POWER RELATIONS AND MULTICULTURALITY IN THE BALKANS

I.
Mutual tolerance in the relations among cultures is undisputedly one of  the values of democracy. A social order cannot be democratic, if  it involves discrimination or assimilation of minority cultures by the mainstream one. That is why, the close coexistence of cultures within one and the same country or geographical region forces the issue of arranging the relations among them in a harmonious pattern.

The Balkans are a place where cultures are interlaced in a most complicated way. The Byzantine and the Ottoman empires have brought together peoples originating from distant lands, having different religions, alphabets, etc. Today the population of the Balkans is composed of groups, speaking mainly Slavonic, Greek, Turkish or Roma languages, professing Greek Orthodox or Catholic Christianity or Islam, writing in Cyrillic, Greek or Latin alphabet. And each of these groups considers itself  the autochtoneous population of the land it inhabits. This means that they regard the presence of their culture in this place as a fully legitimate one. These people do not feel like guests or intruders there. They are at home. And the distribution and redistributions of the territories of the former Ottoman empire among the new states in the Balkans have outlined borders, which by no means coincide with the ethnocultural cleavages in question. All this has brought about a coexistence in this region, which could be called a problematic multiculturality.
 

Power is an important factor for the interactions among ethnocultural communities. Whether they are to be ones of segregation, or assimilation, or harmony, this depends a lot on their relation with power. According to most theories, power is the control on the behaviour of someone else. To exercise power over someone is to make him/her act irrelevant of his/her own will or interest. As far as the social forms of power are concerned, in the typical case this control involves the legitimacy of  an use of force, if necessary. So, the monopoly over political power of one community “at the expense” of another is a prerequisite for cultural discrimination or assimilation of the group in the inferior position. On the contrary, if power is shared in a more or less just way by two or more ethnocultural communities, this is a situation, favourable for the development of  truly multicultural society.

We can find in reality several basic patterns of  relations between cultural interactions, on the one hand, and political power - on the other. They can be classified in two main types: involvement of power in-  or separation of power from cultural interactions. The first type is realized either as political domination of an ethnocultural community over one or more others, usually under undemocratic regimes, or as a competition for power among such groups, or, in the third place, as sharing of  power among ethnocultural communities in various forms of consociational democracy.

The second type is represented nowadays mostly by societies, which follow the ideal of the civic nation. This means that the ethnocultural issues are localized into the sphere of private life. One is expected to act in public social space irrelevant of his/her ethnocultural affiliations. One should act as a citizen. In this way the matters of politics, and the matters of ethnicity are dissociated from one another. However, there are at least two other forms in which the same effect has been achieved in earlier times. The first one was the imperial tolerance towards ethnocultural differences. They were generally preserved by, e.g. the Ottoman and the Habsburg rulers, who did not exercise their power against the variety of ethnocultural identities, as far as this heterogeneity of the population was not a threat for the integrity of the empire. The other form of combining rigid political rule with relative tolerance towards ethnic and cultural particularism was the so called “proletarian internationalism”. The leadership of multinational socialist states, such as the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, had no concerns about the manifestations of local cultures, because the unity of the state was guaranteed by the totalitarian communist party structures.

Our task here will be to examine briefly the historical patterns of compatibility between political power and multiculturality in the Balkans and to draw some conclusions about the conditions for harmonious coexistence of ethnocultural communities in this region.
 

II.
A classical form of separation of ethnic and cultural relations from political ones was the "millet" system of the Ottoman empire. It maintained ethnic and cultural autonomy and pluralism. This, however, did not diminish the superiority of Muslim religion, and the power of the central authorities. Each millet (religious community) "...had the right to deal with religious matters concerning the Church and priesthood, with matters relating to the individual and the family such as marriage, divorce, engagement...and inheritance. But other matters - notably economic and commercial ones, law and order, and most penalties - were left outside the millets' prerogatives." (Karpat, 1972, p.36)

A group of people, who spoke one and the same language, had the same religion, customs, folklore, and more or less distinct collective memories (perpetuated by narratives and songs) of a common historical fate, did not suffer substantially from interference on behalf of the Ottoman administration, or of other groups of its kind, into its communal life. As a result, different ethnic and cultural groups existed side by side, especially in the larger towns. In many cases they cooperated economically, practicing division of labour, complementing each other, up to the extent of a real symbiosis. The historical sources give plenty of evidence that as far as day-to-day issues were concerned, most people, living in such places, had a very good, in modern terms, "intercultural competence". They had sufficient knowledge about the "other's" way of life, the "other's" behaviour was quite predictable for them (at least at everyday level), and, most importantly, they knew what was "allowed", and what was not in their behaviour towards the other "party". The religious holidays of the neighbouring community were respected, ritual food was exchanged, etc. As far as everyday life is concerned, this situation corresponds quite well to the basic criterion of multiculturality as it is defined in our days - "the heterogeneity of societies within and across nations". (Chicago Cultural Studies Group, 1995, p.114)

However, it would be difficult to substantiate the claim, that this cultural pluralism within the Ottoman empire was due to a tolerant attitude of the authorities towards the cultures of the conquered peoples, and to a recognition of their value. There is much more historical evidence, that the preservation of collective cultural identities within the empire did not by itself represent a danger for the political status quo, and even served the perpetuation of power relations. Maintaining large numbers of non-Muslim population resulted in the incorporation of, at least in theory, the whole Muslim population into the mechanisms of power. Ideally every male Muslim was a soldier, and almost none of the non-Muslims had the right to wear arms (there were few exceptions, which were subject to strict regulations). The fact is that most of the uprisings of the Christian population on the Balkans have been suppressed in their initial stage by the neighbouring Muslims, so that an intervention on behalf of the government army was not even necessary.

In a word, cultural autonomy and pluralism in the Ottoman empire have been a long time not only harmless with regard of the state's integrity, but they have even contributed to this integrity. The existence of large non-Muslim ethnocultural groups motivated the neighbouring Muslim population to support the political status quo, defending its own - in many cases illusionary, at least as the economic relationships are concerned - superiority. Besides, in this way the central authorities have avoided a lot of unnecessary internal conflicts, which would have been the price for a radically assimilatory policy.

So, the "secret" of the stability of the millet system was not the harmony in the relations among the ethnocultural groups, but some kind of ruler's "alchemy", which managed to eliminate the aspirations towards power from the communal life of the non-Muslim peoples, without destroying its cultural basis. As a result, these communities retained their vitality and served as dynamic and productive elements of the system, without challenging its integrity. This was certainly not the case with all empires, which comprised peoples, belonging to different cultures. In some of them (e.g. Russia before 1917) the central authorities were imposing their cultural standards over the whole territory of the state. Consequently, the suppressed peoples appeared to be inferior in all respects, not being able to meet these standards, and in the last account they were condemned to backwardness, and did not contribute to the economic and cultural prosperity of the country. Of course, the separation of ethnocultural issues from political ones in the Ottoman empire could not resist the processes of developing national consciousness and the strife towards political self-determination, which dominated Europe in the 19th century. However, many historians represent these events in the empire as a result mostly of external influences.

Another pattern of  compatibility between rigid political power and multiculturality, based on the separation of ethnicity and politics, was realized in the Yugoslav Federation. The latter was constructed generally along the Soviet model. The philosophy of proletarian internationalism represented the ethnocultural divisions as something of entirely different order in comparison with the relations between nations. It was claimed, that the issues of political sovereignty of peoples had become important in the context of the struggle of the bourgeoisie for markets, which had little to do with ethnicity or culture. So, if various cultures thrive within a given society, this would not necessarily endanger its political integrity. The political life of a socialist society is shaped by something totally different - by class relationships.

The great shortcoming of this "recipe" of multiculturalism is, that the peaceful coexistence of different ethnocultural groups is quite vulnerable. If for some reason (weakening of the central authorities, or change in the economic situation, etc.) some of these groups cease to accept the dualism of culture and power, in other words - do not want any more to receive cultural liberties in exchange for political passivity - then the issue of redistribution of material resources, and distribution of positions in the hierarchy of power relations, comes to the fore. While there is an unquestionable centre of power in a society, composed of different cultural groups, however despotic this power might be, cultural pluralism is possible. The cultural groups have nothing to compete for. The relationships among them are regulated by someone else, and if this government, or ruling party decides that such a pluralism suits its interests, then it can be left to thrive in genuine forms, indeed. However, as soon as no center of political domination predetermines the political status quo any more, and it can be revised by the ethnocultural groups themselves, a "bellum omnia contra omnis" can break out.

III.
The weakening of multiethnic states produces, as a rule, antagonisms among the constituent groups. The mobilization for economic and political activity of the population awakens national and ethnic loyalties. As M.Walzer points out, groups, which have lived in peace, side by side, under imperial rule, facing the chance to rule themselves "... found that they could do so (peacefully) only among themselves, adjusting political lines to cultural boundaries." (Walzer, 1995, p.141) Self-government seems to be successful only within culturally homogeneous communities. That is why the ethnocultural groups tend to evolve towards the status of nations, as soon as they are granted the right of self-determination. A group of that kind typically prefers to have the control over its fate in its own hands. Some central authorities, or a neighbouring group look like a potential source of evil-intentioned external influence.

In such situations a change in the role of culture can be observed. Whether the cultural group is in a state of political passivity, or in a state of mobilization, this conditions a different mode of belonging to the respective culture. In the first case, an individual belongs to a culture by being its "product", i.e. by accepting as "normal" and following definite standards of behaviour. They have been shaped in the course of the collective history of his/her group. By being socialized in this group, the individual is "programmed" to perceive the world and to act in a certain way. Knowing the "logic" of his/her culture, we can predict to a certain extent his/her behaviour.

However, "belonging to a culture" can mean also something else, namely: being loyal to a group. In such case the solidarity with the members of this group gives content to the individual's identity. In his paper "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self", M.Sandel claims that we can understand ourselves as the particular person we are only " ...as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of that history, as citizens of this republic."(Sandel, 1984, p.87) These commitments are more than values I happen to have, without identifying myself with them. A person, incapable of constitutive attachments of this kind would be someone without character, without moral depth. "For to have character is to know that I move in a history I neither summon nor command, which carries consequences none the less for my choices and conduct. It draws me closer to some and more distant from others;"(Ibid.). This mode of belonging to a culture involves responsibility for the cultural identity of the group. Any kind of threat for this identity justifies a militant reaction on behalf of the individual members.

These two alternative attitudes towards one's culture can be subsumed under a famous dichotomy in social theory, the one of community and society. In 1887 Ferdinand Toennies defined, in his book "Community and Society" ("Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft"), two kinds of social relations. "All intimate, private, and exclusive living together" is understood by him as life in "Gemeinschaft" (Toennies, 1957, p.33). "Gesellschaft" is public life. There exist communities of kinship, of neighbourhood, of language, of folkways, of mores, of beliefs. By way of contrast, "Gesellschaft" exists in the realm of business, travel, or sciences. The individual lives from birth on in certain communities, s/he is formed as a personality by her/his community. On the other hand, "one goes into Gesellschaft (society) as one goes into a strange country". (Ibid.) Unity with other members of the same community is an end in itself. The association of the individual with other agents in society is a means to achieve her/his ends. That is why in community the individual's identity matters, while in society one is treated as an interchangeable performer of functions. The concept of "Gemeinschaft" refers to real and organic life, the concept of "Gesellschaft" - to an imaginary and mechanical structure.

A similar typology, but in other terms, is made by E. Durkheim. His category "mechanical solidarity" corresponds to the "community relations" of Toennies, and "organic solidarity" - to "society". M. Weber introduces, following Toennies, the categories "Vergemeinschaftung" and ""Vergesellschaftung".

This idea of community is rather controversial. Noone questions its descriptive accuracy. Groups with this kind of internal solidarity obviously exist. The objections concern its eventual normative pretension. It is argued that there is no place for such communities in modernity. They are a remnant of traditional forms of society. Today they are a threat to liberal democracies - a last moral refuge for nationalism and racism. Communitarian authors rarely try to justify the classical forms of communal life. Instead, various compromise ideas are introduced, trying to bridge the gap between community and society. R. Dworkin describes a "liberal community" as a group, which is unified by communal ties in one respect, and is a free association of individuals in all others. The success or failure of a political community, for instance, resonate in the life of its members, exhibiting a typically communal internal cohesion. But this kind of social organization does not interfere with "liberal tolerance and neutrality about the good life". (Dworkin, 1992. p.218)  W. Kymlicka, in his turn, introduces the term "ethnic association". By "association" in general he refers to such groups, which are "a breeding ground for civic virtues" by establishing "horizontal" links of civic engagement, which overcome social cleavages. But on the other hand, these groups foster collective trust and solidarity, i.e. typically communal values. (Kymlicka, 1996) Why not regard some kind of ethnic groups as an association?

Judging from the recent events in former Yugoslavia and former USSR, we can make the conclusion that communities do not exist in modern society as a separate realm. In many cases "us" - "them" divisions, which are emblematic for community, have appeared within individualistic social environment. (The reverse process has been characteristic for Western Europe in the recent decades.) It seems that even in our days, under certain conditions, communities differentiate themselves out of society.

What are these conditions? One of them is, for sure, the threat for cultural identity. In modern civilization the communal nature of culture is not obvious. As a "generator" of identity, community functions under the surface of social life. The individual belongs to a culture simply by being its "product". S/he takes her/his cultural identity for granted, usually not realizing the communal mechanisms of its formation. However, an evidence of its actual source is the fact that a threat for the cultural identity of a number of people, who belong to the same culture only so far as there are certain resemblances in their behaviour, usually unites them with new bonds of solidarity. In such cases community exposes its importance for culture.

Situations of this kind appear with different frequency and intensity in the different parts of the world. Today the Balkans are much more often than Western Europe an arena of cultural confrontations, which nourish communal life. There are a lot of reasons for this. One of them is the relative "symmetry" between the "parties" in cultural interactions. These are not relations between immigrants and host country, where the power is concentrated only in one of the partners. There are ethnocultural minorities in the Balkan countries, which are quite large in comparison with the majority population. Some of them are kindred to the population of neighbouring countries, and so their claims rely on the support of sovereign states.

On the other hand, the interactions between ethnocultural groups on the Balkans are very dynamic. There is no system of stable relationships among states and international organizations, which can guarantee the status quo. Not minor achievements and losses are at stake, but the historical position of the group among the others. No change is so radical as to be impossible. At any moment one expects catastrophic events, concerning the conditions for her/his group's existence: loss of a dominant position in society, or restriction of human rights, loss of parts of state territory and/or population, etc. In 1984, for instance, the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria got their names replaced by Bulgarian ones within one week, without any signs of warning. This dynamism of the situation makes it quite risky to wait until the "other party's" position becomes clearer, and to gather evidence, whether its aggressive claims are serious, or not. Typically, the antagonistic activity against the "other party" is not a defensive reaction to an actual aggression, but an attempt to prevent a possible one. The behaviour of the ethnocultural groups is determined not so much by assessment of the actual events, but by hypotheses and suspicions. "Thus the dynamics of cultural interactions suppresses their rationality." (Makariev, 1996, p.19).

Another reason for the intensity of ethnocultural confrontations on the Balkans is the minorities' negative attitude towards assimilation, due to the lack of mutual respect among the Balkan cultures. Every ethnocultural group regards the other groups' cultures as inferiour to its own. Consequently, a possible assimilation into any of the Balkan cultures appears to be a disgraceful loss of status. That is why an ethnic Turk, or a Bosnian Serb, who would readily assimilate in Germany, is quite reluctant to do so in Bulgaria, resp. in an Islamic Bosnia.

IV.
So, if we recognize the value of cultural identity at all, it would be inconsistent to condemn as nationalism or xenophobia the community-rallying of individuals in cases, when their cultural identity is under threat. Within the framework of our typology of the relations between cultural interactions and political power, this process of ethnocultural mobilization appears as a shift from a state of separation of power from such interactions to a state of its involvement in them. However, this does not mean that we ought to justify the violent competition for power among the ethnocultural communities in former Yugoslavia and in some of the countries, once belonging to the former USSR. Other modes of regulating problematic multiculturality must be also possible.

We shall review here briefly two alternative solutions, which have been realized in democratic societies. The situation in Bosnia has provided an occasion for comments on consociational democracy. Guesses are made that political power in Bosnia can be shared among the Muslim, Serbian and Croatian communities in the manner in which it has been balanced among the Protestant, Catholic and secular groups in the Netherlands, between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon, etc. Consociational democracy is described generally as a consensual form of government, in which all major groups of a plural society are represented. It is an institutional extension of this plurality. A. Lijphart presents four substantial characteristics of consociational democracy: government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society; mutual veto or “concurrent majority” rule; proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; a high degree of autonomy to run its own internal affairs. (Lijphart, 1977, p.25)

Lijphart points at elite cooperation as “the primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy” (Lijphart, 1977, p.1). He contrasts the style of leadership in this model of state organization with the British one, which prevails in the political world. The former is coalescent, while the latter is competitive, or, as other authors call it, “adversarial”. (Ibid.) Another specific feature of consociational democracy is that it makes, at least initially, plural societies more thoroughly plural. “Its approach is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy.” (Lijphart, 1977, p.42).

In a great variety of forms, more or less successfully, consociational democracy combines plurality and democracy in the Netherlands, in Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, and also in some third world countries, such as Malaysia, Surinam and Uruguay. It is not at all certain, however, that it can be realized in the multicultural societies in the Balkans. As favourable conditions for this form of government A.Lijphart enumerates: a certain balance among the groups, competing for power; a multiparty political system; a relatively small size of the country; crosscutting of the cleavages, which constitute the plurality of this society; overarching of loyalties; traditions of  elite accommodation. It is obvious that some of these conditions exist in the Balkans, but some - such as crosscutting cleavages, overarching loyalties and traditions of elite accommodation, do not.

Moreover, the primacy of elite cooperation for consociational democracy makes the latter unsuitable for the Balkans. The elites can negotiate the character of coexistence among the communities efficiently enough (so that  the ordinary members, which they represent, accept these agreements as unproblematic) either if  the range of controversial issues is limited, and there is a general mutual trust among the communities, or if the members of the communities obey automatically their leaders. Such are the situations resp. in Western Europe of the XXth century, and in the traditional societies in third world countries. The case is different in the Balkans, however. The cultural interactions here cannot be regulated “from above”.

There are also other arguments against exercising consociational democracy in the Balkans. This model puts at risk the integrity of society. Provided that the general situation is stable, i.e. there are no additional factors, which work against this integrity, the risk is reasonable. But if there are considerable “centrifugal forces” acting, and they combine with the hardening and the politicization of the ethnocultural differences, which result from the practices of consociational democracy, this might bring about catastrophic internal conflicts. Such was the case with Lebanon. The consociational sharing of political power between the Christian and the Muslim communities was successful until the conflict between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries, the flow of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon and the intervention of the Syrian army. After these events the political organization of the religious communities began to play a negative role, facilitating the conflict between Christians and Muslims. It is evident that the geopolitical situation in the Balkans resembles more the one in the Middle East, than the one in Western Europe. That is why, consociational democracy can be a hazard for our region.

Another option, which seems a constructive alternative to the competition for power among ethnocultural communities, is to replace this struggle by peaceful coexistence within a civic nation. The “price” for that would be the separation of intercultural relations from the mechanisms of political power. As we have already mentioned above, to act as a citizen would mean to behave in public “social space” irrelevant of one’s ethnocultural commitments. One should “enjoy” the latter only in his/her private life. So it is guaranteed that group solidarities of this kind will not interfere with power relations. Belonging to the other ethnocultural entity can not be a reason for discrimination in any of the important social spheres, such as professional career, administration of justice, participation in political life, etc. If the individual human rights of everybody are respected by society, then why should ethnocultural communities compete for power at all?

The recent development of racial relations in American society has cast some doubts on the consistency of this liberal ideal. Blacks and Hispanics claim that they do not perceive the patterns of behaviour which dominate the public social sphere as culturally neutral. Somehow the “rules of the game” there favour the persons, who follow the West-European cultural paradigm. This does not mean that someone of Greek, Russian, African or Mexican descent would not be able, or would be forbidden to learn how to act after these standards. However, that would amount to marginalization of one’s original culture, and in the last account - to assimilation.

Having in mind the ethnocultural solidarities in the Balkans, it is not realistic to expect that a separation of cultural and power relations here can be realized by minimizing the role of ethnocultural differences in the public social affairs. However, the recent research and practice in the field of communication between cultures present another prospect of dissociating ethnicity from the issues of power, which might be of greater relevance to our region. It seems that this alternative is of the same rank of importance as the three options, which we have already reviewed here: the liberal confinement of the role of ethnocultural commitments to the sphere of private life; the imperial tolerance towards cultural autonomy of the ethnic and religious minorities, as far as they remain politically obedient; and the Marxist strict differentiation between the domain of class relationships and political power, on the one hand, and culture and ethnicity - on the other.

An important source of legitimacy for political power are the antagonisms among the subordinate groups. It is justified for the latter to accept someone else's arbitration on their relations, because they cannot bring these relations in order themselves. It follows that the "horizontal" communication, i.e. the dialogue between the "parties", can be of crucial importance for avoiding the politicization of the relations of multiculturality. All deviations from the balance of interests among the ethnocultural communities, such as tendencies towards assimilation or discrimination, can be stopped early enough, provided that there are efficient mechanisms of intercultural communication. If mutual understanding among cultures advances in education, in the media, in the arts, and also in business, this will bring about a minimization of the role of political power in regulating the relations among ethnocultural communities, even if no obstacles are posed to their realization in public social life. A self-regulation of these relations, including the grass-roots level, can leave controversial issues, such as the concerns about the collective rights of minorities, without ground. But this would not be a form of consociational self-government, because it wouldn’t involve the “vertical” organization of ethnocultural communities with the aim of participation in the sharing of power by winning seats in Parliament and in the Government for their elites.

V.
If the dialogue between ethnocultural communities has to fulfill such important functions, it must be something different from the ordinary negotiations. There is enough evidence that since the early eighties a philosophical movement has been taking shape, which seeks an alternative to the postmodernist reaction against modernity, by developing "...the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and action" (Habermas, 1987, p.295). Communicative reason is regarded as a more constructive alternative to subject-centered reason, than the postmodernist particularistic and relativistic approach. From this point of view the importance of dialogue for our civilization appears to be of the same rank as the importance of the subject for modernity.

Habermas describes mutual understanding as "...the intersubjective relationship between individuals who are socialized through communication and mutually recognize one another" (Habermas, Op.cit. p.310). The basic condition for mutual understanding is the "...noncoercively unifying, consensus-building force of a discourse in which the participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favor of a rationally motivated agreement" (Habermas, Op.cit. p.315). These general views on communicative action, however, need concretization, when they are to be applied to the dialogue between ethnic communities, which belong to different cultures. If there is a great cultural gap between them, they have little chance to resolve a controversial issue by a rational exchange of arguments. The latter simply cannot begin. In order to make our partner admit that s/he is not right, we usually juxtapose his/her thesis with a more fundamental assumption that s/he believes to be true, and we show that there is a contradiction between them. But if there are no fundamentals accepted by all participants in the discussion, then each one of them may be right for him/herself. The positions are incommensurable. If there are no common values that can serve as a basis for respecting the "other party's" interests, mutual recognition is only a matter of wishful thinking.

It seems, that if "horizontal" communication is to be a realistic alternative of power-regulation of multiculturality, a necessary condition for this would be the elaboration of methods of intercultural dialogue. Understanding other cultures is a theme in various sciences, such as anthropology, social psychology, intercultural communication. However, philosophy is in an especially favourable position, as far as interculturality is concerned. It is impossible to approach empathetically an alien culture if one does not distance him/herself self-reflectively from his/her own being. And this is an exclusively philosophical attitude. I believe that the potential of philosophy to contribute to intercultural understanding is not confined to the domain of the philosophical disciplines, which are obviously relevant to this cause, such as hermeneutics and discourse ethics. The prospect of mobilizing philosophical intellectual "resources" in order to participate in the solution of the issues of interculturality is a prospect of applying philosophy to social practice in a most efficient way.

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