Prestige
and Pathos as the Life Strategies of a Socioeconomic Group
OLEG Karmadonov
iRKUTSK STATE uNIVERSITY
IRKUTSK, rUSSIA
Any society, any epoch has a certain pattern of cultural values, or a kind of prism through which all social groups, existing in the society, are perceived and evaluated. According to one or another evaluation, some groups are ranked as more prestige, others – as less prestige, and others – as non-prestige at all. The criterion of such an evaluation may be ambivalent: either the prestige of this or that socioeconomic group and profession is attributed to it because of its functional significance for the society, or the value of a group is defined by some exceptional and subjectively attractive qualities, attributed to a group. In turn, the functional significance of a socioeconomic group may be understood as the group’s realization of its management and distribution functions, which always indicates responsibility, or as the production of certain necessary goods and services. The group, which is prestige due to some exceptional and subjectively attractive qualities, is prestige because these qualities are valuable in the given time, in the given society, or in the given public. In any case, the set of socioeconomic groups, ranged according to their social status, is always rather concrete. However, this set is not constant.
It is necessary to remark that the concept “prestige” is widely used in sociological literature. Moreover, there is a relatively monosemantic interpretation of thisconcept1. In the whole, prestige may be defined as a feature or a quality attributed to a socioeconomic group or profession by society and/or the public and characterized by the acknowledgment of any special social qualities of this group and its right to certain wealth, both symbolic and quite material. Prestige is closely connected with profit, power, and education level. It is also necessary to note that the ascriptive essence of prestige, postulated by me, differs considerably from the traditional sociological opposition “ascription – achievement”. I do not contradict these concepts, and consider prestige as an ascriptive quality, conditioned, besides, by the achievements of individuals – members of a concrete socioeconomic group.
Here I try to utilize the concept “pathos”, treated in this work as the means used by a “non-prestige” group for self-preservation. We can note that pathos is stipulated by both collective consciousness and individuals’ aspiration for positive identification. This speaks to its global, ontological stipulation. A human wants the world to smile at him, and when it does not happen, he smiles himself – through his own pathos.
Thus, social status, or the prestige of a socioeconomic group, ideally, might be defined by a group’s real social significance, but, in reality, everything is a little different. The category “prestige” is ascriptive and often depends on the set of values usual for individuals – members of the society. This category reflects the subjective individual priorities supported and/or formed by certain cultural patterns. The composite elements of these patterns are categories, which are important for individuals, such as “profit”, “power”, “education level”. So, “prestige” is an ascriptive feature of a socioeconomic group, which is derivative from the mentioned set of elements. Prestige is sanctioned by a certain system of values and preferences. Therefore, in conditions where this system of values changes, the prestige of some groups and professions also changes, as well as their social perception. Prestige itself functions in society as a means of consolidation of a socioeconomic group, protection of its status, and it supports the feeling of self-significance of the group’s members, which underlines (obviously or concealed) self-exceptionality. All that makes the group be dynamic and maximum adaptable to its environment, i.e. prestige is a primary means of surviving for the group. Obviously, interpreted in this way prestige is rather similar to such phenomena as religion and ideology. Especially if we take into consideration the fact that every socioeconomic group creates its own internal unwritten code of norms, customs and traditions. However, it is also obvious that only some groups are considered to be prestige, though all groups want to survive. And if prestige is a means of increasing surviving, then what means of increasing surviving can groups, deprived of prestige status, use? This means is pathos. The group or profession which is not prestige from the point of view of society or the public creates a certain pathos for surviving, which is also accompanied by a code of norms, instructions, internal legends and traditions. The socioeconomic group-outsider refuses to bear Cain’s stamp of non-prestigeness and is inclined to interpret its unenviable social and economic position as a kind of a cross to bear, a saintly torment, which is to be awarded. Thus, pathos of a socioeconomic group functions just like prestige, so these concepts are not antitheses; rather, they are two sides of one coin. In other words, pathos is a substitute to prestige. Its position as of a substitute does not make lower its importance and efficiency. Groups deprived of prestige – for example, the criminality, hippies, and people of unskilled professions, other various kinds of social outcasts - create and realize successfully their own group pathos, which allows them to take part in social reality relatively harmonious. We may say that pathos is a means of special interpretation of this reality, setting it in conformity with one's own position.
Social practice demonstrates another characteristic feature of the dichotomy prestige-pathos. When there are certain conditions, especially during socio-cultural crisis, there is the possibility of conversion of these concepts when a prestige group becomes non-prestige and vice versa. This phenomenon is in the highest degree characteristic of the Russian society during the last 10 – 15 years. The set of prestige (or, at least, seeming rather worthy) groups and professions was quite definite during the Soviet regime. Despite the fact that prestige was defined by the acting ideology, nevertheless it had the features of actual functional significance, i.e. it was closer to the mentioned above “ideal” variant.On top of everything, such prestige also had support in the social consciousness, which evaluated prestige subjectively – through profit, power, education level (though may be in reverse order). Thus, prestige of any socioeconomic groups during the Soviet period was harmoniously sanctioned both by the society and the public. Among the prestige (worthy) groups of that time were scholars, doctors, teachers, people of romanticized labor (miners, fishermen, etc.), people of heroic professions (the military, pilots, seamen, intelligence officers, astronauts, the militia, etc.), people of creative professions (artists, singers, writers, musicians, actors, etc.). Politician as a person was absent at the Soviet time, instead there was a figure, representing the dominant political power and state structure – the Communist Party.
Among the social outsiders of that epoch were representatives of the criminals, quasi-businessmen (profiteers, etc.), tramps, priests, etc. In the list of social pariahs of that time I include dissidents, despite the fact that they are neither a socioeconomic group nor a profession. However, the conversion of the tandem “prestige-pathos” towards dissidents has rather peculiar character and we will dwell on it a little later.
So, there is a set of concrete socioeconomic groups, which were considered prestige during the Communist regime and reaped the fruits of this prestige, and there are group-outsiders, which were deprived at that time of social acknowledgement and, due to this, created their own group pathos. Pathos spared the members of these groups existential abandonment, justified them before themselves and the surrounding world, and allowed them to exist relatively harmoniously and optimistically in the social space. Thus, pathos is a peculiar theodicy of the group-outsider; justification of its objective position in the social continuum through the subjective notions of the group itself. The concrete discourse of group pathos was built up around a certain and specific myphologem. Thus, for criminals a pathos was based on the “criminal romanticism”, “thieves’ law”, supported by rather a powerful element of “martyrdom for the thief’s idea”, when all stages of imprisonment were perceived as milestones of the "holy" path, as martyrdom for “the criminal idea”.
The pathos of profiteers was formed around the myphologem of the consumerism – the philosophy and psychology of consumption, transcribed, certainly, in the Soviet reality. “You cannot be forbidden to live beautifully!” was the motto of this group. Moral and, quite tangible, direct prosecutions only added more charm and acuteness to their pathos. Tramps and vagabonds cultivated their pathos around the idea of freedom and un-engagement – social, political and family. The seasonal picking of berries, nuts and fern gathered rather a picturesque public. It was meaningfully said about many of them: “In fact, he has a higher education!” (respectful pause).Clergy (Christians and others) professed pathos based, again, on the idea of “martyrdom” and “holy path”, through which the Church had to pass mournfully, but with the dignity, in expectation of redemption. The idea of martyrdom was not strange to dissidents. The ardor of ecstatic feelings, the passionate desire to suffer for “the belief” pushed these people to Red Square in 1968 (the group of Elena Bogoraz) and to the publication and distribution of the forbidden literature. The famous song about “the courageous men’s insanity” was sung by “the courageous men” themselves – by the defenders of rights and fighters for the democratic idea.
The radical changes, which had occurred in the Russian society for the last 15 years altered the picture of social stratification. The dichotomy “prestige – pathos” has also changed. We can observe how the cast of the Russian social drama is changing before our eyes; how the objective statuses of socioeconomic groups and the subjective ideas of their members are transformed. This transformation has rather specific and complicated character. Some groups have kept and even strengthened their prestige: artists and film directors, singers, lawyers, journalists and others. This thriving category has been broadened by new characters: businessmen, bankers, politicians, - which turned from pale elements of political power into the embodiment of this power (powers). The considerable number of the socioeconomic groups has lost their prestige/dignified status completely – for example, miners, fishermen, workers, farmers, or to a considerable degree – such as teachers, scholars, doctors, writers, the military, etc. It is rather paradoxical that these new social pariahs are still functionally important for society, and their recent unenviable position perplexes and shocks them above all. It is also necessary to note that the descending mobility of such socioeconomic groups has not a complex, but rather a specific discrete character. By this I mean that a group, losing its social position, does not lose it completely. Within the criteria of a group’s social position three main parameters are usually included: economic, political, and professional, and new social pariahs are, first of all, economic pariahs. Thus, at the recent moment it is evident that it has become necessary for new socioeconomic outsiders to create their own pathos that is to act as the lost prestige. Let’s now have a look how this is occurring, what it is connected with, what it results in and what it can lead to.
The perception and the significance of a group on the part of both the public and the society are always evident in mass consciousness and in mass media. And, as a rule, in both places – half-reflected. During 1998, 1999, and the first half of 2000, large-scale sociological research of several socioeconomic groups was conducted, including content analysis of the Russian central press and a survey among a set of outcast groups in Siberian cities Irkutsk, and Angarsk.
Content
Analysis
We analyzed Komsomolskaya Pravda issues for 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999 concerning such groups as “workers”, “intelligentsia” (teachers, doctors), “the military”, “dissidents”, “criminals”, “businessmen”, “politicians”, and “clergy”. The total volume of analyzed material included 1,200 issues. The investigated parameters were frequency of mentioning, volume of attention, and total evaluative context (+/-). The category “+” was formed by information of positive, neutral and problematic-sympathetic character, the category “-“ – by problematic-condemnatory and negative information. The investigation of the quantitative parameters was complemented with the transsymbolic analysis (TSA)2. The characteristic dominative symbolic triad was established for each of the given communities. The frequency of mentioning was defined relatively from the whole number of investigated groups; the volume of attention is derived from the number of lines and characters in the given report, summarized and expressed in a percentage relative to the whole number of the groups.
Interpretation
“Workers”. In 1991 the given category of our citizens was in 6th place according to the volume of attention and the frequency of mentioning (in total). In 1993 – 1997 workers stayed in the 6th place according to these parameters in the reports of Komsomolskaya Pravda, and in 1999 they fell to the 7th position. The division of evaluative context is also quite stable – about 70% of information is of positive, neutral and problematic-sympathetic character, and about 30% is negative and problematic-condemnatory information. (To problematic-sympathetic information I attribute reports about accidents, hunger strikes, desperation. Problematic-condemnatory information includes reports about any kind of “destructivity” and so on). The dynamics of the dominative symbolic triad (DDST) is indicated in this group as following: 1991 – “demonstrators – impatient – claim” ~ 1993 – “men condemn to death – indignant – protest” ~ 1995 – “blasts – desperate – strike” ~ 1997 – “hunger strike – indignant – strike” ~ 1999 – “property – deceived – claim”.
An obvious syndrome of “unrealized desires” and the world's inadequate reactions to your actions is obvious. “You are indignant, but nothing happens! You are desperate, and then indignant, but nothing happens again! You can lie on the rails, you can block the roads, not ship coal, turn off electricity, sit for months at the Gorbatiy Bridge, rapping with helmets – all this is useless!” This phenomenon is very characteristic of Russia at the end of the XX century. In the West “symbolic violence” is more popular, when people are made to produce, to consumer, to vote and to think in a certain way. But in Russia the authorities learn “to solve” problems by just not noticing them. Speaking in the psychoanalytical language – problems (their bearers) are not “reacted to”.Symbolic violence, no matter how one views it, is, nevertheless, produced by the authorities’ attention to the people, that the Russian authorities are lack of.
The next category is “intelligentsia”. It includes two groups – doctors and teachers. This is so because of the discovered similarity of these groups by the parameters in investigation. Besides, in our research we omitted the other numerous representatives of “the leading horse of history” (K. Marx), deciding it is possible and expedient to confine intelligentsia to the “grounded”, the realest. So, by frequency of mentioning and volume of attention (in total) the intelligentsia moved from the 3rd place in 1991 to the 4th in 1993, then to 5th in 1995, again returned to the 4th in 1997, and moved to the 5th in 1999. The 3rd place in 1993 is quite logic – the discussion of humanism was very popular, then the following years made this concept irrelevant. The dynamics of the evaluative context is rather revealing. In 1991 negative context of the reports prevailed over positive (%) in correlation 53/47, what was connected with an active “exposure of the vices” of our education and medicine. Among the main incriminated “evils” were its free (in the monetary sense) basis and a certain “conservatism” of the existing orders and methods. However, later, in the balance of the evaluative context the positive prevails:the average correlation is +70/-30. The stability of negative 30% during the investigated period was supported by the regular reports about “indifferent doctors”, “doctors-killers”, “teachers-retrogrades” and “teachers-tormentors”. It was complemented with reports about various “doubtful experiments and technologies” in both spheres (for instance, eye microsurgery, Waldorf schools, etc.). It is interesting to note that in 1999 negative context rose sharply, reaching the correlation +40/-60. Mainly, the reason was hopeless lack of money and desperation, connected, again, with the obvious futility of all protest actions and absolute indifference of the authorities.
The DDST of the intelligentsia was as the following: 1991 – “responsibility – optimistic – work” ~ 1993 – “poverty – self-sacrificing – work” ~ 1995 – “hope – sympathetic – live in poverty” ~ 1997 – “lack of money – desperate – strike” ~ 1999 –“lack of money – desperate – work”. To this comments are unnecessary.
“The military.” In 1991, 1993, 1995 they were in the 2nd place by the frequency of mentioning and the volume of attention (in total), in 1997 – in the 3rd place, in 1999 – again in the 2nd position. The 2nd place at the first three analyzed sets of Komsomolskaya Pravda was based on: 1) the Soviet/Russian Army’s moving from all previous positions; 2) two political crises in the country (1991, 1993), when the Army was responsible for many of the political adventures; 3) the Chechen war, and other “hot points” of the post-Soviet space. The 2nd position in 1999 is again connected with the new Chechen war. The dynamics of the evaluative context is very characteristic. In 1991 +/- correlate as (%) 32.7/67.3, in 1993 – as 47.4/52.6. Once more it was a time of indiscriminate “democratization” and exposure, everything was destroyed, there was almost nothing holy and moral left. “Officer honor”, “duty of honor”, “defenders of the homeland” disappeared. Instead, “bullying”, “officer drunkenness”, “army dullness” appeared and widened. Only in 1995 the correlation changed for the benefit of the Army: +64.4/-35.4, - and increasing in 1997 to +71.2/-28.8.This may be connected with a satiation of abuse, and with a certain conscience of the mass media and mass attitude, when the fragments of the Chechen war affirmed once more the long-known fact, that the main privilege of a serviceman is the right to die during the fight. But the correlation in 1999 is also revealing: +45/-55%%. The latter must be connected, basically, with the growing tragedy, new losses, and with the growing evidence of the senselessness of the Caucasus war. DDST of the military is also logical (in the retrospect only, of course): 1991 – “aggressors – miserable – are banished” ~ 1993 – “discipline – gloomy – die” ~ 1995 – “courage – spitted on – pacify” ~ 1997 – “tiredness – desperate – return” ~ 1999 – “Russian – courage – fight”. The ethnic component of the given events, seen in 1999, is characteristic. It was there constantly, implicitly, but was carefully hidden behind the façade of “the struggle with terrorism”. “We are fighting not against the Chechens, but against the bandits!” was a leitmotiv of all governmental statements. Unfortunately, “we” fight just against the Chechens, the Chechen nation, and "we" are the Russians.
“Clergy”3.
According to the frequency of mentioning and the volume of attention (in
total): the clergy was in the 7th place in 1991, 3rd
in 1993, 4th in 1995, 2nd in 1997, 6th
in 1999. In the evaluative context of the reports on this theme the positive
content, undoubtedly, prevails: +/- correlate as (%) 85.4/14.6 in 1991;
80.7/19.3 in 1993; 91/9 in 1995; 91.9/8.1 in 1997; 80/20 in 1999.
Clergy’s DDST was as the following: 1991 – “revival – active – organize” ~ 1993 – “pastorate – merciful – consecrate” ~ 1995 – “sermon – active – educate” ~ 1997 – “service – patient – edify” ~ 1999 – “patriarch – active – work”. The clergy function during the whole investigated period is rather stably characterized by the tutorial-organizing content. It is necessary to note, however, that the basic set of the reports was devoted to the Orthodox clergy, reflecting the common tendency of the mass media publishing the reports on religious themes. Other religions, including quite “traditional” ones (such as the Russian Old-Believers, Catholicism), appear rarely, unwillingly, and in polysemantic evaluative context. As already mentioned, this phenomenon is a part of a more general process – the merciless struggle of the Russian Orthodox Church with its rivals in the spiritual sphere. It is revealing that the sharpest edge of this struggle is directed against the other Christian communities, including Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 7th Day Adventists, Pentecostal Church and others. Certainly, it is useless and even dangerous to criticize those, whose religious experience is defined by ethno cultural identity, i.e. such confessions as the Islam, Buddhism and Judaism. Here the spheres of influence are subdivided clearly – just like among the criminal structures, and the Orthodox Church is afraid to break “the convention”. It is a different story among the sphere of actual and potential Christians. I think it would not be a mistake to presuppose that if in Russia a kind of authoritative regime is to appear, then the obscurantism of such a state will be connected with the obscurantism of the Orthodox hierarchs.
“The Criminals”. In 1991 and 1993 the criminals were the 5th place according to the frequency of mentioning and the volume of attention, in 1995 in the 1st place (!), in 1997in the 7th place. “+” and “-“ of the evaluative context correlate as (%) 17/83 (1991), 11.7/88.3 (1993), 9.4/90.6 (1995), 40.3/59.7 (1997), 0/100 (1999). Remember, that the category “+” was formed by positive, neutral and problematic-sympathetic information, the category “-“ – by negative and problematic-condemning information.
The criminals’ DDST was as the following: 1991 – “gang – insolent – shoot up” ~ 1993 – “minors – cruel – rage” ~ 1995 – “terrorism – cruel – kill” ~ 1997 – “significance – serious – live (in such a way)” ~ 1999 – “criminals – cruel – kill”.
Thus, the diversification of the criminals has been reflected in the press, in our case – in Komsomolskaya Pravda. It is revealing that we see them in the 1st place by the total volume of attention and frequency of mentioning in 1995, connected with increasing negative context, in the 7th place in 1997, accompanied by almost equalization in the balance of the evaluative categories, and in the 3rd place in 1999. In the first case the reasons are more or less obvious – the Caucasus war, the mass of materials about gangsterism and terrorism, corruption, massive machinations, etc. In the second case the reasons are not so evident. The total attention, falling to the 7th place, is connected, first of all, with another situation that was absorbing all attention – the political crisis in Russia. The relative balance of the evaluative context is the result of a certain evolution of views and attitudes of both the domestic mass media, and the citizens – recipients, from the very ordinary ones to the very top brass. “The most ordinary” (especially among the youth) have their hair cut as short as possible (as if they have been just released from prison), squat down at the most unexpected places (talking about “life”). In winter they loosen the earflaps of their expensive (and not so expensive) hats (external “looseness” as a symbol of internal “unleashedness”, which is in fact just a permanent threatening “baring of teeth”), wear almost exclusively black clothing, not mentioning the slang, which has infested the “great and powerful, truthful and free” Russian language4. “The top strata” demonstrate their “unleashedness” linguistically – debates in the State Duma are filled with slang, sentences like “one should share” (A.Livshitz) and so on, and so forth. I would mention here inimitable “pedal”, all these meetings “without neckties” (the list can be continued).
Undoubtedly, the situation in Russia makes people protect themselves. One, who does not belong to any religious community, acts in the way, which seems to be the most adequate to his notions. If the state does not protect you – do it yourself, i.e. demonstrate constantly your aggressiveness. However, the problem is that such a behavior leaves traces on our deep ethic principles, on the “moral law inside us” (Kant). So, the criminals’ behavior and way of living are not perceived as an absolute pathology. It is hard to overestimate the role (and fault) of the press here. The essence of the reports on the criminals (Komsomolskaya Pravda) is that in place of usual reports on the criminality and articles about policeman-heroes, there is an abundance of detailed, psychological materials about various “yaponchik”, “michas”, “solonik” and other rabble (calling things by their proper names). In these large publications the figure of the hero with his desires, hopes, difficult fate and numerous sufferings moves to the foreground. The content of the personage’s criminal activity is relegated to the background, and sufferings, caused to other people, stay unrevealed. Paraphrasing the last Soviet General Secretary – M.Gorbachev, it is possible to say that the image of robbery “with a human face” has been established in Russia for some time.
“Businessmen”. According to the frequency of mentioning and the volume of attention (in total), businessmen were in 4th place in 1991, 7th place in 1993 and 1995, 5th place in 1997, and 4th place in 1999. “+” and “-“ of the evaluative context correlate as (%) 85/15 (1991), 79.1/20.9 (1993), 61.6/38.4 (1995), 60/40 (1997) and 45/55 (1999).
DDST of the businessmen is as follows: 1991 – “enterprise – charitable – grow rich” ~ 1993 –“enterprise – large – perish” ~ 1995 – “property – giant – trade” ~ 1997 – “management – reliable – agree” ~ 1999 – “small business – without rights – suffocate”. The data illustrate eloquently the evolution of the Russian society’s perception of the given category. The initial admiration for people who managed to earn an money, an incredible feat for the Soviet society, the first hopes, connected with the development of business in Russia have been replaced gradually by frustration, indifference and sullen observation.
The evolution of the Russian business itself is also obvious. From the fervor of young businessmen, crazy from their quick wealth and donating here and there, through the tragic period of deaths, connected with the appeal “to share” with the criminal community, to the increasing of volumes (up to the raw material potential of the country), obtaining of incredible power and influence, and achieving of complete agreement among themselves and the criminality. The latter, undoubtedly, is fed by enterprise; its strength and power are directly connected with the strength and power of the Russian business world. What, then, did Russian business “revive”, “enforce” and “put its feet up on?" (rhetorical question).
“Politicians”. It is a category that is very popular with the mass media. According to the frequency of mentioning and the volume of attention (in total), politicians were in the 1st place in 1991 and 1993, in the 3rd place in 1995, and in the 1st again in 1997 and 1999. The evaluative context: “+” and “-“ correlate as (%) 39/61 (1991), 46.6/53.4 (1993), 62.8/37.2 (1995), 74/26 (1997) and 60/40 (1999).
DDST of the politicians was: 1991 – “share – decisive – fight” ~ 1993 – “instability – scandalous – elucidate” ~ 1995 – “incompetence – scandalous – claim” ~ 1997 – “absurdity – comical – state”~ 1999 – “fever – nervous – go into”.
Unlike the criminality and businessmen, this is the category that has not divided everything yet. Or, in other words, the redistribution of the “power – property” in Russia has not been finished yet.
The famous Russian orientalist L.S.Vasyliev used the concept "power – property"5 in order to describe the specific social-political structure of traditional China. In the country where bureaucracy became a class as a social organization and a norm as a principle of governance, power and property are undivided. In Russia, this tandem is also traditional, but it is most obvious, bright and dangerous in moments of crisis, especially during such a deep and hopeless one as is occurring now. The dynamics of the dominative symbolic triad for Russian politicians is nothing but a diagnosis. The government, the legislative power, and free artists from politics all are irrational, preposterous, unpredictable and, the main thing, feckless in their behavior and statements. The phrase by C. -G. Jung “take one hundred of the most intelligent people, place them together and you will get the crowd of idiots”6 is, unfortunately, very often confirmed by the State Duma of the Russian Federation. As a rule, irrationality is destructive if it is connected with “power – property” and not with the harmless fine arts; when the “power – property” concept gives not a brush or pen, but tanks, artillery and troops. Politicians are becoming crazy, and along with them society is becoming crazy, too. One of today’s Russian paradoxes is the paralysis of the broad mass’s potential for protest, though the masses are constantly described as “ready for social explosion”, and the realization of the authorities’ protest potential (1991, 1993), which are expected to be predictable and stable.
In the DDST of this category, the movement from critical perception and hard formulations to the ironically sarcastic tone about everything that is connected with politicians is seen. This trend is accompanied by a movement to the more “touchy-feely” part of the evaluative context – a light criticism of the reports is combined with a kind lamenting and chiding, which is alternated with problematic-sympathetic reports (specifically, regular reports from the Central Clinic Hospital). As was already mentioned, politicians have transformed from figures representing political power (as it was during the Soviet period) into figures representing only themselves and nobody or nothing else. Almost every modern Russian politician is, concurrently, Narcissus, admiring himself, and the Uroboros, devouring himself, a figure that is self-satisfied, conceited and absolutely uncreative. Alas, I have to conclude that despite the all the spheres of the Russian social organism demand constructive fanatics, however, only destructive pragmatists appear (at least, till now).
"Dissidents". They stay stably in 8th (last) place according to the frequency of mentioning and the volume of attention (in total) during the whole analyzed period. However, the evaluative context changes, "+" and "-" correlate here as (%) 79/21 (1991), 75/25 (1993), 67.7/32.3 (1995), 56.9/43.1 (1997), 80/20 (1999).
DDST of the dissidents is: 1991 – "martyrs – talented – struggled" ~ 1993 – "oppositions – outstanding – hated" ~ 1995 – "realists – optimistic – prophesy" ~ 1997 – "hypocrites – unpleasant – insult" ~ 1999 – "art – talented – create".
Thus, the relation to this category has transformed quite obviously. Respectful attention has been gradually transformed into a more neutral form, and has finished with displeasure and annoyance. No doubt, the dissidents supported this process themselves. Pay attention to the past tense of the active symbol in 1991 and 1993. On one had, there is an obvious nostalgia for the time when there were opponents and, on the other hand, neurasthenic reminiscences of past merits, past protest actions and anti-Soviet activity. This is quite understandable, for after 1985 and especially after 1991 dissidents appeared to be in rather an absurd state – the communist monster, which they had been struggling for all their lives, destructed from the inside and not because of their actions. The process of self-exposure and subsequent castigation of the "communist king", crying around the world about his bareness and, moreover, ugliness, perplexed even many sovietologists, who had predicted the degradation of the regime but not so sweepingly. The world woke up in another world. Undoubtedly, this deprived the dissidents of the possibility to support the flame of their sacred indignation, and many of them were deprived of their livelihood (of their “voice” in various publications, etc.). Moreover, this placed under doubt their whole previous sense of life as a struggle against the Communism.
The West lost their interest in them and the dissidents returned to Russia and, at first, were not upset, as they were met gladly and respectfully. Remembering about previous sufferings, these people, each in their own way, began to explain "how to rebuild Russia". But interest fell. The increasing crisis of economics and other social spheres just did not leave any time to think over the incoherent and far from reality adages. The absence of attention, certainly, hurt and dissidents began to castigate the objects of not the past, but of the present. Though there was another tendency – the shutting of ears and eyes and repeating the incantation: "He is good, he is good, he is good" (Rastropovitch about Yeltsin). Naturally, the neurotic reaction caused quite a definite perception and attitude. Piety ceased its existence and criticism grew – in 1997 "+" and "-" of the evaluative context correlate already as 56.9/43.1! The absence of any peculiar respect for this category we can see among the masses. During the next stage of research 400 respondents were asked "Who are the dissidents?" and asked to name someone, if possible. 43.16 percent of the asked people could not answer the question at all, 56.84 percent demonstrated the presence of some idea. The most typical formulations reflect the fact that the dissidents are already "history"; answers were given in the past tense – "people having left the country due to political motives", "people having struggled against the state regime", "people who did not agree…", etc. Among these respondents 84 per cent could name someone concrete. Among the most frequently mentioned are Solzhenitsyn (79%), Sakharov (34.3%), Rastropovitch, Vishnevskaya, Galych, Brodsky (7.5%). One respondent mentioned Judah, and another one – Eltsin. In 1999 the tone of reports connected with dissidents became calmer, turning to esthetic points mostly. History deprived the dissidents of the laurels of the Communist regime's destroyers, but by this it created their final existential image, the basic element of which is the spirit of tragedy, the drama of destiny and professing ideas. They did not leave the sphere of spirit, did not violate the destructed regime, and all this bears some global, ontological meaning. It is difficult to imagine Alexander Solzhenitsyn as a deputy of the State Duma, standing in line to get to the microphone.
Thus, the thesaurus of all above-mentioned socioeconomic groups is defined. We have analyzed the way they were presented in the mass media (Komsomolskaya Pravda). To support the conclusions, a survey was conducted in four age groups. At the beginning of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to place such professions as doctor, teacher, worker, politician, serviceman, businessman, scientist, and priest in order of their prestige (the 1st position is "the most prestige one", the 2nd "less prestige" and so on). On the last page of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to evaluate the social significance of the same professions for society, using a five-point scale.
The results are as following: the most prestige professions are politician (71.2%) and businessman (60.4%). Worker (61.9%), priest (47.5%), and teacher (28%) are the least prestige (the last three positions). Doctor, serviceman and scientist rotated among three middle positions. Correlating these data with the evaluation of social significance we again have to speak about disjunction, paradox and, at the same time, antinomy of the Russians' mass consciousness. Among the most important (4-5 points) professions they named doctor (92%), teacher (90.6%), scientist (82%), worker (76.3%), serviceman (67.6%), and politician (60.4%). Only 32.3 per cent named priest as socially significant, and 10.8 percent mentioned businessman here. At the same time, 23 per cent of the respondents considered priest as the least important from the point of social significance (0.1 point), and 15.8 per cent said the same about businessman. In other words, those who are prestige today may be "unimportant", and vice versa. Disjunction and inconsistency of the Russians' mass consciousness are obvious. And here there is a problem of definition of "prestige's" concept and content. What is prestige? Obviously, functional significance for the society cannot be a criterion, at least in Russia of the end of the XX century. The criterion is "power – property", that power which brings property, and that property which brings power. At the same time, in two described measuring methods not only disagreement, but also certain conformities were found. So, a politician was acknowledged to be prestige, and the majority named him socially significant. Here, I think, a certain etatism of our psychology is. The coincidence in the case of priest is also noteworthy. Most respondents deprived this category of prestige as well as social significance. Russians' religiousness is still rather problematic, and the mass media, including electronic media, have forgotten the excommunication of Leo Tolstoy, and moral degeneration of the Orthodox clergy on the eve of 1917's revolution and now. In the press, on the radio and television, we see the parading of a trembling “father”.
Thus, there is a certain set of "prestige" groups, and groups deprived of prestige. How do the latter create their pathos, what do they base it on? Russian sociologists (V.A. Yadov and others) conducted research on the problems of social identifications in modern Russian society. It was found out that in the hierarchy of identities primary groups have stable dominative position; such groups as family, friends, colleagues, people of the same profession7. Thus, one of the fragments of the group's pathos is professional identity, the feeling of belonging to any common deed. However, what does this feeling consist in, in what forms is this identity realized? To find out we realized the next stage of our research. In spring, 1999, in Irkutsk and Angarsk, a survey of doctors and teachers, that very same “grounded” and non-prestige intelligentsia, was conducted. The aim of the questions was: 1) to find out common perception of their own profession; 2) to evaluate the professional self-realization and "absorption" of their profession; 3) to evaluate the possibilities and perspectives of welfare improvement and to state what these improvements would consist of for every respondent.
400 people were questioned (200 of each professional group), from age 19 to 64 years old. 75 percent have higher education, and 25 percent – professional education. The results in both the groups, as had been expected, turned out to be almost equal, so I give here a total result.
Thematic blocks were spread through the questionnaire to decrease the cumulative effect of this or that theme.
The Results. In the 1st block (perception of their profession) people were asked: "If you could choose again, would you have chosen the same profession?" 64.2% of asked people would have chosen another profession, 30.2% would have made the same choice, and 16.6% could not answer. The next question was whether the respondent felt the necessity of his job for recent Russian society. The answers were: "Very necessary" – 25%, "not very necessary" – 41.6%, "hardly necessary" – 29.2%. 100% of the asked agreed that their job did not get sufficient material evaluation, and that it should be increased:10 times – 58.3%, 4 times – 20.8%, twice – 16.6%.
However, 79.2% consider their profession to be "respected in society" ("non-respected" – 20.8). 84% of the asked consider their profession "worthy". 75% are satisfied with the results of their job "from time to time", 12.5% - "constantly", 8.3% - "seldom". Still, 85% did not want their children to choose the same profession.
The second thematic block (professional realization and "engagement"). As was found out during the research, 60% of the asked people follow resent inventions and achievements in their field constantly, 31.6% - from time to time, 8.3% - seldom. In the respondents' opinion, the most important condition of professional growth is personal aspirations (87.5%), less significant are individual peculiarities (50%) and material welfare (37.5%). 58.3% of the respondents are 70% fulfilled by their professional activity, 33.8% are 50% fulfilled, and only 8.4% are 100% fulfilled. 33.3% divide the volume of their attention between family and job equally, 16.6% - in 30/70% correspondingly, 20.8% - in 70/30%, and 20.8% - in 20/80%. To confirm the data, respondents were asked to evaluate their own professional level. 50% answered "close to their top", 41.7% think they can "grow and grow", and only 8.3% say they "have already achieved the maximum in their professional sphere".
The third thematic block (perspectives of improvements). Answering the question "What do you most connect with the possibility of improvement of your welfare?" - 92% answered that such a possibility is connected with the normalization of the general socio-economic situation in the country, 30.7% - with a change of job, 42.3% (mostly women) – with changes in personal life, and 69.2% - with personal professional improvement. Trying to predict the path of development of the situation in Russia for the following 10 years, 25% of the respondents expect only deterioration, 45.8% suppose that it will not be either much worse or much better. 25% expect some improvements, and 4.2% think there will be serious improvements. Answering the question "What results of the possible improvements would be most significant for you?" (on the five-point scale), the priorities were spread as following: 75% connected such improvements with the possibility receive sufficient payment for work, 70.8% - with the possibility of a calm and predictable life, 45.8% - with the possibility of professional improvement, 29.2% - with the possibility to respect the government, 25% - with the possibility to be proud of their country. 4.2% of the respondents could not answer the question (that must be those for whom such improvements seems absolutely unreal).
Interpretation. So, the majority of respondents said that they would have made another professional choice. The answer was evidently given under the influence of the general social mood, and that was the intent, as the question was the first. The necessity of one’s own profession is felt weakly, and is, undoubtedly, connected with disproportional wages; the majority defined this difference in 10 times (the same question, asked in the same professional groups in spring 1998, "before the crisis", gave other result – "in 4 times").
The next questions, more deep, show a certain "warming" of the atmosphere of the social mood, and the majority define their profession as respectable in the society and, undoubtedly, worthy from their own point of view. At the same time, "the fruits of work" fulfill the respondents only "from time to time". Certainly, this is connected with the peculiarities of the professional activity of a doctor or teacher, but at the same time, with personal responsibility and self-discipline. However, the majority would not wish their children choose the same profession – this is again the influence of general situation.
The majority of the respondents maintain their desire for the professional growth, and the main condition of such growth is considered personal aspirations, and not the material factor. It is characteristic that only a minimum of our respondents is 100% fulfilled in their work, the 70% fulfillment prevailed. The majority of the respondents divide their life equally between family and job; however, there is a tendency of prevailing professional activity. Most respondents define themselves as people knowing their job rather well; a quarter of the respondents call themselves professionals. There is obvious professional caution in evaluations and conclusions, and yet a certain pride about their professional level. One half of our respondents consider themselves to be "close to their top", the other half thinks they can and must grow and develop more and more. "The top" here is not a limit; it is that professional level which is considered desirable for the answering respondent. Only a minimal number of the respondents could say they "have already reached the maximum".
It is rather significant that the absolute majority connects the possibility of their welfare improvement with the normalization of the general socio-economic situation in the country, and only a quarter of the respondents consider such future improvements possible. Maybe that is why 69.2% of the respondents rely only on their personal professional improvement. Hypothetically, the improvements are connected with the possibility to receive worthy payment for work and to lead a calm, predictable life. In general, and quite understandably, these are simple and really important things, unlike abstract things such as the possibility to respect the government and to be proud of the country.
Thus, recently "non-prestigious" doctors and teachers do not just escape in their own group of everyday practice and professional environment, but demonstrate a significant potential to self-improvement and aspiration to the realization of this self-improvement, depending only on them. So, the content and character of one fragment, or one half of the pathos of this socioeconomic group ("intelligentsia"), have been described. What is its other part? It is the awareness of the low perspective for the profession in the future (remember the question about children), the assurance of unbelievably disproportional wages, the low level of satisfaction from work, the complete awareness of little possibility of any positive changes in the society and, at the same time, a generally positive social-professional identity! People of this group having realized the hardness and bitterness of their chosen path go this way persistently, with their head proudly lifted. Is this not the same thing that was used by the dissidents, priests, and criminals during the Soviet power? Yes, it is exactly! Non-prestigious group refuses to carry the stamp of non-prestigeness, and, creating in its pathos, supposes "saintly martyrdom" as one of two constituents. Thus, the pathos of a group is "narrowly specialized" social mood, cultivated in the unfavorable for group socio-economic conditions and called to play the role of unreachable prestige, i.e. to give ontological sense and unordinary meaning to the type and character of a group's activity, and is based on a prior and structuralized professional identity connected with the professing necessary martyrdom for the right deed.
Thus, there are prestige groups and groups of pathos; prestige and pathos are converted phenomena, they have the same task – to save a socioeconomic community. There is a discordance of the principle bases of prestige and non-prestige groups. "Non-prestigious" groups may be socially significant, and "prestige" ones may be deprived of such significance, what reflects general discordance and synchronous antinomy of mass consciousness in today's Russian society.
Alas, it seems we continue to throw stones both aside and at one another. And still, when it is the time to gather them, when we awake from the absurdity and fuddle of "the dynamic chaos" and begin to build new democratic Russia, these people will be our only hope – the professionals, creating their pathos.
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