Research Proposal

Regional movements in Serbia
– Sources of conflict or part of the solution?

Relevance of the topic
With the recent enlargement of the European Union, the EU and the so-called Western Balkans have become direct neighbors. The stabilization, development, and eventual integration of the region is imperative to reduce the spillover-danger of soft security threats. The democratization of Serbia is a key precondition for creating long-term security in the Western Balkans, yet progress has been far too slow since the ousting of the Milosevic regime. Critical moments are soon to come, as
•    Montenegro presses ahead with the referendum on independence,
•    Crucial decisions are taken regarding the fate of Kosovo,
•    The Serbian government prepares a new constitution setting the main rules of the game,
•    The stalling of the EU-constitution’s ratification calls into question the EU’s commitment to the region.
In this context, I want to address the problem of what kind of policies the EU should adopt concerning the decentralization of Serbia. It is time for the EU to set a clear policy towards the ongoing disputes over the territorial organization of Serbia. It is worth to remember that since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro has faced further self-determination movements, not only in Kosovo and Montenegro, but also in Vojvodina, Southern Serbia and the Sandzak region. Besides movements aiming at territorial autonomy or independence, some minorities – including Hungarians of Vojvodina, Sandzak Muslims and Albanians in Southern Serbia – also began to call for a degree of self-governance, which would require delegating more power to municipalities. The EU Commission has not addressed these problems at all so far. It can be argued that finding the right answer to these challenges is as important for Europe’s future security, as is pressing Serbia to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal. Thus the fundamental question is how the EU should respond to Serbia’s potential decentralization.

The current situation
In April 2005, the EU gave a green light for Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). Negotiations have started in October, and according to the EU’s twin-track approach, specific issues can be negotiated with the individual Republics, not only with the state union. The EU adopted this approach due to the unresolved status of Serbia and Montenegro. The EU highlighted a range of issue areas that were deemed likely to influence the state union’s chances for establishing a contractual relationship with the EU. These were: co-operation with the ICTY, the resolution of relations between the republics, democratic functioning of parliaments and executives, respect for human and minority rights, reform of public administration, the continuation of legal and economic reforms and the strengthening of administrative capacity. These were highlighted the most important for signing the SAA.  Clearly, meeting these conditions is essential for ensuring the country’s eventual EU membership and to foster democratic progress in the Balkans.
Until now, however, it has largely escaped the EU’s attention that since the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, Serbia has found itself home to several self-determination movements, which are inexorably pulling the central state apart. It seems as if the centrifugal forces that tore Yugoslavia apart in the early 1990s are still at work, pushing for further disintegration. Even though another war at this point is unlikely, the future make-up of the country will likely influence the geopolitical situation of the whole Balkan region. This process is still playing out, and has an impact on the stabilization and democratization of the country.
The forces pushing Serbia toward a more decentralized state have met with firm resistance from Belgrade. While these movements have put Serbia under considerable strain, it can be assumed that some form and degree of decentralization would be beneficial. While minority groups most often put forward demands directly concerning minority rights, it can be argued that functional decentralization of Serbia in itself would reduce the frustration of those minority communities that participate in local governments. Pushing Serbia to decentralize state power may be effective in easing internal tensions and fostering the creation of democratic institutions. The need to adopt the appropriate EU policy concerning this matter is urgent, as Serbia is drafting a new constitution this very moment.

Proposed Project
In order to arrive at feasible and realistic EU policies, the inner dynamics of the various movements need to be studied more closely. The existing literature on Sandzak, on South-Serbia, etc. prepared by International Crisis Group and other think-thanks deal with these issues from a narrow conflict resolution perspective: how to reduce the threat of resurgent violence on the ground. However, to foster long term stability, I propose examining these cases in the broader context of Serbia’s transition, democratization and Europeanization. The following questions have to be answered:
•    how and under what conditions each movement started and further evolved,
•    what are its sources,
•    what are the political forces and parties behind it,
•    how politicians mobilized the people,
•    why people have supported the movement,
•    what are the main grievances and demands,
•    in what ways the movements have influenced each other,
•    what are the possible solutions,
•    whether by delegating more functional authority to municipal self-governments some problems of national minorities could be dealt with more effectively.
I propose analyzing political mobilization in each case by the method of process tracing. The main sources of evidence will be academic and policy reports, articles on these cases, reports of events on the ground, opinion polls, and interviews. Conducting interviews on the ground would be especially crucial to the validity of my findings. Therefore, I would need to visit capitols of each region and interview representatives of local parties. My proposed research would focus on those self-determination movements that have territorial aspirations, concentrating on the most recent period (last one-year). These include: 
•    The Vojvodinan movement for territorial autonomy,
•    Hungarians in Vojvodina calling for autonomy,
•    Sandzak Muslims calling for an autonomous Sandzak region,
•    Albanians of Southern Serbia trying to create “Eastern-Kosovo”.

The main thesis of the research is that functional decentralization of Serbia through empowering municipalities could benefit minority groups and reduce ethnic tensions. While meeting demands for minority rights requires more than decentralization, decentralization still could be a simple and practical step in that direction. Furthermore, granting more substantial authorities to local self-governments could possibly pre-empt claims for territorial autonomy put forward by these three minority communities. Besides, bestowing local governments with more autonomy would probably be welcome by most municipalities in Serbia, as most of them complain about the centralized nature of the state. It should be also noted that raising the issue of decentralization with a focus on municipalities would be politically less sensitive than pressing demands for more minority rights, as decentralization carried out this particular way would be an “ethnically blind”, uniform measure.
Thus, it is argued here that decentralization should be carried out with a focus on municipalities. Therefore, examining the current situation of local governments in Serbia will be an essential part of the research, also mapping the different models of decentralization available in Europe. Certainly there is room for improvement in the area of local democratic governance in Serbia, as local authorities still lack substantial fiscal autonomy that prevents them from improving the quality of public services or from providing new ones. In addition, the municipalities have still not had the property returned that the state took from them in 1996.

The ultimate purpose of such a study would be to formulate policy recommendations for EU decision-makers, concerning the conditions the EU should put on Serbia regarding decentralization in light of the potential security threats. The EU must create incentives that encourage Serbia to implement decentralization in a way that fosters stability. This is not a simple task taking into account that some of the movements have hidden or open secessionist aspirations. An analysis through the questions above can provide a detailed picture about the various movements, and can also help to decide to what extent cultural factors should be considered in the design of such an EU policy.
An additional goal of the research is to discuss findings with Serbian experts and politicians that have an influence on the decentralization process.

The cases
A further reason why such in-depth study of these movements is necessary is that sometimes they can look quite contradictory and confusing at first glance. Vojvodinan politicians portray their movement as something inherently democratic, pro-EU, etc, yet the last couple years their support base has considerably contracted. There might be several explanations for this, but certainly one is that provincial political parties lost their credibility and many of their leaders have been accused of corruption. At the same time, the supporters of Vojvodina’s autonomy claim that regionalization would speed the democratization of Serbia and accelerate the process of EU integration. In addition, leaders of the Hungarian minority also support Vojvodina’s autonomy as they see the province as a better guarantor of minority rights than the Serbian state.
It can be argued that minority communities in general might gain a degree of self-governance from decentralization. The example of Subotica during the Milosevic regime demonstrates how important local governments can be to counterbalance country-wide negative tendencies disadvantaging minorities. The municipal self-government of Subotica played a crucial role in sustaining Hungarian and Croatian cultural institutions and preserving the representation of minorities in public sector jobs during the generally hostile environment of the Milosevic era.
Another reason why empowering local governments would be beneficial for minorities is that many of their grievances are related to everyday life-concerns. While Albanians living in the Presevo valley supported moderates during the 2002 local elections, tackling their everyday problems would be a key to gain their loyalty for the Serbian state and to convince them to abandon the idea of creating Eastern Kosovo in the Presevo valley. As Kosovo moves towards independence the Albanians in Southern Serbia will very likely remain a source of tension and potential conflict as well, which might also lead to renewed ethnic cleansing of non-Albanians from Kosovo and destabilize Macedonia.
Southern Serbia and Sandzak are the most economically depressed regions of Serbia, and unemployment is especially high among the young male population. As a result of the policy of discrimination during the Milosevic regime, all three minority communities in question came to be under-represented in public institutions and in the management of companies to be privatized. The integration of Albanians into state institutions such as courts, the judiciary, postal services, tax authorities, land registry, local development agencies, etc. has been very slow or non existent since the adoption of the Covic Plan in 2001. Other problems are connected to education curricula, as for instance history text books use derogatory terms for Albanians. Minority syllabi in general do not reflect the history and culture of minorities, but favor Serbian tradition and culture. Unfortunately the new Serbian law on self-governments adopted in February 2002 gives little responsibility to the municipalities in education. In addition, having multi-ethnic police forces could also ease tensions not only in Southern Serbia but in Vojvodina as well, as such police bodies would probably more effectively respond to incidents committed against members belonging to ethnic minorities.
Empowering local governments could be a way to find better solutions to such issues. At the same time while delegating more authority to the local level might improve the chances for local economic development and the integration of ethnic minorities, some measures should also be adopted that foster local democracy. Recent experiences suggest that minorities sometimes also discriminate against individuals belonging to the majority living in their midst as an actual minority. The last few years Serbs have started to leave Presevo and Bujanovac in growing numbers due to perceived discrimination. Therefore, some institutions and procedures should be put in place that raise the level of citizen initiative, foster consensus-seeking between ethnic communities and guarantee equal opportunities for and treatment of citizens regardless of ethnicity.

Conclusion
The following preliminary policy recommendations could be formulated:
•    The EU should pay more attention to the process of drafting Serbia’s constitution, especially to how the guidelines of decentralization are set. The EU should push Serbia to give up centralization and move towards real decentralization.
•    Regional parties have not been involved in the drafting process up to now. The EU should encourage Serbian politicians to take into account the interests of historical regions – such as of Vojvodina and Sandzak – and of the minority communities while designing the decentralization framework.
•    The Serbian government so far has been quite reluctant to delegate authority to lower administrative levels. Therefore, the EU should watch closely that decentralization would mean delegating real power and authority to the local level.

Dissemination
I would circulate the result of my research to EU decision-makers and to experts and policy makers in Serbia. Second, I intend to spend several months in Brussels during which I plan to meet with people working for the Commission and for the Council of Europe on the West-Balkan region. Third, I would also organize small discussion-workshops with policy makers and experts in Serbia and in Brussels. I would disseminate my research paper through the Balkans Academic News list, OSI network, publish it in the journal of Southeast European Politics, would write opinion peace in journals (euroactiv and EUobserver) and would post it on the website of my research institute.

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