, and in the case of Javakheti this is further reinforced on the part of the population by such factors as informational isolation, Georgian language deficiency, and external manipulation. The central government in its turn, in addition to general mistrust of masses believed to be unprepared for democratic rule, is ever ready to see minorities as a fifth column, promoting the interests of external parties and earlier or later intending to demand much feared autonomy for Javakheti (apart from its local proponents, many members of Armenian Diaspora, in particular those linked to Dashnaktsutiun, argue its importance, sometimes bringing up facts that can be far from actual reality[29]), also stubbornly opposing the withdrawal of the Russian military base very much against governmental intentions. The lack of public trust in the government institutions is further reinforced by corruption, which exists throughout all levels and branches of the Georgian government, but particularly strong and visible on the regional level where the civil society is poorly developed and unable to exercise public control. However, while keeping a wary eye on Javakh and Virk, the authorities in Tbilisi have established pragmatic and mutually-beneficial relations with local elites and appointed officials, and have certain leverage through the control over budgetary funds in the region, also over privatisation process and illegal transit flows.

The government in Tbilisi realises the necessity of paying more attention to the region, but little is done. Just very recently, in October 2002, President Shevardnadze issued a decree (# 1282) approving the „Samtskhe-Javakheti Socio-Economic Development Plan for 2002-2005“. This plan, however, is little more than a wish list, with no detailed indications on funding and timing of its implementation. Still, it is a sign of recognition of importance of the region and of certain concern. Fifteen broad areas targeted for development are singled out:

1. Activation of industrial potential (elaboration of a plan for restructuring industry, development of small and medium enterprises, reducing unemployment)

2. Construction of railway and automobile highway (priorities - Akhaltsikhe-Akhalkalaki and Tbilisi-Tsalka-Ninotsminda roads, Tbilisi-Karsi railway)

4. Strengthening technical capacity of the education system (repair of school premises, increasing the number of teachers for Javakheti)

6. Implementing the State programme of the Georgian language. (e.g. printing textbooks for teaching Georgian, provision of textbooks for non-Georgian schools)

8. Improving healthcare (repair of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki district hospitals)

9. Rehabilitation of water supply and sewage system (e.g. rehabilitating Akhaltsikhe water and sewage networks, also water supply systems in villages of Akhaltsikhe district).

12. Enhancing environment protection (prohibiting timber export from the region. creating new protected zones)

13. Improving energy supply (special programme for identifying alternative to firewood use)

Whatever positive is this move, crisis is likely to occur if the Georgian government fails to start real involvement in the development of the region, to design, publicise and start to implement a long-term and comprehensive package of economic and social measures that are capable to meet the urgent needs of the population, and in particular mitigate potential negative consequences of the Russian base closure.

In the night November 14-15, 1944 about 100,000 Muslims from Samtskhe-Javakheti (the majority of them currently calls themselves Meskhetian or Aklhaltsikhe (Akhiska) Turks, although there were also some other ethnic groups) were forcibly deported to Central Asia, but, unlike other deported peoples, were not allowed later to return home. Today, numbering around 300,000, they are spread throughout Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine as well as Turkey. However, only a few hundred wee able to return to Georgia, and much fewer to Samtskhe-Javakheti, i.e. Meskheti.

Georgia, due to pre-conditioned obligation required for membership in the Council of Europe, must repatriate Moslem Meskhetians in a period of 12 years, of which two have already passed. Today, Georgian authorities declare their readiness to resolve the problem, yet point to several pertinent issues. Official Tbilisi is apparently mindful of the unpredictable reaction of both the Georgians and the Armenians of Samtskhe-Javakheti to the repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks. In the meetings and discussions residents of Samtskhe-Javakheti claim that in case of attempts of repatriation they will took to arms and fight it.

Major concerns and fears feeding the opposition to repatriation are the following:

Fear of Turkisation and subsequent secession. With the repatriation of 300,000 Meskhetians, the demographic balance will change dramatically and the whole province will become predominantly Turkish and Muslim. Then Muslim Meskhetians are expected to demand autonomy for the region and eventually claim union with Turkey.

Fear of ethnic tensions. Stories, real or imaginary, of tensions, bloodshed and atrocities between the Muslims and the Christian Georgian and Armenian populations during the 1918-1921 period and afterwards are widely discussed. The record of conflict between Turks and Armenians, and general Armenian perception of historical victimisation by Turkey, is a strong additional factor.

Fear of property claimed. Many inhabitants of Samtskhe-Javakheti, among them those who had been forcibly brought from different parts of Georgia and settled in the houses of deportees in 1944, fear that repatriates will reclaim their land and property.

Competition for scarce resources. The local population fears that with such significant influx of repatriates the access to scarce resources and employment opportunities will be farther reduced, while current deficiency of agricultural land will get further aggravated.

All these fears and concerns are understandable, and have certain logical ground, but they also serve as means for manipulation by populist politicians or other forces. The actual number Meskhetians who actually want to change their present place of residence and repatriate is unknown. In Samtskhe-Javakheti, as well as in other parts of Georgia, there are examples of highly successful adaptation of those few repatriates that had arrived earlier. While many claim that they want to return, this may imply the desire of having such option rather than denote actual readiness to leave homes and start a new life. Apart from making general statements, the government is doing little to accelerate the process, although in many places of current residence, especially in the Krasnodar region of Russia, Meskhetians live in very difficult conditions. Only those Meskhetians who declare they are Islamised Georgians are currently welcome to return. A number of students study at Georgia’s high school institutions, and notably at the university in Akhaltsikhe, where they have successfully learned Georgian language. In its turn, the Council of Europe has noticeably reduced its pressure for the quick resolution of the repatriation issues, realising many complications and dangers involved. Turkey has invited about ten thousand of Meskhetians to settle there, while USA is also considering an option of offering a refugee status to certain number of Meskhetians[30].

The first post-independence years the Samtskhe-Javakheti region was mostly neglected by the international community, with only a few internationals having visited the area. However, in recent several years Samtskhe-Javakheti attracted increasing attention, and more and more finds itself in the shifting focus. At the same time certain caution is voiced by a number of experts, mostly of Russian or Armenian origin, calling for concentrating pressure on the inefficient central government instead of allocating resources directly to the region[31].

Nevertheless, international involvement is growing, especially in Javakheti, this preference caused by a number of factors such as the Russian base and the consequences of its withdrawal, and the perceived potential for interethnic tension. Currently, most of international organisations or projects covering Georgia have some involvement with the region, those active including the UN agencies, OSCE, EC Delegation, USAID mostly acting through CARE, British Depertment for International Development (DfID), MercyCorps and Horizonti Foundation, the Open Society Georgia Foundation, the Dutch, British and some other embassies, Oxfam, and many others, frequently acting through local or international implementing agencies.

Initially, UNV used to be very active in the region, especially in Javakheti[32], mostly due to activities of UN Volunteer Albertine Smit. The majority UNV-implemented projects were supporting NGOs, youth-related or small business capacity building projects. The Horizonti Foundation also implements NGO capacity building projects. The Eurasia Foundation and UNV have funded NGO /small business capacity building projects. The Consumer’s Rights Organisation (CRO) has funded and implemented similar projects, establishing a branch of the CRO and a Judicial Advice Centre. However, it is interesting to observe that the majority of these projects carried out in Javakheti have been focussed on much smaller Ninotsminda, and to much less extent on Akhalkalaki, creating significant misbalance.

Currently, many projects are aimed at improvement of economic infrastructure and development, while others support the civil society development and mitigating interethnic relations. By the data of November, 2002 the following spheres are to be financed in 2003 as covered by the list of 38 projects (29 in Akhaltsikhe and 19 in Akhalkalaki): Actually, these are 8 projects dealing infrastructure renovation (4 in Akhatsikhe and 4 in Akhalkalaki), 7 projects dealing with the rural development (5 in Akhaltsikhe and 2 in Akhalkalaki), 4 - assisting income generation in Akhaltsikhe, 6 dealing with health related issues, 4 – promoting women empowerment, 3 – developing education system, 3 are relief-oriented, 3 are supporting civil society, there is also language teaching project in Akhalkalaki and one in sustainable energy generation in Akhaltsikhe. More projects are only starting, such as those oriented at business consultancy, micro credits provision, media support and local governments development.

Many of the cross-cutting problems characteristic for Samtskhe-Javakheti are either generic, caused by political and economic weakness of the Georgian state, and can be found anywhere in Georgia, however, others are specific and stem from the concrete reality of the region, including in the first place such issues as isolation, ethno-linguistic structure, and geography. An attempt is made here to characterise and prioritise problems, and when necessary specify their importance for one or another district. Among the most important problem areas and negative trends in the region are the following:

There exists no strategic plan for long-term development of the region, and no effective leadership. The importance and urgency of directing more attention toward the development of Samtskhe-Javakheti, as well as some characteristic features that require special consideration, are recognised by the Georgian political elite and by the Government. This even led to the special Presidential Decision in February 2001 to develop a comprehensive State Programme for Regional Development. While now there exists “Samtskhe-Javakheti Socio-Economic Development Plan for 2002-2005”, adopted and signed by the President in October 2002, its implementation is not backed by any significant funding (it mostly relies on international donors for that) or commitment. So far the Georgian government has failed to allocate adequate amount of resources for these purposes. At the same time, neither the international community coordinates its efforts based on any substantial needs assessment and long-term well-prioritised strategy.

Ineffective governance is at the root of almost every problem in the region - partly a legacy of the Soviet past, partly the result of ailing governance system based of clan groups and paternalistic networks, against the background of the weakness of central government of Georgia and limited capacity of state institutions. General absence of the rule of law, or public control over law enforcement, as well as overwhelming corruption, these are strong obstacles to development. While many problems stem from the overall weakness and inefficiency of the government, another dominant factor is scarcity of economic resources available in the country. Such is definitely widely spread corruption, incompetence and the primate of personal and group interests infesting every level of governance, further enforcing the lack of public trust in the government institutions. Corruption is particularly widespread at the regional level where the system of democratic checks and balances or institutions of civil society are poorly developed or in many instances simply do not exist. Another general problem is ineffective legislation, unable as yet to define clearly the prerogatives of local governments, while the status itself of the regions and the regional representative are rather controversial concepts from the legal perspective. Virtual non-existence of the rule of law is a factor that hinders not only democratic development, but also economic development and its essential elements – attraction and efficiency of honest entrepreneurship. Little attention is paid to education in the area of legal and human rights and individual physical safety, to effective implementation of existing legislation. This generates nihilistic attitude and disrespect toward law and justice, strengthens dual standard and ultimately, broadens areas covered by shadow activities and causes the general erosion of the legal sphere.

Economic underdevelopment and under-investment, and especially underdevelopment of economic infrastructure, are related to many regional problems, and especially that of widespread poverty and low quality of life. There is weak economic integration with other regions of Georgia (particularly in Akhalkalaki with domination of Russian rouble and US dollars at the expense of Lari). General economic situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti is quite dire, even against the background of poor economic performance throughout Georgia. Much of economic activities are in shadow, which makes them risky and unsustainable. Although there are some attempts to support business in both Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe, providing micro-credits or providing training, this is hardly sufficient to boost local economy. While in Akhaltsikhe situation is somewhat better, still investment is very scarce, and economic infrastructure inadequate.

Rural economies suffers from little and fragmented land resources with no effective land market, while credits are virtually unavailable, as the absence of a land market renders property and land as a collateral practically worthless. Equipment, fuel and fertilisers are also in scarce supply. The majority of households engaged in agriculture have insufficient land, technical equipment, knowledge of proper agro-technologies, respectively they are unable observe effective agro-technological requirements leading to low productivity and competitiveness. What is even more important now it is extremely difficult to access to markets causing low monetisation level while subsistence agriculture and in-kind relationships dominate. Insufficient attention is given to preservation of soil fertility both in private and public sectors, especially in case of pastures, causing frequent overexploitation and rapid degradation of soil.

Poverty, unemployment and poor social services, as well as poor conditions of public infrastructure and utilities are eroding the prospects for development. Unemployment and economic difficulties are the main reason for increasing emigration, especially in Akhalkalaki district. While providing some relief through transfers to relatives staying behind, it also causes the demographic misbalances and drain-out of the best-educated and able young citizens. There is a risk that if the economic situation deteriorates and poverty becomes more severe, this issue may acquire interethnic dimension, get ascribed to deliberate discrimination and get politicised.

Poverty is widespread. Even while subsistence agriculture creates certain food security, the quality of life is very low, due in particular to poor state of social services, healthcare and education in the first place. In Akhaltsikhe there is grave problem of potable water, and its deficiency is major cause for many diseases, in the absence of effective prevention. Energy supplies are equally deficient. However, problems with water and sanitation are not limited to Akhaltsikhe, being highly urgent problem throughout the region, as well as that of sewerage in all urban settlements. Deficiencies in healthcare and education will have extremely grave long-term implications if not responded in the nearest future. Erosion of social capital will lead to further decline, which gradually will be more difficult to revert.

Many issues related to poor governance have deep roots in general mistrust (mutual) between different layers and segments of the society, partly based in the legacy of the Soviet past or first post-independence years of total chaos, but further strengthened by malfunction and corruption in the system. There is great suspicion toward central authorities in Tbilisi, especially among minority groups, and fear of the uncertain future. In their turn, authorities have no trust of the population in general and the minorities in particular, ready to see a plot behind every problem, and hence blaming the population or external forces for every policy failures. Fortunately, the Armenian minority in Akhalkalaki would not see nationalist conspiracy as a cause of every government failure, understanding their generic reasons, but this may change with some populist manipulation and become a real threat. At the same time, there is very weak feeling of belonging and citizenship among the population whose ethnic identity is stronger, especially among the Armenian minority of Akhalkalaki.

Development of the civil society is crucial for the region. However, as yet non-government sector is weak institutionally, financially and quantitatively. It is almost fully dependent on external financing, while local sources of financing are practically non-existent. The situation is especially difficult in Akhalkalaki district, where NGOs is by far more underdeveloped than even in the neighbouring Ninotsminda. Lack of political participation is also a problem there, partly related inability to register ethnically-based political parties such as Virk. The feeling of citizenship among minorities is virtually non-existent.

The role of communities and self-governance is also progressively increasing, with some international organisations actively supporting this process. However, their institutional development too, notwithstanding high significance is still rudimentary.

One of the biggest problems is existence of cultural stereotypes, which makes the society inert and impedes establishment of the system of values oriented on civic responsibility, democracy and free market. For instance, gender inequality and social passivity of women, migration misbalance, requirements of labour market and devastation of social infrastructure raised the issue of changing traditional gender roles. Another issue of great importance is lack of attention to youth-related issues, amid growing juvenile delinquency, trafficking and drug addiction.

The region, especially the two Armenian-speaking districts of Javakheti, experience extreme informational, political, communicational and economic isolation from the rest of Georgia. Lack of integration with the rest of Georgia not only creates public alienation, weakening of the feeling of citizenship and belonging, as well as security and confidence in future, it has highly adverse impact on civil and economic development of the area.

Poor knowledge of the Georgian language among ethnic Armenians, and little willingness to integrate into the Georgian society due to practical difficulties as well as elements of ethnic nationalism, contribute further to isolation, underdevelopment and the risks of instability.

In the situation of existing tensions related to economic backwardness and the conflicting attitude between the Tbilisi government and the Armenian population with regards to the evacuation of the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki, situation becomes prone to being sensitive toward external manipulation on all levels. Various actors in the region often exploit popular fears associated with economic insecurity. The crisis is likely to occur if the government fails to develop and publicise in time a comprehensive package of economic and social measures aimed at mitigating negative consequences of the base closure. The demand of separating Javakheti from the Samtskhe-Javakheti region along ethno-demographic lines and creating a political autonomy is one of bargaining chips and leverages promoted if not induced from outside. There are other opportunities for manipulation with potential interethnic tensions not only from Yerevan, Ankara and Moscow, but also from illegal businesses and clans as well as extremist nationalist organisations interested in preserving uncertainty and disorder.

One of the big concerns is the amount of weapons owned by the local population of Javakheti, mostly acquired through Russian military base there. Moreover, this may exacerbate as the previous experience shows that when a Russian base is about to close in any region, the sale of old weapons and ammunition increases. Therefore there is significant risk that even if the Russians are to withdraw, they would leave behind a heavily-armed paramilitary group of local ex-servicemen, which would pose an even greater threat to Georgia. Fears of Turkish expansion are promoting further this trend. Emergence of criminal networks throughout the region and paramilitary such as “Parvents” creates a significant security threat.

Uncertainty and fears related to repatriation of Meskhetians and Turkish expansion are another issue of concern and fear both among Armenians and Georgians throughout the region - repatriation of Moslem Meskhetians is named as a major problem facing the region by the population of both districts alike, Akhaltsikhe and Akhakalaki, although repatriation cannot as yet be considered as a problem as there is only a tiny amount of repatriates in Akhaltsike district and none in Akhalkalaki, hence hardly could be qualified as a threat. This attitude ignores the fact that as in Samtskhe-Javakheti as well in other parts of Georgia there are examples of successful adaptation of those repatriates that had arrived earlier.

Strong anti-Turkish feelings are a serious obstacle to many policies dealing with enhancing of trade and cooperation with Turkey, precluding developing economic exchanges and partnerships especially those including military partnership, and the return of Muslim Meskhetians (perceived as Turks), but also related to transportation projects (railroad Tbilisi-Kars, border crossing at Kartsakh). Actually, anti-Turkish attitudes are particularly strong among ethnic Armenians, most of them descendents of those resettled from Eastern Anatolia and preserving memories of ethnic violence. However, also ethnic Georgians throughout the region have strong suspicions toward motives behind Turkish Caucasian politics, and its increasing presence here.

In the region there are a number of severe problems related to deterioration of environment and linked health problems. Environmental problems include extreme contamination of the Mtkvari river, and excessive logging wherever there are forests. Against the background of increasing anthropogenic pressure on the environment and non-availability of adequate financing mechanisms, the only way out is to mitigate adverse effect on the environment through exercising effective monitoring and control system. The risks associated with animal’s epidemic too necessitate more attention, because they may represent danger, especially considering the appearance of new diseases of the livestock, such as foot-and-mouth disease.

Due to geo-tectonic specificities, mountainous relief, current condition of environment the region is vulnerable to natural calamities such as earthquakes and landslides. Available material resources and, respectively, the mechanisms to mitigate and compensate risks are diminutive, the absence of engineering control over the operation jeopardizes the safety of buildings and energy, communication, and transportation infrastructure, while the system of monitoring and forecasting of natural calamities is underdeveloped. Furthermore, the population and the local administrations are not prepared for emergencies, special education and organizational programs are not implemented either.

Until recently, humanitarian and structural international aid has been far less generous in Samtskhe-Javakheti than in some other parts of Georgia. Although now the situation is changing, such efforts are often having less positive impact due to lack of understanding and vision among their planners and implementers, and the coordination among major donors. This is partly related to lack of holistic, concept-based approach on the part of the central government, but neither have the donors achieved developing any consistent and comprehensive agenda, with the overall strategic goal for Samtskhe-Javakheti to integrate and develop in the wider context of national development.

Hopes

Of course, there are not only problems and weaknesses present in Samtskhe-Javakheti, there are also many positive factors that create hopes for the better, as are developments that have great positive potential if properly approached. Positive or conditionally positive assets and trends:

The biggest asset present in Samtskhe-Javakheti is actually the population itself, and the work force that is laborious and disciplined, skilled in some areas such as agriculture and construction works, but what is most important, open to learning and change. Many local residents have significant experience of (seasonal) construction works in Russia, and could easily readjust themselves to local opportunities should such arise. Special training programmes assisted by the international community (Eurasia F., OSGF, World Vision, etc.) will help further to develop skills in small business management, while other efforts are directed toward introducing modern agro-technologies.

Notwithstanding complex ethno-demographic situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti, and the recent history of attempts of ma, there is unwillingness on the part of both the Georgia’s government and the Armenian minority to exacerbate interethnic tensions. Equally cautious is the Armenian government. This is partly at least the result of lessons of the past learned, partly to understanding that any conflict could be disastrous for all parties involved, while no benefits could be foreseeable. So far, there are no signs of economic issues being politicised, that is, residents of Javakheti or political activists do not blame their poor living conditions on ethnic discrimination.[33] Still, prolonged extreme poverty could earlier or later contribute to developing political tensions. However, popular trend to analyse the situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti from a conflict prevention perspective is unduly reductionist and alarmist, not substantiated by facts.

While the neighbourhood of the region to Turkey and Armenia is often considered as a factor of risk causing tensions, it also can be considered as an asset of great importance. Javakheti is well located on the routes to these two countries, and could benefit greatly from the increase of trade and development of transportation infrastructure. While Akhalkalaki is an important location on the route for a prospective railroad to Kars, and a highway passing through Kartsakhi cumsoms site, Akhalkalaki on the Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum pipelines route. Both will definitely contribute to the improvement of economic and trade relations between Turkey, Armenia and Georgia, and to significant flows of goods from/to Central Asia. Both countries provide significant assistance to the region, such as energy from Armenia, or the Turkish aid in alleviating the drought consequences in 2000.

Although the region is probably one of the least developed in Georgia, both economically and socially, until now it has received little attention from international organisations and agencies, with a slight upward tendency during the recent past, especially due to the drought of 2000. Now, Samtskhe-Javakheti has increasingly become the subject of international attention, due to publicised risks for potential ethnic conflict and the anticipated withdrawal of the Russian military base.

Although the terrain in the region is difficult, and not many mineral resources available (basalt, coal, diatomite, mineral waters), still there is quite significant potential for industrial development, provided there is improved infrastructure and investment conditions. Local agriculture can produce excellent potato, meat products, fish and dairy, also fruit in Akhaltsikhe. There is very significant potential for cultural tourism in the region, and the airfield in Akhalkalaki can be also turned into an additional asset, as complementary to general transit function of the region. While currently financial markets are inadequate, even minor economic investment such as opening of Magti GSM office in Akhalkalaki has created demand for Georgian currency.

The university in Akhaltsikhe (actually a branch of the Tbilisi State University) has played an extraordinary role in promoting education and civil activism in that district, creating new opportunities for the youth and serving as a crystallisation centre for intellectual and cultural life. Now, with opening of its branch in Akhalkalaki, it will play equally beneficial role there, in addition contributing to promotion of Georgian language skills, and overcoming informational isolation.

Information technologies change the situation everywhere. Development of autonomous telecommunications systems such as cellular phones, or satellite and cable TV, helps greatly in overcoming informational isolation, especially in Javakheti, serving as a stimulus to cultural exchange and more awareness about neighbouring cultures. While there are special programmes assisting to overcome informational isolation through supporting access to Georgian TV in Akhalkalaki, as well as to Internet, cellular telephone networks develop under market pressures. Becoming a popular means of communication[34], along with stationary radio-telephone networks (such as “IberiaTel”), they may finally resolve the problem of communicational deficiency. Equally good prospects have the development of optical cable networks for telephone, TV and internet connections.

Planned military reform, moving toward NATO standards and the creation of professional army in Georgia, taking place with concentrated assistance of the USA, will reduce tensions and probably attract some youth from the region to military service, therefore assisting further to social integration, but also serving as an alternative to service at the Russian military base. Such trend will gradually develop with further integration of the Georgian military system into Euro-Atlantic community.

Future of the region depends primarily on the initiative of the population itself, but external interventions and policies can do a lot in promoting development, stability and democracy in Samtskhe-Javakheti. With the growing interest toward the development of the region both within the country and internationally, it is important to reflect on elaborating a clear-cut list of strategic priorities for intervention, understand the feasibility of planned initiatives and compare to other policy options. Also, as much of support is coming from international sources, these should be translated into universally accepted and comprehensible objectives and goals.

However, not all aspects of the regional development are adequately studied and described, which makes it difficult to design well-justified and sound strategy for development. We try here to present some recommendations that can be proposed based on available information and analysis (so, it is obvious that overcoming isolation and developing civil society are a natural priority), while describing and focusing on other issues that need further research and elaboration. Addressing macro-structural weaknesses obviates the need for greater co-operation and co-ordination between donors and organizations involved. This process comprises two components: first, the sharing of information and greater co-ordination in the field and secondly, the possibility of pooling resources in order to address priority areas more effectively.[35] Still, a balance between “micro” and the “macro” spheres of proposed levels of intervention should be found, which too needs further research. However, we may argue that while in economic sphere and infrastructure development more macro-intervention would be more effective, in civil sphere more grass-roots level of intervention is needed.

Goals and Objectives for interventions

In agreement with what has already been discussed by both the donor communities and the Government[36], following strategic goals for interventions can be suggested:

v Development of effective governance, rule of law, democratic institutions and civil society in the region, as well as contributing to democratic development, security, political stability and economic prosperity of the Georgian society and state as a whole

v Securing sustainable economic development of the region, radical improvement of the quality of life through better social services, educational opportunities and healthy environment

v Overcoming isolation - achieving social, communicational, economic and political integration of all parts of the region into the Georgian society and state

v Creating conditions for every ethno-cultural group living in the region to preserve its identity, language and culture, as well as to preserve links with related groups

v Providing conditions for implementation of justice both toward the deported and repressed groups of the population (Muslim Meskhetians) and the current residents of the region

In order to achieve these strategic goals, the following overall implementation priorities can been identified. Actions in social sphere should include actions towards the human capital development, enhancement of the labour force mobility and its reproduction level, improving standard of living of the marginal groups, preventing drastic deterioration of the living conditions. In economic sphere, they should concentrate on attracting investment, creating favourable conditions for business through developing economic and physical infrastructure, rule of law and flexible and skilled labour force. Other actions should focus on:

o Improvement of structural and institutional environment, empowering communities and local governments;

Prospects

Although existing information is hardly sufficient for fully understanding processes going on in Samtskhe-Javakheti, and providing basis for sound policy analysis and comprehensive policy choices, still there are a number of points which could be considered as priority actions for the development of the region, related to priority problems of isolation and underinvestment. However, one very important specificity of the region is that there are only few priorities common for both Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki districts, apart from very general ones related to enhancing employment, business environment and social cohesion.

B. Turning Akhaltsikhe into development hub, supporting integration of the whole region around it

In order to achieve rapid development in the region, under conditions of limited resources available, it is important to identify priority areas not only in sectoral terms, but also from territorial-geographic viewpoint. The city of Akhaltsikhe for many reasons is exactly the focal point for such development, being not only administrative centre of the region, but also due to its advantageous location on many crossroads (Baku-Jeyhan MEP and Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline, Vale border crossing, etc.), its easy access via Borjomi, good natural conditions and potential for urban development coupled with long urban tradition (this however will require cardinal improvement of water supply and sewerage), balanced ethno-religious demography, good cultural and educational opportunities, relatively positive attitude toward all neighbouring countries – i.e. Armenia and Turkey. Concentrating efforts on increasing investment in Akhaltsikhe will serve many additional economic and political goals, but primarily enhancing economic integration of the whole region, promoting social and interethnic cohesion, and creating at least one full-fledged urban and cultural centre in the region that may meet respective needs of the population.

C. Improving roads, making easier transportation links and access to markets,

Prospects of development for Samtskhe-Javakhetui are strongly linked to its border-zone location, which although posing certain risks can be a great comparative advantage. The future of the region is closely related to big-scale transportation projects, such as Baku-Jeyhan and TRACECA. However, a number of other transportation projects may play equally important role for the region’s development, and especially that of Akhalkalaki, namely reactivating Marabda-Akhalkalaki railroad and continuing it to Kars in Turkey, reconstruction of the Tbilisi-Tsalka-Ninotsminda-Akhalkalaki road, and continuing it to Akhaltsikhe, and opening of the border crossing and customs at Kartsakhi. These projects not only have the great potential for overcoming Javakheti’s isolation, they may boost the economic development of the whole region by radically improving access to local and international markets, bringing in benefits from transit of goods (particularly if long expected provisions are made for leaving part of customs taxes inside the region) and contribute to the overall economic growth of the country.

Knowledge of Georgian language is an unavoidable precondition for social, economic and political integration of the ethnic Armenian population of the region and the Akhalkalaki district into the nation, and a major means for overcoming informational isolation. Although there are currently a number of projects and initiatives directed and overcoming this deficiency, these are mostly uncoordinated and lack synergy. It seems there is a necessity to develop a state programme that would define in detailed time frame planned steps and requirements, aiming at gradual introduction of language skills in all areas of civil service, and into implementation of respective standards at school level. While the donor community, and in particular the OSCE are applying much effort to this area, their activities could be much more effective if coordinated with governmental programme, which may need more external pressure and initiative in order to be brought to life.

H. Diversifying local agricultural production, especially through improvement of irrigation, developing fisheries, and introducing know-how transfer.

I. Diversifying and investing in non-farming activities: Tourism; building materials and mining (coal, diatomite and basalt); processing agricultural products, cheese export, etc.

Question marks

Although in many cases common sense and available information prompt the list measures necessary to improve overall situation, there are many cases when widely shared beliefs and stereotypes are far from obvious, and need justification of rejection. Such wrong stereotypes may be misleading and harmful, as they influence concrete policies in the situation of very scarce resources. Below we consider a number of such widespread opinions that in our view are doubtful, or at least require checking:

a) Mutual (Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki, Georgians-Armenians, centre-periphery) mistrust as a natural phenomenon

In addition to above discussed stereotypical opinions that we find doubtful, there are other issues of importance that require in-depth study, before respective policy choices are made:

Designing peace strategy for South Caucasus is a formidable task in the light of numerous general and local problems and difficulties. However, dealing with this task is unavoidable and absolutely necessary, and any delay only aggravates problems, as the next task – implementing the strategy, is even more urgent. Unfortunately, there are a number of obstacles hindering both the development and the implementation of such strategy.

First, and above all, is the current inefficiency, and one may even say, inability of the central and secessionist governments in Tbilisi to cope with problems of peaceful resolution of conflicts in any consistent, rational and productive way. There are many reasons for that, apart from so frequently recalled external manipulations and the lack of financial resources (which in its own turn is to significant extent the consequence rather than the cause of poor governance). It could be argued that many problems in South Caucasus will be solved automatically, if there is overall development in the region, and better governance system at every country.

Secondly, scarcity of available information and analysis makes it difficult to assess the viability of various policy options, related to elite strategies and public attitudes, or major actors. Most of data are unreliable even when they do exist.

Said that, much can be done within limited time span in assessing the needs of the peace process, and the comparative effectiveness of this or that policy. Our major finding is that such work is necessary and urgent, which is probably not a very original statement. However, we have also attempted to outline the key issues that need to be studied, on the example of two troubled regions of Georgia, and the choices that need to be made.

The most important points that we consider to be well substantiated is that it is more effective to select few priority areas and pool efforts in order to achieve a breakthrough in these areas. In the further work we wil on one hand cover other issues such as Karabakh and South Ossetian conflicts, and on the other the implications of the new geopolitical developments for the possible models that may be used for both their resolution and the establishing durable peace in South Caucasus.

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[1] “NATO is going to keep a close eye on countries involved in the transport of energy sources, Georgian officials said.
"NATO will soon start paying special attention to countries that are playing an active role in the development and transport of energy sources. They are Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine," Shalva Pichkhadze, the president's adviser on international relations," told Interfax. These nations "see their future security under NATO's umbrella and are ready to work together to secure membership in the alliance," he said. Pichkhadze said that consequently, the United States may show particular interest in GUUAM, which includes Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. This organization, which was established in 1997, was named GUUAM after Uzbekistan joined in 1999”. 12 May 2003 Interfax News Service

[2] “Russia's military bases in Georgia are not standing in the way of its integration with NATO, President Eduard Shevardnadze believes. The issue of their withdrawal is closed, and negotiations on the deadline for the withdrawal are now underway, Shevardnadze told national radio on Monday. The agreement on the pullout of Russian's military bases from Georgia was achieved at a 1999 summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Istanbul. The president believes that the presence of a number of unsettled conflicts in Georgia should not be a setback to Georgia's NATO ambitions either. Shevardnadze said that he and the alliance's Secretary General George Robertson, who will arrive in Tbilisi within the next few days, will discuss prospects for Georgian-NATO integration and a number of options for NATO's assistance to the Georgian Armed Forces. Georgia unveiled its intention to join NATO at the alliance's Prague summit last November”. 12 May 2003 Interfax Information Services, B.V.

[3] “The ceremony of termination of third phase of Georgian-American program "Train and Equip" was held on Republic Square in Tbilisi on Saturday.American instructors trained second special mission battalion within the frames of third phase. Defense Minister David Tevzadze told journalists that Sachkhere mountain-shooting battalion trained by Americans completely responds to NATO standards. . . Attendants of graduation ceremony were President Eduard Shevardnadze, Catholicos Patriarchy of Georgia Ilia II, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia Richard Miles, representative of U.S. marine pedestrian forces' commandership dislocated in Europe Major General Phills and Major General Davis, who arrived in Georgia specially for the event. Four anti-terrorist Georgian battalions will be trained within the frameworks of program "Train and Equip". Prime News Agency. 11 May 2003

[4] The Confederation of Caucasian Peoples (initially the Confederation of Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus) was a loose association of national movements which claim to represent most of the North-Caucasian nations. It was created just before the break-up of the Soviet Union and was actively involved in all the conflicts apart from Karabakh. It has been dominated by the Abkhaz, the Adyghs and the Chechens.

[5] Olivier Roy, ‘Crude manoeuvres’, Index on Censorship, 4, 1997, p. 148

[6] Tim Potier, The constitutional future of the post-Soviet Caucasian autonomous republics, Briefing Paper, on Internet: < tpot@premier.co.uk >

[9] "On 4 April 1994, an agreement on the refugee question was signed in Moscow in the presence of Boutros Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, Andrey Kozyrev, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, and various Western ambassadors. The Moscow agreement set up a quadripartite commission with representatives of Russia and the UN, as well as Georgia and Abkhazia, to supervise the return of refugees; this began work in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi at the end of April 1994..." Jonathan Aves, Georgia: From Chaos to Stability, RIIA, London, 1996, p. 31.

[10] Wesselink, Egbert, The North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey, WRITENET, May 1996, [pp. 17-18]. 'Re-emigration to Abkhazia had started in 1989 and continued until the Russian blockade of Abkhazia in 1993 (...) Most people who did re-emigrate were young men, who planned to create a basis for existence before marrying or having their family coming over. When the war came, they either joined the Abkhazian army or returned to Turkey (...) According to Abkhazian sources, an estimated 150 ethnic North Caucasians came from Turkey in 1992 to fight in Abkhazia. Three-quarters of them were believed to be of Abkhaz descent.

[VK: THE FOLLOWING INVERTED COMMAS INTRODUCE A QUOTATION FROM WHOM?]

"The Abkhazian authorities acknowledged that [during the war] they had received significant financial assistance from the Abkhaz diaspora, in addition to an unspecified number of essentially free-lance fighters. Even though the hope of returning is still very much alive, only a small group of highly motivated individuals have actually taken the step of settling in Abkhazia. The members of the diaspora are generally too well integrated into Turkish society to make a massive return movement possible."'

[VK: I’VE REPLACED Conf. WITH Cf. - IS THIS ALL RIGHT?]

Boutroue, Joel and Stephen F. Jones, Prospect for the Return of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees to Abkhazia, UNHCR, May 1997.

[11] There are also some other Caucasian leaders who have withdrawn their support from Abkhazia.

"In Georgia's pre-independence and early independence period South Ossetia maintained close links with Abkhazia but these ties have gradually weakened...", Jonathan Aves, Opus cit., p. 35.

[12] The Caucasus and the Caspian: 1996 Seminar Series, vol. II, F. Hill (ed.), Harvard University, J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, 1996, Presentation by Michael Ochs, p. 77.

[14] Otyrba, Gueorgui, War in Abkhazia: The Regional Significance of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict, in: National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New Independent States of Eurasia, (ed.) Roman Szporluk, Armonk, NY, Sharpe, 1994, p. 287.

[15] Baev, Pavel, Russia's Policies in the Caucasus, RIIA, London, 1997, p. 47.

[17] Notwithstanding recent census, no precise and reliable demographic data are available

[18] Deported to Central Asia in 1944, currently their number is estimated to be around 300,000.

[19] According to latest news from Ankara: Kars-Tbilisi railway line project included again to 2003 year investment program. 28 April 2003, Anadolu Agency.

[20] E.g. cnf. Giragosian, 2001: “Throughout the 1990s, Armenia sought to maintain a cooperative relationship with Georgia as the severe restraints imposed on Armenia by the dual blockade of the landlocked country by Azerbaijan from the east and Turkey from the west made the Armenian outlet to the north through Georgia a vital necessity.”; “This Armenian dependence on Georgia and its restraining influence on the Armenian government's handling of the Javakh issue has been most clearly demonstrated during the presidency of Levon Ter Petrosian. In the late 1990s, for example, Armenian President Ter Petrosian was so concerned over the potential destabilizing effect of the Javakh issue that he ordered the closure of the Armenian "Lragir" newspaper for three months for publishing a series of articles calling for the annexation of ethnic Armenian territory in Georgia.”

[21] Policy Brief: Javakheti In Georgia. Problems, Challenges And Necessary Responses. CIPDD & FEWER. 2000

[22] Some Russian analysts such as K. Zatulin or A. Migranian have repeatedly recommended that their government encourages the annexation of Javakheti by Armenia if Georgia supports NATO efforts to restrict Russia's presence in South Caucasus (see e.g. Nezavisimaja Gazeta, March 27, 1997).

[25] As revealed by the 2000-2001 study of the Save the Children in 6 districts of Georgia.

[26] Implemented by the International Orthodox Christian Charities, funded by the United States Department of Agriculture

[27] Other two include a branch of the Georgian Technical University, and a business school.

[28] While Javakh's influence is dwindling, Virk -- "Georgia" in ancient Armenian – has become the driving political force in the region. ‘Throughout the 1990s, the popularity of the “Javakh” autonomist movement gradually declined. It was replaced by a new, more moderate political force – the “Virk” party, which advocated the interests of Javakheti’s Armenian community within Georgia, but did not call for violence or secession.’ Antonenko, 2001.

[29] So, e.g., R. Giragosian argues that “There are some precedents for an autonomous region negotiating a share of transit fees in this way, as the Ajarians are paid for the use of their Black Sea port Poti…”, neglecting the obvious fact that Poti is located definitely not in Ajara but on the border of Guria and Samegrelo regions and enjoys special status. Furthermore, the relations between Ajara and the Georgian government are far from harmonious, and can hardly serve as a positive example of friendly cooperation. Equally doubtable is his suggestion of involving Armenian government: “Even more encouraging would be the possibility of utilizing such revenue in a special “Javakhk Development Fund” to be administered by the regional government of an autonomous Javakhk and with the possible involvement of both Armenia and Georgia.” Another characteristic quotation: “Moreover, seduced by the Caspian oil and eager to use its geographical position as a political leverage against principally Russian presence, Shevardnadze allied Georgia to regional projects with an inherent threat to Armenia's, as well as Russia's, security and interests. Some of those projects, especially the ones related to oil pipelines from the Caspian to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, cannot, in the actual conflict-prone situation in the Caucasus, be realized without weakening Armenia.” Der Ghoukassian, K. and Giragosian, R. Javakh: Stability Through Autonomy. 2001 http://groong.usc.edu/ro/ro-20010326.html

[31] E.g.: “The stark dilemma appears to be whether international bodies can tackle the root cause of the problem, such as collapsing state in Georgia, and risk upsetting the Georgian political establishment to the point that it would make the activities of the internationals virtually impossible. Or should they ignore the signs of a developing chaos in the country and proceed with acting on the proxy causes? Another option is not to engage in conflict prevention in Georgia at all, saving time and money which may be more usefully applied elsewhere.” Also, “So far, the expectation has been created on the Georgian side that international aid will replace the income the base provides for Akhalkalaki into the indefinite future. The international community has to think carefully whether it is prepared to commit itself to such an agenda. The West has no real security interests in the region, so Western compensation to the Georgians on a massive scale for closure of the base will be hard to sell to the politicians.” A. Matveeva

[32] “In the case of Javakheti, these non-economic measures are clearly developed and in place, particularly the relatively “low cost” civil society components. … a plethora of small scale projects aimed at civil society capacity building has been initiated - whereas economic, health care, professional training (etc.) projects are marked by their absence. The importance of implementing agencies like UNV is clearly acknowledged here, yet, the need for an improvement of strategy is paramount if the objective of reducing poverty and ultimately the potential for conflict in Javakheti, is to be achieved. This recognition points toward the need for greater resource mobilisation and more effective/ targeted allocation ...” Freya von Groote, Integrative Development Plan for Javakheti. UNDP Georgia, March 2002

[33] Conf. Policy Brief: Javakheti In Georgia. Problems, Challenges And Necessary Responses. CIPDD & FEWER. July 2000

[34] In neighbouring Azerbaijan already almost 8% of the population owns a mobile phone, compared to less than 4% in Russia. Figures for Georgia are catching up.

[35] See, e.g : Samtskhe-Javakheti Integrated Development Programme. UNDP Georgia Office, November 2002

[36] National Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Programme. Draft text as of February 2003. Tbilisi

Introduction

OBSTACLES TO STABILITY

GEORGIA’S EXTERNAL ORIENTATIONS

Hopes

Goals and Objectives for interventions

Prospects

Question marks