The Role of Media in the Integration of Estonians and Russian Speaking Minorities
 

The main objectives of the project are to research Estonian broadcasting regulations relevant for the access of ethnic minorities to the media and, hence, to public sphere, particularly their access to public service broadcasting, to assess the role of Estonian media in influencing the processes of national integration so far and to define alternatives to the approach taken on media and ethnic minorities by the governmental institutions today.
 

A brief overview of the background and the topics addressed in the research paper, as well as the policy memo.
 
 

When the Past Becomes the Present :
Demographic Composition and Political Status of National Minorities in Estonia
 
 

The estimated number of the population in Estonia in January 2003 was 1 356 000,  the ethnic composition being 68% Estonians, 27% Russians, 4% other Russian-speaking nationalities and 1% others.

Before the forced annexation of the country to the Soviet Union in 1940, 12% of the population were non-Estonians by ethnic origin, two thirds of them Russians. After the Second World War the rebuilding of the socialist republic included mass immigration of mainly industrial workers from the Slavic republics of the USSR into Estonia. The latter process continued well into the end of the 1970s and was seen by the immigrants themselves as moving within the borders of a unitary state.

By 1989 the share of Estonians had decreased to 62%. After the country declared the restoring of its independence in 1991, the dominating tone of both the authorities and the members of the titular nation were in favour of repatriation of as many Russian-speakers as feasible. Among ethnic Estonians the drastic changes in the demographic composition of the population had generated existential fears, suspicions about Russians both as potential threat to the newly gained independence and as assimilators, and these fears contributed to the wide acceptance and favouring of exclusionist citizenship policies.

As in the eyes of Estonians their independent state was to be restored, this restitution provided the ultimate justification for the Laws on Citizenship, which adopted the principles of ius sanguinis and naturalization: only persons who were citizens, or the descendants of a citizen of the Republic of Estonia before 1940, when the independent statehood of Estonia ceased to exist de facto, have the right to Estonian citizenship. Thus, in 1992, almost half a million people in Estonia, immigrants from the former Soviet republics were denied citizenship. Although they could become citizens through naturalization, in order to do so, they could not have been officials of the Soviet army, nor have one as a spouse and had to pass Estonian language test.

The latter requirements have resulted in that approximately 110 000 non-Estonians have emigrated since the beginning of the 1990s, and that of those who stayed only 38% of have Estonian citizenship, 24% Russian citizenship, 1% other citizenship and 37% of Russian speakers are stateless. Even though non-citizens who hold temporary or permanent residence permits have the same social rights and guarantees as citizens, they are deprived of such political rights as voting in the parliamentary elections or becoming members of political parties, as well as the right to hold positions in the state and municipal administration or to serve in the army. The Law on Cultural Autonomy does not consider non-citizens to be national minorities, thus does not grant any rights to the majority of non-Estonians.  The Law on the Cultural Autonomy for National Minorities states:

This law considers as national minorities citizens of Estonia who:
        - reside on the territory of Estonia;
        - maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with Estonia;
        - are distinct from Estonians on the basis of their ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic character
        - are motivated by a concern to preserve together their cultural traditions, their religion or their language which constitute the basis of their common identity

Hence, as over half of non-Estonians are non-citizens, in legal terms we cannot speak of a national minority of 32%, but of only 12%. Yet, even when disregarding the legal aspect, the definition of the status of non-Estonians is still problematic and differs from case to case according to the preferences of the one who is giving the definition. First, the distinction between national/ethnic/cultural  minorities is not clear-cut and agreed upon univocally even in academia, even less is there an unchallenged agreement of these distinctions in international politics. Usually, distinction is being made between historical national minorities (i.e. indigenous peoples who have resided in the territory of a given state before the state came into existence or nations who used to be a part of a neighbouring state and are now a minority due to the re-drawing of borders) and immigrants who arrived with the awareness of voluntarily leaving behind their own cultural/linguistic environment and therefore are expected to adapt to the society and legal obligations of their new homeland. To distinguish between these two kinds of minorities, most commonly the former are called national, and the latter ethnic minorities.

In the case of Estonia and its minorities, such a distinction is rather problematic. First, how long does a minority have to reside in a country to become a historic minority? 20, 40 or 100 years? Or is the length of the period insignificant if the previous boundaries were illegal? For instance, illegal as a result of occupation, and thus, does everyone who immigrated in the state during the occupation period become therefore an illegal immigrant after restoring the legal boundaries? Can people who thought they were moving within the boundaries of one state, in this case, the Soviet Union, considered to be immigrants in the first place? Or should it be, on the contrary, disregarded that Estonia and Estonians had any rights of self-determination and decision-making about their future during the time of occupation, and should simply accept that nowadays they have a large national minority and grant them full-fledged rights of one? These are all extremely controversial questions provoking other controversial general issues such as that of historical justice and rights of a people as a community. These questions can never be completely separated from any particular or pragmatic issue related to national/ethnic minorities. Yet, in this paper I will attempt to do so and simply to stay within the framework of the premises and values of a liberal state - not to appeal to group rights, but rather the rights of individuals who in some cases may be at a disadvantage because they have a different ethnic/linguistic/cultural background. That is, the paper will attempt to disentangle the relationship between the duties and rights of the state to its citizens, as well as to the non-citizens as individuals who have long-lasting ties with the state and have expressed the willingness to sustain these ties. Therefore, in this study it does not really matter whether the non-Estonians are called a national or an ethnic or a linguistic minority - in some respects they could belong to all of these categories, in some respect to none. What matters is the state of affairs at this present moment in the country and how to improve it with more desired outcomes for both counterparts - both from the aspect of what kind of a social and political environment for the country’s inhabitants do we want to promote and what kinds of values are we claiming to uphold.

Several surveys and analyses have demonstrated that whether a non-Estonian has Estonian citizenship or not has a correlation between the individual economic and social well-being as well as the perception of the degree of well being and willingness to participate in the affairs of the society.  The requirement of passing the Estonian language examination in order to become a citizen is one of the major reasons behind such a large number of non-citizens: less than a fifth of all them prefer their current status as stateless or Russian citizens.   Only about half of naturalized non-Estonians have had to actually pass the language exam, since simplified procedures existed for those who supported Estonia’s independence in 1992, children under 15 and disabled people.

The difficulties of learning adequate Estonian language are given various explanations by different parties. The non-Estonians would probably refer to the territorial and social segregation that has always existed between the nationalities - to the extent that before 1992 one could well speak of two parallel and almost independent ‘societal cultures’. Even nowadays, there are Russian-speaking cities (with up to 97% of non-Estonian population) such as Narva and Sillamäe, Russian-speaking schools, Russian-speaking businesses, families, circles of friends, as well as Estonian-speaking ones but rarely mixed. Schools are still lacking adequate language teaching, and for adults learning is expensive, especially as many non-Estonian speaking people live in the nowadays economically most deprived region. Yet, there has been considerable progress in this field during the last few years.

When one asks Estonians for an explanation of the situation, most of them might respond that the Russian-speakers are simply unwilling to learn Estonian.  For Estonians, someone not speaking the language after having lived in Estonia for decades, has no respect for its history, culture and people, thus does not deserve to become a citizen. The language is the basis of Estonian nationhood and culture, and Soviet-time immigrants have to earn the right to citizenship - these are the convictions shared by a great majority of ethnic Estonians. Every fifth Estonian thinks that the current citizenship policy is too mild and thus damages Estonian national interests.
 


 

When the Future Interferes:
Governmental Programme ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007’
 

The official change in approach towards the Russian-speaking minority took place in 1998 and was provoked
by several factors, including studies by the academic community, requirements related to the European Union
accession process, pressure from international organisations, activities of minority organisations,
and political initiative within the Estonian Government itself. The external criticism and internal recognition of the
need for a change from silent hostility towards future-oriented tolerance and co-operation resulted in the preparation
and approval of a governmental Integration Programme. In order to efficiently implement the Programme,
a governmental Integration Foundation was also founded in 1998.

The Integration Programme emphasises a two-way process, promoting the integration of minorities into
the Estonian society while protecting their distinct identity, as well attempting to increase the tolerance of the
majority nation. Yet, the chosen means for promoting greater inclusion is the Estonian language, and an
overwhelming majority of projects (over 75%) funded and implemented under the Programme are accordingly
related to language instruction.
According to its own criteria, the Programme is successful in the spheres that it identifies as priorities;
minority representatives, however, express concern that too much emphasis has been put on language learning
and not much has been accomplished in the legal/political and socio/economical spheres in which clear inequalities still persist.
This reflects a division between minority and majority perceptions of the goals and priorities of the integration process.

Nevertheless, significant changes in the perceptions of both parties have also taken place. The discourse has turned
into a more rational one: Estonians are more willing to accept at least the Estonian-speaking members of minorities,
as ‘there is a need for all the human resources the country can have in the future of ageing European societies’,
Russian-speakers recognise the advantages of mastering the state language and becoming a citizen of the potential
EU member state.

One of the sub-programmes targets mass media and public awareness on integration issues. This includes support for
minority radio programmes, education of minority journalists, toleration and language learning promoting campaign and
a yearly monitoring report of how the press reflected upon issues of inter-ethnic relations. Analysis of the two previous
years suggests that a certain common sphere has started to emerge in the Russian and Estonian language press.
As journalists and editors have become increasingly aware of stereotyping and the impact of negative characterisations,
both the language and content of journalism have become more neutral.
 
 

The Broadcasting Media: Reflecting upon or Creating Reality?
 

The media are neither passively reflecting upon the reality neither an all-mighty tools for propaganda, but rather a part of a societal culture which provide a forum for a subjective interpretation of reality. What is on the agenda of this forum, as well as what is not, and who are participating as interpreters, as well as who are not - has as a result of various studies been claimed to contribute to the perception of relations and
roles of different groups in the society, as well as the re-producing of the reality according to these perceptions.

Estonian Government has been critical of its own efforts to enhance national integration by and in the media sphere.
In its report on implementation of the Programme in 2000, the Government observed that “the potential of the
Russian-language media in the area of /…/ integration /…/ remains largely unused, due to the low number of viewers
of programmes. The reason for this is the lack of financing for Russian-language television and isolation from its viewership.”
The same has been concluded by various other studies.  Indeed, over 80% of the Russian-speakers watch the channels
of the Russian Federation daily and only 27% follow the Estonian TV, whereas the trust in the latter is higher than
in the former. Why then is their exposure to Estonian audiovisual media so low? Is the Russian-speaking population
simply uninterested?

There are no special provisions ensuring Russian-language print or broadcast media. On the contrary, the Law on Language
even restricts television broadcasting in foreign languages, including Russian: "The volume of foreign language news programs
and live foreign language programs without translations into Estonian /.../ shall not exceed ten per cent of the volume of
weekly original production."  The law would allow programs with subtitles in Estonian, yet the list of Russian-language and
bilingual programs on Estonian public television (ETV) consists of 5 programs a week (3 of them bilingual), including a program
for children, on traffic issues, crime and two addressing social and political matters - each 30 minutes a week.
The daily news of a quarter of an hour in Russian are broadcasted 6 PM every evening which does not qualify as prime time.

This brings us back to the language issue - the authorities seem to assume that anyone willing to integrate, be informed
and participate in the public sphere (and there is one public sphere, the Estonian one) should at first learn Estonian language,
not the other way around, not that the processes complement each other and should be simultaneous. Thus, even though
it is widely recognized that the potential of media has not been sufficiently made use of to facilitate the process of integration - whether the latter is understood as unidirectional or bilateral - yet, little has been done to seek for improvement.
 
 

What Are the Particular Aims of This Paper?
 
 

  • To examine the justifiability of the reasons to change the current situation in the media sphere, particularly the approach taken by the Estonian National Television. Why to implement any changes?