ISLANDS OF
GLOBALIZATION:
REGIONAL RUSSIA
AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD
Andrey S.Makarychev
The
basic challenge of modernization for Russia is that of the country’s structural
integration into the world, both politically and economically. Russia’s
adaptation to and accommodation with the globally dominant norms, rules and
institutions will take a long time, experience ebbs and flows and cannot be
expected to produce quick results. Russia’s search for her place in the world
community will take the form of gradual and evidently controversial adjustment
to a rapidly changing external environment. These changes stem from the
much-discussed globalization, that is understood in this paper as a higher
stage of internationalisation, its latest phase characterized by:
- intensification
of links with a mounting number of international actors to the level of mutual
dependency;
- integration
of economic, financial, social, political and managerial resources;
- technological
progress;
- liberalization
of trade and commerce;
- changing
roles of states and NGOs in decision-making processes.
However, the purpose of this paper is to
show that globalization in Russia develops in a peculiar environment, which is
different from that in the West. In this paper the discourse about Russia’s way
to globalization will be placed into the Russian domestic context. The purpose
will be to demonstrate that:
- first,
subnational territorial units in Russia are gradually becoming international
actors;
- second,
globalization of Russia’s regions is a very uneven and competitive process;
- third, this
unevenness and competitiveness might bring both new opportunities and challenges for Russia.
Of course one should not overestimate
the significance of global influences on Russia’s regions. The evolution of the
federal system in this country is basically determined by domestic developments
such as strengthening of “vertical power” and re-imposition of federal
regulations over regional governments. The paper argues that globalization is
still underdeveloped in Russia, which is a big problem for the country as a
whole: if Russia is unable to integrate with the world and the “islands of
globalization” are overrun by the “ocean”, this would keep the country isolated
and underdeveloped for many decades to come.
Yet why is it so important to raise the
issue of globalization for Russia and her regions? Several reasons ought to be
mentioned. First, despite the underdevelopment of Russia’s version of
globalization, this is not to say that the international community in general
and specific foreign countries in particular have no impact on internal
developments in Russia. Sometimes the effects of globalization are not visible
enough, but they cannot be disregarded. In spite of his inward-oriented
rhetoric, President Putin’s federal reform launched in May 2000 to some extent
was inspired by developments outside Russia. It was the foreign investors who
were confused by the tug-of-war between the federal center and the regions, and
who called for a reshuffle of the federal system in Russia to avoid conflicts
between federal and regional laws and get rid of regional autarchy. What is
also telling is that Putin intends to implement his federal reform in
accordance with formal democratic procedures, keeping in mind Western
sensitivity to these issues.
Second, one of the worst effects
that globalization might have for Russia is her further isolation from the
West. This is already a problem in
Russian-EU relations. The case of Kaliningrad shows that there is a concern
about new dividing lines in a globalized Europe. Hence, the problem of Russia’s
integration into the world system will maintain its priority both in federal
and regional politics.
Third, globalization might bring
more domestic instability for Russia, since not all territories might prove
capable of fitting into the new logic of an international division of labor.
Many Russian regions are afraid to face the perspective of becoming the
depositories of foreign nuclear waste and sources of cheap raw materials[1].
At the same time some provinces might opt (and already did) for gradual
distancing and even separation (economic and political) from Russia, as they
are aware that small territorial units have better chances for prosperity in
the era of globalization. This uncertainty provokes counter-globalization
reactions from a significant number of Russian elites.
Fourth, globalization questions
the relevance of the old understanding of security as being related to purely
military issues. Nowadays security is determined mostly by the scale of
integration of the country into international institutions and processes, which
is again the challenge, both intellectual and political, for Russian federal
and regional elites.
The paper will start with focusing on
three types of gaps that exist for globalization of the regions. The first one
divides Russia and the West in terms of their attitudes towards living in a
global world. The second set of gaps divides Russia’s regions that are not
equal actors in the international arena. Thirdly, there are controversies in
the group of four domestic actors, each of which has its own foreign policy
perspectives. After that the paper will turn to the issue of obstacles and
opportunities for globalization of Russia’s regions.
The interest shown in the world to this
problem might be explained, among other reasons, by the fact that scholars in
the West legitimately wonder whether (and to what extent) Western theories of
regionalism are applicable to the Russian Federation. In case some of them are
not quite appropriate for explaining the course of events in the Russian
regions, their claims for universality shall be reconsidered. This is not an
easy question to answer, since Russian studies in the West to a significant
degree are being influenced by the heritage of old “Sovietology” which, as many
deem, was often isolated from the mainstream developments in social sciences[2].
Many recent developments in the field of nascent
internationalization of Russia’s regional policies coincide with Western
trends. It certainly might be assumed that both in Russia and the West:
- the growing range of
political, social and economic issues can no longer be managed by the central
government;
- traditional
distinctions between “high” and “low” politics (as well as between domestic and
foreign policies) are becoming less rigid;
- at the level of regional
governments there is a recognition that the needs of the localities in specific
functional areas cannot be satisfied without greater involvement in the
international system;
- foreign policy localization
is a form of adaptive behavior by government structures to a changing policy milieu,
and is marked by differing patterns of conflict and cooperation between central
and regional governments[3].
Russia, alongside the international community, is still in
search of the balance between globalization and regionalization, as well as
between inward and outward commitments. Yet we ought to be very cautious in
trying to apply Western lessons to the Russian reality and moreover in
anticipating complete similarity. Let us turn to what makes the Russian
regionalization very special, peculiar and different from Western experience.
First, the international dynamism of Russia’s subnational
actors more and more resembles an anti-crisis strategy, a tool to overcome
current economic deficiencies, rather than an organic element of the pluralist
pattern of territorial governance. As a result, the regions’ foreign affairs is
overwhelmingly dominated by regional political/administrative elites, who
mainly give their blessing to those projects and ideas that are directly
related to their political careers (Boris Nemtsov of Nizhny Novgorod, Yevgeny
Nazdratenko of Primorski krai, and Mikhail Nikolaev from the Republic of
Yakutia might be good illustrations). In fact, foreign affairs are a part of
“patronage politics”, which is very widespread in Russian provinces.
Second, in Western Europe the self-assertiveness of
subnational regions is complemented by
supra-regionality (in the form of the EU)[4].
In contrast to this, as a direct result of the sporadic demise of the
super-centralized Soviet unitary state (with no parallel in Western European
history), Russian regionalism is developing clearly as a disintegrative
phenomenon. In terms of the devolution of powers, it is geared from the center
to the regions. Unlike Europe, Russia lacks a strong integrative drive at the
supra-national level (the eventual alliance with Belarus is more an exception
than the rule). What is interesting is that anti-integrationist attitudes are
heard in Russia mainly from regional leaders (the first one was Boris Nemtsov,
former governor of Nizhny Novgorod oblast, later followed by Presidents of
Tatarstan and Ingushetia, respectively Mentimer Shaimiev and Ruslan Aushev).
Ambiguity and uncertainty about Russia’s ability to become a cornerstone of CIS
is treated by many in Russia as an indicator of weakness of Russian
statehood.
Third, there is a striking contrast between the West and
Russia in perceiving and interpreting the notion of sovereignty and, hence, the
functions of the state in the contemporary world. There is still a discussion
underway among Russian legal experts on whether it is appropriate to
acknowledge sovereignty vested in subnational units. Those in Russia who still
adhere to the principle of “indivisibility” of the state sovereignty, refuse to
recognize the constituent parts of the federation in their capacity as subjects
of international law[5]. Russia has
still to learn that “sovereignty is used to refer not so much to status as to a
particular degree of political freedom”[6].
2. EXPLAINING THE
DISPROPORTIONS BETWEEN THE
REGIONS
The shift of power from the center to the regional actors was
the major development in Russian politics in the beginning of the 1990s. Yet
the Russian regions are not equal players on the international scene. Not all
of them are capable of playing meaningful roles internationally, and these
roles can be quite different for each one. Differentiation between the most and
less-developed Russian regions in terms of key socio-economic indicators is
reaching the proportion of 50:1[7].
Three broad groups of constituent parts of the Federation
ought to be considered as the most important Russian subnational actors in the
international arena. It is important to note that only regions belonging to
either of these groups (or to two of them simultaneously like Tatarstan): a)
might have sufficient resources for challenging the federal foreign policy and
designing its own long-term strategic routes in the world; and b) demand more
powers in foreign-related issues. Their strategies contrast with those of
inward-oriented (“introvert”[8])
regions seeking more protectionism from the central government and more state
control over import and export operations.
2.1.
Export-oriented regions
The
first group comprises those regions with a strong export potential (industrial
regions or those rich in mineral resources[9]).
Natalia Lapina singles out several sub-categories in the group of
export-oriented regions. These are: a) regions with well-developed industries
(precious metals, energy resources, etc.); b) trade-oriented regions; c)
regions with strong armaments and heavy industries[10].
Their administrations rely on cooperation with foreign partners seeing this as
the most profitable way of earning money for replenishing their budgets. In the
research of the Moscow-based Institute for U.S. & Canadian Studies five
regions were given highest marks in this respect: the Kemerovo, Perm, Samara
and Cheliabinsk oblasts and Krasnoyarsk krai. Another nine were ranked very
close to the leaders: Bashkortostan,
Moscow, Irkutsk, Murmansk, Nizhny Novgorod, Orenburg, Sverdlovsk and Tiumen
oblasts and Khabarovsk krai[11].
The first problem with this group
is that economic interests of these leading regions are very different from
other territories, since attractiveness of the Russian domestic market is
minimal for them owing to cheap prices, crime, federal bureaucracy, etc. That
is why regions belonging to this group (especially those with substantial
extractive possibilities) are very enthusiastic about opening and liberalizing
the Russian economy[12].
It is infeasible for the federal
government to ignore or curb the exceptional international standings of these
regions. Yet in practical terms it is enormously difficult to find a balance
between two contradicting priorities: fostering international openness and
preserving regional markets for domestic producers[13].
The second problem is that Russian
and Western perspectives might differ in regard to export-oriented regions.
Russia might be interested in using these regions’ potential for building
“investment corridors” (like Moscow-St. Petersburg) to foster high-tech
development, know-how and technical expertise, while Western European countries
are attracted basically by projects dealing with transportation and developing
natural resources.
2.2. Ethnic Republics
The second group is composed of ethnically non-Russian
republics. Ethnicity is a powerful factor that almost automatically pushes
those republics into a wider system of international and transnational
relations[14]. A search
for ethnic identity is a factor of international socialization of the republics
like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Tyva, Buriatia, Komi, Karelia and
others, giving a new quality to their international standing. Transnational
identity based on cultural heritage, religion, and language can provide a
network of opportunities for the region’s population or for certain segments of
the population[15]. For
example, some Islamic countries (Saudi Arabia, Turkey and others) assist
Dagestan and other Russian republics in spiritual and educational affairs, as
well as by rendering moral and political support[16].
Establishing links with their ethnic diasporas also plays an important role in
the foreign affairs of these republics.
What is more, ethnic republics usually are eager to position
themselves internationally by placing special impetus on international legal
norms defending ethnic minorities. At the same time all of them count on
international solidarity in case of encroachment from the federal government on
their autonomy, since they have both moral and material support abroad among
like-minded ethnic groups and organizations[17].
Ethnic regions are split up into two developmental patterns in
Russia. The first is represented by those republics that are primarily
motivated by preserving their ethnic and cultural identities in a presumably
unfriendly environment, which leads to playing the religious card and violence.
This type of ethnic region could be called “the zone of frozen ethno-national
development”, since it is very cautious with regard to Western concepts of
progress, modernization, and industrialization. Chechnia is an extreme example
of this unfortunate pattern.
Ethnic communities of this kind appear to be rather closed,
inward-oriented entities, worrying much more about keeping intact their own
cultural, religious, and linguistic identities than about integrating into the
“world society”. Ethnic exclusiveness and nationalism is a collective
affirmation to be oneself and avoid assimilation. It offers a narrow
perspective on identity and dignity, freedom and security. Ethnic forms of
self-organization seem to be very conservative, bound to historical memories
and specific territorial “hotbeds”, and their resistance to modernization can
be explained by the desire to preserve ethnic “exclusiveness”, “uniqueness”,
even in old-fashioned, archaic forms. Many attempts to remodel the political
process in ethnic communities according to “universal”, “civilized” standards
have failed. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe was involved in assisting the
presidential election in Chechnia in 1997, but since the formal procedure was
over and Alan Maskhadov was elected, no other signs of democracy in Chechnia
were noticed. In ideological terms, too, many postulates of some Muslim groups
within Russia are hardly compatible with the Euro-Atlantic version of
globalization.
Some manifestations of internationalization of ethnicity may
pose serious questions for the nation’s security. The best illustration is
financial and technical assistance received by Chechen guerillas from terrorist
organizations in Muslim countries. This is also related to other regions. For
example, federal security services expressed their concern about contacts
between the leadership of the Republic of Adygeya and the World Islamic Appeal,
Libyan government, etc.
The second type of ethnic regionalism is geared by the
adaptation of international economic experience and its projection to specific
ethnic backgrounds. Their elites try to thread ethnic identity through economic
rationality. Ethnicity in this case is used as a resource to foster autonomy
from the federal center and provide societal consolidation. Tatarstan could be
mentioned as one of the most telling examples of this sort.
2.3. Border Regions
The third group includes 45 borderland regions. Russia’s
external borders are the longest in the world (60933 km), and the number of
bordering countries – 16 – is also the highest. 32,6% of the total population
lives in the border regions of Russia. The perspectives of border regions are a
mix of both opportunity and challenge.
Opportunities. The first is that they usually
get preferential treatment by foreign countries. It goes without saying that
China is especially eager to keep its influence in Primorsky krai, while
Finland, for example, has particular interests in giving priority to
neighboring Karelia.
Second, frontier location and geographical vicinity to
foreign countries increase the possibilities of bargaining with the federal
center: requesting additional financial resources in compensation for border
control, demanding direct access to revenues from customs duties, and even threatening
the federal center with secession.
Third, the border regions are one of the few groups of
Russia’s regions, which have a special legislative status on the federal level
for developing overseas contacts, apart from bilateral agreements. These legal
acts include transborder cooperation agreements signed between the government
of Russia and a number of its neighbors: Finland (January 1992), Poland (May
1992), Kazakhstan (January 1995), Ukraine (January 1995), Mongolia (January
1993) and China (May 1994). There is also an Intergovernmental Agreement
between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kirgizia on the basic principles of
transborder cooperation, signed in February 1999, as well as Recommendations of
the 8th Session of the Advisory Council of the Subjects of the
Federation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the area of transborder
cooperation, issued in June 1998[18].
Fourth, trans-border economic interaction encourages
trade and investment relations (e.g., “investment corridors”), and (unlike GATT
and WTO) does not require the reciprocity[19].
It is not surprising that two pioneering free-trade areas in Russia were
located in the borderland territories: “Yantar” in the Kaliningrad oblast and
“Nakhodka” in Primorsky krai. What is also important is that the border regions
are subjects of international transit business, still underestimated (experts
of President Putin’s think tank assume that the transportation networks might
raise seven or eight times more revenues than at present)[20].
Fifth, since most of the border provinces of Russia are
highly militarized (be it the Kaliningrad oblast or Primorsky krai), direct
military-military relations might be fruitful. Besides, working contacts
between military commanders stationed in the region and the regional political
elites are indispensable for resolving a plethora of social problems of
servicemen, a fact that increases the roles of regional political institutions
in security issues.
Trans-border regionalism gives us a good
illustration of the changing nature of the contemporary borders that stems from
two basic processes: one is domestic (the self-determination of regions in a
new international ambit), and the second is external (global reshaping of the
world geopolitical scene). Both developments lead to growing mobility,
flexibility and transparency of traditional frontiers. As Chris Brown put it,
“the possibility of a genuinely global economy clearly raises the issue of
‘borders’ to the top of the agenda – hence the notion of a ‘borderless world’
and ‘de-bordering’”[21].
A closer look at trans-border regionality
also gives us some clues for understanding the changing nature of regional identities.
The process of creating trans-border regions cannot be deprived of a specific
socio-political context. It was the demise of the old bi-polar world that
provoked such new forms of trans-regional cooperation like the
Barents-Euroarctic project, the Council of the Baltic Sea, “Northern
Dimension”, Black Sea Economic Forum, and many others. The very notion of
‘region’ in this context becomes “softer”, open to multiple interpretations,
and more adaptable to the changing political milieu. Region-building, being
generally treated as a process of the strengthening within a certain territory
of a number of traits characterized in terms of mutual dependency, cannot be
secured against a certain degree of political subjectivity.
Of course, it matters which group of
subnational territories is going to build a region. It is easier if these
territories are sufficiently homogeneous in social terms, representing a
“natural” entity in geographical terms, and possessing a common feeling of
cultural identity (like, for example, the three ex-Soviet Baltic republics).
The whole picture gets more complicated when it comes to a “functional region”[22],
initially presented as a sort of a picture puzzle with the parts to be
assembled. The concept of constructing “functional regions” is based on achieving
integration, inter-dependency and internal coherency. In this case a system of
multi-layered, overlapping identities might appear (Black Sea area, for
example). Within its framework there is room for different societal groups,
each having its own resources and orientations, united by communication
networks and converging cultural values.
Challenges. Yet cross-border
cooperation (bilateral or multilateral) is a very fragile phenomenon in Russia.
Its vulnerability stems from a number of factors.
First,
border regions are usually located on the fringes of civilized areas. Thus, the
Baltic countries consider themselves culturally different from Russia, which
fuels isolationist attitudes from them[23].
“The Finnish-Russian border region has historically been an interface and a
battlefield between eastern and western cultures and politico-economic spheres
of influence in northern Europe”[24].
The Black Sea Economic Area is to no lesser extent overwhelmed with ethnic,
religious and cultural gaps. Negative perceptions of Chinese migration in the
Far Eastern provinces of Russia are also mainly cultural.
Second, borderland
provinces – to a greater extent than inland territories – have to deal with
immigration (be it Chinese seasonal workers in the Far East or refugees from
the Caucasus in Stavropol, Rostov-on-Don and the Krasnodar region). It is
estimated that there are from 1-1,5 million illegal immigrants in Russia,
entering mainly through border regions.
Their damage to the Russian fiscal system is assessed by President Putin’s
think tank in the amount of US$5-7 billion. It was also noted that there is a
tendency to form ethnically populated areas (Kazakhs, Armenians, etc.) within
Russian border regions, whose leaders have already raised the problem of
granting them a special autonomous status[25].
In the territories neighbouring Chechnia
(mainly in the Stavropol krai and Dagestan[26])
local authorities had to begin passport control. 23 regional computer networks
were established recently in order to monitor foreigners residing in specific
areas and ban the entrance of religious extremists, criminals, etc. In March
2000 the government of Karelia created a commission to regulate the inflow of
foreign workers to this republic[27].
Similar measures were introduced in the Belgorod oblast[28].
These forms of direct contact with the
outside world sharpen the problem of regional political identity. Not accidentally,
many borderland provinces are dominated by conservative, nationalistic and even
jingoistic public attitudes (the governor of the Pskov oblast Yevgeny Mikhailov
is a member of Zhirinovsky’s LDPR party, the governor of Krasnodar krai Nikolay
Kondratenko is known for his xenophobic views[29],
and the governor of Primorsky krai Yevgeny Nazdratenko has the reputation of a
local “patriot” defying both Moscow and Peking).
Third, authorities in the border
regions have to tackle, on a regular basis, the “dark side” of
internationalisation – crime, illegal fishing, hunting, border-crossing or
smuggling (drugs, guns, undeclared cash, etc.). In the Far East, for example,
numerous cases of murders among Chinese entrepreneurs – the bulk of them
executed by Chinese gangs – are registered each year[30].
According to the tax authorities of Primorsky krai, 263 joint ventures created
by Chinese entrepreneurs in the region (out of 405) do not submit their
financial accounts, while another 38 joint ventures were closed by the court owing
to violation of laws[31].
As a result, security services in border
regions have to perform protective functions and shield off those threats
stemming from their frontier location. In Sakhalin, for example, a special
military command unit was created in March 2000 to prevent illegal fishing.
According to the regional customs office, more than 75% of all local seafood
products are each year illegally transported to Japan[32].
Fourth, border regions are more likely than inland
territories to find themselves under the overwhelming influence of strong
neighbors. Some experts fear that instead of becoming full-scale international
actors, some border regions (like those of the Far East and North West) might
face the perspective of turning into passive objects of foreign policies of
such mighty countries as China or the EU,
and in the long run might be economically assimilated.
Fifth, the border territories might become an object of
outside pressures owing to their direct involvement in common technological
links. For example, the authorities of Chernigov, Ukraine were able to shut
down the energy supply to a Russian village in the Briansk oblast, and insist
on payment for electricity in the Ukrainian currency[33].
Dagestan is dependent for its water supply, which is critically important for
agricultural development, on neighboring Azerbaijan, which is able to
technically control the Samur river[34].
This implies that border regions are very exposed to negative impacts from
abroad and should have at their disposal specific resources to avoid
victimization or blackmail.
Sixth, one of the most demanding and troublesome issues
for the Russian regions bordering with more developed countries is the gap in
living standards. All the endeavors of trans-regional cooperation imply that
higher Western standards eventually should also be applicable to the Russian
regions, which is a huge problem. For example, the delegation of the European
Parliament in May 2000 stated that in the near future the Kaliningrad region
should comply with basic EU norms regulating imported and locally produced
merchandise[35]. The
Lithuanian authorities explicitly acknowledged that the visa-free regime might
not be sustained unless Kaliningrad shows economic growth and the well being of
its citizens[36]. Estonian
experts see one of the obstacles for trans-border cooperation in the fact that
the Russian regions facing the Baltics cannot qualify for international
integration because they do not possess “similar patterns of social and
political life”[37] and hence
are not well-suited for full-fledged partnership with the other regional
actors. In the opinion of a group of Finnish specialists, “viewed from a
European perspective, the technical and organizational prerequisites for
efficient cooperation across the Finnish-Russian border have to be regarded as
very bleak”[38].
Internal developments in the border
regions have a very visible security context because of their high explosive
potential. Chechnia is the most evident example. Western Europeans are very
sensitive to what is going on inside the Kaliningrad oblast, especially in
terms of crime and law enforcement, environment, political debates, etc.
Seventh, one of the vulnerabilities of the border
regions stems from their heavy dependence on the customs policies of the
federal government. Thus, new customs
duties introduced by the federal center in April 2000 have destroyed the
outlook of small- and middle-size businesses in the Amur oblast and other
regions with strong trade connections with neighboring China[39].
The Volgograd oblast authorities complained that the decision of the federal
government to impose 25% customs tax on Ukrainian sugar, while leaving untaxed
imported Ukrainian confection, undermines the confectionery industry in many
Russian regions[40].
Because of all these problems the border regions still failed
to benefit from the opportunities that they have, and get rid of the “periphery
complex”, inherited from the past[41].
Foreign investments are still in a deficit in the border regions. Many of them
face the perspective of economic isolation. There is no conceptual clarity
whether regional authorities should further strengthen immigration control or
open up regional markets for foreigners (including lifting obstacles for
registration in big cities, facilitating the launch of small businesses, etc.)[42].
Taking into account everything mentioned above, some leaders of the border
regions argue that there is a need to give a special legal status to their
territories[43]. But all
these projects are still under consideration.
Driving forces of trans-border cooperation
|
NorthWest |
CIS |
Far East |
|
Direct access to
EU-sponsored programs |
Legacy of former economic
interdependence |
Vast market for cheap
foreign goods[44] |
|
Fostering trade |
Relative similarity of social institutions |
Labour opportunities for
immigrants[45] |
|
Improving communication
infrastructure |
Cultural homogeneity |
Relative weakness of federal
bureaucracy |
|
NorthWest |
CIS |
Far East |
Economic imbalances
between Russian regions and their foreign partners
|
Debts of Ukrainian,
Belorussian and Kazakhstan enterprises and lack of financial guarantees for
Russian export |
Poor legislation |
|
Russia’s political isolation
in Europe after Kosovo, Chechnia and corruption/money-laundering scandals |
Lack of adequate resources
and competitive merchandise from both sides |
Lack of long-term
commitments from the Russian side (“bazaar syndrome”) |
|
Geopolitical ambitions of
the central government |
Lack of finances, which are
substituted by barter operations[46] |
Territorial disputes |
3. GLOBALIZATION: FOUR
DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVES
Russia’s adjustment to the world is complicated by the existence of
different visions and approaches to living in a “global world” among its
domestic actors. This is a separate set of gaps to be analyzed.
3.1. Federal Center perspectives
Neither Boris Yeltsin nor Vladimir Putin were inimical
to fostering international cooperation and becoming a part of the world system.
Yet the war in Kosovo and NATO eastward expansion have strengthened the feeling
among Russian federal leaders that globalization is a form of U.S.-led hegemony
increasing Russia’s marginality in world affairs. There is a growing tendency
in Russia to reinterpret what is called “globalization” in the West as
consolidation of political and economic elites within the limited group of the
most advanced industrial and military nations of the world. Because Russia is
“still in the process of nation-building, the idea of decentralization may be
conflicting with fears generating from accelerating centrifugal forces at the
subnational level, especially in the case of regions with a relatively high
proportion of politically active minorities”[47].
The federal government sees Russia’s role in the world as still
far from being determined. This lack of clarity stems from two basic reasons. The
first one has a domestic background. Such concepts, which are deeply rooted
in the West, as “vanishing borders”, “borderless world”, “fragmented
sovereignty” and others are not very favored in Russian political discourse.
Globalization is frequently interpreted in Russia as menacing to the country’s
territorial integrity[48].
Russian federal authorities treat globalization with some suspicion and
reluctance to accept the deep involvement of non-central government actors
(NGOs, regional and municipal authorities, etc.) in performing functions
compatible with those of the state. Few in the Kremlin would have questioned
the assumption that the sovereign state is the basic means of comprehensively
organizing modern political life and providing the array of public goods[49].
What is more, since globalization weakens the efficacy of national policy
instruments, the Russian federal government finds it sometimes threatening[50].
Russian perceptions of globalization reveal the conceptual gap
that exists between Russia and the West. This gap is easily explained by the
fact that in the West the cornerstones of globalization are actors and social
agents other than states – coalitions of business and producer groups, private
companies, etc.[51] In fact,
globalization is the application of liberal free trade theory to the
development of international relations and hence is dependent on private
economic transactions[52].
This is not yet the case of Russia where private sector is still
underdeveloped, and no “globalization lobby” is formed as yet.
The second source of ambiguity could be found in developments
outside Russia. Along with the appearance of new social, political and economic
phenomena that are relatively neutral to geographic lines, we see that the
territorial instinct still plays an important role in international relations.
This can easily be illustrated by the emergence of new states, conflicts over
boundary delineation, concerns over illegal immigrants, etc[53].
The still existing and even widening political, social, economic, and cultural
gaps between the “Western” and “non-Western” (China, Iraq, Iran, Libia, India,
etc.) countries challenge and question the perspectives of globalization for
Russia as well.
3.2. Regional Perspectives
It is impressive that many regional administrations are able
to develop more liberal – in comparison to the federal government – approaches
to foreign relations. This is applicable for example to St. Petersburg,
Novgorod, Samara, Nizhny Novgorod and Tatarstan. Those regions were pioneers in
introducing laws that induce foreign companies to invest money in their
economies. According to the former mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak,
widely known for his liberal views, his government as far back as 1993 signed
trade and economic cooperation agreements with several ex-Communist countries,
including Lithuania and Bulgaria, while Russia’s federal government didn’t yet
go so far[54]. The
Novgorod oblast administration, skipping federal legislation, introduced its
Land Code, which allows foreigners to lease land for a 49-year period[55].
The reason is obvious: unlike the federal government, Russia’s regions are not
overburdened with tough geopolitical legacies and are pursuing mainly economic
goals, trying to stimulate foreign economic ties.
For example, the regions are not happy with high customs
duties that are imposed by the federal government and impede foreign economic
contacts at the regional level. Often regional enterprises are unable to make
use of the much-needed equipment coming from their Western partners because
they are not in a position to reimburse the customs duties that are as high as
30% of the equipment value[56].
Regional administrators complain that the federal government is basically
concerned with “strengthening fiscal muscles”[57]
and is insensitive to the economic needs of the regions.
The regions have tried to make the federal government hear
their interest in ecological matters. It is appropriate to mention that the
administration of the Kirov oblast created a commission to oversee the
implementation of the liquidation of chemical weapons in this territory.
Preserving the social security of the local population and developing the
social infrastructure were listed as the priorities of the regional government
in all arrangements related to chemical disarmament[58].
Similarly, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Komi
Republic launched an ecological investigation to research the negative effects
of fall out on republican territory of the parts of missiles being tested by
the Defense Ministry[59].
The difference between the geopolitical strategy of
the federal center and geoeconomic incentives of the regions is sometimes
called “tanks or market dilemma”, or “a ‘warrior’ scenario against a ‘merchant’
scenario”[60]. Geoeconomic
and geofinancial interests of the regions are particularly visible in the
borderland territories. The view is widespread among experts that “the
strengthening of the contact functions of borders will become a dominating
tendency... This is clearly manifested both on the western border (with Norway
and Finland) and on the eastern border (especially the borders with China)”[61].
At the same time, as Stephen Blank put it: “One reason why
Kaliningrad’s economic situation has deteriorated more than that of Russia
since 1991 is Moscow’s inclination to military-type rhetoric and solutions to
Russo-Baltic security issues. That trend stifled European interest in
investment and inhibited sensible initiatives such as creating a regional free
economic zone… Russia’s economic policy does not benefit its national or local
interest either. It places high tariffs on Estonian goods coming into Pskov,
penalizing Pskov’s efforts to become a gateway to northern Europe”[62].
Differences between the federal and regional authorities
could be summarized in the following table. It should be taken into
consideration however that these trends are meant to be understood in
comparison with each other, and not as absolute ones[63].
|
Geopolitics of the Federal Center |
Geoeconomics of Regions |
|
Hard security approach |
Soft security approach
|
|
Reliance on balance of power
theory and military strength |
Non-military priorities:
search for new opportunities for trade and investments, integration of
transport infrastructure, ecological monitoring |
|
Divisive |
Integrative |
|
Regional security
arrangements (Nordic, Baltic, Black Sea) are seen as strongly tied with
all-European security |
Security might be achieved
on a regional level (security and regionality are compatible) |
|
The perspectives of
subnational units are bound to the policies of major powers and alliances
(Kaliningrad, Pskov) |
Subnational units are not supposed to become hostages in the
competition for domination or hegemony |
|
Russia treats itself as an
object of regional policies of major countries |
Russian North West treats itself as an organic part of wider Europe |
|
Russia’s resistance to the
West’s eastward expansion |
Search for new opportunities
derived from the proximity to expanding Europe |
|
Border regions as barriers
to foreign expansionism |
Border regions as gateways and trade links to more developed countries |
This table leads one to assume that there is a disjuncture
between the geopolitical/geostrategic outlook of the federal center and the one
underpinning regionalization. The central government is mostly focusing on
relations between states as marked by conflicts of interests. In this sense the
regional build-up is “a clear, though theoretical challenge to the domination
of the nation-state; there is little sign of its demise”[64].
Yet controversies between the federal and the regional levels of power are
embedded in the very structure of Russian society, and in this sense are
inevitable. It is as natural for the central government to think and act in
terms of “vital national interests”, or “national dignity”, as for the regional
governments to concentrate on the strategy of economic survival in a wider
international context, and endorse the concept of “civic security”[65].
Speaking about the geoeconomic motivations of Russia’s
regions, we should bear in mind several important points. First,
regional geoeconomic strategies are still in their infancy in Russia, which is
just a nascent trend, co-existing and overlapping with others – geofinancial,
ecological and geocultural[66].
Second, geoeconomic thinking is not yet an overwhelming
characteristic of the regional elites in Russia. Geoeconomic approaches are
impeded by multiple factors, strongest among which are: a) weak
conceptualization of the region’s mission, lack of strategic vision, inertia of
the “old times”; b) “negative” corporate solidarity within administrative
elites (i.e., patronizing regional industries facing competition from the
outside). The “agents of globalization” in provincial Russia are not yet strong
enough to dominate the whole area of decision making in foreign economic
policies.
Third, there should be no expectations that geoeconomic
orientations of sub-national units are to be free of harsh conflicts. Entering
the new area of geoeconomics, the Russian regions should have learnt and been
prepared to deal with such phenomena as “geoeconomic wars”, “geoeconomic
weapons”, “geoeconomic expansionism”, etc.
3.2.1. Regions-Center
Relations in Foreign Policy
The existence of different interests of
the federal center and regions might result in political conflicts between
them. In those regions where the federal government prevails in foreign-related
matters, there might be collisions (like in Primorsky krai whose chief executive,
Yevgeny Nazdratenko, for several years refused to recognize the treaty on
border delineation between Russia and China), and cooperation in those numerous
regions that coordinate their foreign actions with the federal authorities. A
good illustration of mutually beneficial interaction between federal and
regional authorities is the beginning of the oil refinery construction in
Primorsk (Leningrad oblast): for the federal center this is an important step
towards securing a new, economically efficient oil transportation route to the
Baltic Sea; while the Leningrad oblast will profit by new incomes for the
regional budget[67].
More action of the regional elites compared to the federal
government might also be in the form of a conflict (e.g., the cases of
Tatarstan or Bashkortostan whose laws are contradictory to the federal
legislation) or cooperation (for instance, the case of Karelia whose integration
with Northern Europe does not provoke a negative reaction from Moscow).
Finally, in those regions where both regional and federal governments have
equal (or comparable) opportunities in setting the foreign policy agenda, it is
usually implemented by consensus and communication between the federal and
regional bodies (Pskov and Kaliningrad). In certain cases relations between the
federal center and the regional authorities are based on bargaining tactics.
For example “the Kremlin’s loss of the Baltic ports after the Soviet Union
collapsed gave Pskov a chance to position itself as a gateway to the newly
emerging Baltic-Nordic free trade area”[68].
At the same time there are examples of Ingushetia and Dagestan which are
heavily dependent on federal subsidies, but publicly articulate dissident views
on most sensitive foreign policy issues (like the union with Belarus or
relations with some Muslim countries in the framework of the Chechen conflict).
Obviously, only a limited number of
internationalised regions are able and willing to challenge the basic political
assumptions of federal diplomacy. A few cases of this sort might be recalled:
disagreements of some regional chief executives with the Russo-Belorussian
rapprochement (Boris Nemtsov, Mentimer Shaimiev and Ruslan Aushev); Mentimer
Shaimiev’s discord with the Russian Foreign Ministry on Bosnia; the governor of
the Samara oblast, Konstantin Titov’s opposition to sending the Russian peace
keeping forces to Kosovo; Moscow mayor, Yury Luzhkov’s official visit to Paris
and his talks with the French President in March 1999 when all political
relations between Russia and NATO countries were frozen after the bombing of
Yugoslavia.
The regions’ diplomacy might give the Russian government a hard
time because of three basic reasons. Firstly, the booming activities of
regional leaders abroad might run against Russia’s geopolitical approaches and
her international obligations. Thus, Bashkortostan recognized Abkhazia as a
state, while according to international law it is still a part of Georgia[69].
Secondly, there is a fear (even among quite liberal
intellectuals and politicians) that uncontrollable foreign policies of the
regional units would in the long run cause the federation to disintegrate[70].
A “tug-of-war” between the federal center and regional elites on this issue was
exacerbated by the repeated refusals of the Council of Federation to introduce
the “Law on Preserving Russia’s Territorial Integrity” which would give the
federal authorities the right to declare specific regions “temporarily
uncontrollable” and empower law-enforcement organs to restore order in those
regions[71].
Thirdly, the federal government complains that
internationalization of Russian regional politics complicates the policy making
process and erects new obstacles for federal foreign policy. Yet this point is
hardly convincing, since democracy is always about institutional competition
between endless numbers of political actors. The center’s complaints could
theoretically be justified somehow should its foreign policy be widely
supported and prove its efficacy, which is not the case, at least for the time
being. In fact, the long-term strategy of Russian foreign policy is still being
shaped, its priorities are being reshuffled, while the feasibility of many of
its components (like an eventual rapprochement with China, anticipation of
closer union with Serbia, confrontation with NATO, etc.) are highly debatable.
The regions have much to say in these debates. The federal center’s
“infatuation with geopolitics” in the future ought to be balanced with
geoeconomic pragmatism from the regions.
3.3. The Larger Regions’
Perspectives
Projects for enlarging the Russian regional units were a part
of the political agenda in Russia throughout the 1990s. In particular, these
ideas were developed by “EPICenter”, the “Yabloko” party think tank, that
advanced the perspective of giving priority to the so-called “regional poles of
growth” to become in the future the centers of “large lands” all across Russia.
One of the strongest arguments was that most of the small states of the
federation are economically weak, and hence are unable to rebuild their
economies and effectively find their niches in the world market. Yevgenii
Primakov the then Russian prime minister was sympathetic to these views.
The initial attempts to implement the ideas of inter-regional
associations go back to the beginning of the 1990s when the leaders of the
states of the federation tried to build
up economic alliances, like for example the Siberian Accord, Larger Volga, etc.
However these associations failed to turn into strong political actors and
remained loosely bound units with a blurry legal status and multiple conflicts
among the regions themselves.
In May 2000, with Putin as the new Russian President, the
old idea of reshuffling the whole system of Russian regionalism obtained a more
concrete design: according to the Presidential decree of 13 May 2000 seven
federal districts were created, each one to be run by a Presidential envoy. The
new “super-regions” coincide closely with pre-existing military districts, and
five of the seven appointees hold the rank of general. This makes one assume
that security matters will be given a high priority in each of the newly
created “fiefdoms”[72].
Though Putin himself calls these measures an administrative reform within the
Presidential apparatus, it is quite clear that the consequences of these steps
ought to have a major impact on the state of the Russian federation[73].
In case the new “viceroys” will eventually use the existing resources to
control the districts, they might strengthen their political weight and become
even more important actors than the states of the federation, both domestically
and internationally.
3.4. Municipal Perspectives
If the relationship between the federal center and the regions
ought to be analyzed in terms of “geopolitics versus geoeconomics”,
controversies between regional and municipal authorities are based on the as
yet unfinished process of redistribution of resources and powers. Politically,
according to the Russian Constitution, local self-government is not a part of
the state system of power. This provision, coupled with the practice of
competitive elections for the cities’ chief executives, increased their
political profiles and encouraged them to challenge the influence of the
governors.
Right from 1998, when Russia ratified the European Charter of
Local Self-Government, the cities have obtained very important legal frameworks
for their international contacts[74].
Being a member of the Council of Europe since 1996 Russia pledged to adhere to
the European Charter of Cities introduced in 1992, which makes the grass-roots
political participation a matter of international concern.
Local self-government, treated internationally as a foundation
and a prerequisite for genuine democracy, received both attention and funding
from major foreign NGOs. Thus, for example, the Soros Foundation runs a
project, “Small Cities of Russia”, aimed at strengthening grass-roots
self-management and assisting non-central cities in joining the Internet
worldwide community[75].
The Moscow office of the American “Eurasia” foundation has a special
grant-funding program for local self-government. The Research Triangle
Institute, working under the auspices of USAID, co-operates with the Union of
Russian Cities in a number of pilot projects dealing with updating the cities’
financial accounting, convening public hearings on budgetary issues, etc.
The major cities have at their disposal all the basic
prerequisites for joining the family of international actors: they have
transport and telecommunication networks, servicing and banking, industry, etc.
60-90% of all foreign companies operating in the regions are located in the
biggest cities. The tandem of the two largest Russian cities, Moscow and St.
Petersburg, often is referred to as potential “gates to the global world”[76].
It would not be surprising if the mayor of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov, became a
high-profile nation-wide political figure[77].
The roles of the cities in developing foreign economic ties
are also important. The city administrations of Krasnodar and Yaroslavl first
initiated the creation of free economic zones within the municipal territories[78].
Cities play key roles in projecting to Russia civic, cultural
and civilized standards from the outside world[79].
As Boris Nemtsov put it, “mayors are generally younger and more liberal-minded
(than the governors. - A.M.) and have fewer political inhibitions. They often
are more intellectual and are backed by small and medium-scale businesses...
These people are largely self-made men, a democratic group that is unburdened
with Communist dogmas”[80].
In many respects cities might perform some security functions
as well. Thus, according to the “Law on Bordering Territory in the Orenburg
Oblast” adopted by the regional legislature, the organs of local
self-government (i.e., cities), along with enterprises, public organizations
and institutions have their share of responsibility in guarding the border
regime[81].
For example, the mayor of Kaliningrad, Yurii Savenko, is one of the best-known
internationally oriented municipal leaders in Russia. He is a permanent participant of debates concerning relations
between Russia and the EU, Russian security policy in the Baltic Sea, etc.[82]
In the ethnically divided regions (Dagestan), as well as in those where the
power on the regional level is either paralyzed (Chechnia) or unstable
(Karachaevo-Cherkessia), traditional institutions of local self-government
might play important security functions in terms of preventing civil wars and
atrocities.
The major problem for municipalities in Russia is scarce
finance: the cities’ authorities have virtually to fight for their budgets with
the regional administrations. That is why international cooperation is one of
those options allowing local self-governments to survive and find much-needed
funds for structural reforms. Developing the real estate market, construction
and land management are among the basic resources of growth for the cities.
None of these resources could be successfully managed without strong
international cooperation.
The international self-assertion of the Russian cities
coincides with worldwide tendencies. In
many parts of the globe it is mainly the big cities that perform the role of
motors, or locomotives of economic, political, and social dynamics of the
country as a whole. Major cities are focal points of modernization, loci for
the accumulation of experience and resources, homes for dense networks
involving people of different background. “Urban innovative environments” being
formed in larger Russian cities consist of networks of expertise, financial
infrastructure, labor-market resources, small- and medium-sized companies.
Cities are already becoming crucial accumulation centers for the industries
connected with infrastructure (be it ecology, advertising, legal services or
entertainment). All this increases the mobility of capital, and improves the
perspectives of privileged social groups. The cities’ elites are attempting to
properly position themselves internationally, which means developing prestige,
status and culture to attract visitors, competition for transnational-company
centers, etc.
As market regulation grows in importance vis-´-vis state regulation,
cities – especially those that attribute their power to the local concentration
of wealth and mobilization of capital – cannot fail to make their political
voices heard more clearly. Economic globalization reduces the state’s capacity to
manage economic and financial flows, a fact which opens up new international
perspectives for Russian cities.
Yet President Putin’s administrative reform launched on 13 May
2000 challenged the autonomous status of municipalities, giving the governors
the right to remove those mayors, who were accused of breaking regional and
federal laws. However the very system of municipal government is being
preserved.
4.1. Obstacles for
globalization on the regional level
The international endeavors of Russia’s sub-national units are
hindered by numerous factors. Firstly, there is no conceptual clarity in
respect of what constitutes “regional interest” for each of the federation
states, and who in implementing the regional development strategy should liaise
with foreign institutions. No more clarity exists in the way the “regional
interests” ought to be correlated with “national interests”. Discussions on
these challenging issues are still underway in Russian political and academic
circles, but it becomes more and more obvious that it would be too simplistic
to interpret “national interests” as merely “the sum of regional interests”.
Correlation between “national” and “regional” interests is much more complex,
mainly because of two basic reasons – the existence of conflicts between the
regions themselves on specific issues, including those related to foreign
affairs, and different criteria used by the center and the regions in
approaching foreign countries.
On the regional level counter-globalization actions are
quite noticeable. For example, insurance companies in Tver expressed their deep
concern over the perspectives of facing (and subsequently losing) competition
with foreign companies, while leaders of some border regions impose severe
restrictions on immigration of foreign workers. In some communist-dominated regions
local politicians regularly play the nationalist card: thus, the governor of
the Ulianovsk oblast, Yuri Goriachev, appealed to Vladimir Putin “to resist the
dictate of the IMF”, while the chairman of the Ulianovsk regional legislature,
Sergey Riabukhin, bitterly accused “Greenpeace” of destroying the local
pharmaceutical industry and preparing the Russian domestic market for the
invasion of U.S. medical equipment[83].
Secondly, there is no sufficient clarity in separating
the powers of the federal and regional governments in the sphere of foreign
contacts. Legal experts themselves disagree with each other on how to treat the
delineation of prerogatives and responsibilities between the two levels of power.
The third impediment is the deficit of resources and
infrastructure in the regions for full-fledged international standing:
- Transportation is one of the
worst problems. Few foreign air companies have direct flights to regional
centers in Russia. Roads and highways need drastic modernization.
- Banking services are in most
cases inadequate. Regional (and even some central) banks fail to provide the whole set of financial
services for business people (for example, cashing cheques and withdrawing cash
in ATM machines above very modest – in Western terms – amounts might be very
time consuming procedures). Bank credit for export and import operations is
underdeveloped.
- Tourist facilities are
basically poor. Hotels, airports, railway stations, shopping centers, etc. are
in need of investments for renovation and maintenance.
- The communication
infrastructure is also weak. Internet access is complicated by policies of
local authorities to charge customers for local calls, which has a negative
effect for students, scholars, NGO volunteers and other Internet users with
modest incomes.
The fourth restraint could be found
in the institutional framework for international relations. Regional
administrations usually lack experienced and well-trained professionals in
international relations. Bureaucratic rivalries (mostly between regional and
municipal authorities), as well as a lack of proper coordination among a
plethora of administrative services (customs, railway, banks, etc.) abound.
Meanwhile the interaction between the official authorities and the nascent
“third sector” is minimal. This is a disturbing point, since a better quality
of the international activities of Russia’s regions might be reached only with
a deeper involvement of NGOs, public groups, parties and other non-state
actors.
A deficit of managerial skills is also a huge problem. In many
regions “autonomy has often been mismanaged”[84].
It is telling that many Free Economic Zones (FEZ) projects failed, mainly owing
to bad management. In Kaliningrad the FEZ plans from the very beginning “lacked
thoughtful design and were loaded mainly with political and ideological tasks,
which transformed the whole project into a peculiar regional political myth”[85].
A group of experts from the Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of
Sciences, came to the conclusion that the troubles with the FEZ in Kaliningrad
could be explained by a domination of a “narrow-minded managerial approach”,
non-transparent financial flows, incremental augmentation of administrative
expenditures, and the excessive influence of lobbyist groups in the
decision-making process. As a result, during the last seven years the scale of
industrial decline in the Kaliningrad oblast was worse than in Russia as a
whole, investment inflow was not higher than in the average regions and
transportation costs rose. What is more is that the whole system of regional
economic development was oriented towards increasing cheap exports, which
eventually led to the growth of the shadow economy and its merging with the
regional bureaucracy[86].
It seems that similar problems are typical for other free economic zone
experiments: in March 2000 the federal government decided to cancel the FEZ in
Altai[87].
In the fifth place, regions failed to build coalitions
for reaching their international and security goals. The regions were unable to form any alliance to reverse federal
policy during the wars in Kosovo and Chechnia. Each of the regions prefers to
tackle the federal government individually, making use of its political status,
access to mineral resources or geographical position, and avoiding binding
commitments with others[88].
Finally, Russian regional authorities, as well as
regional enterprises, are burdened by serious legal problems arising from the
intensification of international activities. Foreign companies operating in
Russian regions are sometimes drawn into very complicated processes of
redistribution of property. The search for a common language with foreign
partners is not an easy task.
The major problems as seen from the Russian regions’ perspective
might be subdivided into several categories:
a) Many conflicts occur in the
field of extracting and processing mineral resources. Many in Russia complain
that the rental fees paid by foreign companies are very low. Implementation of
Product Sharing Agreements with foreign partners in the Russian regions is also
seen as controversial, since the share of the Russian state might drop to 10
percent or even lower[89].
b) In numerous cases the Russian
regional authorities accuse their foreign partners of failing to fulfil their
contractual commitments. Thus, for instance, in March 2000 the administration
of the Perm’ oblast filed two suits in the International Court of Law in
Stockholm against Finnish companies “Tuomo Halonen” and “Erik Star”. Both of
them, according to the Perm’ authorities, had broken agreements concerning the
construction of a food processing plant[90].
c) In many regions
law-enforcement agencies are seriously concerned with collecting taxes from
foreign citizens temporarily in residence in Russia. In January 2000 the Nizhny
Novgorod tax police reported that more than 3000 foreign residents in this
oblast were accused of tax evasion. Three cases were taken to court, including
one against a director of “Nizhny Novgorod Coca Cola Bottlers”[91].
The Legislative
Council of the Republic of Karelia also appealed to the Ministry of Justice of
the Russian Federation expressing concern about the lack of mechanisms to
enforce the decisions of Russian courts against foreign tax evaders. More than
40 decisions of the Arbitrary High Court of the Republic of Karelia concerning
foreign residents have not been implemented since 1995. Each year, according to
the media, about 500 citizens of Finland work illegally in Karelia, paying no
taxes[92].
In the meantime, foreign organizations also have a lengthy
list of complains:
- Many foreign companies leave
the Russian market because of their general disappointment with the way the
business is run in Russia. This was the case of the Finish company, “Nokia”,
that in April 2000 cancelled the operations of its “Nokia Switching Systems”
plant in St. Petersburg[93].
- Conflicts in the
sphere of property rights are very frequent. The U.S. “Exxon” oil company was about
to leave the international consortium aimed at investing in the Timan-Pechora
oil basin, since the regional administration of the Nenets okrug claims
acquisition rights of more than 50%. Another illustration was the November 1999
decision of the court in the Siberian city of Nizhnevartovsk to ban the process
of bankrupting and selling out the regional oil company, “Chernogorneft”. The
court decision was lobbied by a group of foreign investors (Harvard University
Endowment and a number of international investment funds controlled by George
Soros), who claimed that the bankruptcy was artificially fabricated by the
“Tiumen Oil Company” (TNK) in order to deprive foreign investors (including BP,
Amoco, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and others) of
their assets and eventually to get control over the oil-rich Samotlor area[94].
A similar case was registered in Magadan court which in January 2000 considered
the legal suit of Pan American Silver company (Canada) against the Russian
“Kaskol” company which won the tender for extracting silver in the Dukat area[95].
The German company “Davis International L.L.S.” controlling 20 per cent of the
Kachkanar mining plant in the Sverdlovsk oblast protested against the ousting
of the former director and redistribution of the enterprise’s assets[96].
TUSRIR, the U.S. Investment Fund that in 1998 became the leading shareholder of
the Lomonosov Porcelain Factory, was unhappy about the intention (though
revoked later by the court) of the St. Petersburg State Property Committee to
deprivatize this enterprise[97].
- Bureaucratic
regulations could also be discouraging. For example, IKEA, the Swedish company,
has publicly expressed its dissatisfaction with the decision of the Moscow city
authorities to ban the construction of the highway leading to IKEA supermarket,
despite the fact that the Moscow oblast administration approved the whole
project[98].
- The difference in accounting
practices between Western investors and Russian recipients also matters. With
no trust in Russian accounting, foreign firms usually require guarantees either
from regional authorities, or from major banks, which seriously complicates the
whole business process.
These collisions are not rare in Russia. Their persistence
demonstrate how much is still to be done by Russia’s regional actors to find
rational solutions to complex situations involving the interests of domestic
and foreign institutions. Regional Russia still has to learn the art of
reaching compromises with foreign counterparts who are motivated by making
money – not charity - in the Russian market.
Yet globalization opens new possibilities for both regions and
the federal center. There are numerous opportunities, and the issue is how to
make better use of them for the sake of all the actors involved.
4.2.1. Regions’ Gains
The increase in the number of globally oriented subnational
actors in Russia had a positive impact on Russian statehood in terms of
democratic transition, since both the central and regional governments have to
act in a much more competitive political and institutional environment. Articulation
of regional and outward-oriented interests regularly checks and balances the
federal bureaucracy and destroys its monopoly in policy making, a fact that
might be seen as a part of the democratic transition agenda.
Many forms of interaction between
Russia’s subnational actors and international institutions are observable. In
each specific area the concrete outcomes of “going global” take different forms
resulting from the peculiar combination of institutions belonging to several
levels – from municipal (local self-government) to global (U.N.). The results
of what is usually labelled as globalization are determined by a constellation
of its protagonists. Here are the most typical schemes of international
cooperation involving Russia’s subnational actors:
- City-to-City
(“twin cities”) cooperation based on the exchange of experience in local
self-government, training and retraining sessions for municipal servants,
exhibitions and so forth. There are numerous examples of this kind of
relationship all across Russia.
- City
à International entity. The city of Voronezh, for example, became a
participant of the EU program on municipal management development[99],
while Stavropol takes part in the international “Healthy Cities” project under
the aegis of the “Aalborg Charter” of sustainable development of cities signed
in 1994[100].
- City
à Foreign city à
International organization(s). The twinning experience gave a start to the
Union of Baltic Cities which in its turn stays in close touch with the Council
of Baltic Sea States, the Parliamentary Conference on Cooperation in the Baltic
Sea Area, Europe’s Council of Local and Regional Authorities, Baltic Chambers
of Commerce Association and the Baltic Sea Tourism Commission[101].
The TACIS program of the EU includes technical assistance to facilitate
cooperation between Russian cities and their Western European counter-partners
in such fields as urban infrastructure, suburban areas development, etc. The
Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs encourages cooperation between Winnipeg
and St. Petersburg within the Northern Forum[102].
- City
à Municipal Associations à
International organizations. The Union of Russian Cities, a major nation-wide
association of municipal authorities, cooperates with the Council of Europe,
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe (18 representatives of
different Russian cities form the Russian delegation at this body), Council of
Communities and Regions in Europe and the International Union of Local
Authorities[103].
- City
à Federal Center à
International organization(s). For instance, “Roszarubezhcentr”, a federal
institution, works with Russia’s municipal authorities to help them in
participating in the European program of “Twinned Cities”.
- City
à Global organization. The United Nations runs a program of assisting
selected Russian cities in improving their urban management and maintenance
system.
- Region-to-region
cooperation aimed at fostering bilateral links in different social, economic,
cultural and scientific fields. Almost all the Russian regions are involved in
such cooperation..
- Region
à Private international institution(s). For example, the regional
administrations, which were allowed to issue Eurobonds in 1997, hired
international banks and companies, as well as legal and audit institutions, as
leading managers of the projects.
- Region
à Federal government à
Private companies à
International banking institutions. The president of Tatarstan and the federal
government had to contract an international audit company in order to make
transparent the financial situation in “KamAZ” – the major car-producer in
Tatarstan – before the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development takes
further decisions on restructuring the factory’s debts.
- Region
à International NGOs (Human Rights Watch in Northern Caucasus, Greenpeace
in different localities of Russia, French “Runners Without Frontiers”, etc).
- Region
à European organization(s). The EBRD has developed separate programs for
Russian regions targeted for lending funds for small and medium businesses. For
example, many regional administrations in Russia are in direct touch with those
EU authorities in charge of implementation of the TACIS and TEMPUS projects.
The EU Commission for Humanitarian Aid was instrumental in working with the
North Caucasian republics of Russia during the war in Chechnia.
- Region
à Foreign government(s). Thus, many regional administrations deal with
the governments of foreign countries through their Embassies or Consular
offices. Most Western embassies (France, Netherlands, Canada, Germany, USA
etc.) in Moscow run certain programs of cooperation with regional partners in
Russia.
- Region
à Federal government à
International institutions. This was the case of the Nizhny Novgorod regional
administration that consulted with the federal Ministry of Finances concerning
the negotiations on restructuring regional debts to the London Club of
creditors. Another example is also telling: in May 2000 President Putin
assigned the Chairman of the Samara Duma, Leon Kovalsky, to the post of Deputy
Chairman of the International Commission of Local and Regional Powers of Europe[104].
- Region
à Inter-regional association(s) à Federal Center à
International organization(s). For example, “Roszarubezhcentr” has concluded an
agreement with the “Siberian Accord” inter-regional association in order to
facilitate cooperation between its member regions and the outside world.
- Region
à Federal organs à
Foreign governments. A good example of this linkage might be regional branches
of the state-run “Rosvooruzhenie” company aimed at finding the easiest ways for
regional armaments industries to foreign military equipment markets.
“Rosvooruzhenie” provides a set of services for regional enterprises, including
those of drafting agreements with foreign partners, analyzing the international
demand for military equipment, assisting with participation in major
international exhibitions and fairs[105]. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also
has its branches in the major regions to help them in issuing business
invitations to foreign citizens, provide enterprises with analyses of
international economic trends and information about specific companies, advise
in legal disputes with foreign partners, etc.[106]
- Region
à Ethnic diaspora à
International organizations and/or foreign governments. Reliance on the
diaspora in searching for new international possibilities is characteristic for
Tatarstan, Chechnia, Mari El and some other republics.
- Region
à Transregional associations à European organizations. For example, regions participating in
transborder cooperation (BEAR, Northern Dimension and Baltic Sea Forum) become
subjects of EU programs.
- Regional
enterprise à
Global organization. Usually a group of directors of major enterprises
processing mineral resources (aluminum, black metals, etc.) are invited to
attend the World Economic Forum in Davos. One interesting example in this
category was also the appeal of the GAZ automobile factory in Nizhny Novgorod
to the United Nations asking for the lift of economic sanctions against Iraq
with whom GAZ has good perspectives of cooperation.
- Region
à Global organizations. Several Russian regions were selected as direct
recipients of World Bank assistance programs. Unesco has special funds for
helping certain localities in Russia in ecology and culture preservation,
assistance to refugees, etc. Authorities in regions bordering with Chechnia
keep working relations with the UN High Commission for Refugees, UNICEF, World
Health Organization, Red Cross, etc. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) has a
number of regional partners in Russia to work with biological diversity and
forestry.
Regional law-enforcement
agencies are also going global. In a number of regions (Nizhny Novgorod, Tiumen
and some others) new security units were established to investigate and prevent
high-tech crime, including the misuse of Internet logins and accounts[107].
The Revenue Office of some regions is in touch with Interpol regarding tax
evasion affairs[108].
Developments of the last decade in the area of foreign
activities of the regions have led to many positive changes. In no way were the
1990s completely the “lost decade” for cooperation between Western countries
and Russian regions. International engagements gave a new political resource to
regional authorities and opened them up to the international public sphere.
Thanks to that, many regional leaders expanded their political horizons - for
example, the governor of the Novgorod oblast, Mikhail Prussak, and the
president of Chuvashia, Nikolay Fiodorov, were elected Deputy Chairmen of the
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly. Regional policy-makers started to
learn the meaning of legal norms in working with credits and investments,
acquired new skills for conducting negotiations, reaching compromises, building
partnerships, etc.
International openness brought positive fruits to the regions
both financially and socially. Airports upgraded to international standards in
the Russian heartland (Magnitogorsk, Yaroslavl, Briansk and many others) bring
improved infrastructure for international communication, traffic and cargo, new
work places (duty-free stores, tourism, etc.) and new incomes for regional
budgets. There were of course some controversies among regional
administrations, which are more accustomed to dealing with their local
business, and transnational companies[109].
Yet international openness made feasible the gradual evolution of Russia’s
provincial conservatism towards more openness and more mobility while regional
administrators found themselves in a much more demanding and challenging
environment.
Internationalization expands the scope of policy
alternatives and instruments available for resolving problems at each of the
subnational levels of society. The challenge is to identify properly these
instruments and take advantage of them for the sake of the region.
International contacts provide some regions with direct
communication not only with foreign officials and public servants, but also
with the public. Thus, the municipality of Kaunas (Lithuania) which has entered
into an informal twin-city partnership with the destroyed Grozny and
established an Information Center of Chechnia in Kaunas Town House, initiated
multiple appeals from different Lithuanian organizations to various EU
institutions aimed at stopping the bloodshed[110].
There are clearly discernible fields in internal regional
life that to a significant extent are influenced by international actors. Firstly,
this is the sphere of regional finances, investments and credits. The state of
the budgets (and hence the perspectives of implementing social programs) in
those regions that issued Eurobonds and applied for restructuring of their
debts is considerably dependent on negotiations with the foreign creditors.
Many infrastructural construction projects in major Russian cities (hotels, airports, communication, etc.) were
undertaken by foreign funding. It was the people from the regions who were most
concerned about the perspectives of freezing certain forms of technical
assistance from the West (in particular the TACIS program and Soros Foundation
network) during the war in Chechnia. This confirms that the regions are even
more sensitive, than the federal government, to the foreign economic
environment, and are more dependent on technical cooperation with international
institutions.
Foreign institutions are able to have their say in certain
economic processes. For example, the World Bank in fact blocked the transfer of
the shares of “Krasugol”, the Krasnoyarsk mining plant, to the regional
administration. The World Bank representative issued a statement urging for
genuine privatisation instead of handing over shares from the federal
authorities to the regional ones, and threatened to freeze future credits
unless these conditions were observed[111].
Of course, international financial institutions keep their
eyes on developments in each of the major regions of Russia, evaluating their potentials
for cooperation and investigating the perspectives of regional growth. One of
the better examples is the rating of Russian regions in terms of investment
attractiveness published annually by the Moscow-based “Expert” journal. This study is based upon two characteristics:
investment potential of the region (comprising such major factors as natural
resources, labor market, industrial development, level of innovation,
institutional background, infrastructure, finances and consumer ability of the population)
and investment risks (economic, financial, political, social, ecological,
criminal and legislative)[112].
There are examples of other measurements. For example, in
1999 the World Bank commissioned the study of the state of market reforms in
ten urban centers along the Volga river[113].
These cities were compared along such criteria as price control on goods and
services, fiscal policy indicators, housing privatisation tempo, small business
development, foreign investments and joint ventures, economic and social wages,
unemployment rate, growth of consumer prices, telephone and automobile
possession, school age population, etc.
Political risk assessment also received a great deal of
attention in the last few years. Thus, the study of the Institute for Advanced
Studies, Vienna, done for the Bank of Austria, distinguishes such indices of
political risks as continuity of regional voter preferences, fragmentation of
the regional political spectrum, organization and power of radical political
parties, presence of strong interest groups, legislative stability and proper
implementation of treaties, state-ownership in the economy, support of foreign
trade, regional tax policy, crime rate, internal security, transparency of
decision making, relation of the local administration to the federal
authorities, social orientation of the governors, regional mentality towards
foreigners, etc.[114].
Secondly, foreign institutions might have some
influence in intra-regional disputes. Thus, in November 1999 the Hungarian
authorities and Interpol arrested Anatoly Bykov, the Krasnoyarsk tycoon, who
was for several months was wanted by the Russian police. Having under his
control the largest Russian aluminium processing factory and a number of
industrial enterprises in Krasnoyarsk, Bykov was seen as the most influential
rival to Alexander Lebed, the governor of Krasnoyarsk krai, who pledged to
bring him to court on charges of extortion, money laundering and financial
fraud[115].
The trial of Bykov will also have an impact over the future of the major
regional oil company in Russia “Sibneft”. It is worthwhile noting as well that
in 1998 the political feud between Lebed and Bykov was exposed to a world-wide
audience through controversial web sites “Claw-1” and “Claw-2” containing
negative information about the regional political elite. Thus Krasnoyarsk is
known as the first region in Russia to use Internet technologies for public
relations purposes.
Foreign institutions could also play their roles (though
obviously limited ones) of arbiters in regional political conflicts. For
instance, Andrey Klimentiev who won the mayoral election in Nizhny Novgorod in
1998 but immediately afterwards was accused of financial crimes, arrested and
jailed, filed his complaints to the European Human Rights Court. The delegation
of the European Congress of Regional and Local Authorities was visiting
Vladivostok to mediate between politically clashing groups there. Human rights
groups and electoral observers are frequent guests in the Russian regions and
cities.
Thirdly, there is a significant impact from abroad in
the so-called “third sector”. Numerous NGOs and Universities have managed to
increase their potential and even expand with direct help from Western
grant-giving foundations. Cultural, artistic, academic and student exchanges
have become an organic part of the daily functioning of regional institutions
of higher education. The Soros Foundation, British Council, IREX, Peace Corps, Unesco
and other institutions are represented in the most advanced Russian regions,
contributing to the creation of transnational “epistemic communities” of
experts, scholars, consultants, teachers and journalists. There are really good
signs of improvement in this area since the social activities of
non-governmental community groups often challenges the governing elites and
intellectually changes old assumptions and practices[116].
Western environmental groups were quite instrumental in
raising the issues of ecology, including clean water supply, forestry
maintenance, safety of nuclear waste, etc. Russian “Greenpeace” activists
monitor regularly the compliance of regional authorities with ecological
standards and are quite instrumental in drawing public attention to ecological
dangers (thus, “Greenpeace” protested against deadly air pollution in
Dzerzhinsk, the city with a chemical industry, and against the contamination of
Baikal lake in the Irkutsk oblast). Yet the most widely publicized case was the
involvement of the Norwegian Bellona organization into the public campaign to
support the former Russian military officer, Alexander Nikitin, who helped to
uncover data about the leakage of radioactivity and water contamination in
Andreeva Bay, Gremikha naval base, Severodvinsk and other sites located only a
few dozen kilometres from the border of Norway. Being charged with revealing
classified information and jailed, Nikitin won the lawsuit in Saint Petersburg
in January 2000 backed by a European Parliament resolution and a group of U.S.
Congressmen. Afterwards, Bellona took the St. Petersburg TV channel to court
for defamation[117].
Foreign NGOs were important actors during the regional
conflicts in Chechnia and Dagestan. “Non-violence International”, “Forum on
Early Warning and Early Response”, “The Caucasus Forum”, “Search for Common
Ground”, “Berghoff Center”, “International Alert”, and the NGO Working Group on
Conflict Management and Prevention organized by the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees were involved in monitoring human rights abuses and
helping to deal with humanitarian issues in the whole area of Northern Caucasus[118].
In many regions there are organizations lobbying the interests
of foreign ethnic groups, like “Black Sochi” (organization of African
residents)[119], “Kazakh
League of Volga” based in Saratov[120],
etc. In the Krasnoyarsk oblast a new law was adopted allowing foreign citizens
to get elected to the local self-government[121].
The national cultural autonomy of the Azerbaijan diaspora was instituted in the
Murmansk oblast in June 2000[122].
4.2.2. Federal Benefits
The regions’ cooperation with foreign partners is also important
for the federal government. First, the regions’ regular communication
with Western counterparts might to some extent compensate for Russia’s
political isolation after the wars in Kosovo and Chechnia, and an insufficiency
of traditional country-to-country diplomatic instruments to deal with Western
countries. In participating in the “Northern Dimension” initiative, the
Barents-Euroartic Council, the Council of Baltic Sea States, Black Sea Economic
Cooperation and the Northern Sea Route project Russia, through its regions,
might have a direct impact on its Western neighbours and in the long run
influence EU and NATO policy towards Russia. In this regard the regions might
regain what the federal government has lost. The Russian regions are capable –
to a limited extent, of course – of influencing EU policies, provided that: a)
EU institutions and procedures concerning trans-border cooperation would be
properly understood; b) Russia’s regional representatives would contact the
relevant institutions at the right level of organizational hierarchy; c)
Russian initiatives would be timely and well scheduled.
Despite its consistent opposition to NATO, the Russian
government is deeply interested in further Western financial and technical
assistance. It needs to reframe its dialogue with the West and to find new ways
to communicate with countries aspiring to join NATO and the EU, as well as
neutral and non-aligned countries, and even CIS members that are reluctant to
come into closer alliance with Moscow. This is also what the West wants to
support “to defy the cosmos-chaos duality by showing the possibility of
non-zero-sum cooperation between integrated and non-integrated, unitary and
fissile, Christian and non-Christian states”[123].
Second, certain regional leaders might be useful as
mediators or negotiators (formal or informal) with foreign groups in those
cases when the Russian government either lacks official instruments or wishes
to stay behind the scene. It is telling that Vladimir Putin’s aide Sergey
Yastrzhembsky recognized that the leaders of certain subjects of the federation with the consent of the
federal government kept up relations with the president of Chechnia, Alan
Maskhadov[124]. Most
likely he meant the leaders of North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Tatarstan who on
numerous occasions raised their voices in favor of negotiating with Maskhadov.
Tatarstan was particularly active in internationally advertising its
peace-keeping initiatives. Rafael Khakim, political advisor to the President of
Tatarstan, propagated the idea that Tatarstan might represent the interests of
the Russian Federation in international Islamic organizations[125].
The President of Tatarstan in 1995 (along with the Dutch Foreign Ministry,
Harvard University, Carnegie Endowment, and IREX) initiated a series of round
table discussions called “The Hague Initiative” aimed at finding non-violent
political solutions to regional conflicts in Abkhazia (Georgia),
Trans-Dniestria (Moldova), Crimea (Ukraine), and Chechnia[126].
In particular, the principle of “delayed decision” in Chechnia was proposed by
the “Hague Initiative” and later implemented in the Khasaviurt Agreements
signed by Alexander Lebed with the rebels in 1996. To maintain politically its
presence in the turbulent North Caucasus area and act in parallel with foreign
NGOs, the President of Tatarstan in February 1995 established the office of
Tatarstan’s representative in Ingushetia on humanitarian issues (medical care,
food supplies, etc.).
Third, the regions’ resources could be mustered for
implementing Russian foreign policy and security objectives. Thus, maintaining
the transport communication infrastructure in the West of Russia would be
impossible without the involvement of the regional authorities[127].
In the “new frontier” regions (like in Cheliabinsk bordering with Kazakhstan)
it is the practice to contract local people for servicing the border-control
units[128]. Similarly, according to the agreement signed
between the Federal Border-control Service and the administration of the
Yamal-Nenets autonomous district, local conscripts will be recruited for
military stations located in this area[129].
In its turn, the administration of the district provides financial support to
the frontier-guards.
It was the Karelian government, which introduced the regional
program of modifying and developing customs units across the border with
Finland to help the federal agencies[130].
The administration of St. Petersburg signed agreements with two Russian
military units located in Tajikistan pledging to provide them with food and
medical supplies[131].
In a similar endeavor the administration of the Dudinka sea port took
responsibility for the Taimyr border-control unit[132].
In the Kurgan oblast the “Corps of Frontier-guards” was created to help
soldiers stationed in the region and retired officers[133].
The governors of the Volgograd and Briansk oblasts launched regional programs
to financially assist military servicemen, who participated in anti-terrorist
campaigns and military conflicts[134].
Fourth, widening transregional cooperation with foreign
partners might bring more expertise and fresh ideas to the federal
policy-making sphere. A good example is an initiative of the International
Discussion Club (St. Petersburg) in cooperation with a number of international
environmental groups aimed at arranging a series of public hearings on the
project of the Coastal Code of Russia, with special emphasis on its
implications for the Barents and Black Sea regions[135].
5. SCENARIOS FOR THE
FUTURE
Some of the feasible future scenarios
might be summarized in the following table.
|
Geopolitical
Scenarios |
International
Roles of the Regions |
|
1.
“Optimal”: gradual integration with the West in parallel with stabilization
based on liberal economic reforms |
Strengthening
of leading regions that become “juncture points” of progress, locomotives of
modernization, “gates to the global world”. Increasing social mobility would
lessen the attachment of ethnic groups to their specific territories[136] |
|
2.
“Realpolitik”: division of spheres of influence between Russia and the West
(“two security communities”). |
Priority
will be given to the regions bordering the CIS countries; other regions will
face relative international isolation |
|
3.
“Malign”: direct conflicts between Russia and the West |
Western
regions will play the role of security barriers; on the contrary, Far East
regions will be considered as important factors to keep good relations with
China |
|
4.
“Huntington scenario”: clash of civilizations |
Violent
outbursts of ethnic separatism threatening the very existence of Russian
federalism |
|
5. Imperial
Russia |
Drastic
decrease of autonomy of all sub-national units, restoration of centralization |
|
6. Russia
as confederation |
Regrouping
and enlargement of regions, their sporadic search for new international
roles. Complete alteration of both Russia’s domestic political landscape and
foreign relations. |
It seems nowadays that the first
and second scenarios are the most plausible. Implementation of either of
them depends on the intentions of both Russia and major Western powers.
Unfortunately, there is still a great deal of uncertainty from both sides. From
the Russian side, quite discouraging is the fact that neither the Military
Doctrine of 21 April 2000, nor the Foreign Policy Concept of 10 July 2000 even
mention the roles of subnational units in international and security affairs.
This is clear evidence of the federal center’s neglect of the importance of
regional actors in the policy-making process. This unfortunate disregard
testifies that the regions’ road to the global world is not a smooth one. Even
in an optimistic scenario the regions would not be able to turn into “islands
of globalization” automatically, but they would have to repeatedly raise this
issue in negotiating with the federal government and keep incrementally
mobilizing resources to achieve their strategic goals defined in terms of
international integration.
In the West, on the one hand, hopeful
signs might be seen in repeatedly emerging forecasts that “in time, Russia
could be considered for NATO membership”[137].
There is a relatively strong consensus in the West that “only with Russia will
Europe achieve security in the broader sense for the 21st century…
Neither the alliance nor any of its members individually should seize upon
Russia’s weakness to develop challenges in the regions that could become
sources of long-term instabilities and possible conflicts… The Russians must
not be led to believe in a new encirclement of their country, based upon any
reality of Western policy directed against it”[138].
Even in clashing with Russia over the war in Chechnia the Western experts and
journalists recognize that “the Chechens’ warlike qualities are linked to their
new success in organized crime”[139],
and that the whole rebel region is based on illegal and criminal activities[140].
On the other hand, there is “a deep
underlying hostility to Russia in much of the American policymaking elite… In
all … regions of the former Soviet Union, the United States policy is now
directed to rolling back Russian influence”[141].
Yet direct conflicts between Russia and
the West are very unlikely. That is why the third and the fourth
scenarios are mainly hypothetical. As Thomas Graham puts it, “most of Russia’s
neighbors are focused on their own domestic agendas rather than external
expansion (e.g., Iran and China) or on rivalries with other states… Some states
(e.g., Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia) are undoubtedly fishing in the muddy
waters of the Caucasus, including the territories of the Russian Federation,
but their strategic goals are limited to the Caspian region and Central Asia.
There is little desire – or capacity – to penetrate further into Russia… Any
outside group that might seek Russia’s dismemberment lacks effective levers to
use inside Russia today”[142].
As regards the fifth and sixth
scenarios, they both would obviously signal the failure of Putin’s reforms.
Imperial Russia will inevitably lead to the country’s isolation from the West,
which is illogical and absurd in terms of both Russia’s economic imperatives
and national security interests. The confederation of Russia, as a step to its
further demise and the appearance of several “new Russias”, might be not only a
national tragedy for her population, but a huge problem for the West too. It is
not surprising that many in the West are sure that “devolution should not
proceed uncontrolled…Authoritarian regional bosses who carry on gangster-style
feuds with local bosses are not democrats. On the contrary, they are a serious
threat to democracy. Under certain circumstances, attempts by the central
government to regain some of its lost power can also be conducive to democracy”[143]. According to Sam Nunn and Adam Stulberg,
“the emergence of independent actors complicates diplomatic protocol and
compounds the difficulty of effectively controlling Russia’s weapons of mass
destruction. Unchecked regionalism and the spontaneous privatisation of the
Russian military jeopardize control and other security arrangements, holding
them hostage to the parochial concerns of local authorities, who are neither
accountable for nor committed to upholding them. The potential rogue elements
in Russia to steal or sell weapons abroad, beyond the scope of Moscow’s control
and to the detriment of U.S. global security interests, will only be hastened
by political fragmentation”[144].
Still domestic developments can proceed
in many directions, and therefore President Putin’s choices are of primordial
importance. On the one hand, starting from the very beginning of his accession
to power in the fall of 1999, Vladimir Putin was highly dependable on regional
elites, particularly on those with the most ambitious international endeavours
like Tatarstan, Nizhny Novgorod, Bashkortostan, St. Petersburg and others.
Besides, in the beginning of the 1990s he himself was in charge of working on
foreign relations in St. Petersburg City Hall under the mayorship of the late
liberal reformer, Anatoly Sobchak. In 1997 Putin defended his Ph.D.
dissertation in economics on “Strategic Planning of the Reproduction of the
Mineral Resources and Raw Material Base of the Region Under Market Relations”.
From his former economic studies one may conclude that he favours increasing
the export of raw materials and mineral resources as the basic instrument for
integration with the West[145].
On the other hand, the federal center is
determined to tighten its grip over the regions in a variety of issues,
including foreign relations. One of the key figures in the Russian government,
Valentina Matvienko, who used to be Director of the Department of Liaisons with
the Federation States and NGOs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, favors more
regulations from the part of the central government in this domain[146].
Vladimir Putin repeatedly advocates strengthening “vertical power”, meaning
that the central government will impose more limitations on the regions’
autonomy. In February 2000 Russian on-line media had referred to the Report
drafted by the Federal Agency of Government Communication & Information
urging Vladimir Putin to impose stricter limitations on regional and municipal
authorities in order to avoid corruption and separatism[147].
Those ideas were partly reflected in the 3 February 2000 decree signed by
Vladimir Putin stipulating that “the government of the Russian Federation will
be in charge of taking decisions concerning the execution of international and
foreign economy matters between the federation states and governmental
institutions of foreign countries”[148].
According to the press release, the federal government will take decision in
each case separately based on an application from the executive bodies of the
federation states, provided that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice,
as well as other federal organs, approve it.
The regional authorities in one way or
another resist these plans. Yet some governors – eager to strike a deal with
the new President – are supportive of Putin’s ambitions to impose more
regulation on the regions. Certain regional leaders easily agree with the
federal government that foreign sources of support should not play a meaningful
role in Russia’s development. To be able to compete with other countries
economically, the Russian government needs to run the major companies dealing
with the export of diamonds, oil, gas, coal, gold, and to unilaterally control
the communication infrastructure, including roads and ports. It is quite
symptomatic that the Club of Regional Investors working closely with the
Council of Federation (upper chamber of the Russian parliament) has called on
the central authorities to conduct an “imperial policy”, in the sense that it
must remain the dominant economic player in Russia[149].
Attitudes of this kind are not rare in the Russian province, a fact that will
be used undoubtedly by Putin in his polemics with regional establishments.
It is interesting as well that Putin’s
intentions to strengthen federal control over the territories are widely shared
among liberal pro-Western economists and politicians in Russia. People like
Boris Nemtsov, Sergei Kirienko, German Gref, Anatoly Chubais and Alexei
Uliukaev argue that more centralization is not an aim as such, but rather an
instrument to equalize the regions in terms of their status and relationships
with the center, and force the most independently-minded regional leaders to
obey the common laws in the country. For the liberals all this is a
precondition for restoring the trust of investors in Russia, improving the
business climate, defending property rights, etc.
It is still debatable whether more
centralization will be an incitement or an impediment for economic
liberalization and the country’s integration into the world economy. Yet what
is certain is that the first months of Putin’s presidency gave very
controversial results. Hopes and public confidence still remain, but the
political contexts for Putin’s reforms are becoming more and more uneasy:
- the
President provoked institutional conflict with the upper chamber of the
parliament, composed of the governors and chairpersons of regional
legislatures, who are unwilling to voluntarily give up their seats in the
Council of Federation as stipulated by presidential legislative proposals;
- the President
is in deteriorating relations with the so-called “oligarchs”, some of whom
control the whole regions both economically and politically;
- the
President’s relationship with two of the three major religions in Russia are
rather tense: Muslim groups are unhappy with the war in Chechnia, while the
Jewish community was against the arrest of Vladimir Gusinsky; media tycoon and
the Chairman of the Russian Jewish Congress, in June 2000;
- the
President lacks a full-fledged political party to support him both nationally
and regionally;
- the
military fear that Putin will wrap up the military campaign in Chechnia because
of international pressure.
In
this situation much will depend on how smart the President will prove as
negotiator, and whether he will be able finally to get the support of the major
elites, including the regional ones.
* * *
To sum up, globalization in Russia
should be discussed among its domestic actors. In most cases of non-central
governments’ cooperation with foreign partners a number of institutions are
engaged, each belonging to different social levels. Its effects are primarily
dependent on the interaction of those forces and the resources involved.
Since true globalization
requires interdependence, mutual interests and universalization of basic
political and economic procedures, in the strict sense it may be applicable
still to a very limited number of processes and phenomena developing at the
regional level in Russia. They are still rather weak and could be reversed or
suppressed should the federal government choose further distancing from the
West. On the regional level in Russia we have small “islands of globalization”,
just first fragments of what in the future may constitute a wider and more
coherent picture. Globalization of Russia’s regions is a long-term process,
which will experience flows and ebbs, and go through periods of hope and
disillusions. Yet opportunities and dangers still exist. Much will depend on
whether president Putin will be able to implement his reforms within democratic
frameworks, or will opt for some form of authoritarian rule which will
undoubtedly diminish the role of all the non-central actors in both domestic
and foreign policies of the Russian Federation.
[1] Kudriavtsev, Viktor. Ogranichenniy izoliatsionism neizbezhen (Limited Isolationism is Inevitable), in Nezavisimaya gazeta, N 14 (2076), 27 January 2000.
[2] Pursianen, Christer. Beyond Sovietology. International Relations Theory and the Study of Soviet/Russian Foreign and Security Policy. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute for International Affairs, 1998: 2-3.
[3] Ibid: 9-18.
[4] Christiansen, Thomas; Joenniemi, Pertti; Linstrom, Bjarne. “Nationality and Regionality: Constituents of Political Space Around the Baltic Rim”. In Neo-Nationalism or Regionality. The Restructuring of Political Space Around the Baltic Rim. Ed. By Pertti Joenniemi. Copenhagen, COPRI, 1997: 12-13.
[5] Pustogarov, Vladimir. “Subiekty Rossiyskoi Federatsii v mezhdunarodnoi zhizni” (Subjects of the Russian Federation in International Life). In Panorama-Forum, N2, 1997: 4-5.
[6] Fowler, Michael Ross, and Bunck, Julie Marie. “What Constitutes the Sovereign State?”. Review of International Studies, 22, 1996: 399.
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[137] Hunter, Robert. Solving Russia: Final Piece in NATO Puzzle, in Washington Quarterly, volume 23, No.1, winter 2000. p.120.
[138] Ibid. p.131.
[139] Lieven, Anatol. Nightmare in the Caucasus, in Washington Quarterly, volume 23, No.1, winter 2000. p.148.
[140] Luke, Timothy, and Toal, Gerard. The Fraying Modern Map: Failed States and Contraband Capitalism, in Geopolitics, volume 3, No.3, winter 1998. p.25.
[141] Lieven, Anatol. Ham-Fisted Hegemon: The Clinton Administration and Russia, in Current History, October 1999. p. 308, 313.
[142] Graham, Thomas. The Prospect of Russian Disintegration is Low, in European Security, volume 8, Summer 1999, No.2. p.9.
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