One of the major implications of the Rose Revolution in Georgia has been its inclusion, together with Armenia and Azerbaijan, into the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Raised expectations about the success of democracy in Georgia and its possible spillover effect on the neighbourhood in the wider region have largely determined this decision on the part of the European policy community. This, in turn, has galvanised Georgian policy community and public opinion with the hopes about the increased prospects for Georgia’s integration in the EU. In addition, it is expected that in the shorter run the ENP will provide a basis for the EU’s active involvement in the process of conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
On the other hand, Brussels views the ENP as a powerful resource for Georgia to get modernised based on genuine democratisation and effective market-based reforms. There has been not a single hint, however, on considering the ENP as an interim stage towards Georgia’s institutional integration in the EU. Uncertainties with ratification of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe further reinforce this attitude. What is expected in Brussels is that through the ENP Georgia will share with enlarged Europe values and also public goods, such as peace, stability and prosperity. Also, as a capable and reliable partner Georgia could effectively cooperate with the EU in addressing future common problems and challenges. Thus, there is an obvious direct evidence of divergent outlooks in Brussles and Tbilisi on Georgia’s new ‘wider Europe’ context.
This paper examines the extent to which the existing dicrepancies between these two outlooks may affect ongoing reforms in Georgia and the EU-Georgia relations. It is assumed that the mentioned divergent interpretations are fraught with consequences for both Brussels and Tbilisi. In this regard, the proposed research will test three hypotheses:
First, a consistently negative message on EU membership for Georgia will diminish any leverage the EU has on promoting democratic reform. This is particularly important at this moment, as the new Georgian government has set itself the goal to push through reforms that do not necessarily imply popular decisions. As these reforms are implemented in the name of joining the EU, they have, so far, been enjoying unchallenged popular support. At some juncture, however, as the possibility of the EU accession remains unclear, this support might be lost and the reforms stalled.
Second, in case the EU fails to engage in constructive dialogue with Russia on the terms of resolving Georgia's outstanding security problems, the ENP’s credibility will suffer significantly. This disillusionment may diffuse elsewhere in the region as well.
Third, Georgia’s misinterpretation of the ENP’s substance and objectives may be misleading in identifying priorities and activities for the Action Plan, which is due by the end of 2005. A defective Action Plan will negatively affect the second phase of the ENP, which starts in 2007 through which the major assistance programs within the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) are to be implemented.
In order to eliminate the ambiguities of Georgia’s role in the Wider Europe from the outset, a number of issues require close examination and policy discussion. Toward this end the following research questions will be addressed; namely:
The primary research goal is to formulate a coherent vision of Georgia’s future role and place in the enlarging Europe. To this end the project intends to help bridge the existing gap between the different interpretations in Brussels and Tbilisi. Specific objectives of the project include:
The primary result of the project will be the raised awareness among Georgian and European policy planners about the implications of Georgia’s inclusion in the ENP.
Accomplishment of the project will also result in: