Issue Paper

Regional movements in Serbia – Sources of conflict or part of the solution?

The democratization of Serbia is a key precondition for creating long-term security in the Western Balkans, yet progress has been far too slow since the ousting of the Milosevic regime. Recent social and political developments indicate that in the near future it will be difficult to maintain the principles for regionalism, minority rights and democratization. According to recent opinion polls, the Serbian Radical Party enjoys the highest popularity. Serbia responded with resentment to Montenegro’s recent proclamation of independence, and as crucial decisions will be taken before the end of this year regarding the status of Kosovo, it can be expected that the political climate will not be conducive to fostering a pro-minority attitude in Serbian society. No one knows what will be the response to Kosovo’s eventual independence, yet, internal reaction in Serbia remains one of the most critical sources of insecurity for the region. Moreover, as Kosovo moves towards independence, the Albanians in Southern Serbia will very likely remain a source of tension and potential conflict as well, even if at present they seem very unlikely to take up their weapons to join Kosovo.

At this delicate time some ethnic minorities stepped up their demands, increasingly calling for territorial solutions. Albanians in Southern Serbia began to require decentralization and territorial autonomy similar to what Belgrade seeks for Kosovo Serbs.

Amidst the escalation of inter-ethnic tensions in Vojvodina, Hungarians again put forward their autonomy proposal including territorial autonomy. The incidents targeting ethnic minorities in Vojvodina raised concerns not only in the neighboring Hungary, but prompted reactions from European institutions, such as the European Parliament. At the end of 2005, Sandzak Muslims gave voice to their grievances as well. Three Bosniak parties presented a declaration claiming that their human and minority rights were being violated, and thus called for the creation of Sandzak region as a political-territorial unit.

While minorities are putting ethnic-territorial autonomy even more vocally on their agenda, in light of the present political mood in Serbia the positive reception and support of such demands is very unlikely. According to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia,[1] the minority issue is marginalized, as a result of which it has become a security issue, gaining international attention. Yet, grievances of ethnic minorities remain a potential source of insecurity. As a result of the policy of discrimination during the Milosevic regime, ethnic minorities came to be under-represented in public institutions and in the management of companies to be privatized. The integration of Albanians into state institutions such as courts, the judiciary, postal services, tax authorities, land registry, local development agencies, etc. has been very slow or non existent since the adoption of the Covic Plan in 2001. Among the various problems the issue of education curricula can be also mentioned, as minority syllabi in general do not reflect the history and culture of minorities, but favor Serbian tradition and culture. Providing adequate institutional mechanisms to solve such problems and thus reduce ethnic tensions is a precondition of stability not only in Serbia, but in the whole region.

The Serbian government is presently preparing a new constitution, and the issue of how to regionalize Serbia is one of the most contested topics on the table. While creating new regions might provide an opportunity for ethnic gerrymandering, by dividing for instance the compact blocks of Hungarians in Vojvodina or of the Muslims in Sandzak, decentralization through empowering local governments might be a better solution. Decentralization of Serbia through delegating more authority to municipalities could benefit minority groups that constitute a local majority. This idea has been promoted also by the Council of Europe, which in a recommendation given in 2001 to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia connected the issue of decentralization to the situation of ethnic minorities. The recommendation stated that “broad decentralization will help respond to the legitimate expectations of the minorities in Vojvodina and Sandzak, and of the Bulgarian and Albanian minorities (Presevo Valley).” It further suggested “that the debate on regionalization in Serbia should also focus on the structures that might be proposed to the regions with large minorities.”[2]

While admitting that meeting demands for minority rights requires more than decentralization, it can be maintained that decentralization still could be a simple and practical step in that direction for those minorities that are more numerous and live in concentrated areas. Furthermore, granting more substantial authorities to local self-governments could possibly pre-empt claims for territorial autonomy put forward by the three minorities mentioned above. Besides, bestowing local governments with more autonomy would probably be welcome by most municipalities in Serbia, as most of them complain about the centralized nature of the state. It should be also noted that raising the issue of decentralization with a focus on municipalities would be politically less sensitive than pressing demands for more minority rights or the creation of ethnic regions, as decentralization carried out this particular way would be an “ethnically blind”, uniform measure. Lastly, decentralization can be viewed as something desirable, also because it “will strengthen democracy, citizen participation and the quality of public services while generally contributing to national cohesion”.[3] According to the evaluation of the Council of Europe, there is a lot of room for improvement in the area of ensuring real autonomy for local-governments in Serbia, yet, it is not so much the matter of their legal status. It was being argued that merely through new legal provisions local authorities cannot be straightened substantially. What is lacking is effective implementation. Whereas theoretically self-governments have wide powers, many of those do not exist in practice. Therefore, real responsibilities should be transferred from the center to the local level, including not only legal powers, but also financial resources and administrative backing.

Besides strengthening the power of municipalities, implementing genuine provincial self-government for Vojvodina was also recommended by the Council of Europe, which would be very welcome by ethnic minorities. Leaders of the Hungarian minority support Vojvodina’s autonomy because – among other reasons – they see the province as a better guarantor of minority rights than the Serbian state.

However, probably the most important reason why empowering local governments would be favorable for minorities is that many of their grievances are related to everyday life-concerns. It is somewhat worrying that in Presevo during the 2004 local elections the most radical nationalist Ragmi Mustafa’s Democratic Party of Albanians  (PDSH) came out as strongest, also taking over the mayor’s office in 2005. According to analysts,[4] this was a result of popular dissatisfaction with economic hardships – local officials estimate unemployment at 70 per cent – and the moderates’ failure to achieve progress. In Bujanovac, due to decades of discrimination, over 90 per cent of the employed in the public sector are Serbs, in areas ranging from the administration to state-owned companies. Clearly, tackling people’s everyday concerns would be a key to gaining their loyalty to the Serbian state and to convince them to abandon the idea of creating Eastern Kosovo. Southern Serbia and Sandzak are the most economically depressed regions of Serbia, and unemployment is especially high among the young male population. The Law on Investment Planning in Serbia until 2010 does not mention a single major investment in Sandzak. If local authorities gained substantial fiscal autonomy – which they lack at the moment – they could possibly improve the quality of public services and could also counter-balance the ethnic bias of countrywide policies. In addition, having multi-ethnic local police forces could ease tensions not only in Southern Serbia but in Sandzak and Vojvodina as well, as such police bodies would probably more effectively respond to incidents committed against members belonging to ethnic minorities. Empowering local governments could be a way to find better solutions to such issues.

At the same time, while delegating more authority to the local level might improve the chances for local economic development and the integration of ethnic minorities, some measures should also be adopted that foster local democracy. Recent experiences suggest that minorities sometimes also discriminate against individuals belonging to the majority living in their midst as an actual minority. In the last few years Serbs have started to leave Presevo and Bujanovac in growing numbers due to perceived discrimination. Therefore, some institutions and procedures should be put in place that raise the level of citizen initiative, foster consensus seeking between ethnic communities, and guarantee equal opportunities and equal treatment of citizens regardless of ethnicity.

In April 2005, the EU began to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and Montenegro. Until the EU upholds the prospect of future membership for Serbia, during the negotiations it has considerable leverage to push forward democratic reforms, among them decentralization. However, the stalling of the EU-constitution’s ratification and the significantly reduced budget for the instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) calls into question the EU’s commitment to the region. Strengthening the EU’s presence in Serbia and maintaining the prospect of membership is a key to the success of EU conditionality, and thus for the continuation of democratic reforms.

It is time for the EU to set a clear policy towards the ongoing disputes over the territorial organization of Serbia. The EU Commission has not addressed these problems at all so far. It can be argued that finding the right answer to these challenges is of similar importance for Europe’s future security, to that of pressing Serbia to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal.
The need to adopt the appropriate EU policy concerning this matter is urgent, as Serbia is drafting a new constitution at this very moment.

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