Ireneusz C. Kaminski
 
 

Law and the media in Poland


  1. Legal provisions relevant for freedom of the media.
In Polish law exists a number of legal provisions which may raise serious doubts as whether these rules conform with European standards established first of all on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the case law resulting therefrom. The first part of this paper aims at presenting the main discrepancies between the standards and the legal provisions, the second one offers a short overview of the most important media cases either pending or recently decided in Polish courts. The author takes advantage of a recent analysis of Polish law relevant for the media which was prepared by experts of the Centre for Monitoring of Freedom of the Press, a Warsaw non-governmental organization.
 
 

Penal Code.
 
 

Although Poland has a new penal code which came into force September 1, 1998 and had been prepared with the aim to adjust criminal provisions to the requirements of the European Convention, several rules seem to suggest that this aim has not been achieved successfully.
 
 

Art. 135 § reads that "anyone who in public insults President of the Republic is liable to up to three years’ imprisonment". This provision is a remnant of the corresponding rules of the old penal code which penalized insults directed against Polish nation, socio-political system, "leading" state organs with the draconian sanctions of up to 8 years’ imprisonment (when an act was committed by means of mass communication the sanction was up to 10 years’ imprisonment). Under the present law, it suffices that insulting words have been spoken or otherwise communicated to others to commit an act of insult against President. This crime is a crime of action not a crime of result. The provision seems to contradict those Strasbourg principles which specify that the level of protection of public figures (even the highest ones) should be lower than in case of non-public persons.
 
 

Art. 226 § 1 provides that "anyone who insults a civil servant or a person officially assisting him during or in connection with carrying out of his official duties is liable to a fine, to restriction of personal liberty or up two years’ imprisonment". When compared with the previous penal code, this provision seems even to broaden the scope of intervention because it has replaced the old phrase "during and in connection" with the new one of "during or in connection".
 
 

Art 226 § 3 reads that "anyone who insults or abases a constitutional organ of the Republic is liable to a fine, restriction of personal liberty or up to two years’ imprisonment". This provision is a remnant of the archaic construction of crimen laese maiestatis which afforded a special protection to public persons or institutions. Apart from that, the provision does not precise which constitutional organs are protected by the law. A far-reaching interpretation of this rule may encompass all state organs and institutions mentioned in the Constitution.
 
 

Art. 212 § 1 states that "anyone who defames another person, a group of people, an institution, a legal entity or organizational unit without legal personality by attributing them an act or a characteristic which may abase them in the eyes of public opinion or jeopardize the loss of confidence necessary to carry out a certain post, profession or kind of activity is liable to a fine, restriction of personal liberty or up to one year’s imprisonment". § 2 continues that "if a perpetrator commits an act prescribed in § 1 by means of mass communication he is liable to a fine, restriction of personal liberty or up to two years’ imprisonment". According to the materials from the legislative procedure (travaux pré paratoires), these provisions have been enacted to increase the protection of good name by setting out limits on the right to criticism, especially when this criticism is expressed publicly and concerns private and family matters.
 
 

The truth of statements is an excuse upon the condition that the statements are communicated to safeguard "a socially protected interest". If, however, a statement concerns a private or family matter the proof of truth is admissible only when the statement aims to prevent a danger to human life or health, or demoralization of minor (art. 213 § 2). The requirement of the proof of truth is applicable both to facts and opinions. As such it is very restrictive. The Strasbourg Court has in its case law stressed that when value judgments are concerned this requirement is impossible of fulfilment and accordingly infringes freedom of opinion. Even in case of facts many modern Western laws provide for good faith and public interest defences. In Poland, the defence of "socially protected interest" is applicable only when true statements are involved. It is not certain whether courts will interpret the latter element in subjective terms (journalist thought that statements were truthful and was justified in his opinion) or objectively (statements are true as such). In the first situation Polish practice would be consistent with European standards. In the latter case, however, penal law would punish not only the dissemination of information known to be false, but also statements made in good faith if the perpetrator cannot prove their truthfulness or could not - according to reasonable standards - predict that they were not true.
 
 

Many doubts also rises the absoluteness of the restriction for the proof of truth when statements involve a private or family issue. With the exception of the three explicitly defined situations, truth does not exonerate from criminal responsibility even when a statement involves a public figure and is made to protect a legitimate social interest. Polish law does not allow any balancing of different interests and if the judicial practice will literally follow what the law says it will essentially infringe the right to information.
 
 

Apart from the provisions mentioned above there are several other norms which restrict freedom of expression and freedom of the media as well. Art. 196 penalizes anyone who offends others’ religious beliefs by publicly reviling an object of religious reverence or a public place of worship. Art. 256 makes liable anyone who publicly propagates fascist or other totalitarian regime as well as incites to hatred on account of national, racial, ethnic or religious differences. According art. 257 liable is also anyone who publicly defames a person or a group of people because of their national, racial, ethnic and religious attachments. Although Polish penal law does not follow a market of ideas approach, all these restrictive provisions do not seem to directly violate the corresponding European standards. Much will depend on the judicial practice which will have to balance conflicting interests and principles, as well as evaluate dangers and consequences of particular acts. Not each act of disseminating totalitarian ideas or communicating hate speech should face a reaction of the law. To render a good decision in such situations Polish courts should find guidelines in the Strasbourg case law on what is necessary in a democratic society.
 
 

Civil Code
 
 

All cases of civil libel/defamation are based on art. 23 which provides for the protection of so called personal goods. One of these protected goods, which the article explicitly enumerates, is good name. Such a regulation does not differ from other Western laws. In Polish Civil Code there is, however, a certain additional rule which is dangerous for freedom of the press. Art. 448, which was introduced by a novelty to the Code in 1996, provides that while finding a violation of personal good, the court may award either pecuniary compensation to the plaintiff or adjudicate "an appropriate" sum of money for a social purpose which the plaintiff specifies. The court does it "irrespective of any other means that are necessary to eliminate results of the violation". This provisions has replaced art. 40 of the Press Act which allowed compensation for a natural person only in case of deliberate violation, i.e. when journalist acted out of malicious intent, to discredit or to ridicule another person. Now journalist’s civil responsibility is not conditional upon the qualified form of intent on his part.
 
 

Civil Procedure Code
 
 

Art. 730 § 1 provides rules that secure claims in civil law suits during the pendancy of cases. Court may issue an interim/temporary injunction when a claim is credible and the plaintiff can prove that without this measure he may be deprived of satisfaction. In practice interim injunction prevents journalists from publishing materials which are the subject matter of civil actions for libel. Given that in Poland proceedings in civil cases take usually many months and even years, the application of the measure results in a serious restriction of publication. Courts issue injunctions very easily only after the plaintiff’s declaration that his claim deserves interim protection. Moreover, it happened that Polish civil courts awarded this measure also when the publication at issue was not known to the court or even was not yet existing (!). The Centre for the Monitoring of Freedom of the Press considers this practice as the most serious and dangerous restriction which in fact creates a form of preventive censorship. The Centre, accordingly, postulates an urgent novelty of the rules on interim injunction in media cases. The novelty may consist in enacting a lex specialis regulation which would set out higher criteria to evaluate whether the claim is credible. In addition it should oblige the court to consider if the publication is not justified by an overwhelming social interest. Moreover, there should be rules which make interim injunction actually of interim character. According to the proposal the court would have to decide the case on merits in a certain time, e.g. seven or fourteen days, and only for such a period the claim might be secured by interim measures.
 
 

Penal Procedure Code
 
 

Art. 180 offers journalists, along with doctors and advocates, guarantees for non-disclosure of professional secrets. § 2 provides that members of the three professions "can be heard as witnesses about facts which are covered by professional confidentiality only when it is indispensable for the good of the administration of justice and when certain circumstances cannot be established by other evidence. Court decides about hearing or gives permission to hear. The court decision can be complained of". § 3 specifies that "exemption of the journalist from the obligation to keep professional secrets is not applicable to information which could enable to identify the author of a press material, a letter to the editor or other material of this kind, as well as to identify people who provided information which was published or designed for publication, if these people have reserved the right of non-disclosure of the above data". The protection given by § 3 is not applicable in case of the most serious crimes which are enumerated in art. 240 of the Penal Code (genocide, high treason, espionage, attack on life of President, terrorist attack on military forces or an object of military character, murder, bringing about danger to life, health of many people or to a property of huge size, hi-jacking, hostage taking). This regulation has replaced the previous unclear rules which generated a lot of problems and met criticism of journalists. Now the situation seems to be much more precise as the law explicitly provides guarantees of non-disclosure of sources. There is, however, § 5 which reads that the refusal to disclose data specified in § 3 does not exempt the journalist from criminal liability for a crime he committed publishing the information. This provision opens a possibility to pursue journalists for certain types of crimes or offences, first of all for breach of secrecy, when they refuse to reveal the source of information. In such a case journalist may become the main perpetrator (see case law below) when the Office of Public Prosecutor cannot identify the informant by other means.
 
 

  1. Main media cases and the application of European standards.
1. The most important case seems to be Kwas niewski v. Z ycie. The case is now pending before the Regional Court in Warsaw and may very likely turn out to be a leading and path-breaking case for legal practice in a certain important branch of civil law and even in broader legal terms. This case ignites a lot of emotions because it carries a strong political element, but it also makes lawyers, who would pretend to argue on a more neutral legal basis, excited.
 
 

The plaintiff in this case is the President of the Republic, Aleksander Kwas niewski, acting as a private person. The defendant is daily "Zycie", a leading quality newspaper. In August 1997 the daily published a well documented article whose authors stated that in summer 1994 Aleksander Kwas niewski, then not yet president, had spent his holiday in a renown resort at the same time when a Russian citizen, a high rank former KGB agent, now a businessman, had also been staying there. The authors wanted a president’s comment on the findings and asked for an interview accordingly. Before the publication appeared, some news about the content of the material broke to the public, so it must also have been known to the future plaintiff. His press office tried to postpone the interview, suggesting that the president was very busy. After having been waiting for over a week, the newspaper decided to print the article. Once the publication had appeared, the president instituted proceedings for civil libel. He demanded a compensation of 2.5 million zloty, which is the equivalent of over 700,000 US dollar. He presented some evidence that he could not have been in the incriminated place at the stated time. To make the political background more understandable, only one more information. The plaintiff, who now declares to be the president of all Poles, before the election was the most prominent figure of the post-communist political left. The defendant - on the other hand - is a daily with strong commitment to anticommunist Solidarity tradition.
 
 

Before the court proceedings started, there had appeared a series of articles and comments written by Polish academics and practicing lawyers who pointed out that damages demanded in civil cases must be evaluated in the light of the European Convention. They referred to the case Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom which requires compensation to be proportionate and not excessive. In Tolstoy Miloslavsky, the Strasbourg Court recognized that a court decision awarding £ 1,500,000 compensation for libel committed in a pamphlet had violated art. 10 of the Convention. Such an amount was not necessary in a democratic society and did not assure a reasonable relationship of proportionality to the legitimate aim pursued in the proceedings. The Court did not, however, point out what would be the reasonable and the proportionate. According to some suggestions and practice, test of proportionality may refer to such elements as the average salary in a particular country or the average damages awarded when more basic goods are violated, especially in case of death and injury. In Poland, in the latter situation damages are relatively low and under communism any compensation for moral suffering was considered contradictory to new emerging communist morality. By awarding, in the pending case, any compensation approximate to the plaintiff’s demand, Polish courts would risk that their judgement be complained to Strasbourg. Judges in the case must also take into account the fact that if the damages were awarded according to the plaintiff’s demand it would mean serious financial problems - and even bankruptcy - of the leading political daily. This consequence must not be disregarded by the judges as freedom of the press has been declared one of the most fundamental values important for the proper functioning of democratic society which are given special protection under the Convention.
 
 

2. In autumn 1997 Polish public television and one private station shown a video tape which depicted police dealings at the time of a local soccer match. Before this sport event the police detained a group of fans. The fans were searched for possession of dangerous tools. Before being freed some fans were forced to say to the police camera that they loved the police and one boy had to pronounce colloquial phrases which meant confessing to onanistic practices. The tape was sold by a policeman to fans who subsequently handed it down to the television stations. The same day the scenes were several times shown in information journals without any covering or blinding of the face of the boy who pronounced humiliating words.
 
 

The boy’s parents instituted proceedings for a civil libel asserting that the publication had held him up to ridicule by schoolmates. They demanded 400,000 ZL (about 100,000 USD) from the public television and 200,000 from the private station. The court recognized that the two stations had infringed personal goods of the boy by showing his face. The journalists as professionals should have predicted defamatory results of the depicted scenes and words. Simultaneously the court pointed out, however, that the stations had not acted in pursue of sensational materials but with the intention to reveal illegal practices of the police. In assessing damages the court - said the judges - must take into account intentions of the perpetrator, harm which was inflicted as well as the standard of living in Polish society. Accordingly the court decided to award the compensation of 10,000 ZL (public television) and 5,000 ZL (private one). For the first time in media cases Polish court has overtly referred to the requirement of proportionality between damage and compensation which should be assessed on the basis of comparison with some economic indices relevant for Polish society. In consequence, the case can serve as a precedent for many other pending cases where high and excessive compensation was demanded by the plaintiff. It is also worth mentioning that the test/requirement of proportionality sounds familiar to many Western media law and practice as well as makes Polish judicial activity consistent with European standards.
 
 

3. In 1984 three functionaries of the Ministry of Interior had kidnapped, beaten and murdered priest Popiel uszko, a Catholic clergyman known for his active support of then clandestine Solidarity. Because of the strong public reaction to the killing, the existence of witnesses and many evidence pointing out where to look for the perpetrators, Communist authorities could not have covered up the murder. The three officers as well as a deputy director of the ministerial department in charge of spying Catholic church were sentenced to long imprisonment. In February 1997 Polish tabloid "Super Express" published a story about one of the perpetrator, Grzegorz Piotrowski. The newspaper wrote that when on temporal release from jail, Piotrowski would be employed by a woman who is actually his extramarital daughter. Piotrowski sued the newspaper demanding compensation of 100,000 ZL for infringement of his personal goods. The court awarded him 7,000 ZL pointing out that the information concerned private and intimate life which as a principle must be protected by law. No public interest justified in this case any limitation of this protection although Piotrowski became a publicly known person.
 
 

4. Mirosl aw Lewandowski v. Filmotechnika. The defendant is an advertising agency which was sued for having distributed a poster of the film "People v. Larry Flynt". The poster depicted the figure of a naked man with crossed arms silhouetted against a background of woman’s hips. The figure resembled crucified Christ. The plaintiff stated that the poster violated his religious feelings and demanded apology as well as compensation of 10,000 ZL paid to a fund for victims of the flooding in 1997. He stressed that he did not want the introducing of a censorship but looked for the protection of religious beliefs. The Regional Court in Cracow rejected the demand and pointed out that the agency did not have an obligation nor a right to censor the content of materials given it for distribution. Court of Appeal confirming the decision of the lower court referred to the European Convention and stressed that according to European standards individual’s feelings, which are protected by the law, cannot be treated in absolute terms and must be weighed up against the freedom of expression of others.
 
 

5. In May 1996 weekly "Poznaniak" published an article on homosexual prostitution which accompanied a picture of two young men. This picture was taken in entirely different circumstances than described in the article (in fact during a charity action). The weekly tried to escape liability by stating that the article had been written by journalists not employed by the weekly and the weekly had but bought the picture from a freelance photographer. Moreover, the weekly had twice apologized the wronged persons. The court found, however, that the publisher was responsible for the materials because even in this situation he should have acted very diligently. Assessing the size of compensation, the court decided that although the plaintiffs had not suffered any serious harm affecting their life plans and the results of the publication concerned rather "the sphere of fears", they deserved the damages of 15,000 ZL each (close to their original demand of 20,000 ZL). A similar case happened recently when a newspaper published an article about Polish tennis player Wojciech Fibak who was interrogated by a Paris prosecutor in relation with a luxury prostitution affair. The story was illustrated with a picture of a young woman sitting close to the tennis star. The picture was taken during an official party and the woman instituted action for a civil libel. She won the case.
 
 

6. When post-Solidarity President Lech Wale sa was leaving his post to the newly elected post-communist candidate, Aleksander Kwas niewski, he convened a meeting of several official persons where he revealed that there were serious suspicions that a high rank political figure was a mole working for KGB. Some evidence were collected by Polish intelligence during a secret abroad operation. The materials suggested that the mole called "Olin" might have been Jó zef Oleksy, a leading figure of the post-communist left and then prime minister. He had contacts with Wl adymir Al ganow, a higher KGB officer now working as a businessman (it is the same person who is alleged to have stayed in a renown resort at the same time when Aleksander Kwas niewski was there in summer 1994. An article on this led to the civil libel action described in point 1). The affair stirred a lot of emotion leading to the resignation of Oleksy from his post. Ultimately the Military Prosecutor’s Office decided that there was no evidence that Oleksy and "Olin" was the same person and accordingly terminated the investigation. The reasons of the decision were partly published but some fragments were made secret. In May 1996 daily "Zycie Warszawy" revealed a classified fragment which contained the name of a KGB agent working for Polish intelligence. The Office of Military Prosecutor wanted to know the source of the leak and demanded this information from the editors-in-chief. They refused the demand quoting the protection of journalist’s sources. The prosecutor disagreed and started criminal proceedings for an act of support in breaching of secrecy. In December 1998 Regional Court in Warsaw decided - on the request of the prosecutor himself - that the new Penal Code, which came into force on 1 September 1998, entitles the journalist to non-disclosure of his sources. The only explicitly enumerated exceptions when the journalist may be asked to reveal sources of information concern a limited group of the most serious crimes which does not include breaches of secrecy.
 
 

In the light of the aforementioned decision as a surprise must come another case concerning the same spy affair. Jerzy Jachowicz, a journalist working for the biggest Polish daily "Gazeta Wyborcza", revealed the name - very likely not true but "operative" - of a Polish intelligence officer who had participated in the abroad operation mentioned before. The journalist refused to disclose his source of information and was then accused not only of an act of support in breaching of secrecy but of a breach of secrecy itself. In January 1999 the prosecutor has terminated proceedings for the act of support (non-disclosure of sources) but the case for the breach of secrecy is still pending before a Circuit Court in Warsaw. Such a practice may be a dangerous precedent because on the one side the Prosecutor’s Office accepts the protection of sources but on the other it institutes proceedings on a more serious legal basis.
 
 

7. Andrzej and Monika Kern v. "Agora" Weekly. In August 1992 Andrzej Kern, then Deputy Speaker of Polish Parliament, made a special television appeal for help in searching his daughter Monika, a high school student, who had disappeared. He also informed about the disappearance the Prosecutor’s Office which started an investigation for kidnapping accordingly. It was becoming, however, very quickly increasingly apparent that the circumstances were entirely different. The girl had a love affair and escaped with a boy. The boy’s parents supported the couple and refused to give any information about the place where the two were hiding. When the prosecutor could not find the mother of the boy to hear her he issued a warrant of caption (a "wanted" notice) and later on even arrested her. Her advocate became Michal Plisiecki who in an interview to "Agora" said that Andrzej Kern (also a barrister) had misused his power, called him a liar and put in doubts his qualification as a parent. The weekly wanted an interview with Anrzej Kern but he refused the offer.
 
 

After a few years Monika has returned to her parents (in the meanwhile she married and divorced). The Kerns instituted a civil action for libel stating that the publication had infringed their personal goods and especially their right to privacy. They demanded apology and compensation. The court of first instance recognized that Andrzej Kern had contributed to making the affair public and - as a result - to the growing interest media had in it, but despite this element the weekly should have censored the interview because it dealt with the intimate sphere of family relations. In the Court of Appeal the lawyers for the weekly argued that Andrzej Kern was a public person and this qualification justified writing about his private and family life. It is also apparent that he contributed to the interest in the affair. Moreover, continued the lawyers for the defendant, the court should differentiate the newspaper’s own comment from the interview, especially when interviewed is a professional person about issues of his professional activity. In the latter situation, the publisher may rely on what the interviewed has said and any censorship in such a case would amount to an unacceptable limitation set on freedom of information. The plaintiff’s advocate opposed this argument by stating that the law affords the protection of private life to everybody, be it a private or public person. The court upheld the decision of the first instance changing only slightly the words of apology. It stressed that this part of interview which concerned the alleged misuse of power was a legal opinion that did not need verification by the publisher. In consequence, the weekly cannot be held liable for what said the lawyer (that is where the court changed the content of apology). "Agora" is, however, responsible when the interview touched private and family matters.
 
 

The lawyers for the weekly has lodged a cassation to the Supreme Court and are considering an action to the Strasbourg Court if this decision dissatisfies them.
 
 

  1. Interim injunction cases.
Polish civil courts in many defamation cases automatically afforded the plaintiff the temporary protection during the pendency of cases if he demanded the application of interim injunction. Courts seem to have presumed that the mere fact of taking legal action for an alleged infringement sufficed to justify measures preventing any further dissemination of the materials.
 
 

Interim injunctions have been applied in several important cases:
 

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