DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
BUILDING IN RUSSIA’S
REGIONS: GLOBAL CHALLENGES,
DOMESTIC RESPONSES
The interim results of Vladimir Putin’s institutional
reforms are very controversial. It is still hard to give clear characterisation
of Vladimir Putin‘s conception of
future Russia. This uncertainty is well manifested in Russia‘s regional
politics.
Russian reality has
many faces. The challenge to political analysts is to find out which are the
crucial elements of the institutional building in Russia, and in which way they
are related to wider world-wide developments.
In this paper I will try to point out the
main features of the current processes of democratic institution building in
Russia and in its regions and highlight the factors that I think are the
driving forces – including outside ones - behind the scene. The question of whether, how and to what
extent emerging institutions are influenced by or are to be seen as the result
of globalisation forces is very important with regard to Russia’s democratic
development.
My two basic arguments might be presented in the
following way. First, I think that globalisation has created (though on a
rather modest scale) preconditions for maintaining and/or even enhancing
political plurality in most of Russian regions. On the one hand, by the end of
1990s it became clear that clan-like sub-national political regimes face
serious difficulties in attracting foreign investments and plugging into
international cooperative projects. Krasnodar krai, Tula oblast,
Primorskii krai, Kirov and Ulianovsk oblasts are good
illustrations of politically non-democratic regimes with scarcely developed
international relations. On the contrary, as a rule, those regions that work
hard on creating economically open market environment and fostering
international cooperation, have better results in democratic institution
building.
On the other hand, the forces of globalisation have
started penetrating into the Russian regions in many direct and indirect ways.
One of them is intervention into the regional politis of major Russian
financial and industrial groups (FIGs) which might be fairly treated as global
actors – both by their potential and geographic scope of operation. They have
challenged old regional elites and thus contributed to important
transformations of regional regimes towards more transparency and pluralism.
My second argument
is that these positive transformations are of rather limited scope, and are
unevenly distributed across the huge country. Nevertheless, foreign
institutions might take advantage of these changes in the regions as soon as
they open better chances for creating business-friendly environment, predictable
and corruption-free decision making process, and resourceful non-governmental
sector.
Pluralism and Globalization:
Uneasy Linkage?
It is assumed by
many Western scholars that “globalisation positively affects democratisation. A
higher degree of democratisation opens the political process to a wide array of
domestic interest groups”[1].
Yet the projection of this principle onto Russia is not so straightforward.
There is a wide spread belief on the part of Russia’s elites and society that,
at least for the time being, firm authoritarian rule is needed to stabilize the
country. In sociologist Igor’ Kliamkin’s words, “the state is perceived as more
important than the democracy”[2].
In the words of Viktor Kuvaldin, globalisation is conducive to appearance of “mega-society”, which transforms the whole set of social linkages and connections of each individual. The basic and traditional principles of social structuring are being reshaped. The problem is how adequately the political management structures respond to these globally-driven changes. Political institutions – including the regional ones – are perhaps “the weakest chain” of globalisation in Russia[3]. Indeed, it is hardly imaginable to discover the future with the old political norms and instruments.
Russia’s regional political institutions are in the process of
uneasy transformation, which occurs as the cumulative result of both domestic
and international developments. The new political norms coexist with the old
ones, making their symbiosis an interesting phenomenon to study. In some
regions, the inter-elite agreements still derive from the post-Soviet common nomenklatura
background, while in more democratic subjects of federation inter-elite
settlements are being achieved on the basis of negotiations and the balance of
group interests[4].
I. Pluralism by Default?
Many Russian
scholars are rather pessimistic in their assessments of perspectives for
democracy in Russia’s regions. For example, Alexei Chernyshov sticks to the
conclusion that there are no roots of democracy in sub-national Russia, and –
what is more – provinces are major sources of Russia’s authoritarian tradition
and feed up new totalitarian impulses[5]. Closely
stays Sviatoslav Kaspe’s assumption about “non-organic” character of Russian
federalism, which he thinks turns out to be a myth[6].
In a similar way,
Nikolay Petrov argues that the basic explanation of Putin’s reform is that
Kremlin is steadily preparing for installing the emergency regime, with
increasing percentage of administrators coming from the military and security
services[7].
In his logic, regions will easily fall victims of federal centre policies.
These gloomy views seem to misperceive important aspects of
what is going on in the regions. In parallel with re-imposing centralisation in
center-periphery relations, the new openings for strengthening institutional
democracy appear in the provinces. These new openings might not always be
visible, since all of them are of “technical” nature and not necessarily go
public[8].
Yet they do exist, which makes their preservation and incorporation into the
emerging system of re-centralisation and hierarchisation the highest priority
task for Russian democracy[9].
New possibilities are also
manifested in increasing the number of political actors within each of the
regions and new division of the spheres of their influences. Òhere is much room for pluralism in the
regions, and the
federal center seems to tolerate it. It appears that Moscow is positive about
giving to the regions some additional powers in politically peripheral matters
– for example, the State Pardon Commission was recently dissolved, and its
functions were transferred to the regional chief executives. President Putin
has positively commented on the chances of some regions to take over some
technical functions of the federal agencies and ministries[10].
Basically this tolerance is due to the fact that neither of the regions seems
to be able or willing to challenge the federal authority.
Of course, we can’t grasp the
meaning of democracy only in terms of pluralism of political actors. This is
just one of prerequisites for democracy, and one of criteria to assess the
democratic credentials and perspectives of political system. But the more
actors perform on the political scene, the more chances are open for transparency to survive and progress.
Electoral statistics also supports the thesis of
pluralisation of regional political process. This might be well illustrated by
the following table[11]:
|
|
January
2001 – January 2002 elections in the regions (20 gobernatorial campaigns) |
Previous
20 regional campaigns (in 2000) |
|
Average
number of candidates running for office |
7 |
5 |
|
Number
of incumbents losing the election |
10 |
7 |
|
Number
of second rounds held |
7 |
3 |
|
Number
of winners coming from the business |
5 |
2 |
This data shows that since 2000 the regional elections
became more competitive and demanding. The shoots of pluralism are still there
in regions dominated by authoritarian rulers – in Krasnoyarsk krai with
its deep split among different elite groups, or Krasnodar krai with a
number of politically strong municipal units challenging the supremacy of
region’s elite.
As seen from globalisation
perspectives, numerical increase of regional political actors is important
since the old-style governors might loose their political predominance, which
gave them the ability to block a number of projects aimed at tax reform and
macroeconomic stabilisation[12],
treat the economic enterprises as their fiefdoms, help the insolvent factories
to survive without badly needed restructuring, impede financial transparency,
and conduct their own customs and export policies[13].
1. To start the
account for new changes, I would mention that President himself became more
involved in regional policy issues – not personally but institutionally.
Presidential representatives in the federal districts are new
sources of President’s influence in the regions. They have appeared
within the framework of Putin’s territorial reform launched in May 2000. This
reform has divided the country into seven federal districts. Presidential envoys
have essential powers to control the implementation of federal programs in the
regions, monitor governors activities, etc. In all districts presidential
envoys were quick to become new centres of political power, sometimes
alternative to the governors. This made Vitaly Ivanov, the member of the Expert
Council of the State Duma’s Committee on Federation Issues and Regional
Politics, to assume that Russia is a country of two overlapping federations,
competing with each other[14].
This competition makes regional political actors change and apply better
strategies.
Presidential
representatives try to find new ways of projecting the federal policy onto
regions. Among the most widely used methods are PR campaigns, creation of new
co-ordinating bodies (like, for example, Association of Municipal Organs and
Association of Legislatures in South Federal District), anti-corruption
“cleansing” in the regional administrations, etc. There are many supporters of further strengthening the powers of
presidential representatives to institute alternatives to ineffective governors
in the regions[15].
These attempts give
however mixed results. In 2000 in St.Petersburg and Briansk oblast, for
example, Kremlin lost the undeclared contest with incumbent governors Vladimir
Yakovlev and Yurii Lodkin[16]
respectively. In other cases federal centre policies were more effective. For
example, it was the case in
Yakutia where former President Mikhail Nikolaev was unseated, and Viacheslav
Shtyrov (the head of major diamond company "Alrosa") was elected. Kremlin also has
successfully unseated throughout electoral procedures Leonid Gorbenko, the
former governor of Kaliningrad oblast, known for ineffectiveness and
mismanagement of regional economy. It is quite telling that just a few months
afterwards the federal government had issued a seemingly liberal “Concept of
Kaliningrad Oblast’s Development” that stipulates transforming this
Russian exclave to the export-oriented zone and speeds up the perspectives of
its faster co-operation with the EU[17].
Alexander Kislitsin, the former president of Mari El
Republic, known for corruption in his administration, was also defeated with
the help of the federal centre. In some cases measures other than electoral
were applied – thus, former governor of Kursk oblast Alexander Rutskoi
was denied the registration due to procedural misgivings.
In other regions the federal center preferred to stay
aloof of the
intra-regional competition, and was ready to work with almost anybody whoever
wins. This was the case of Nizhnii Novgorod oblast where in July 2001
the
election was won by the Communist Gennadii Khodyrev. Yet the point is that
there was no danger to domestic pluralism in the region. Khodyrev has formed
right-centrist government (of technocratic nature, with no Communists), and
appointed his representative in the Federation Council a rather pro-business
figure.
The problem is that Putin is unaware to which
direction the presidential representatives ought to move further. Authorities
of certain regions are still unwilling to give up their powers acquired under
Yeltsin presidency, and obstruct changing their legislation according to
federal standards. The Commission on Power Sharing was formed under the aegis
of Dmitry Kozak, Deputy Chief of Presidential Administration, but it still
lacks clear mission statement and perspective vision. Discussion on the future
of seven federal districts are still underway, and the general feeling is that
they might give some results only during Putin’s second term in office.
2. Regional
legislatures have consolidated their powers and even managed to receive
new rights, which makes them potentially more active and self-assertive players
of the regional political scenes. Regional legislatures got the veto power in
approving and dismissing the region’s representatives in the upper chamber of
the parliament[18]. In some
provinces (like Nizhnii Novgorod oblast) the regional legislature has
got the right to approve the head of the regional government (though later it
was revoked). In Yakutia, Chuvashia, Krasnoyarsk krai, Irkutsk oblast
and St.Petersburg legislatures are the strong challengers of the regional
executive authorities[19].
A group of Russian scholars came to the conclusion that “fetters that shackle
the legislatures in the regions, are less hard than it is the case of the
federal parliament"[20]. Again, it
works for greater diffusion and dispersion of political power.
As a confirmation
of significant political potential of the local parliaments, in June 2001
President Putin has convened a working meeting with the head of legislative
assemblies of the most important regions. In the Ural Federal District, the
Association of Chairpersons of Regional Legislatures was created, with open
support from the presidential representative[21].
The President had made it clear that he would like the regional lawmakers to
play more important roles both regionally and nationally (within the framework
of the State Council, for example)[22].
At the same time,
the whole picture does not seem to be so inspiring. In the regions of Ural, for
example, the political role of local legislatures is very much limited, and
most of these institutions operate in “structural vacuum” having missed the
chance to build up effective partnership with both political and civil society
institutions[23].
3. Political parties
are expected to become stronger actors in regional politics. The President has
supported the amendments of Igor Egoshin and Boris Nadezhdin aimed at
introducing the federal legislation requiring not less that 15% of the local
legislators to be elected by party lists, which might eventually diminish
political influence of the governors and increase that one of the parties[24].
Alexander Uss, the head of legislature in Krasnoyarsk krai, one of few
regions (along with Sverdlovsk and Kaliningrad oblasts) to apply
proportional electoral system, suggests that it lays good foundation for
political plurality and strengthen local parties[25].
It was telling that some governors (like Ivan Skliarov of Nizhny Novgorod) were
quick to reject the idea of giving to the parties greater weight in the
regional politics[26]
fearing that this will eventually lead to weakening of their patronage over
regional politics.
In general, parties might have greater political voice
in those regions with sharp political conflicts within governing elites. On the
contrary, the more consolidated are the regional political actors, the less
chances are for parties to participate in decision making process[27].
One has also to bear in mind however that the new law
on parties might give political bonus to the Communists, because they are
usually weak at single-winner districts but rather strong as a party with its
own political identity and electorate. The right-wing coalition faces the
opposite problem: they have sufficient number of attractive personalities but
rather weak party support.
4. In some regions the
municipal units became more important than ever before. This is the case of
Moscow city where the heads of the city districts were traditionally appointed
by Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov and gave him much of his power. Now according to
the Supreme Court decision they have to be popularly elected, as all heads of
municipal units across the country. 125 administrative units would have their
own budgets and subsequently become more independent of the all-mighty mayor.
This innovation certainly undermines the political monopoly of the mayor
Luzhkov[28].
The good news is also that the Supreme Court decision was taken as the reaction
to the law suit filed by two local NGO with ostensibly liberal background,
which signifies that the dreams about the civil society might become true one
day. Yet in other regions like Tatarstan the municipal institutions are still
under the direct supervision of the regional authorities.
5. “Peaceful invasion”
of major financial and industrial groups in Russian regional politics is
another important matter. These new regional actors systematically buy out the
shares of local enterprises and become their owners. For example, “GAZ”
car-building factory in Nizhnii Novgorod is under control of “Siberian
Aluminium” group led by tycoon Oleg Deripaska. “Krasnoe Sormovo” – major Russian
ship-building plant also located in Nizhnii Novgorod - is under control of
another politically and economically influential figure Kakha Bendukidze.
The high-ups of some regional financial and industrial
groups have succeeded in achieving direct political goals – thus, Roman
Abramovich (owner of “Sibneft’” oil company), Alexander Khloponin (owner of
“Norilsk nickel” company) and Boris Zolotariov (top manager of “Yukos” oil
company) were elected governors of respectively Chukotka, Taimyr and Evenkia
(three Siberian provinces rich of mineral resources). Khazret Sovmen, the wealthiest gold-producer of
Russia, in early 2002 was elected the President of small Adygeia.
Hence, the businessmen are still interested in
regions, and in some of them they have succeeded in becoming important poles of
gravitation.The recent election in Perm’ oblast had brought to power younger
and business-oriented group of new leaders. All this might indicate the advent
of new type of regional elites, with stronger entrepreneurial culture and much
needed management skills[29].
There are strong indications that the federal centre favours the new
business-like regional administrators, since it is expected that those business
structures that stood behind them would take care of the plethora of regional
social issues[30]. It might
open new opportunities for foreign investors as well.
Of course, the impact of FIGs entry into the regional politics
differs from one region to another. Republics such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan,
Mordovia, Udmurtia, Yakutia, being inward-oriented semi-autarkies, seem still
to keep aloof of external FIGs influence. In relatively small subjects of
federation heavily dependent on a single enterprise, the most typical pattern
could be described as “oligarchic monopolism”. The term coined by Rostislav
Turovsky from the Centre for Political Technologies means that there is a
dominating economic actor eager to convert its financial and managerial
potential into a political one (the case of Taimyr). In larger regions the
governors have to consider different strategies for different economic actors.
This is what could be called “oligarchic pluralism”, a more complicated model
of relations between political rulers and economic agents based on balance of
interests and search for compromises (examples are Khanty-Mansy Autonomous okrug,
Sverdlovsk, Yaroslavl’, Tomsk, Murmansk oblasts). In case if the
regional political structures are insufficiently inclusive and adaptive, the
region faces the perspective of “oligarchic wars”, with each of competing
economic groupings trying to undermine the rivals[31].
In terms of political pluralism, it is important that the governors face the challenges from major Russian financial and industrial groups operating in their regions. As seen from globalisation perspective, the situation seems to be more complicated.
On the one hand, some of FIGs are in favour of implementing more protectionist measures in order to defend their businesses from international competition. Among FIGs owners and top managers strong are anti-WTO feelings. Yet on the other hand, major FIGs are both domestic and global actors, since they trade their shares in international securities market, look for expanding strategic partnership with foreign companies, and hire international lawyers for defending their rights in the courts abroad. It makes the governors get adjusted to the new environment which is a part of the global market development.
6. The federal
government had ruled that some business practices – traditionally
supervised by the regional nomenklatura – have to be altered. The most
telling example is the requirement of the Russian government to distribute quotas for fish exportation
not by governors’ decisions – as it used to be - but through open auctions. The
Minister for Economic Development and Commerce German Gref has said that the
auction is the purest and the most transparent mechanism for distributing the
quotas[32].
Needless to say that all governors of maritime regions were fiercely against
this decision, being fully aware that it would eventually destroy their
paternalistic networks and bring new actors (including foreign ones) to their
domains[33].
7. In some regions
media actors are becoming more politically active than before. Thus,
“Mediasoyuz” group with well developed regional network is intended to become
an alternative to the Russian Union of Journalists on the local level.
“Mediasoyuz” patronized by Kremlin is conducting a number of regional campaigns
for “honest election” and greater political transparency.
Thus, as we have seen, in a number of regions the new
polycentric model of power is being installing (according to Natalia Lapina’s
study, Perm’ oblast is one of the most illustrative cases[34]).
The “old guard” in these regions is gradually losing their exceptionality,
which is a good sign[35].
They are slowly becoming one of several actors, which pushes them into strong
competition with other power brokers. Regional elections were in 2001-2002 even
more competitive and intensive, the fact that might be a good prove of
democratic perspectives in the regions[36].
In the light of the ostensible rise of influence of liberal economists, these
developments might be rather fruitful. Market economic policies[37]
would definitely necessitate more diversification within regions and more
operational freedom for each of them.
Yet I am not sure that this new constellation of political forces in the regions should be however treated as a direct result of Putin’s political design. Rather this is “pluralism by default”, one of unintended outcomes of Putin’s policies. In this sense we consent with the Russian political analyst Alexei Kara-Murza who has said that paradoxically ‘liberalism is the by-product of strengthening the statehood’[38].
Doubtless, one should not overestimate the significance of
this “pluralism by default”. The problem is that “both the elite in Moscow as
well as in the regions have almost no experience in creating a federalist state
from below and not from the top. They largely do not see and understand the
regionalisation/decentralisation as a chance to build up a real and viable
federalist/confederalist state from below. Furthermore, they overlook the
globalisation trends in economic-political affairs which are strengthening
those processes, regardless of what Russia is doing”[39].
President is still in search for those social actors – apart from the governmental bureaucracy – that could take greater responsibility for country’s recovery and modernisation[40]. It might be rather likely that the real effect of new regional political polycentrism will be weaker than it could have been expected. Yet the new developments have created some opportunities for new wave of democratic institution building in the regions. Assuming that the political strength of civil society might be measured – among other factors - by the number of political alternatives available, we see some positive developments in the recent time[41].
Now, let us turn to major setbacks of Putin’s regional reforms
as seen from the perspectives on country’s modernisation.
1.
New representatives of the regions in the upper
chamber of the parliament look neither convincing nor effective. Previously
the governors and the chairpersons of regional legislators obtained their
membership in the Council of Federation ex officio, in their capacity of office
holders. Putin’s reform reversed this practice. Senators now have to be
nominated by the governors and by the regional legislatures. The separation of
senatorship from the governorship theoretically makes possible the appearance
of new political leaders at the grass roots level.
But this only a part of the story. The
new members of the upper chamber lack strong political reputation and
appropriate background and are not even sufficiently known among the regional
political elites. For example, Saratov oblast Duma has delegated to the
upper chamber of the federal parliament Valentin Zavadnikov who is the deputy
chairman of “EES Rossii”, the major energy supplier all across the country[42].
Viktor Glukhikh, former director of “Gosoboronprom” (major arms
exporting agency), was approved as representative of Yaroslavl’ oblast in
the Council of Federation[43].
This new practice of appointing
influential – but having little relevance to the regional politics - figures to
the Council of Federation questions the whole concept of popular representation
in the upper chamber of the parliament. The fear is that the new nominees will
be very much dependent upon the political will of either governors or mighty
economic institutions, and the upper chamber will look like “mobile phones”
institution, with no clear political coherence, identity and mission. All this
already gave start to talks about “political uselessness” of the upper chamber
as such, its possible fusion with the State Council, and other options. In
terms of enhancing political pluralism in the regions, is that vitally important
to make the Federation Council members popularly elected, since it will further
diversify regional political landscapes.
2.
The President failed to find proper procedural tools
for constitutionally removing those governors that are ineffective, corruptive
or break the laws. For example, Evgeny Nazdratenko, the former governor of Far
Eastern Primorskii krai known for numerous scandals and inefficiency,
had resigned only in exchange for decent job in Moscow. This was a habitual
sample of political bargaining “under the carpet” instead of fully transparent
institutional procedures. What is also telling is that it is still unclear
whether there is a strategy of integration of Primorskii krai to the
Asian Pacific trans-boundary co-operation models after Nazdratenko’s demise.
3.
Putin was unable (or unwilling) to block the
introduction of the legal norm allowing the incumbent governors to run for
re-election for the third consecutive term. Putin’s inaction was an overt
concession to the most influential governors led by Tatarstan President
Mintimir Shaimiev. Needless to say that the third-term amendment would only
strengthen clan-like political systems in certain regions.
4.
The judiciary in the regions – as well as countrywide
- still waits for being reformed. The courts system lacks genuine independence
from the political authorities, is weak, corrupted and scarcely funded. Russia
still has not complied with the international standards in human rights,
criminal prosecution, and law enforcement[44].
This is evidently one of major barriers for international business co-operation.
5.
Fighting with excessive (and often unconstitutional)
powers of the governors, Putin deprives the regions of their resources. This is
basically done for political purposes. For example, the tax distribution ratio
under Putin became much more favourable to the federal centre, at the expense
of the regional budgets. In international arena, regions were deprived the
right to borrow abroad. These developments could easily fit into the logic of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs approach according to which “federation
components can score the greatest success on the international scene only with
support from the federal organs of the state”[45].
Yet the thing is that the regional elites will undoubtedly try to compensate
their losses through imposing more control over local businesses and
self-government bodies, which would complicate democratic institution building
at grass-roots level.
6.
There is still too much obsession with secrecy and
security regulations in the regions. The Western media has covered a number of
cases. In Omsk the regional office of Federal Security Service (FSB) announced
that it had reprimanded an American lecturer Elizabeth Sweet after
counter-intelligence learned she had asked students to examine the economic
health of local businesses. In Kaluga Russian military analyst Igor’ Sutyagin
is on trial for high treason, accused of passing state secrets. In Krasnoyarsk,
a University scientist was charged with high treason for fulfilling a contract
with a Chinese company to supply research on shielding satellites from
radiation. In Vladivostok, a military court restarted trial against Grigorii
Pasko, a military journalist accused of treason after helping Japanese TV
report on the Russian Fleet’s dumping of nuclear waste at sea[46].
Economic Openness
and Institutional Democracy: Are There Strong Linkages?
The institutional
basis for regional democracy in Russia is still weak: thus, according to the
study of influential Council for Foreign and Defence Policies, gubernatorial
elections of 1996-98 have led to lesser governability of the regions, both
economically and politically[47].
Yet most interesting is that the Russian case demonstrates that global
integration does not necessarily need to lead to an enhancement of internal democratisation
processes. Let us take basic economic criteria reflecting the region’s openness
and inclusion to international economic and financial networks and see whether
the most advanced regions were those with higher democratic standards.
-
Banking infrastructure development. Here we have Moscow city as
its indisputable leader, followed by St.Petersburg. Others in this list are
regions with authoritarian governments - Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and
Krasnodar krai. Bashkortostan also is the second-largest region (after
Moscow city) in terms of number of local banks’ branches spread all across
Russia[48].
-
“Big privatisation” rating
(privatisation of large federal property). The leaders – as by mid-1990s – are
the regions with traditionally conservative political background: Riazan’,
Belgorod, Volgograd, Oriol oblasts, Stavropol’ krai, Buriatia
(privatisation scale is above 80%). By the same token, regions with rather
pluralistic political regimes (what Vladimir Gel’man calls “community of
elites” or “struggle by the rules” models, with competition of different actors
and compromise strategies widely employed[49])
such as Samara and Perm’ oblasts are located at the bottom of this list,
with 30-50% of privatisation scale.
-
“Small privatisation” rating. Here we find among the leaders (more than
97% of small- and medium size enterprises being privatized) Moscow city,
St.Petersburg and Saratov oblast, along with Republic of Altai,
Khakassia, Dagestan and Riazan’ oblast (the last four regions generally
match Gel’man’s “winner takes all” model of political regime, with high levels
of political monopoly and scarcely developed competitive strategies).
-
Establishing free economic zones. The majority of the regions with FEZs
are politically conservative, widely relying on administrative resources and
political patronage (Primorskii krai, Kaliningrad oblast, Altai krai,
Ingushetia, Kalmykia).
-
Foreign investments per capita. In this category the leaders – apart
from Moscow city – are Magadan oblast, Jewish and Yamalo-Nenets
Autonomous okrugs, Sakhalin, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Tatarstan, Komi
Republic, Omsk and Tomsk oblasts. Only the last two regions’ regimes
could be called moderately pro-democratic (“community of elites”, in Gel’man’s
terminology), all others are predominantly monocentric and traditionalist. It is telling that, in
Vladimir Klimanov’s assessment, foreign investors’ interest is basically
focused on those regions with lower social standards and weaker financial
institutions[50], and
consequently which weakly developed political resources which tend to be
insufficient for democratic institution building.
-
Financial-industrial groups formation. By the end of 1990s about one
half of them were registered in Moscow, while the rest were located in Voronezh
and Riazan’ oblasts (the two most notorious samples of “Red Belt”
regions), St.Petersburg, Nizhnii Novgorod, Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg, and
Tula.
-
Participation in more than one inter-regional associations of economic
cooperation. This criterion might prove the region’s search for more
diversified economic strategies and new resources. Yet politically speaking,
the regions of this category are far from democratic standards (Kaliningrad,
Briansk, Smolensk, Tula, Chita oblasts, Buriatia, Aginsky Autonomous okrug),
with just a few exceptions like Novgorod oblast usually considered as
one of most democratically advanced in Russia.
-
Securities market development. In fact, this is one of few economic
indicators that could be neatly associated with the characteristics of
political regime. The first inter-regional centers of securities market
operations emerged in 1992-93 – St.Petersburg, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg
(the main city of Sverdlovsk oblast) – shared clearly visible pluralist
and institutionally democratic political background. Some other centers to appear by 1997 – including Nizhnii Novgorod
and Samara (along with Vladivostok and Rostov-on-Don) – had also significant
potential for competitive politics.
-
Establishment of recruiting agencies based on international standards.
Again, starting from the end of 1980s Moscow and St.Petersburg took the lead,
yet by mid-1990 the new centers of recruitment have appeared – Ykaterinburg,
Novosibirsk, Nizhnii Novgorod, Samara, Saratov. Later on, Perm’ and Omsk joined
the list of the most advanced regions in this field. All these regions have
rather credible – according to Russian standards - democratic background. Yet
at the same time, we may find among those regions with more or less developed
labour market practices Krasnodar krai, Voronezh, Lipetsk, Yaroslavl’ oblasts
that have much less democratic credentials[51].
-
Inter-regional trade barriers. This is another valuable indicator that
could give us an adequate idea of region’s political profile. All the regions
that have imposed administrative impediments for production outflow were ruled
by illiberal elites with weak or non-existent sense of modernisation and
international integration like Mari El Republic, Udmurtia, Krasnodar,
Stavropol’ and Khabarovsk krais, Briansk, Vologda, Ivanovo and
Yaroslavl’ oblasts.
What we see from this analysis is that if
we take a single criteria of economic openness and try to find out what is its
influence in the sphere of democratic institution building, in most cases the
positive correlation is not evident, to say the least. In most localities the
regional rent-seeking actors are motivated by getting material profit from
globalisation, without inciting democratic institution building. Autocratic
personalistic regimes could be more advanced in terms of plugging into the
trans-national economic and financial networks than those adhered to separation
of powers and democratic procedures.
Yet if we choose more complex criteria,
the linkage between economic openness and democratic institutionalisation will
become more traceable.
-
The aggregate indicator (proposed by Alexander Parkansky) encompassing
the region’s export and import volumes and dependence on world market demand.
The five top regions are Kemerovo, Samara, Cheliabinsk, Perm’ Oblasts, and
Krasnoyarsk krai[52].
Some of them (perhaps Samara and Perm’ oblasts) are more advanced than
others in terms of democratic institutions building, yet one can’t find in this
group neither overtly repressive or isolationist regimes.
-
The same goes for the comprehensive and perspective (till 2003)
assessment of regions’ economic development done by the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade. This index contains a greater variety of indicators
(gross regional product, the volumes of investments and foreign trade,
financial sustainability, share of employees in small and medium businesses,
etc.). Moscow, as it should have been expected, is on the top of the group of
most advanced regions, followed by Samara oblast, Yamalo-Nenets
Autonomous okrug, Murmansk oblast, Komi Republic, St.Petersburg,
Tomsk oblast, Sakhalin and Khabarovsk krais. This group is very
uneven in terms of its members’ political regimes, but most of them roughly
correspond to what Gel’man called “community of elites” (elite consensus) or
“war by the rules”. Not less telling is
that the regions that were placed at the very bottom of the list are either
politically fragmented (Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Dagestan,
Ingushetia), corrupted (Mari El), or monocentric (Buriatia, Tyva)[53].
-
What is called by Mikhail Alexseev the “magnet regions” accounting for
50% of Russia’s foreign trade and 70% of direct foreign investments (all having
diversified economy, strong science and technology base, developed access
infrastructure and urban milieu) is a group of regions with predominantly
pluralist and competitive political regimes (Nizhnii Novgorod, Samara,
Sverdlovsk and Leningrad oblasts) with few exceptions of Tatarstan and
Moscow city[54].
-
Leonid Vardomsky’s index of regions’ economic openness is also useful
for the purpose of our analysis. He singles out three groups of economically
open regions (“central”, “maritime and borderland”, and “export-driven”
groups), with 29 regions included. Only a limited number of them might not
qualify for democratic standards (again, these exceptions are Moscow city,
Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Krasnodar krai, Vologda and Lipetsk oblasts,
etc.)[55].
The information
given above makes the whole picture extremely paradoxical. Yet the more
criteria we apply, the more evidently we see that economic globalisation is a
significant factor shaping the behavior of regional elites.
Also important is
that the greatest variety of factors of democratic institution building has to
be taken into account. Plurality of regional political actors and
competitiveness of regional policy making is only one of them. Another
important factor is voting preferences of the regional constituencies. If we
take it into consideration, the “deviant” cases (Moscow city, Tatarstan and
other regions with undeniable potential for economic globalisation but weakly
developed or non-existent democratic procedures) might be perceived
differently. The point is that, according to Nikolay Petrov and Alexey
Tishkov’s typology of regional electoral behaviour, such regions with weak
democratic credentials as Moscow city, Ingushetia, Karelia, Yaroslavl’ oblast,
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous okrug, and Komi ought to be located in the
right (pro-market) wing of political spectrum since their voters overwhelmingly
support non-communist and non-nationalist parties thus demonstrating their
commitment to reforms and modernisation[56].
In fact,
globalisation erects “constrained corridor” for regional policy makers in a
sense that it drives the regional regimes (with different speed and in
different ways) to stick to those norms and procedures that are dominant on a
global scale.
From “Cold Globalization” to “Warm” One[57]
We have to keep in
mind that external forces (basically political ones) can sometimes have
negative effects on democratic institution building. For many Russians, the
term “globalisation” has a negative connotation and is understood as a sort of
global “US imperialism” against which Russia has to defend herself. At the
subnational level, we can notice also negative impact in agrarian or border
regions (mainly in the southern and far eastern parts of Russia), which are
more than other regions exposed to foreign influences such as illegal
migration, drug trafficking or cross-border smuggling. It is no coincidence
when we find authoritarian and nationalistic regimes in these crisis-racked
areas of Russia.
At the beginning of the 21st century it became
clear that the whole concept of relations between Russia and the West is in
crisis and has to be seriously reconsidered. This crisis is very observable in
the lack of new and fresh ideas concerning the role of non-central actors in
Russia-West communication. It is very much telling that the 2000 Russia-focused
report of the Carnegie Endowment “The Program of Renewal” has not a single
mention of the US policies with regard to the Russia’s regions[58].
Seemingly, this is both a political and intellectual
problem. The American policy expert community seems to loose the sense of
direction of the Russian transition and is overwhelmingly disoriented by the
lack of clear indications of progress in the field of regional institution
building. Missing or uncertain correlation between the economic openness and
the state of the regional democracy is also discouraging for those who in the
beginning of 1990s propagated the theory of quick institutional changes within
Russia. Also controversial are political profiles of the regional leaders, the
bulk of whom could not be classified as either democrats or communists. All
these are perceptual difficulties, but having clear political
implications.
The truth is that the West has had already the same kind of
disappointments and frustration in tackling other non-Western nations. As
William Easterly, the senior adviser of the World Bank’s research group puts
it, much of the efforts to assist the developed countries have failed to attain
the desired results. “Sub-Saharan Africa has not emerged from a decades-long
economic crisis, Asia remains the home of the majority of the world’s poor,
Latin America has known only erratic and low growth, the Middle East has not
converted oil riches into sustained development”, he argues[59].
Turning globalisation into the force that sustains
democracy-building in the regions of Russia has to be implemented by switching
from “cold globalisation” paradigm (expert-driven, basically technical, and
touching mainly financial, managerial and macroeconomic matters) to a “warm
one” – based on deeper involvement of social institutions, more sensitive to
societal and humanitarian needs, and focused on grass-roots exchanges among
non-professionals. It is wrong to anticipate that issuing academic
recommendations, giving “conditional loans” to Russia, and focusing exclusively
on industrial modernisation will bring the country closer to the global world.
It seems that the basic challenge for the Western assistance
to Russia is reshaping priorities to foster concentration of resources[60].
Strangely enough, still there were no comprehensive measurement of the
successes and failures of Western assistance programs, some of which were very
costly. We think it is time to apply adequate assessment tools to find out in
which regions and in which areas the international community did achieve
positive institutional changes, and in which it failed.
Global challenges have exercised some – though rather modest and fragmented – impact over Putin’s reforms. One of its most essential incentives was to make Russia more competitive internationally through redistribution and rationalisation of resources and rearranging political relations. In this sense Putin’s policies are responding to the global challenges. Yet basically all those changes are of domestic background, which makes them even more durable and sustainable phenomena than those imposed from abroad.
Foreign actors
however might take advantages of the new developments in the regions. They
could benefit from diversification of political resources and appearance of new
set of autonomous power contenders in the regions. Under the new circumstances
there is much more space for political bargaining and coalition building for
the sake of investment promotion, business development and all kind of
international projects. There is also more room for fighting the corruption in
the regions, which is one of basic impediments for greater international
participation: the more actors operate within the region, the more checks and
balances unfold, and the more transparent the decision making process might
become[61].
But these are only chances. The nearest future is to show
whether the new opportunities will be duly implemented both internationally and
domestically. The reform would fail in the
long run unless there is clear indication that it stimulates better business
conditions, strengthens middle class, fosters openness and transparency, and
eradicates corruption - all what is much needed for smooth and effective
international cooperation.
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[35] For example, the governors were forbidden to apply different electoral tricks like sudden resignation and arranging new election on a short notice in order to marginalize their opponents (gerrymandering).
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[57] The title of this chapter was borrowed from my colleague Professor Andrey Dakhin who coined it at his presentation at the international congress of Twin Cities in Nizhny Novgorod, June 14, 2001.
[58] ‘Programma obnovlenia’ (The Program of Renewal). Report of the Russian-Eurasian program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Moscow: 2000)
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