EU regional policy aims to support innovation, job-creation, environmental protection, and the development of efficient energy networks and transport networks while involving independent municipal and regional actors in the priority setting process. This concept of regional policy was not only non-existent in socialist Czechoslovakia, but even the democratic governments after the Velvet Revolution of 1989 assumed a centralist stance on regional policy, reducing it to mere redistribution of state funds to alleviate problems caused by regional unemployment. The same centralist attitude delayed the establishment of self- governing higher territorial regions as they were foreseen by the constitution of the Czech Republic of 1992. This paper argues that it was the accession process to the EU, which introduced the Czech Republic to the principles of subsidiarity and a more dynamic understanding of regional policy. Once the Czechs applied for EU membership, the introduction of a new understanding of regional policy became inevitable. We show that the role of the EU was pivotal in overcoming both domestic political opposition as well as resistance against enlargement within the EU itself.

Chapter prepared for the book, Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States, edited by Ronald Linden.

Countries engaged in post-Communist transformations seek to catch up in both substantive and procedural ways. In some cases, Central and East European (CEE) elites have found allies for both kinds of modernization in international organizations like the EU and NATO. For example, EU regional policy aims to support economic innovation, job-creation, environmental protection, and the development of efficient energy networks and transport networks while involving independent municipal and regional actors in the priority setting process. While the "substance" of such important problems is a work in progress in every country, the "procedure" in CEE countries has often been remade from scratch since 1990. The EU's particular concept of regional policy was not only non-existent in socialist Czechoslovakia, but even the democratic governments after the Velvet Revolution of 1989 assumed a centralist stance on regional policy, reducing it to mere redistribution of state funds to alleviate problems caused by regional unemployment. The same centralist attitude delayed the establishment of self-governing higher territorial regions as they were foreseen by the constitution of the Czech Republic of 1992.

This paper argues, that it was the accession process to the European Union (EU), which introduced the Czech Republic to the principles of subsidiarity and a more dynamic understanding of regional policy. Once the Czechs applied for EU membership, the introduction of a new understanding of regional policy became inevitable. We show that the role of the EU was pivotal in overcoming both domestic political opposition as well as resistance against enlargement within the EU itself. In the process, a set of fairly detailed norms about policymaking were introduced and nurtured in the Czech Republic. Our point about these norms is that they found much more widespread acceptance and use because of the prestige and power of the EU. We do not, by contrast, argue either that they were non- existent in the Czech Republic before its intensive contact with the EU or that the norms are so widespread now as to be beyond challenge. To the contrary, throughout the paper, we will stress the contention around these norms and the vulnerabilities they still face today.

What do we mean by norms? Clearly, we mean more than the sociological conception of informal practices. For this chapter, norms are mostly things like fundamental principles about how to handle procedures and problems present in member states. In some cases, we will also refer to pieces of the acquis or technical standards for, say, building a bridge as norms. Some of the norms to which we will call attention in our case study of regional policy include detailed coordination between regions and the central government, the formal separation of management and monitoring, multi-annual budgeting, inter-regional competition, and a preference for investment over redistribution.

All norms are meaningful in particular contexts. The same norm can be powerful or widely ignored, depending upon the situation. Consequently, we think it useful to note that the current EU enlargement is different from previous enlargements in three ways that matter for the transmission of norms: first and most obvious, the acquis is larger for this wave of countries than for previous waves. That means the density of norms to be adopted is quite likely higher than in previous cases. Second, a larger number of prospective members waits at the EU's door. These numbers compel the EU to reorganize in preparation for accepting new members, and they simultaneously increase the importance of precedents set by early entrants for later entrants. Third, and related to the previous point, while new members have always had to adopt the acquis with, at most, temporary derogations, this enlargement asks more in terms of "pre-accession" preparation than have previous waves. Of course, in a comparative sense, it is likely true that Austria, Sweden, and Finland were relatively closer to prevailing EU practices and standards than are the CEE states. Yet the relatively unprepared Southern Tier states of Greece, Portugal, and Spain were allowed in with relatively little advance preparation. Indeed, in the Greek case, the Commission was concerned enough about the extent of needed reforms that they issued a negative opinion- avis -which was then overridden by the Council. In one important way, however, we think this enlargement is likely to be quite similar to previous waves: the hardest work begins once membership is achieved. That said, the run-up to membership has also taxed each CEE state's ability to comply with a bewildering array of norms and practices. We substantiate this claim through a case study of the development of regional policy instruments in the Czech Republic.

In the context of this volume, we favor a focus on regional policy for several reasons. First, it is obviously a very important policy area, indeed, the second most expensive thing the EU does. Second, the Czechs, who had very little in the way of regional policy in Czechoslovakia, start nearly from scratch in 1990. Third, there are lots of norms to implement; while there is little acquis per se, there are a significant number of rules and technical expertise in the member states about how to comply with those rules. Forth, regional policy is an area where the Czech government does not confront actors with strong identities, deep pockets, and formidable organizational skills that they can use to tenaciously defend prerogatives inherited from the old order or new benefits that might be threatened by EU procedures. Taken together (see the chart below for more), the case is interesting because there is relatively low potential for "path dependence," whether in terms of old institutions or established actors, because the stakes are high rather than low, and because the amount of acquis is not overwhelming, though it is sufficiently complex to pose a stiff challenge.

These four points are only analytic virtues if seen in a larger perspective. We do not claim that the dynamics we highlight in this chapter hold true for all policy areas in which the EU has urged reforms. In fact, we think the impact of EU norms varies across policy areas. In this paper, we focus on two potential dimensions of that variation and assume that the likelihood that EU norms will be adopted follows from two important questions: first, is the policy area one in which the EU has a large body of legislation which it expects the prospective new members to approximate? Second, is the policy area one in which well-established actors with well-established norms already are present? One proposition is that one can expect relatively low influence of EU norms in areas where EU norms are few and actors are well established (e.g., health policy). Somewhat more infusion of norms can be expected either where pre-established actors are weak (e.g., regional policy) or where the number of EU norms are quite high (e.g., agriculture). In each of these two cases, while one variable tends to promote the spread of norms, the other tends to suppress them. Only where both variables point to the importance of EU norms (e.g., consumer protection), should we expect them to playa dominant role, washing out other kinds of domestic variables. As indicated, one should have no such expectation for the case of regional policy. As the evidence below will show, EU norms must interact with a variety of other interests and identities.

Table 1: Stylized expectations about where EU norms might be strong and weak

Density of actors prior to onset of post -communist reforms

The second dimension of this political struggle occurs between Prague and Brussels. We describe below some of the details of this struggle, but for now it is important merely to see that delays in implementing regional policy are important because structural funds are a "use 'em or lose 'em" proposition. Indeed, many member states have to forego some potential funding every year because they are unable to meet all of the strict guidelines set by the EU.

Although we have provided a detailed chronology of regional policy developments (see page 8), we find the best place to start is neither the beginning nor the end, but the middle -1997, to be precise, and the initial EU Commission opinion on the Czech membership application. Because it was written around projections of future reforms, the opinion was generally positive about the prospects for meeting the terms of membership in the medium term. Yet the basic optimism could not mask the EU's great concern that there were virtually no functioning regional policy instruments in the Czech Republic.

From the perspective of the last wave of entrants, this reluctance to develop instruments of regional policy is particularly striking. One of the primary motives for several new members in the past few decades has been the promise of access to structural funds that might help in the development of their weaker regions. It is, of course, hard to overestimate the importance of regional policy to EU activities. Spending from the structural fund is the second largest component of the EU budget, trailing only the CAP. But access to funds is predicated on planning competence and administrative mastery of complex procedures. These controls are sufficiently strict that many sub-national governments in longtime member states are unable to gain access to monies to which their region is nominally entitled. That is, certain administrative competencies are a prerequisite for receiving structural funds. But because almost all legislation is directly applicable, there is very little need here to "approximate" laws. Rather, the task is to create competent regional actors.

In the Czech case, however, Prime Minister Václav Klaus's preference for centralized control long prevented even the formal establishment of the agents who would conduct a regional policy. That such agents long did not exist in a policy domain undeniably crucial to EU member states speaks strongly to the incompleteness of institution building in the region. We will see that when the Klaus government finally agreed to allow regional bodies, it insisted on inflating the number so that no one region could develop a large base of authority. While the analytical narrative to follow stresses some steps in the development of Czech regional policy more than others, the chronology below encapsulate all of the most significant turning points in the case study.

Chronology of key steps in the development of regional policy (RP) in the Czech Republic.

1990. Dismantling of central planning and rejection of notion of regional planning.

1991 Regional Policy Act subsumes RP under economic policy. Key objective is the achievement of minimal living and working standards for all citizens.

1992 Act on Principles of Government Regional Economic Policy. Principle RP goal is to support the development of a market economy, especially though the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises.

1994 EU Cross Border Programs started on the Czech-Austrian and Czech-German borders.

1996 Newly formed Ministry for Regional Development awarded coordinating role in RP.

1998 Government releases Principle of Regional Policy as stopgap measure until formal legislation can be prepared. Broadens aims of 1992 principles.

1998 Regional Coordination Committees and Regional Development Agencies established. Both bodies devoted to easing transition to regional government.

1998 Eurostat and Czech Statistical Office agree to make 8 NUTS II units from the 14 planned regions. Each NUTS II unit will have its own Regional Management and Monitoring Committees.

1999 Act on Regional Development Support. Outlines RP responsibilities of new Czech regions and establishes framework for national RP coordination.

1999 Government announces program for 18 problem districts.

1999 EU pilot projects commence in North West Bohemia.

1999 Regional Operational Program commences.

2000 Constitutional Act on the Formation of the Regions (passed 1997) takes effect on January 1 and creates 14 regional governments in Czech Republic.

2000 Publication of the National Development Strategy of the Czech Republic, a document outlining the transfer of resources from EU structural funds.

The preliminary trends hardly need repetition: As is well known, one can observe a growing tendency towards common policymaking in the EU, especially since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The heads of the EU member states meet at regular summit meetings (the European Council) where common policy making is discussed. Policy decisions that result from these Council meetings then set the agenda for the European Commission, which can then propose new legislation. Norms established by Council, Commission, and Parliament cast a shadow over CEE efforts to join the EU insofar as their reforms must take account of these norms. Their efforts to prepare for membership are affected by the policy that exists among EU member states. As stated above, the importance of EU norms extends beyond mere technical standards or laws and regulations concerning individual policy areas. So much for the sketch of the general trend. What about the particulars?

The two central priorities of the EU's regional policy are to reduce existing economic and social disparities between regions and to reduce unemployment in the EU's weakest regions. The EU's structural and cohesion funds contribute financially to the regional policies of the member states as they seek to create appropriate conditions for investment and job- creation. While the member states retain the responsibility for defining their development priorities, the co-financing role of the EU requires that individual projects take account of the European dimension of economic and social development. What, precisely, is this "European dimension"? For the period 2000-2006, which covers the last stage of membership preparations of the first wave of new memberstates, the Commission set three strategic priorities: regional competitiveness, social cohesion and employment, and the development of urban and rural areas.

With these priorities fixed, how can we understand their normative power for those countries wishing to join the EU? While the Council of Ministers is responsible for laying down general provisions for the use of structural funds, it is the Commission which sets the guidelines and thematic priorities for the use of the structural and cohesion funds. Authorities of the respective recipient countries use these guidelines to prepare their programs for the use of structural and cohesion funds. For the purpose of our study, it is this specific role of the Commission which characterizes it as a supervising institution, or "nanny", for the respective recipient states.

Two background conditions apply to any discussion of Czech regional policy: first, much Czech thought about regional policy in the early 1990' s came against the immediate backdrop of state socialist policies of Czechoslovakia under which "regional policy" under communist rule was reduced to the redistribution and reallocation of resources in the socialist economic planning process. The general understanding of regional policy was reduced to the intervention of a centralist government into economic and social developments in different parts of the country. Second, between 1990 and 1992, uncertainty about the durability of the Czechoslovak state cast a long shadow over any thinking about regional policy. By 1993, of course, the "velvet divorce" had separated the former country into independent Czech and Slovak Republics.

Against these two background conditions, a range of serious economic problems soon appeared, including the decline of state-owned heavy industry, the decline of the collectivized agricultural sector, the very low mobility of the work force (due in part to lack of accessible housing), and pollution and environmental problems. In the hardest hit regions, such as North Bohemia and Northeast Moravia, some officials began to consider policies to address regional development, retraining and restructuring. Job-creation in regions with industrial decline became a priority, as rising unemployment figures also began to reveal a growing cleavage between regions.

The response of the Czech government in the early 1990s was a mixture of the old logic of the socialist era, saying that regional problems have to be addressed by central government intervention, and a new market-oriented focus on the development of infrastructure and support for small and medium sized enterprises. After the velvet divorce, the approach towards regional policy taken by the Klaus government focused on some selected industrial crisis points but neglected both inter-ministerial coordination on central level as well as coordination with actors on the regional and municipal levels. As such, it tended more towards "bailouts" than development.

The strong role of the central government was partly due to the fact that regional governments, which existed in communist Czechoslovakia merely as an extension of the central communist government, were abolished in 1990. The resulting lack of regional authority was apparent in comparison with many EU member states, even ones resolutely unitary in nature. Article 99 of the Czech constitution of 1992, however, did foresee the creation of a layer of self -administered regional governments (also called higher territorial administrative units) between the central and municipal level: "The Czech Republic is composed of municipalities which are the basic territorial administrative units and regions which are higher territorial administrative units."

The authors of the constitution saw the creation of regional governments as a step towards a political differentiation. But they also assumed that the re-creation of a regional authority able to manage social and cohesion policy independently from the central government would eventually promote the integration of the Czech Republic into the EU.

The Klaus government, however, did not show much enthusiasm for giving up power to regional authorities. And in the wake of the 1996 parliamentary elections, the re-elected coalition government, led by Klaus's Civic-Democratic Party (ODS), abolished the Ministry of Economics in a cabinet reshuffle and created a new Ministry for Regional Development. But while this new ministry was charged with the coordination of regional policy at the central level, it soon became apparent that this weak ministry had significant competence only with regard to the desolate housing situation in the country, thus earning it the nickname of "housing ministry." A stalemate ensued. Despite the constitution's call for regional governments and the EU Commissions not-so-subtle warnings that some form of regional planning competence is required of all members, the Czechs essentially stood pat. While the EU paid a Czech regional planning group for three separate studies of foreign systems of regional policy formation, domestic political considerations continued to block the space for such a transfer.

This stalemate, based as it was on a complex domestic balance of power, did not come apart all at once, but when it did come apart, EU actions did play an important role. In January 1996, the Czech Republic applied for EU membership, and the Commission set out to prepare the required opinion on the preparedness of the Czech Republic to join. As a consequence of the disinterest of the ODS-led government in regional policy, the Commission's initial assessment in this area was blunt: "Currently, the Czech Republic has no regional policy. Indeed, regional development initiatives are implemented through sectoral policies at national level. Economically weak areas are selected annually on the basis of principally unemployment rates. In 1996, for example, the chosen area covered 18.4% of the population of the Czech Republic." The Commission did take notice of the creation of the Ministry for Regional Development, yet it noted that due to the ministry's limited finances for regional investment, it was not yet possible to establish the co-financing capacity necessary for projects financed from EU structural funds.

We will see below that norms established by the EU for structural funds did have an impact in this case. At the same time, we must be careful to circumscribe the general claim: In respect to the creation of and structure of regional governments in the Czech Republic, the EU was of course not in a position to comment. These questions remain the sovereign decisions of each state. In its opinion, the Commission was nevertheless able to point at the functional necessity of authorities able to formulate regional development priorities. They were further able to specify the need for some kind of partner on the Czech side able to develop and articulate such plans. On these points, the Commission noted that, "Czech authorities still have to introduce important reforms to comply with EC's structural policies. ...Financial resources at the disposal of regional policy should be increased and efficient instruments need to be created. ...Czech authorities have to determine the future legal basis of a Czech regional policy in order to provide the appropriate legal structure for the actions envisaged to counteract regional disparities and for financing structural policy expenditure."

The Commission's opinion sparked a new discussion among Czech politicians about the need for a regional policy. The Ministry of Regional Development saw itself as the responsible body for the preparation of structural funds, but it had a weak voice in the Klaus cabinet. In fact, some of the most interesting initiatives came from outside the cabinet. It was primarily those actors who had already experience from working with EU Phare funds who seized the opportunity to erode the stalemate. Here, in turn, it becomes difficult to see where "external influences" end and "domestic politics" begins. The Commission Delegation in Prague, responsible for the coordination of Phare programs, was looking for appropriate partners in the Czech administration in order to implement Phare projects aimed at preparing the ground for regional policy and public administration reform.

In searching for partners, the Delegation had two major actors from which to choose. First, the Ministry of Regional Development (MRD), which had established a Phare unit headed by its own official, Eva Píšová, had established a team of foreign and local experts all financed from the Phare budget. The second alternative lay within the broad ambit of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA). This Ministry, however, had created an independent foundation, the National Training Fund (NTF). The NTF had the task of running public management-related Phare programs. Miroslava Kopicová, who benefited from being relatively independent from the inflexible Ministry hierarchy, directed it. Mainly due to the reluctance of the Klaus government to deal seriously with the reform regional policy, the Delegation decided to cooperate with the NTF on preparatory programs for public administration reform. These programs were then later extended to preparatory training programs for structural funds. A partnership forged for one set of policies became a channel for reform of another kind of policy.

If the erosion of the regional policy stalemate had begun with the Commission opinion and the Delegation's Phare initiatives, these developments could pose no more than an annoyance to the Klaus government as long as it remained firmly in the saddle. A major change occurred in late 1997, however, when the Klaus government resigned over corruption charges leaked by its own coalition partners. An interim caretaker government lead by the former Director of the Central Bank, Josef Tošovský, was appointed by president Václav Ravel to rule until the general elections in Apri11998. Although it had only six months, the Tošovský government managed to unblock the issues of public administration reform and regional policy and paved the way for future reforms. Most importantly, in late 1997 the Constitutional Act on the Formation of the Higher Territorial Administrative Units was passed by both chambers of the Parliament. This represented the first major step towards fulfilling the provisions of Article 99 of the constitution, though, as it would turn out, the political maneuvering was not yet finished.

A Social Democrat minority government, headed by Prime Minister Miloš Zeman, emerged from the April 1998 elections. The government was willing to enter into a substantial dialogue with the Commission on the critical issues raised in the Commission's 1997 Opinion. Its primary move to address the issue of regional policy and territorial reform was to appoint a new Deputy Minister of Interior, Yvonne Štrecková, with exclusive responsibility for public administration reform and the creation of higher self-governing territorial units (territorial reform). With regard to regional policy, the government adopted "The Principles of the Government Regional Policy." This document already reflected on the principles of regional policy of the EU and identified two types of problem regions according to the classification of structural funds: economically weak regions (What the EU calls objective 5b regions) and structurally weak regions (objective 2). The new government hewed closely to EU norms on its definitions of these regions: The structurally weak regions were defined by a high concentration of traditional industry and a high level of urbanization and unemployment. Economically weak regions comprise mostly rural areas with lower levels of urbanization and economic development.

In the Commission's eyes, these moves constituted real progress -the first they'd seen in a while. Based on this progress, the Delegation started a Phare-financed pilot project for the afflicted region of North Bohemia. This project was run by the Ministry of Regional Development, which now began to develop a regional policy according to the EU structural policy framework. These policies were based on the Ministry's Regional Operational Program, which involved the central government as well as actors from the regional and municipal levels. Before the creation of the higher territorial units in January 2000, these regional actors were mainly mayors and representatives of Regional Development Agencies, independent agencies, which were set up with Phare financial support. In 1999 the regional actors formed special Regional Coordination Committees, which included also representatives of the state administration. These committees assumed the de-facto role of informal non- elected governments on the sub-national level. With the creation of the higher territorial units in 2000 and subsequent regional elections, the regions then incorporated the Regional Coordination Committees into their administrative structures. Thus did Commission pressure, Phare seed money, a latent constitutional provision, and a change of government produce new momentum for regional policy in the Czech case.

While these broad outlines underspecify the precise role of European norms, we can identify a number of relevant norms that the EU is bringing into the candidate countries. Four in particular stand out. First, the EU presumes that states have in place formal regional actors who have the authority to formulate regional policy objectives. As we have seen in the Czech case, when domestic politics blocks the creation of formal actors, the Commission pressures seem to have resulted in a set of informal actors (the Committees). Second, the EU promotes the coordination of regional policy between the central government and the regions concerned. Third, the EU pushes the expectation that the allocation of structural funds based on competitiveness among regions. And fourth, the EU understands regional policy as an instrument of job-creation and investment incentives, instead of a mere redistribution mechanism.

Once the Commission launched the negotiation process with the first group of candidate countries in March 1998, all areas of the acquis were divided into 31 chapters and became subject to a screening process. During this period, the Commission explained to the candidate countries the amount the acquis comprised in individual policy areas. The candidate countries, in turn, responded by describing the extent to which they already complied with EU law and further specified time periods over which they could likely achieve full compliance. After completion of screening in 1999, substantial negotiations began on each chapter.

Both exercises -- screening and the negotiations -- are distinguished by the transmission and explanation of norms to the prospective member states. This learning process was instrumental for the set-up of a reform agenda, timetable and prioritization in the candidate countries. In its regular reports the Commission assessed the progress of each country in meeting the norms it had laid out. And besides mere explication of the acquis in this highly structured process, the EU made substantial financial support available in order to support the development of necessary administrative structures for a successful implementation of EU policies and also to start concrete work by financing pilot projects.

Besides screening laws and paying for reform initiatives, personnel training represented a third major tool of the transmission of norms. Here again, the EU had to deal with multiple partners. Two are familiar from our earlier story: First, the Ministry of Regional Development was responsible for Phare-funded Regional Development Agencies responsible for the coordination of regional policies on the so-called NUTS II level as well as for business support projects for SME's. Second, the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs was responsible for regional labor offices, which, in turn, were responsible for regional employment policies. As before, the National Training Fund acted independently through Phare-funded projects in support of the MLSA activities. To these we can now add a third player, the Ministry of the Interior, which was responsible for public administration reform and territorial reform. In order to channel EU norms into the Czech Republic, projects had to be launched in cooperation with all three Ministries. The formula was usually that provision of financial assistance was conditional upon using the funds for projects that would implement regional policy objectives as they are being applied in the EU.

On the personnel front, the Ministry of Regional Development launched a project entitled "Training Program for the Implementation of Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund" where public officials were acquainted with EU priorities in regional development. Compliance with these priorities was required in order to receive money from the structural fund. The aim of the program was to develop a standardized system of widely available training for public sector employees. The first training priority was to "train the trainers" who would carry the priorities of EU regional policy into the farthest reaches of Czech public administration and into the new regional governments. The initial target audience is for 1600 participants to be trained in the period between October 2000 and May 2001. A central priority of the project is to develop a sustainable network of training institutions, which would be accessible to regional decision-makers even after the project ends.

While the Commission agreed to implement this project with the MRD, preparations for using the European Social Fund (ESF) were coordinated with the MLSA. In this case, the Commission suggested that, due to its competence, the NTF should be entrusted with the management of the special preparatory program for the ESF. In this way, the EU introduced a certain competitive factor between the MRD and the MLSA (NTF). As for the substance of the project, in accordance with established norms in the EU, the Czech government passed a declaration that established the required institutional framework for the future implementation of ESF projects by articulating three main priorities:

• Establish programming units within all relevant ministries to plan projects
• Establish administrative units within ministries to run individual projects
• Appoint pre-monitoring steering committees to oversee projects

This institutional structure was supplemented by a time-scale that was laid down in a subsequent government resolution in January 1999. It too had three main features, all of which were dominated by considerations of potential EU membership:

• The regional development plan was synchronized with the 2000-06 EU budget
• Conditions were added to qualify for pre-structural funds from the EU
• Pilot Operational Programs were to be developed modeled on the guidelines for structural fund projects

In short, this example demonstrates how the initial presentation of norms becomes law in the candidate countries when their adoption is tied to the overall goal of EU membership. With these two recent government resolutions, the Czech Republic broke new ground in its regional policies, harmonized its regional policy objectives with those of the EU, and began to channel its own funds into related projects. In addition, as required by yet another EU norm, the Czech Republic has taken steps to separate the management and the monitoring of regional policies. To be sure, the Commission's regular progress report in late 2000 raised several cautionary notes -including a continued lag in some administrative capacities and the as-yet unadopted norm of multi-annual budgeting for regional policy projects. The argument, then, cannot be that the Czechs have already done all that the EU has asked. Far more, the main point to us is that EU pressure played some role in eroding a domestic stalemate, and once that stalemate was broken, EU pressure played a significant role in channeling and shaping subsequent activity.

Given the evidence that EU pressure is significant, it should not be surprising that it also can be controversial. While it can be argued, that the adoption of EU policy objectives results directly from the logic of preparation for membership, in some areas EU pressure to adapt policies does not set aside other important political considerations. A good illustration is the size and shape of the new regional governments. As indicated earlier, while the EU sets guidelines on policy priorities for the use of structural funds (see appendix 1), it does not have say in how member states organize their territorial governments. Given the demographics of the Czech case and prevailing EU accounting standards, creating only eight regional territorial units would have eased coordination of regional policies. This efficiency gain would have come if the Czech regions had been coterminous with the so-called NUTS II regions -the key target areas for EU policies. But though larger regions would have avoided an extra layer of regional authority -NUTS III regions -a political consensus was reached on the basis of strengthening the role of 13 larger cities (plus Prague) as regional centers. Under the plan adopted, each of these cities would become the anchor for a different region.

Klaus's attitude reveals two contrary ways of thinking relevant to the study of norms. The introduction of EU-style regional policy into the Czech Republic is closely tied with the devolution of significant government powers. The principle of subsidiarity -a word not found in the dictionaries of centralist and latently nationalist politicians such as Klaus -follows once regional policies take effect and ties with EU members become concrete and substantial. With accession preparations in full swing, those who promote the ideal of strong central government struggle to stand their ground. A more diverse and self-confident regional political layer of government is emerging in the Czech Republic -a development that would be difficult to imagine without the normative influence from the EU.

Appendix I: Areas eligible for financial support from the EU structural funds

Improving transport networks

Priority for small and medium-sized enterprises instead of large industries

Support for business innovations

Strengthening the potential of tourism, culture, and the environment

Promotion of employment through active labor market policies

Promotion of employability through retraining and life-long learning

Developing entrepreneurship

Ensuring equal employment opportunities for women

Urban development integrated into regional policy

Coastline and fishery development

Appendix 2:

The 14 New Czech Regions (Eurostat NUTS III Level), Source: Ministry of Regional Development, Prague 2000.

The New Czech Eurostat Regions (NUTS II level), source: Ministry of Regional Development, Prague 2000.