Pavel Barsa
Managing Immigration and Integration in Europe and
in the Czech Republic
[DRAFT]
The main task of this policy paper is to produce a framework
for immigration and integration policies in the Czech Republic with comparative
reference to the experiences of western countries. The paper is divided
into three chapters.
In the first chapter I overview the main analytical
and normative approaches which have been developed in western countries
and I construct four ideal types of nationhood entailing different degrees
of liberality or restrictiveness in receiving and integrating aliens.
In the second chapter I summarize the historical development
of immigration and integration policies in the U.S., France, Great
Britain and Germany, and, in the last part, I focus on the current
convergence of the immigration and integration policies of Great Britain,
France and Germany within the framework of the migration and asylum policies
of the EU.
In the third chapter I apply the conceptual tools as
well as the historical models and examples worked out in the first two chapters
to the case of the Czech Republic. I begin by describing the development
of the Czech Republic’s immigration and integration policies since
the end of the Cold war and give special attention to the last two years,
when several steps have been made in the direction of an active immigration
policy. I then assess these recent policy initiatives with regard to the
last developments in the EU countries and in the common EU framework for
migration and integration. Finally, I construct a tentative policy framework
that should guide Czech policy-makers in their future decision-making.
[THIS DRAFT, HOWEVER, CONTAINS ONLY THE FIRST TWO CHAPTERS.]
Table of Contents
Chapter I: Theories and Models
I. 1. Explanatory Theories
I. 1. 1. Neo-classical Economics
I. 1. 2. The New Economics of Migration
I. 1. 3. Dual Labour Market Theory
I. 1. 4. World-Systems Theory
I. 1. 5. Migration Networks Theory
I. 1. 6. Cumulative Causation Theory
I. 1. 7. Institutionalist Theory
I. 1. 8. Client Politics Theory
I. 2. Normative Theories
I. 2. 1. Two Contradictory Principles of the Liberal
Nation State
I. 2. 2. Libertarianism
I. 2. 3. Liberalism
I. 2. 4. Communitarianism
I. 2. 5. Realism
I. 2. 6. Grounds for liberality and restrictiveness
I. 3. Nationhood Models
I. 3. 1. Four Ideal Types
I. 3. 2. The Immigrant Civic Nation: USA
I. 3. 3. The Endogenous Civic Nation
I. 3. 3. 1. Assimilationist Republic: France
I. 3. 3. 2. Pluralistic Empire: Great Britain
I. 3. 4. The Endogenous Ethnic Nation: Germany
I. 3. 5. The Immigrant Ethnic Nation: Israel
Chapter II: Western Experiences
II. 1. USA
II. 1. 1. Immigration Policies
II. 1. 2. Integration Policies
II. 1. 2. 1. Ethnic Pluralism
II. 1. 2. 2. Racial Pluralism
II. 2. France
II. 2. 1. Immigration Policies
II. 2. 2. Integration Policies
II. 2. 2. 1. Assimilatory Integration
II. 2. 2. 2. Islam
II. 3. Great Britain
II. 3. 1. Immigration Policies
II. 3. 2. Integration Policies
II. 3. 2. 1. Pluralistic Integration
II. 3. 2. 1. 1. Official Multiculturalism
II. 3. 2. 1. 2. “Race Relations” and Anti-discrimination
II. 3. 2. 2. Islam
II. 4. Germany
II. 4. 1. Immigration Policies
II. 4. 1. 1. Ethnic State as a Country of Immigration
II. 4. 1. 2. Asylum Debate
II. 4. 2. Integration Policies
II. 4. 2. 1. From Ethnic to Civic Nationhood
II. 4. 2. 2. Islam
II. 5. Convergence of European Policies and EU framework
II. 5. 1. Three waves of Post-War Migration to Western
Europe
II. 5. 2. Last Developments in France
II. 5. 3. Last Developments in Britain
II. 5. 4. Last Developments in Germany
II. 5. 5. Convergence of National Policies
II. 5. 6. Common EU Framework for Migration and Asylum
Policy
Chapter I: Theories and Models
I. 1. Explanatory Theories
I. 1. 1. Neo-classical Economics
Immigration as a consequence of an unbalance between
demand and supply on labour markets.
Regions or countries with a great deal of cheap labour
have less demand for it than regions and countries with more costly labour
of limited volume. Wage differentials incite workers to travel to the regions
where their labour will be paid better (push factor). Their labour will
nevertheless still be cheaper than the labour of domestic workers which
is why they are also actively recruited by employers (pull factor). In the
long run, such migrations should establish a balance both in supply and
in salaries. The last explanatory variable of this model is a rationally
calculating individual who migrates because he wants to maximize his benefit,
that is, his (salaried) income. He compares his future income in the place
of his original residence with the possible income in places with higher
salaries. (Todaro, 1969) His destination is co-determined by different sets
of economic conditions (besides income also unemployment rates) and of migration
policies (e.g. skill-based or family-reunification based policies) in receiving
countries. (Borjas, 1988: 95).
It pays to see the other theories as critical responses
to what has been perceived as the flaws of this neo-classical “push and
pull model”: what seems logical in retrospect, that is, people migrating
form poor countries to the rich ones, is more ambiguous under closer comparative
scrutiny: in many poor countries people do not migrate in large numbers to
rich countries whilst, on the other hand, outmigration is an important phenomenon
in many not-so-poor countries which have experienced a phase of intense economic
development. (Panreiter, 2000: 45) Additional (or altogether different) explanatory
variables are needed besides (or instead of) the abstract model of individual
rational choice.
I. 1. 2. The New Economics of Migration
Migration as a consequence of efforts at risk avoidance
and income sources diversification and of relative, rather than absolute
impoverishment.
Oded Stark of Harvard, the major representative
of this approach, studied migrations from countryside to cities in the third
world. In contrast to the neo-classical model, he shifted the focus from
the (supposedly rational) individual to the family as the basic unit of decision-taking.
He also drew attention away from labour to insurance and capital markets.
Rather than wage differential, the main incentives for migration are said
to be insecurity, relative impoverishment, efforts at risk avoidance or
income sources diversification. Migration is seen as serving as a means
of transforming a household so that it fits the requirements of the capitalist
economy in an environment which lacks working insurance and credit markets.
A rural family faces two major barriers to its entering
the capitalist economy: it lacks the capital needed for modernization (e.g.
purchase of machinery) and also sufficient guarantees against the possibility
of failure. “It is here the rural-to-urban migration by the most suitable
family member – a mature son or daughter (especially if educated) – comes
into the picture. In bypassing the credit and insurance markets (with their
bias against small farmers) migration facilitates the transformation; it
succeeds in doing this via its dual role in the accumulation of investment
capital (...), usually generating significant urban-to-rural flows of remittances,
and through diversification of income resources, controlling the level of
risk.” (Stark, 1991: 11) Remittances are not only an additional income but
rather a new source of capital which allows the modernization of a household
while keeping the risk relatively low. From this perspective, it is not
labour markets but capital (or credit) markets that are crucial. Besides
this capital investment function, migration to the cities represents also
a sort of “portfolio diversification” whereby the risks are being scattered
in the absence of an insurance market. (Stark, 1991: 48) There is a mutually
advantageous “trade of risks” - the migrant member of the family is insured
against the possible failure of his (her) job seeking in town (he or she
can always come back and find safe haven in his/her original home), the remaining
members of family are insured against natural or economic misfortune by
having an independent source of income in town. (Stark, 1991: 43, 219)
Another major point of the new economics of migration
is the explanatory shift from the rational choice stress on absolute benefits
(maximizing calculation) towards the consideration of relative benefits
and relative poverty as the main incentive for migration – an individual
is seen as being motivated to migrate when he sees others having advantages
that he does not have but could have if he migrated (especially when he knows
that those others got them via migration). (Stark, 1991: 102) What motivates
is attainable benefit seen with reference to the others. The act of comparison
and examples of success are crucial: this explains why the rate of migrations
from countryside to city is not highest in the poorest regions or villages,
but rather in those with very unequal income distribution.
Two major implications for government policies follow
from the new economics of migration. (1) Government can influence migration
rates not only through labour markets, but also by shaping insurance and
capital markets, (2) the changes in the distribution of income may influence
migration independently of or at loggerheads with the changes of mean income:
„In fact, government policies that produce a higher mean income in migrant-sending
areas may increase migration if relatively poor households do not share in
the income gain. Conversely, policies may reduce migration if relatively
rich households do not share in the income gain.“ (Massey et al., 1997: 261)
I. 1. 3. Dual Labour Market Theory
Migration as a consequence of a hierarchical segmentation
of domestic job market and of recruitment policies.
This theory, worked out by Michael J. Piore, explains
migration by referring to its demand side. It also shifts the crux of explanation
from the micro- to the macro-level – from the rational choices of an individual
or a household to the structural and cultural condition of industrial societies.
Labour markets in industrialized countries are divided into two segments
– the second one offering unstable, badly paid jobs with a low social status
and without any opportunity for upward mobility (so-called “dead-end-jobs”).
These jobs are avoided by the indigenous labour force so that there is a
demand for an additional labour supply even though there might be a high
unemployment rate in the first segment. Immigrants are the most suitable
group to fill this vacant space. This is so not only because of the wage
differential between their country of origin and the host country but also
because they are recruited for a temporary period, maintaining their social
centre of gravity in their countries and caring little either about the social
status of their work or about the chance for upward mobility in the host
country. They do not link their self-esteem and identity to their social
standing in the host country but rather in their country of origin, where
their status moves upward because of their earnings abroad. Jobs in host
countries are thus severed from social identity which remains rooted in the
social structure of the sending countries (or migrating cultures themselves).
In contrast to the neo-classical suppositions, from this perspective migration
phenomena are best explained not by wage differentials across countries and
regions but rather by the social segmentation of the domestic market in jobs
and recruitment policies: “(i)t is the employers, not the workers, and the
jobs, not the incomes, that are strategic”. (Piore, 1979: 19) Low-level wages
are held down by cultural and institutional mechanisms and may not rise in
response to a decrease in supply, they may fall, however, in response to
an increase in the supply of immigrant workers since „the social and institutional
checks that keep low-level wages from rising do not prevent them from falling“
(Massey et al., 1997: 262)
“Ethnicization” (or even “racialization”) of the lower
segment of labour market splits the working class into superior insiders
and inferior outsiders, indigenous and privileged and alien and disadvantaged.
It establishes a welfare and social threshold below which native workers
will never fall since it is assigned to a social group with a permanently
inferior social status. This segmentation may work well until immigrant communities
settle for good in the host country and begin to use the framework of liberal-democratic
universalist principles to raise the claims of equal opportunities and life
chances in the host society. Then the split between the space of identity
and social status and the space of money earning is broken and the social
and ethnic tension follows. (Parnreiter, 2000: 29 – 30)
I. 1. 4. World-Systems Theory
Migration as part of capitalist accumulation that
thrives on imbalances between the advanced centre and backward periphery.
According to this theory, the migration of labour is
an inherent part of the process of the capitalist accumulation which needs
the incessant incorporation of new areas and the uprooting of traditional
rural classes so that they become a new and cheap labour force. The flow of
goods and capital into the non-capitalist periphery is followed by the flow
of labour migrants in the opposite direction. The penetration of capitalism
into the peripheries creates uprooted, mobile populations and, at the same
time, forges strong material, cultural and political links to the core countries
resulting in population movements. (Wallerstein, 1974)
The emergence of the inter-state system with closely
checked borders transformed migration: mere geographical displacement was
compounded by the change in juridical and political status which allowed increased
exploitation. Borders and national identities split the working class into
insiders and outsiders. Borders become selective filters that weakened the
bargaining position of immigrants and allowed their increased exploitation.
Both separation and connection – the wall and the holes – were indispensable
to heightening profits. According to Saskia Sassen, “national boundaries
do not act as barriers so much as mechanisms reproducing the system through
the international division of labour (...) The strengthening of the nation-state
creates the conditions for immigrant labour as a distinct category of a nation's
labour supply … characterized by (1) the institutional differentiation of
the processes of labour-force reproduction and maintenance; and (2) a particular
form of powerlessness, associated with formal or attributed foreign status,
that meets the requirements of types of work organization based on direct
rather than structural control over the workforce.” (Sassen, 1988: 36)
The processes of globalization in the last quarter of
the 20th century underlined the basic assumption of this approach that labour
migration is a subsystem of the world-market: migration is enhanced and
intensified by an increase in the mobility of capital and goods, by the
acceleration of transport and information transfer, and by the electronic
media and means of communication which are able to connect instantaneously
even the most distant places on the planet. Globalization incorporates all
remaining rural areas on the Earth into one world-market and into its division
of labour. It accelerates the processes which have accompanied capitalist
expansion from the very beginning. Agrarian households are deprived of the
traditional subsistence economy and pulled into the realm of salaried work
- they move to the cities and/or to other countries offering jobs. (Massey,
1990: 67)
Moreover, the post-fordist transformation of capitalism linked to the process
of globalization in the core countries increased the offer of precarious
and badly paid jobs in the services appropriate to the unqualified and undemanding
labour arriving from the periphery. Capital may move to the periphery and
labour to the core – nowadays as in previous stages of its development,
either way capitalism thrives on the imbalances between two regions.
I. 1. 5. Migration Networks Theory
Migration as sustaining and enhancing itself through
the networks of information, assistance and obligations between migrants
in the host society and their friends and relatives in
the sending area.
Whereas the previously outlined theories try to catch
the causes or origins of migration, the theory of migration networks focuses
upon the ways migration reproduces or sustains itself. The networks established
by and through migration feed back and increase migration: „Migrant networks
are sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and
non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship
and shared community origin. They increase the likelihood of international
movement because they lower the costs and risks of movement and increase
the expected net returns to migration. Network connections constitute a form
of social capital that people can draw upon to gain access to foreign employment.
Once the number of migrants reaches a critical threshold, the expansion
of networks reduces the costs and risks of movement, which causes the probability
of migration to rise, which causes additional movement, which further expands
the networks, and so on.“ (Massey et al., 1997: 264) Networks make available
information about the situation in the receiving country to the people still
residing in the country of origin and give them also social, economic and
residential infrastructure on which they can rely after they have moved
to the receiving country - orientation in the new environment, assistance
in residence and job seeking, help in emergencies). Family and ethnic or
regional ties make up the densest parts of the networks. This explains not
only the residential concentration of one ethnic (local, regional, religious
etc.) immigrant community (in city quarters or regions) but also its economic
and social concentration in a particular type of job and level of social
standing – in one economic and social niche.
To be logged into a social network highly reduces the
cost of migration – beginning with traveling arrangements or illegal border-crossing
guides and ending up with searching for an apartment and job, not to speak
of the kind of circular migration developed for instance between Mexico
and US and Poland and Germany. Not only are opportunity costs reduced by
the network but also psychological costs fall sharply since a migrant maintains
his involvement in his cultural group which alleviates the feeling of alienation
in a foreign country.
The process of globalization enhances the opportunities
for circular migration and permanent communication between local community
and emigrants. Migratory networks establish a new and permanent transnational
social space in which a new kind of identity is constructed. This kind of
identity shatters the traditional concept of migration as an irreversible,
one-off process and of identity as linked to a fixed and permanent place
of residence (either in the country of origin, or in the country of immigration).
Migration becomes instead a permanent state in which emigrants do not lose
their original contacts and identity but keep and cultivate them while settling
in the new country. They do not change their place and identity once and
for all but rather they stay in a new space “between”. Hence the new notion
of „transmigrants“: “Transmigrants are immigrants whose daily lives depend
on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and
whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state
(...) They are not sojourners because they settle and become incorporated
in the economy and political institutions, localities, and patterns of daily
life in the country in which they reside. However, at the very same time,
they are engaged elsewhere in the sense that they maintain connections,
build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence local and national
events in the countries from which they emigrated.” (Glick Schiller et al.,
1997: 121)
Migration networks theory implies a pessimistic assessment
of the capacity of government policies to control migration movements. On
the one hand, many networks form independently of a government’s intentions
and actions. On the other hand, certain policies which cannot be abandoned
for human rights reasons, such as family reunification and asylum and/or
refuge granting, serve to enhance migratory networking.
I. 1. 6. Cumulative Causation Theory
Migration as a consequence of changed circumstances
brought about by migration itself such as migration networks, change in
the job market
structure and/or institutions of receiving society.
Social networks are a prototype of a broader category
of mechanisms which may be called cumulative causation mechanisms.
In these a process causes a change in the environment which sustains or enhances
the process itself. While the formation of migration networks pertains to
the supply side of migration, many other changes pertain to the demand side,
such as changes in the social status of certain jobs, in the organization
of production or in the distribution of land, income and human capital.
Many such feedback effects of cumulative causation lie outside the reach
of government: for instance a devaluation of certain jobs as „immigrant“
makes it difficult to recruit native workers even in times of domestic unemployment.
(Massey et al., 1997: 266)
I. 1. 7. Institutionalist Theory
Migration as a result of the emergence and consolidation
of institutions linked to migration.
This theory uses the general model of cumulative causation
to describe the working of institutions associated with immigration. Most
of these institutions emerged as a result of an imbalance between the large
number of people seeking entry into capital-rich countries and the official
barriers set up by these countries. Demand for services to would-be immigrants
brought about a black market where the following services are on sale -
smuggling across borders, black contracting between immigrants and employers,
counterfeiting documents and visas, arranged marriages. Besides these private
agencies there also emerged NGOs trying to protect immigrants both from
exploitation and victimization by these illegal profit-makers and from the
repressive apparatuses of states (counseling, legal advice, shelter, legalization,
human rights protection). (Massey et al, 1997: 265) Similar to networking,
this institutionalization makes immigration quite independent of the original
causes and reasons. Even more than networks, institutionalization goes against
the regulatory efforts of governments. For one thing, increased police efforts
only increase the profits of illegal smugglers and mediators, for another,
human rights groups use their transnational leverage to trigger an alarm
bell and apply pressure whenever stricter regulatory measures are proposed
by government.
I. 1. 8. Client Politics Theory
Immigration as an effect of the client relationship
between the employers’ lobbies and higher officials.
There is a paradox between the overall tendency of the
nation-state to sustain its boundaries, supposedly leading to restrictive
immigration policies, and the fact that for long periods (especially after
WWII) the politics of immigration in western states was rather liberal.
The may be partly explained if we use the concept of client politics (developed
by James Q. Wilson) as Gary Freeman does: “The typical mode of immigration
politics ... is client politics, a form of bilateral influence in which
small and well-organized groups intensely interested in a policy develop
close working relationships with officials responsible for it. Their interactions
take place largely out of the public view and with little outside interference.”
(Freeman, 1995: 886) Christian Joppke, following Wilson and Freeman, summarizes
the argument as follows: “The costs of immigration, such as unemployment
or overpopulation, are widely diffused, while its benefits, such as cheap
labour or family reunification, are highly concentrated. This poses a classic
collective-action dilemma, in which the organized beneficiaries of concentrated
benefits will prevail over the unorganized bearers of diffused costs. Accordingly,
the expansive interests of organized employers and ethnic groups will outcancel
the restrictionist leanings of the non-mobilized and underinformed public.“
(Joppke, 1999: 17) Client politics is backed up further by the „strong antipopulist
norm“ (Freeman, 1995: 885) of the culture of political élites as
it was shaped in the 1950s and 1960s by coping with experiences of nazism,
colonial racism and racial segregation. This „antipopulist norm“ is institutionalized
in the constitutional framework: whereas the political process is vulnerable
to the populist pressure of majority opinion, the legal process is anchored
in universalistic principles.
I. 2. Normative theories
I. 2. 1. Two contradictory Principles of the Liberal
Nation State
The contemporary international system has been progressively
built up since the 17th century, when the principle of territorial sovereignty
of states became entrenched in Europe. In the same century, the modern doctrine
of human rights was formulated. This doctrine became the foundation of the
liberal-democratic institutions which have been subsequently developed in
the states of western Europe and northern America. The synthesis of the
principle of territorial sovereignty with the principle of human rights
brought about a specifically modern political form - the liberal nation-state.
The two principles at its foundation are, however, potentially conflicting.
One establishes a special ownership claim for members of a particular national
community to a given territory, the other establishes the right to equal
treatment (or concern) for all members of the universal community of humankind.
The principle of national sovereignty requires the state to care for the
well-being of one particular nation, rooted in a particular territory, the
principle of human rights requires the state to respect the rights of human
individuals, regardless of their national membership. The predicament of
the liberal nation-state consists in a permanent effort to meet those two
obligations which are, most of the time, at cross-purposes with one another.
This tension between the particularistic and collectivistic
mandate of states and the universalistic and individualistic spirit of their
liberal constitutions is exemplified acutely in the dilemmas
of their migration and integration policies. Wavering between the two poles
is inescapable since – as the very expression adumbrates – the liberal nation
state has to ensure both the collective goods of members of a particular
nation, and the individual rights of members of the universal community of
humankind (once they find themselves under its jurisdiction). In so far as
these two memberships coincide, everything may run smoothly. The predicament
begins when the state needs to adjudicate between claims of people who are
nationals and claims of people who are not. Precisely this is usually at
stake in immigration and integration policies. We can locate these policies
on a continuum spanning the two poles. The predominance of the universalistic
consideration amounts to the readiness of a state to open its gates to ethno-culturally
alien immigrants and to include them among its citizens. The predominance
of the particularistic consideration amounts to the closing of the state’s
borders and the reserving of its own territory, resources and institutions
for the members of its own nation, already living on the territory. All liberal
nation-states try to strike a balance between these two poles and, thus,
their immigration and integration policies are situated somewhere in the
middle of this continuum. As stated above: being both “liberal” and “national”,
they have to find a compromise between the individual rights of the person
as a member of the human species and the specific claims of their own nationals.
Normative theories reflect the predicament of the liberal
nation-state. In looking for their premises they cannot but choose between
the two general standpoints which are embodied in the two poles – universalistic
individualism and particularistic collectivism. The first stance takes as
its last reference point an individual as a member of the human species,
the second stance takes as its last reference point a nation or an individual
as a member of a nation. The first approach is deontological, that is to
say, it gives priority to rights and principles over goods and consequences.
The second approach is teleological or consequentialist, that is to say,
it gives priority to goods (or goals) and consequences over rights and principles.
In other words, the first stance focuses on rights of members of the
universal community of humankind and looks for principles which uphold them,
the second stance focuses on the well-being or welfare of the members of
a community and the consequences of state behavior for these values. Each
of the two normative views is specified by two political theories: libertarianism
and (egalitarian) liberalism make up the two wings of the first, communitarianism
and (political) realism coexist in the second. Rather than concrete traditions
(which they are as well) I will take these theories as ideal types, that
is to say, as abstract models of reasoning with specific premises and theorems.
My presentation relies on the general characteristics of these positions
as they are used in contemporary political philosophy (Kymlicka 1990; Goodin,
Pettit, 1993) and on their specification for the issues of migration and
political membership as provided by Steiner (1992), Carens (1992), Walzer
(1983) and Hendrickson (1992).
I. 2. 2. Libertarianism
The basic premise is the right of individuals to
have at their free disposal their lives (self-ownership) and possessions
to which they are entitled either by the legitimate appropriation of common
natural resources or by consensual (i.e. voluntary) transactions with other
individuals. From this point of view, a state is the mere result of contracts
concerning the security and lawfulness of the given society: individuals
give the state certain powers and resources so that it ensures their right
to own themselves and their legitimately obtained goods, and that it enforces
their contracts. Individuals do not owe anything to any association (including
the state) unless they have promised it within the terms of a voluntarily
agreed deal. As a result of free association of independent individuals
the state is to serve those individuals, rather than vice versa.
Freedom of movement is part of the right of (self)ownership
and, therefore, can be restricted only by the equal right of another individual
or of an association of these. The free transactions of individuals should
not be hindered by state borders since these are no more than the frontiers
of jurisdiction agencies, established by free individuals to ensure their
property rights. In an ideal world of libertarian principles the difference
between moving within the borders of one’s state and across the state borders
should be merely formal – crossing under the jurisdiction of another law
enforcing agency. To the extent that individuals living in the realm of one
agency (that is, of one state) agree to make contractual exchanges which
entail the free movement of migrating individuals, there should be no restrictions
on these movements.
This quasi-absolute freedom of movement may be limited,
however, if a libertarian accepts a Lockean proviso on the appropriation
of free (that is, not yet owned) natural resources which stipulates that
one can appropriate parts of them only to the extent that they are left “as
good and enough” for the others. That would require that each human being
has equal initial share in natural (that is, material) resources. It could
imply a duty of redistribution on behalf of those who were born without any
resources, including the possibility that they are allowed to enter a wealthy
country where they have more opportunity to obtain their fair share of resources.
By taking into account the initial distribution of material resources, and
hence the conditions of possibility for the full exercise of one’s
right of (self)ownership, this modified version of libertarianism would move
half-way towards (egalitarian) liberalism.
I. 2. 3. Liberalism
The basic premise of (egalitarian) liberalism is that
each human individual has, morally speaking, equal moral worth or dignity
and is, therefore, entitled to be treated on the same footing as others.
This basic assumption of the equal dignity of all human beings is translated
into the requirements of equal liberty, equal opportunity and fair share
in material and social resources which ensure that freedoms and opportunities
that are formally guaranteed may be exercised in reality. Given its stress
on the fair distribution of opportunities and resources, liberalism has to
give a much more important role to the state than that assigned to it by
libertarianism. If the state wants to meet the basic requirements of liberal
justice as they flow from the basic premise of equal dignity, it must equalize
distributive inequalities. Although these requirements have a universal scope
of validity and application (they are valid for and concern all humans),
due to the division of humankind into many nation-states, they have to be
realized first by one state vis-a-vis its own citizenry. In other words,
in the absence of the universal polity, universal values have to be realized
by a particular nation and human rights have to become civil rights.
Despite its universalistic and individualistic moral
foundations, therefore, liberalism has to draw a line between the mutual
rights and obligations of individuals belonging to a particular community
and their obligations towards outsiders. This line can be thin and rather
formal, or, alternatively, thick and rather substantive. The first view is
taken up by those who pay lip-service to the practical expedience of the
nation-state but still insist that it should conceive its obligations towards
insiders and outsiders as basically equal. In terms of immigration policy
it means that the only legitimate reason for the restriction of immigration
is that it would jeopardize the human rights of insiders and/or the liberal
nature of their society and, thus, the interests and rights of outsiders
would be given more weight than the interests and rights of insiders, which
would go against the principle of equal treatment.
The second wing of liberalism, led by John Rawls, gives
the line between insiders and outsiders more substantive implications. This
is because it conceives mutual rights and obligations as derived not
only from a common humanity but also from principles of mutually advantageous
cooperation, the product of which each of its participant should have a
fair share. Since a nation-state provides the legal and political framework
for a relatively closed system of cooperation, the obligations of its citizens
towards one another are qualitatively different and thicker than their
obligations towards those who are outside the common cooperative scheme
– the outsiders do not contribute anything to the social product, and, therefore,
they should not have any entitlement to it.
Here the interests and rights of insiders are given
clear precedence over the interests and rights of outsiders. Nevertheless,
once the rights of insiders have been ensured the state has free leeway
to accept as many immigrants as it can. Besides, it has a duty to accept
those fleeing from persecution by states which deprived them of basic human
rights. It should also accept people fleeing from natural catastrophes or
civil wars and other violent conflicts which threaten their rights, lives
and property. As long as it has already given assistance to its own needy
people and still has free resources at its disposal it should help needy
and starving people living outside its territory, either by assisting them
in places they live in or by accepting a bearable number of them on its own
territory.
Roughly speaking, whereas the liberal state as conceived
by Rawlsians is bound to ensure the full set of liberal rights (including
welfare rights) of its own citizens, it is bound to ensure only the basic
human rights of outsiders if they find themselves in emergency situations
in which those rights are threatened. The obligation to help the needy is
contingent upon its fulfilment within the given political community in the
first place. In sum, the duties to outsiders are much thinner and weaker
than the duties to insiders. This brings this type of liberalism closer to
approaches which stand on the other side of the moral fence that separates
individualistic universalism from the collectivistic particularism.
I. 2. 4. Communitarianism
The basic premise of this theory is that an individual
cannot live a valuable life unless he is a member of a thriving ethical
community. His good is interwoven with the common good of one large cultural
group – nation – which governs itself through a state. Participation in
the common life generates a thick web of mutual claims and obligations which
sharply contrasts with a very thin web of moral ties linking an individual
of one national community to individuals of other national communities.
The thin moral ties do not stem from a cultural and political membership
in one particular group but rather from a natural membership in the human
species. Unlike the communal obligations, the universal ones are formulated
negatively (Do not harm the other! Respect his property!) and imply
a positive action only if one encounters a stranger in some emergency situation
in which his life, property or basic human rights are threatened. It follows
that communitarianism allows the closing of doors to any immigration
claims which are not based on urgent needs such as the claims of people
fleeing a war, natural catastrophe, starvation etc., i.e. situations where
their very life and the fulfilment of their basic needs are jeopardized.
I. 2. 5. Realism
While communitarianism supposes that people are tied
to one another by their common striving to better ethically their lives and
cultivate their shared values, political realism supposes that people are
tied together in one community by their common interest in securing themselves
against a possible attack from without. Though realists do not deny the
existence of other common interests (economic, cultural, ethical), they
consider an interest in security and stable order as the hard core of the
national interest. All other concerns are, in the last analysis, conditioned
by the safe and predictable social environment and ensured by the state
monopoly of the means of coercion which is capable of sustaining “law and
order” inside the given territory and protecting borders with other states.
All other values and interests of the citizens – material welfare and ethical
well-being, prosperity and human rights – are ultimately contingent upon
the security provided by the state. As long as the particular national interest
is secured, the universalistic principles of humanity may be respected.
Once there is a clash between them, however, the national interest should
take precedence. This applies to all external relations towards people of
other societies, including their claims to immigration. This tenet does
not prevent realists from allowing help to needy outsiders whenever it does
not collide with the particular interest of the nation, not to speak of
those situations when to open doors to foreigners is not only neutral to
the national interest but indeed promotes it (e.g., in the periods of labour
shortage).
I. 2. 6. Grounds for Liberality and Restrictiveness
The immigration policies of liberal nation-states operate
on a continuum between individualistic universalism and collectivistic particularism:
the more they alleviate the sharp distinction between citizens and aliens
– that is, the more they make possible an easy passage from the first status
to the second via open doors to immigration and readiness to naturalization
- the more they move towards the universalistic pole; the more they strengthen
this distinction – that is, the more they make difficult to immigrate and
get citizenship - the more they move towards the particularistic pole.
We can call the former kind of immigration policies liberal – be they motivated
by libertarian or egalitarian principles - and the latter kind of immigration
policies nationalist or restrictionist – be they motivated by communitarian
or realist principles.
If the political membership is to be liberal and democratic
at the same time, it has to grant both individual rights, ensuring the independence
and equal status of persons, and the collective right of self-determination.
In the modern international system the universal rights of persons can be
ensured only through their membership in particular national communities.
Hence the two faces of citizenship – it amounts both to a legal status (with
the rights and obligations it entails) and to a national identity. The terminology
speaks for itself: nationality is usually merely another term for citizenship.
While the contingencies of national domestic politics may let the pendulum
swing in one direction or another at any given time, the long-run tendency
is to settle somewhere in the middle.
This long run “centrism” relies on the double normative
grounding of modern politics adumbrated in I. 2. 1. Despite of the theoretical
incompatibility of the premises of the two standpoints, there may be a substantial
practical overlap between them. Only extreme forms of moral individualism
and collectivism - such as libertarianism without a Lockean proviso and
vulgar realism - exclude the opposite view altogether. Moderate versions
of the two standpoints allow an incorporation of the opposite view on a subordinate
level once the precedence of the favored perspective has been ensured. Thus
according to liberals the collective interests or values of the community
may be promoted so far as a full range of universal individual rights
is safeguarded, whilst according to communitarians, on the other hand,
individual rights should be guaranteed as long as their exercise does not
clash with the common good.
The promotion of the opposite value may even be found
instrumental to the long run promotion of the prioritized value: thus, liberals
may acknowledge that the universal principle of human dignity can be realized
only in a stable and secure nation-state (realist view) and in a thriving
cultural-political community (communitarian view), especially if the values
of individual freedom and ethical pluralism belong to the primary set of
common goods. On these grounds, normative individualism and universalism
may justify sharper distinctions between insiders (citizens) and outsiders
(aliens), and consequently more policed, or even closed borders, if it is
arguably necessary for the advancement of individualist values. Normative
collectivism and particularism, on the other hand, may justify the equalization
of the standing of insiders and outsiders, and consequently less policed
and more open borders, if it is arguably necessary for the advancement of
the common good or of the national interest.
I. 3. Nationhood Models
I. 3. 1. Four Ideal Types
An exact place on the continuum between liberal immigration
(and integration) policies on the one hand and nationalist or restrictionist
policies on the other is contingent not only upon outcomes of political
decision-making processes but also on the historically constructed identities
of nations and their states. The different genealogies and self-understandings
of different nations tend to move them closer towards one or the other of
the two normative standpoints which they have to combine. We can order various
articulations of the two poles from the more universalistic, inclusive and
liberal identities (and attitudes towards immigration and integration) to
the more particularistic, exclusive and nationalist identities (and
attitudes towards immigration and integration).
I propose a typology that rests on two oppositions.
The first is that between the countries of the New and the Old World. Whereas
in the former nation-building coincided with immigration and the settlement
of a land, the latter conceived of themselves as endogenous, that is, as
descendants of those who used to live on the national territory continuously
up to the present since some mythical time of arrival and rooting. While
for the nations of the New World, belonging was a result of free choice with
an eye to the future, for the nations of the Old World, belonging was a result
of historical destiny. The second opposition is that between ethnic and civic
nations – the former vesting the criteria of membership in blood lineage,
the latter in political belonging to the territorial state. By combination
of the two oppositions we arrive at the following table.
Four Ideal Types of Nationhood
|
immigrant-settler
|
endogenous
|
civic
|
USA
|
France, Britain
|
ethnic
|
Israel
|
Germany
|
At first glance, the ethnic nation is nearly an absolute
opposite of the immigrant nation – it is based on destiny rather than on
free choice, and it is past-oriented rather than future-oriented. In this
view, the civic nation strikes a middle ground between those two mutually
exclusive options. The absolute opposition between immigrant and ethnic nations
is, however, problematised by many examples of immigrant-settler nations
which, within the process of modern European colonization, claimed an ethnic
pedigree. Israel is chosen as a prime empirical prototype since unlike the
others (such as Africaners in South Africa before 1994), Israel wants to
be a liberal-democratic, “western-type” nation-state. To include Israel under
the category of the immigrant ethnic nation presupposes that we make a qualitative
difference between a modern Israeli identity, linked to the Zionist state-building
project, and a pre-modern diasporic Judaism that referred to statehood only
in relation to the biblical past or the messianic future. (Attias, Benbassa:
2001) The secularization or politicization of the religious concept of the
statehood into the Zionist project of return and state-building amounted
to a radical transformation of Jewishness: migration and settlement in Palestine
and the establishment of the state of Israel there coincided with the creation
of the national identity in the modern sense of this word. As the title of
the play by Theodor Herzl – Das Altneuland (1907) - intimates, the Zionist
project combines the opposite traits of the New- and Old-World identities:
a community of destiny was to be realized as a community of free choice and
radiant future. Unlike the revolutionary French or Americans, who conceived
of their republics as the homelands of all humankind, Zionists conceived
of Israel as the homeland for Jews only as they are defined by blood lineage
and religion.
I. 3. 2. The Immigrant Civic Nation: USA
In the USA, Australia or Canada, immigration and
the settling of immigrants coincided with nation-building. As these nations
were created out of the people who originally belonged to other nations,
their immigration and integration policies have been in the long run closer
to the universalistic and inclusive end of the continuum. They have encouraged
permanent immigration and treated most legal immigrants as future citizens.
Once ethnic and racial prejudices were overcome in the last quarter of the
20th century, the USA, Canada and Australia came progressively to conceive
of themselves as “multicultural” (that is, multi-ethnic or multi-racial)
nations. (Glazer 1994; Takaki 1993; Kymlicka 1997)
I. 3. 3. The Endogenous Civic Nation
I. 3. 3. 1. Assimilationist Republic: France
France is a good example of how a civic nation in Europe
may occupy a middle position between an immigrant civic and endogenous ethnic
nationhood. The French founded their modern identity not only on past ethnic
history but also on the projected political future, that is, on a conscious
choice of the republican form of government. This political form allegedly
expressed universal values of humankind so that, in principle, France was
supposed to be the true fatherland of all freedom-loving people across the
whole world. Since the times of Napoleon, this revolutionary universalism
provided an ideological cover for the French colonial project, and, simultaneously,
made France quite open and inclusive as far as immigration was concerned.
The integration pattern, however, had been distinctly assimilationist. The
inclusion of others (be they colonized or immigrants) required that they
abandon their particular ethnic identities and fully buy into the French
national culture which allegedly incarnated universal values of humanity.
(Brubaker 1992; Dumont 1990; Favell 1998)
I. 3. 3. 2. The Pluralistic Empire: Great Britain
A different example of the civic nation is Great Britain.
As an empire, Great Britain was supposed to be a universal commonwealth
for many particular regional, religious or ethnic groups. They could retain
their differences under one imperial roof, albeit under the condition that
they respected the superiority of English culture. The development of liberal
norms with their antiracist and antidiscriminatory thrust brought about a
transformation of this hierarchical cultural pluralism into a liberal multiculturalism.
The latter view conceives of partial ethnic identities as complementary to
an overarching Britishness. Since Britain was traditionally a country of
emigration, rather than immigration, liberal immigration policy towards oversees
“subjects” between 1948 and 1962 was not motivated by a genuine openness
towards them but rather by the goal of keeping the Empire. Once this goal
proved unattainable during the 1950s, Britain subscribed to a zero-immigration
tenet. (Favell 1998; Grillo 1998; Hansen 2000; Parekh 1990)
I. 3. 4. The Endogenous Ethnic Nation: Germany
Whereas political membership in Britain and France was
traditionally conferred by ius soli (that is, on the basis of the place
of birth), in Germany it was conferred by ius sanguinis (that is, on the
basis of blood lineage). This constitutive element of German nationhood
was further strengthened by the homeland role which the Federal Republic
of Germany played for East Germany and the East European German diaspora:
this role meant that West Germany had to care for all ethnic Germans no
matter where they lived or whether they were formally German citizens or
not. This implied very exclusivist and particularistic attitudes to immigration
and integration in the years of post-war reconstruction. Whereas Germans
conferred an automatic right to citizenship on all ethnic Germans, regardless
of whether they had ever lived in Germany, they denied this right to their
labour immigrants even if they had resided in the country for a long time.
(Brubaker 1992; Dumont 1983, 1985; Joppke 1999)
I. 3. 5. The Immigrant Ethnic Nation: Israel
Since the establishment of Israel, Jewish immigrants
(and their family members), called “returnees”, have been given automatic
citizenship and large assistance has been provided for their integration -
over two million Jews have arrived and been absorbed into Israeli society
since 1948. The right of return has been denied to the Palestinian exiles
of 1948 - originally more than 700 000, now around 3,5 million. The Arabs
who stayed – originally 186 000, now more than 1 million – have been given
citizenship but many of their rights have been curtailed (the right of movement,
land property rights, political rights etc.) and the development of their
communities has been barred by many formal and informal measures. There is
no other avenue for immigration and naturalization than the ethnoreligious
one. Since the first Intifada (1987 – 1993) which caused the frequent closure
of the territories occupied in 1967, and especially since 1991, when the Israelis
began to regulate entry into Israel proper from the territories, a growing
number of guestworkers has been accepted (around 200 000 of them were in
Israel in 2003) with no opportunity to integrate and naturalize. (Dieckhoff
1998; Kimmerling 1989; Lustick 1980; Smooha 2001)
Chapter II: Western Experiences
II. 1. United States of America
II. 1. 1. Immigration Policies
The universalistic and liberal potential of the immigrant
civic nationhood of North Americans was captured by G. Washington’s expression
“an asylum of all nations” and by W. Whitman’s expression “nation of nations”.
(Whitman, 1926: 38) For the most part of American history, however, this
open and inclusive identity was superseded by a closed and exclusive one.
Whereas the former identity derived nationality from immigration and a liberal-democratic
creed, the latter hypostasized an ethnic core of White Protestant Anglo-Saxonism.
This conception was epitomized by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which
barred Chinese labourers from entering the United States and those who had
already been in the U.S. from becoming naturalized. (It was repealed in
1943.) The National Origins Act of 1924 restricted immigration to a few
Northern European source countries. It established a quota system which
was supposed to reproduce existing ethnoracial proportions as determined
by the 1920 census. By contrast, the Hart-Celler Immigration Reform Act
of 1965 established source-country universalism and thus opened the door
to the large-scale immigration from the Third World. “The new act established
an Eastern hemisphere ceiling of 170 000 new immigrant visas per year (complemented
by 120 000 visas for the Western hemisphere), distributed according to a
seven-category preference system prioritizing family reunification, and
stipulating that from no country the total number of new immigrants was
to exceed 20 000.” (Joppke, 1999: 27)
The cap of 120 000 per year for Western hemisphere immigrants,
whose number was not restricted before, unleashed illegal immigration over
the Mexican-US land border. This problem was tackled by the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 which legalized the status of about three
million undocumented immigrants in the country but failed to stop the further
inflow which was fuelled by the client politics of Mexican and employers’
lobby groups (for client politics see I. 1. 8.) Those groups’ pressure ensured
a toothless sanctions scheme that was partly defended with reference to the
civil rights imperative of non-discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity.
It was thus client politics in combination with civil rights discourse that
stood in the way of effective immigration control.
The Legal Immigration Act of 1990 was a result of efforts to balance family-based
with skill-based immigration and thus, among other things, to redress an
imbalance in the national origins of post-1965 immigration, which was skewed
towards a few Third World countries, especially Hispanic and Asian. Attacks
against the alleged racism of this project prevented the skill-based criterion
from overtaking the family-based criterion and ultimately a compromise was
found by “expanding the pie”, that is, by an increase in legal immigration
to the United States by almost 40%.
Since the 1960s and 1970s the civil rights movement
has strengthened progressively the rights of ashore aliens, including illegal
ones and asylum seekers, against the American government whereby it enhanced
the universalistic and liberal as against the particularistic and nationalist
pole of immigration politics. Classical immigration law – dominant in the
1880s and 90s, had its crux in the latter pole. The state had no obligations
to the alien except those explicitly consented to, and it had a sovereign,
unfettered, “plenary power” over the admission, expulsion and naturalization
of aliens. This sovereignty was exerted on behalf of an ethno-racially defined
national community. By contrast, postclassical immigration law conceives
of individuals as invested with inalienable human rights and social ties
to the community (represented by the state), even if the community did not
consent to his/her entry to the territory. (Joppke, 1999: 45)
While civil rights discourse penetrated the courts and
pushed them in the liberal direction, public opinion reacted and tried to
swing the pendulum back towards the nationalist pole in the 80s and 90s.
The symbolic hallmark of this change is the passing of Proposition 187 by
Californian voters in November 1994. This proposition, dubbed as the “Save
Our State” (SOS) initiative, wanted to “bar illegal aliens from most state-provided
services, including non-emergency health care and school education.” (Joppke
1999: 55) Subsequently, it was blocked by courts. The nationalist movement
was supposed to be enshrined in the Immigration Control and Financial Responsibility
Act of 1996. The client politics and civil rights opposition watered down
its original restrictive impulse to a quite benign modification of liberal
openness.
The anti-immigration populist wave of the 90s was accompanied
by intellectual challengers to immigration liberalism who argued both from
economic premises (immigrants as a burden to the welfare system), social
premises (immigrants as a threat to the country’s own low-skilled workers),
and moral and cultural premises (immigrants as eroding the values on which
the cohesion of the American republics rests). These restrictionist opinions
were voiced across the whole ideological mainstream from the left liberals
(Lind, 1995), through the conservative liberals (Glazer, 1995) to the right-wingers
(Brimelow, 1995).
II. 1. 2. Integration Policies
II. 1. 2. 1. Ethnic Pluralism
The idea of many people from many “endogenous” nations
coming together and forming freely a new “nation of nations” found its expression
in Israel Zangwill’s notion of America as “the great Melting-Pot where all
the races of Europe are melting and re-forming”. (Zangwill, 1909) This idea
evoked “the bi-directional adjustment of immigrants and receiving society”
while covering up “the uni-directional assimilation of immigrants into an
already established Anglo-American culture.” (Joppke, 1999: 147) Against
the melting-pot ideology, Horace Kallen proposed to conceive America as a
“federation of nationalities”, in which particular ethnic differences should
co-exist with an overarching civic identity. (Kallen, 1956; 1996) Kallen
gave a lofty normative meaning to the process of ethnic networking which
has always existed among American immigrants for whom ethnicity was a major
resource of economic and social integration.
The sociology of integration of the 30s and 40s assumed
a progressive waning of ethnic consciousness with the second and third generation
– the self-help networks of one’s ethno-cultural group should serve only
as an “ethnic cushion” on the way from exclusion to full integration amounting
to cultural assimilation (Park, 1950) Against this assumption, Kallen and
his multiculturalist followers have conjured up a permanent ethnocultural
pluralism. Recent theories of “symbolic ethnicity” described the processes
of ethnic revival in the 60s and 70s which correspond to this idea. (Gans,
1979; Waters 1990) These theories could take cue from an old observation
of Marcus Lee Hansen that the third generation tries to remember what the
second generation tried to forget (Hansen, 1996) In other words, while ethnic
identity was a resource of integration for the first generation, and often
a burden for the second generation, it is a voluntary choice and a means
of self-fashioning for the third generation.
II. 1. 2. 3. Racial Pluralism
A voluntary pluralism of symbolic ethnicity for European
Americans is complemented by the pluralism of racial groups whose difference
is grounded in their uneven position within the social division of labour
stemming from the period of colonization or enslavement. (Blauner, 1994)
Since the adoption of the new regime of immigration in 1965 the ethnoracial
composition of immigrants has been reversed in favor of non-Europeans: “Whereas
almost 80 per cent of the older immigrants were European, about 84 per cent
of post-1971 immigrants came from Latin America (49, 6 per cent) and Asia
(34.5 per cent).” (Joppke, 1999: 150) They have followed only partly the
ethnic pattern of integration, typical for previous waves of European immigrants.
One of the causes has probably lain in the social meanings which certain
physical traits had in the American racist past, the meanings which survived
deep in the post-civil rights movement era. But part of the responsibility
for the persevering of racial categories lies with the radical fringe of
the civil rights movement itself. Out of this fringe emerged a movement of
racial liberation (Black Power) which reversed the original thrust to civic
inclusion and equality of individual rights and opportunities and began to
profess the separation of racial groups. (Carmichael, Hamilton, 1967) To
this reversal, perverse effects of affirmative action programs added up:
these programs were supposed to enhance the integration and equality of individuals
from previously excluded race groups, but their emphasis on racial characteristics
actually reinforced racial divisions by giving incentives to these individuals
to assert and claim their racial distinctiveness rather than to shed it.
The separatism of radicals, the perverse effects of affirmative action and
debates about bilingual education in the Southwest have been compounded by
“culture wars” in the U.S. campuses where the term “multiculturalism” has
been used mainly in connection with the curriculum battles about new programs
of ethnic studies of racial groups. (Takaki, 1994; Gutierrez 1994)
All these factors reinforced the tendency of racial
groups to entrench themselves in their specificity and encouraged newcomers,
whose bulk came from Latin America and Asia to adopt “Asian” and “Hispanic”
identity even though these identities, unlike European ethnic identities,
had anything but a real cultural or psychological basis and had no meaning
beyond the American domestic sphere: rather than being transplantations
of a specific cultural heritage, they have been produced by “the structural
positioning of immigrant groups in the receiving society” (Joppke, 1999:
178). Racial identity is panethnic in the sense that it may cover quite disparate
and heterogeneous ethnic or national cultures: what is the shared cultural
basis between Koreans, Chinese and Japanese which makes them all “Asian”?
And what - save the Spanish language - do Puerto Ricans and Mexicans have
in common so as to invite the single category of “Latinos”?
In the last quarter of the past century, “race” has
ceased to be exclusively a form of discrimination and has become a source
of opportunity as well - especially for those already advantaged members
of groups disposed to racialization. Ethnic entrepreneurs and power-brokers
are racializing ethnic boundaries so that they can “model their immigrant
constituencies as victimized clients of the state, and to clamour for affirmative-action
privileges: preferential college admission, government jobs and business
contracts, and political representation in majority minority districts ...
However, contrary to scare scenarios of ‘Balkanization’, multicultural élite
discourse should not be mistaken for the common immigrant’s unwillingness
to integrate, of which there is little evidence. On the ground, ethnicity
functions much as it always did, as a source of adjusting to the new society.”
(Joppke, 1999: 185)
II. 2. France
II. 2. 1. Immigration
In contrast to nations of immigrants-settlers (be
they civic as USA, or ethnic as Israel) for the French national identity
immigration did not play a constitutive role. Still, France is the only society
in the Old World which was a country of immigration from the mid-19th century
to the 1960s. Without being a nation of immigrants, France has been, nevertheless,
a country of immigration. (Geddes, 2003: 52) The positive acceptance of
immigrants was allowed by the universalistic thrust of modern French identity
as it was created at the end of the 18th century. The French nation was constituted
in 1789 as a result of democratic rather than ethnonational revolution.
That is to say, the raison d’etre of the republic was not primarily political
self-determination by an ethnocultural group but rather the realization of
moral principles - égalité, liberté, fraternité.
Given the assumption that these principles were universal, that is, valid
for every human being, France was a universal republic of humankind. No wonder
that for a short period of time after the French Revolution, every foreigner
who entered French soil and was ready to subscribe to the founding values
of the Republic was immediately entitled to French citizenship. (Moreau,
1999: 321)
There have been three major waves of immigration to
France. The first wave of immigration began in the wake of the Napoleonic
wars and achieved its momentum from the 1850s onwards during a period of
high-intensity industrialization accompanied by the rising demand for unqualified
labour and a simultaneous drop in natality (due to the use of techniques
of natural contraception). (Bernard 2002, 66) The second wave of immigration,
after the First World War, was already run by the State, though through a
non-governmental organization Société générale
d’immigration (SGI) that was in charge of recruitment from 1924. In the 1920s.
the influx of foreigners was proportionally greater than in the United States.
(Bernard, 2002: 71) During the 1930s, due to the economic crisis, the first
restrictive measures were taken and supported by flurries of populist xenophobia.
In the first two waves, Europeans prevailed, in the former coming mainly
from the border countries of Belgium, Italy, Spain, Germany and Switzerland,
in the latter coming mainly from Poland, Portugal and Eastern Europe. The
number of Africans was insignificant.
The third wave was the post-war immigration of Les trentes
gloriouses. In this influx, Spanish and Portuguese were progressively outweighed
by North Africans, especially Algerians: ”between 1949 and 1955, 180
000 Algerian Muslims settled in the metropole compared to 160 000 workers
of other nationalities.” (Bernard 2002, 79) Despite the original idea of
national and regional criteria of selection (with preference for North Europe
and northern regions of Italy and Spain), a government ordinance of November
2, 1945 did not mention any. The new governmental organization was set up
after the liberation to recruit and settle the immigrants – Office national
d’immigration (ONI), that will become Office des migrations internationales
(OMI) in 1984. In 1952 another institution was established: Office francais
de protection des réfugiés et des apatrides (OFPRAH).
Having French nationality, Algerians have been allowed
to migrate freely in their colonial metropolis since 1946. Nevertheless,
from 1954, when their nationalist uprising in Algeria broke out, until 1962,
when de Gaulle signed the Treaty of Evian on Algerian independence, Algerian
immigrants in France found themselves in the enemy’s territory, torn up by
the violent struggle of two main nationalist groups – Front de libération
nationale and Mouvement national algérien – which tried to get control
over the Algerian population in France and, to a certain extent, export civil
war to the French territory. Even after the Treaty of Evian, the influx of
Algerians did not abate.
Due to the oil crisis of 1973, labour immigration stopped
in 1974, after the election of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as French
president. The second half of the 70s were characterized by systematic
and unsuccessful efforts to have immigrant workers returned to their countries
of origin. The Bonnet Law of 1980 modified the law of 1945 by strengthening
control and repressive measures for the breach of regulations. These measures
included expulsions for non-regularized immigrants, threatening even the
second-generation immigrants who had grown up in France – called since
the early 80s les beurs. Francois Mitterrand took presidential powers in
1981 with a strong antiracist rhetoric: he promised to abolish expulsions
of second-generation immigrants, to fight their discrimination and to interrupt
the program trying to encourage immigrants to return to their places of origin.
In 1982, a measure was taken allowing 130 000 clandestine immigrants to regularize
their stay in France. Mitterrand also raised the issue of immigrants’ right
to vote at municipal elections. These xenophilic gestures and rhetoric were
intended to unify the left-wing camp and to split the right-wing camp even
if at the cost of strengthening the popularity of Jean Marie le Pen’s Front
National. (Mitterand’s xenophilic rhetoric represents a case of left-wing
populism, unique in Europe and allowed obviously by the universalistic foundations
of French identity.)
Mitterand’s Machiavellian moves brought about some real
results such as the law of 1984 introducing la carte de séjour de
dix ans (a green card for ten years) that put an end to repeated applications
for a prolongation of stay on the basis of employment. After that, however,
Mitterand’s Machiavellianism backfired and the far right pushed the left
onto the long-term defensive. The far right exploited the slogan le droit
a la différence (the right to be different) - originally coined by
parts of the Left - to stress the inassimilability of (North) Africans. The
Chirac government (taking power in 1986) made a clear U-turn when it set
up conditions for the renewal of la carte de séjour, justified expulsions
of non-regulars, introduced expulsion as a form of second punishment (double
peine) for immigrants who commited a crime (abolished only by Nicolas Sarkosy
in 2003) and abolished the automatic acquisition of nationality for persons
born in France to foreign parents. This tough approach to immigration was
symbolized by the Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua. The softening
corrections were brought about by the Law Joxe (after the left wing Minister
of the Interior) in 1989. The return of the Right (with Pasqua again heading
the Interior) in 1993 brought again a hardening of immigration control –
restricting jus soli by additional conditions, giving additional powers to
the police in its handling of immigrants and having its peak in the Law Pasqua
modifying the ordinance of November 2, 1945 with many restrictive measures
focused on making difficult the entry and stay of immigrants and the reunification
of their families (some of these measures were subsequently blocked by the
Conseil Constitutionel). (Geddes, 2003: 62)
In 1996, the so-called sans-papiers (undocumented) entered
the public scene. (The very word reverses the burden of blame since instead
of being “down-by-law”, that is, culprits themselves, they are portrayed
rather as victims, people who are in need of official status.) The Law Debré
(after the Minister of the Interior of the right-wing government) of 1997
was passed in a period of heated public controversy and mass mobilization
of solidarity with non-regulars. In the spring of this year the right lost
the elections and the government of Lionel Jospin made immediately positive
gestures in the direction of sans-papiers and vowed to overhaul the whole
immigration question. Patrick Weil was summoned to suggest a set of guidelines
for future politicies of immigration and nationality. Two laws resulted
from these efforts at the beginning of 1998: the Law Guigou on nationality
and the Law Chevenement on immigration. The latter scrapped some of the
restrictive conditions of the Law Pasqua on acquisition of la carte de séjour
and made easier family reunification. The Law Guigou lifted up the restriction
on jus soli and thus went back to the legislation before 1993: children
born in France to foreign parents became French when they reached the age
of majority unless they wished otherwise.[or still now?] However, their
parents have the right to get the citizenship for them only when they reach
the age of 13 and not – as it was the case before 1993 – immediately after
they are born. (Bernard 2002, 106)
II. 2. 2. Integration Policies
II. 2. 2. 1. Assimilatory Integration
The reverse side of the openness and inclusiveness of
the French republic has been an assumption that universal values are embodied
not only by the political regime but also by the particular form of French
culture and that, therefore, to accede to these values requires that an
individual imbibe this culture. This combination of political inclusiveness
with cultural imperialism was the leading thread of French integration policies,
no matter whether they concerned regional subcultures (like Bretons, Basques,
Corsicans), immigrants to France or populations swept by the mission civilisatrice
of French colonialism. (Grillo, 1998: 107 – 110) All these groups
were supposed to be stripped of their particularities and garbed in the
new cultural clothes of the French nation – its language, memories of past
tribulations and the project of a glorious future.
The first wave of immigration was in full flow when
the Third Republic renewed the French creed of la nation, une et indivisible
and set out on the route to the systematic homogenization of French society,
still at that time permeated by regional, linguistic and other cultural differences.
(Weber, 1976) The main vehicles of this project were the school, army, trade-unions
and left-wing political parties. All these institutions moulded Frenchmen
not only out of Bretons, Basques, Occitans or Jews but also out of the children
of Belgians, Spanish, Italians or Swiss who decided to immigrate. The nationality
laws relying on jus soli endowed the children of foreigners born in France
with the opporunity to get citizenship with a minimum of additional conditions
required.
“The French cultural jacobinism” (Schnapper, 1994: 92)
considered cultural group differences as a barrier to civic freedom and
equality. Not communities but individuals were supposed to be integrated,
that is to say assimilated. In the 70s the word assimilation went out of
fashion and was replaced by “integration”, but the regulative ideal was
still the same. The measures of social integration, including welfare provision,
were formulated systematically in a universal language and in color-blind
fashion – targeted are “disadvantaged neighborhoods” or “the poor” and “the
excluded” rather than racial, ethnic or national groups. Policies of integration
passed as part of the politique de la ville (urban policy). (Geddes, 2003:
67) The French have had problems even with the gathering of statistical data
about immigrants since it has been conceived as inappropriate to take into
account the ethnic background of immigrant groups. The very “concept of minority
is absent from French law with policy-makers finding it very difficult to
think about the notion of minority groups” (Geddes, 2003: 66). This causes
difficulties to the French when it comes to coping with certain EU anti-discriminatory
directives which expect that the government gathers data about the ethnic
makeup of the population.
With growing awareness of the difficulties of integration
of large numbers of non-European and non-Christian immigrants, neo-republican
discourse evoked a threat of “lebanonization” or “balkanization” which
would fragment France into a “juxtaposition of communities” or “ghettoes”.
With its task to fight this “ethnicization” of public life, a disease called
in French pejoratively communautarism (“communitarianism”), “the Haut Conseil
a l’Intégration was established as a think tank in 1990 under the
direction of a Secretary-General for Integration based in the Prime Minister’s
office … [its] first report in 1991 was entitled ‘For a French model of integration’
informed by ‘a logic of equality and not a logic of minorities’.” (Geddes,
2003: 70)
II. 2. 2. 2. Islam
Since the end of the 80s the problem of the cultural
integration of immigrants was epitomized in the so-called affaire du foulard
(headscarf affair). The ideal established by the Third Republic stipulates
the secular nature of the educational institutions in which no visible symbols
of religious differences are allowed. Public spaces such as the school must
stress commonalities based on secular values of liberty and equality, not
divergences stemming from specific ethnic or religious loyalties. That is
why some headmasters and school directors did not allow Muslim girls wearing
headscarves to enter their schools. The first case took place in November
1989 in a school in Creil, but since then, several other conflicts have followed,
surrounded by several waves of heated public discussion. A related issue is
the unwillingness of Muslim parents to allow their children to participate
in sport classes where boys and girls exercise together only in light sportswear.
Both instances are highly symbolic since they pertain to two issues in which
the traditional Muslim cultures clash with the modern definition of the French
nation – the separation between religion and politics, and the principle of
equality between, and integration (as opposed to segregation) of, sexes. (Castles,
Miller, 1993: 241 – 242; Khosrokhavar, 1997)
Since the early 90s there have been attempts – both
from the Right and from the Left - to create a French Islam and to incorporate
representatives of France’s Muslim communities into the State by means of
special advisory or representative bodies. This concern took on greater
urgency after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington:
special unease has been aroused by the fact that “many mosques, Muslim schools
and Islamic cultural centres were financed by the governments of Muslim
states such as Saudi Arabia and Algeria … Many imams were trained outside
Europe.” (Geddes, 2003: 71) Hence, the critical question of current debates
is how to shift the organizational and cultural centre of gravity of spiritual
life of French Muslims to Europe, hopefully resulting in a mellowing of
some of those Islamic tenets that are incompatible with a liberal-democratic
societal structure.
II. 3. Great Britan
II. 3. 1. Immigration Policies
Britain’s advantageous position as an island has given
her an opportunity to develop a system which has combined strong external
frontier controls with a much weaker internal control regime (signalled
for instance by the absence of identity cards). A similar kind of duality
has pertained in respect to non-White minorities immigrating in huge numbers
after WWII: “British ‘race relations’ policy has been centred on the strict
control of immigration defined as unwanted (from African, Asian and Caribbean
people in the 1960s and 1970s and by asylum seekers more recently) coupled
with anti-discrimination laws that tackle both direct and indirect discrimination
and allow for positive action to tackle inequalities.” (Geddes 2003: 30)
Unlike the United States and, to a certain extent France,
Great Britain has never conceived of itself as a country of immigration.
For a long period it was rather a country of emigration – so long as the
empire expanded, British colonists set out to settle newly acquired lands.
The post-war reversal of this flow – that is, the immigration from the New
Commonwealth - was perceived as an unpleasant price for the maintenance of
Empire. The legal act passed after the war in reaction to the independence
of India in 1947 – the British Nationality Act of 1948 - invested some 600
000 000 subjects with equal right of entry and settlement in Britain. Everything
was done, however, to avoid this happening in practice.
Not that there was no labour shortage. The opposite
was true. In the face of it “the Royal Commission on Population recommended
in 1949 to recruit some 140 000 young immigrants, but only if they were
‘of good human stock and ... not prevented by their religion or race from
intermarrying with the host population and becoming merged in it’ (...)
While rejecting any concerted effort to recruit black immigrants, Britain
engaged in its one and only active immigration policy in the postwar period,
luring some 350 000 European Volunteer Workers (EVWs) – mostly Poles and
other Europeans ‘displaced’ by the war – into the country. They were welcome,
and not just as German-style guestworkers. As a civil servant in the Ministry
of Labour explained, the EVW’s ‘are coming definitely for permanent settlement
here with a view to their intermarrying and complete absorption into our
own working population’. Aliens being preferred to fellow subjects of the
Crown – never was the disjunction between formal membership status and identity
more obvious.” (Joppke 1999: 105)
How then to explain the fact that Britain maintained
the BNA regulation until 1962? Two factors combined: a real and sentimental
attachment to the Old Commonwealth of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia (a
sort of “greater Britain”), and a reluctance to apply officially racial criteria
by which the population of these countries would be distinguished from that
of the New Commonwealth countries. Unable to introduce such measures, “British
politicians faced the choice of casting the net of migration control over
the whole of the Commonwealth or accepting New Commonwealth migration as
the unavoidable corollary of the Old; they chose the latter. Policy-makers
accepted the transformation of the United Kingdom into a multicultural
society as the price of supporting the ties between Britain and the Old
Dominions.” (Hansen 2000: 19)
During the 50s, and especially after race riots in Nottingham
and Notting Hill at the end of 1958, voices had been rising about the necessity
of curbing the unstoppable inflow of non-Whites allowed by the BNA of 1948.
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 established the notion of belonging
– i.e., birth and ancestry – to filter the colored from the Anglo-Saxon
whites. The Commowealth Immigrants Act of 1968 took away the right of entry
from 200 000 East African Asians with UK government passports, who found
themselves victimized by the Africanization drive of independent Kenya.
“Britain thus came close to violating one of the fundamental norms of the
international state system: the obligation of states to accept their own
nationals.” (Joppke, 1999: 109) The justification for it was couched in
terms of preventing social conflict stemming from an implantation of people
of different habit, religion and culture.
According to the Bill of 1968, to be allowed to enter
the United Kingdom, UK passport-holders had to prove a “substantial connection”
with the UK – besides a birth in the UK also a parental or grandparental
connection. Inclusive legal status (citizenship) was narrowed by an exclusive
criterion of belonging. De iure criterion was ancestry and birth, de facto
criterion was race: the non-White subjects of the Empire had to stay out.
Free immigration was to be possible only if it could be conceived of as a
return, that is, if those who came were descendants of white British settlers.
The Immigration Act of 1971 dealt for the first time
jointly with aliens and Commonwealth citizens, lowering the status of the
latter almost to that of the former. For this purpose it introduced “the notion
of patriality to determine who had the ‘right of abode’ and thus was exempt
from immigration control. Building on the concept of substantial connection
in the 1968 Act, patrials were all citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies
born in or with an ancestral connection to the UK, citizens who had settled
for at least five years, and - this was a novelty - any Commonwealth citizen
with a parent or grandparent in the UK. The last clause finally realized
the second objective of British immigration policy, first intimated in the
grandfather clause of 1968, to prioritize the re-migration of British settlers.”
(Joppke, 1999: 111)
Distinguishing between those citizens of the Commonwealth with and
without the right to enter was, however, a rather uncommon relic of the
politics of Empire: it removed the distinction between the control of aliens
and of citizens and thus severed immigration law from the citizenship law.
The British Nationality Act of 1981 was supposed to remove this anomaly
and thus completely normalize the British system, that is, get it out of
post-colonial orbit. The old composite “citizenship of the United Kingdom
and Colonies” was broken up into three separate citizenships of which only
one – British Citizenship (having incorporated and replaced the category
of patriality) – entailed the right of abode in the UK while the two others
– British Dependent Territory Citizenship and British Overseas Citizenship
– did not entail this right, even if the government acknowledged certain
“moral and constitutional responsibilities” to their holders. The most contested
concept of the BNA of 1981 was the restriction of jus soli only to
children born to parents with British citizenship or settled in the UK.
This was justified by reference to the fact of greater transnational mobility
which supposedly made the place of birth a mere accident that should not
entail automatically the right of abode. This general argument about national
belonging notwithstanding, “the true animus of restricting jus soli was effective
immigration control. Once endowed with citizen children, non-citizen parents
who had entered illegally or overstayed might be more difficult to deport.”
(Joppke, 1999: 113)
After the 1971 immigration act reined in primary immigration,
secondary immigration – that is, family reunification – and asylum seeking
became the main sources of immigration. In both instances the state does
not accept foreigners according to its sovereign discretion but rather is
compelled to do so by family and asylum rights. In Britain, however, due
to the absence of a written constitution, for a long time, these rights had
been not assured automatically. “Until the passing of the Asylum and Immigration
Appeals Act in 1993, there was no separate asylum law. Asylum was processed
according to the Immigration Act of 1971 and the non-statutory Immigration
Rules.” (Joppke, 1999: 129) This was reflected in the rhetorical and structural
conflation of asylum and immigration policy: “The cleavages and discursive
metaphors of immigration policy became exactly mirrored in asylum policy:
asylum advocates calling racist the government’s assumption that most refugees
were economic migrants, and the government defending its get-tough approach
toward asylum-seekers as in the interest of firm immigration control and
good race relations.” (Joppke, 1999: 128) The 1993 Act was already anticipating
the arrival of European standards granting an in-country right of appeal
for all asylum seekers. Certain measures such as the fingerprinting of applicants
or a “fast-tracking” of “manifestly unfounded” applications (e.g. these coming
from “safe third countries”) became on the other hand forerunners of the
common European asylum policy.
The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, pushed through
by the Labour majority after the victorious elections of 1997, introduced
vouchers for asylum seekers in place of cash-paid welfare benefits and established
a system of dispersal of asylum seekers so that they did not concentrate
in London and the south-east. A government White Paper of February 2002 proposed
to abolish vouchers and to establish a network of induction, accommodation,
detention and removal centres. (Geddes, 2003: 43)
II. 3. 2. Integration Policies
II. 3. 2. 1. Pluralistic integration
The origin of British pluralistic integration lies with
the history and idea of empire as a political roof encompassing many ethnic
and regional cultures, albeit unequal and subordinate to English culture.
The difference between this pluralistic imperialism and the French assimilatory
imperialism is instructive. (Favell 1998, Grillo 1998) The French
conceived of their mission civilizatrice as a revolutionary transformation
of the savage cultures into French culture, which was supposed to be the
only true embodiment of universal civilization. The British felt endowed
with a civilizing mission as well, but they respected particular cultures
and ways of life as things to be polished rather than abolished and replaced
by a ready-made external model. While the French assumed cultural assimilation
as a precondition of socio-economic and political integration, the British
tried to articulate integration at the socio-economic and political levels
with the maintenance of group differences at the cultural level. In contrast
to both the French model of assimilation and the American model of “melting-pot”,
Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins defined integration in 1966 as “equal
opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual
tolerance.” (qtd in Geddes, 2003: 44) The report produced by the Commission
on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, which was established after Labour’s
1997 election victory, updated the same vision when it called for employers
to be required to produce employment equity plans (i.e. to mend “indirect
discrimination”), for political parties to put on their electoral lists members
of ethnic minorities, and evoked the idea of the UK as a “community of communities”
(Parekh 1999) (The last expression nicely encapsulates a difference with
the French neo-republicans who would take it as a national catastrophe if
France was seen this way.) British integration policies have combined measures
of multicultural accommodation on the one hand with measures of anti-discrimination
and equal opportunity on the other. I will examine both types of policies
in the two following sub-sections.
II. 3. 2. 1. 1. Official Multiculturalism
Jenkins’ speech quoted above marked a symbolic beginning
for official multiculturalism. The pragmatic common-law approach enforced
minimal limits to diversity while allowing a wide range of non-European
practices: it outlawed polygamy, forced marriage, female circumcision,
and some Muslim divorces while giving many exemptions which allowed ethnoreligious
groups to continue their ways of life: “Turbaned Sikhs, for instance, are
exempted by the Employement Act 1989 from the Construction (Head Protection)
Regulations of 1989 ... The Slaughterhouse Act 1974 and Slaughter of Poultry
Act 1967 contain exemptions for Muslims and Jews from the legal duty of
stunning animals before killing them, enabling them to comply with their
religious laws and traditions … In Mandla v. Dowell Lee (1983), the House
of Lords ruled against a headmaster who had refused to admit a Sikh boy as
a pupil solely because he was wearing a turban and thus in violation of the
official dress code. In this British ‘turban affair’ that never was, the
Law Lords found the headmaster’s refusal ‘indirect discrimination’ according
to the 1976 Act [see further] – a notionally neutral measure having a disproportionately
negative effect on an ethnic minority that was not ‘justifiable’ on
non-racial grounds ... Similar help from the ‘indirect discrimination’ clause
came in the area of employment. Religiously prescribed beards, headgear,
and time-outs for prayer and religious observance are no longer easily discriminated
against in the name of safety, hygiene, or work schedules.” (Joppke, 1999:
233 – 235)
In the area of education, the government report Education
for All (delivered by a commission headed by Lord Swann in 1985) asked the
state to help ethnic minorities to maintain their distinct identities
and regarded ‘colour-blindness’ “as potentially just as negative as a straightforward
rejection of people with a different skin color since both types of attitude
seek to deny the validity of an important aspect of a person’s identity.”
(qtd in Joppke, 1999: 236)
II. 3. 2. 1. 2. “Race Relations” and Antidiscrimination
Whereas in the U.S., the politics of race was an outgrowth
of a vast social movement, in Britain it was rather “an anticipatory move
by élites who were eager to avoid the explosive race dynamics of
the United States ... As a result, the smell of élite paternalism
has always tainted British race relations law and institutions.” (Joppke,
1999: 226) The first Race Relations Acts of 1965 and of 1968 were supposed
to outlaw racial discrimination in places of public resort, housing, employment
and insurance. The Race Relations Act of 1976 established a Commission for
Racial Equality (CRE) and made a step toward American ways of dealing with
racial matters by stressing indirect discrimination as evidenced by the
unequal impact of formally neutral measures upon minority members and the
disproportionate representation of racial groups in certain social or occupational
positions. The latter aspect implied that equality of opportunity was measured
by equality of results; if taken to its logical conclusion it could result
in “equal opportunity policies” setting up goals and timetables and employing
special treatment of racial groups in educational, occupational and other
spheres. On the other hand the Act dismissed affirmative action measures
which discriminate in favor of a particular racial groups. It nevertheless
allowed some exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination - called
“positive actions” – such as providing special job training for an underrepresented
minority employees or the priority hiring of minority members under circumstances
related to the nature of the job (e.g., social work). “In contrast to American
affirmative action, British positive action is permissive rather than mandatory;
an employer or local authority may engage in it, but is not required to do
so.” (Joppke, 1999: 230)
The reluctance towards affirmative action was tempered
by the Brixton race disorders in April 1981. These also provided an
incentive to gather data about the ethnic composition of the population
and the acceptance of ethnic group questions in the 1991 census. By that
time “ethnic monitoring” was already standard practice at the local authority
level after the hot debates of the 1980s. “With the introduction of an ethnic-minority
question in the 1991 census, Britain is now – next to the Netherlands –
the only country in western Europe to recognize ‘ethnic minorities’ of immigrant
origin in law and official statistics. Under the sway of combating indirect
discrimination through positive action and ‘equal opportunity’ policies,
Britain’s precarious balance between social-citizenship universalism and
racial-group particularism has shifted toward the latter pole. No wonder
that the Commission for Racial Equality’s battle of the 1990s is to accomplish
the half-step from positive to affirmative action ... the CRE’s Second Review
of the Race Relations Act 1976 (1992) calls for legally binding ‘goals
and timetables’ to check the achievement of ‘equality of opportunity’ employment.”
(Joppke, 1999: 232 – 233)
In the Race Relations Act of 1976, “race” has been used
as a highly indeterminate and over-inclusive notion, covering groups defined
by reference to colour, nationality or ethnic and national origins. Race
tried to capture both objective patterns of discrimination or disadvantage
and a subjective sense of group identity: Afro-Caribbeans preferred a self-definition
stemming from their socio-economic and cultural disadvantage in Britain
as “black” or “British black” which would blur the difference between West
Indian and African blacks. South Asians preferred to be defined by their
particular descent and ethno-regional or ethno-religious origins – Indian,
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sikhs. “After intense negotiation with the affected
minority groups, the 1991 census finally settled for six discrete ‘ethnic
group’ categories: White, Black-Caribbean, Black-African, Black-Other, Indian,
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, and a seventh ‘any other group’ category.”
(Joppke, 1999: 249) Case law disputes coped with the problem to what extent
religious groups are to be given the status of a racial group – Sikhs and
Gipsies were given this status, Rastafarians not. (Joppke, 1999: 249)
II. 3. 2. 2. Islam
Muslims were not given the status of race because of
the universal character of their membership – the umma encompasses many different
ethno-cultural groups and is not tied to a particular territory. Until the
Rushdie Affair, South-Asian immigrants of Muslim confession were instead
divided along ethnic, clan and sectarian lines which amounted to the primary
network of immigration and social integration in Britain. Only with the second
and third generation did religious observance become more important as a
stabilizer of group identity, partly replacing the myth of return and thus
helping to shed a diasporic identity. In other words, with the second and
third generation, there has been a shift from a particular diasporic Muslim
community, glued together by a clan, traditional habits, a culture and region
of origin, still cultivating memories of the sending country (or locale)
and/or even a myth of return, and a new, universal Muslim community – umma
– deterritorialized and fuelled by the new electronic media of the 1990s
– the internet and satellite TV channels. The Rushdie affair may be seen
as a marker of this “shift from a diasporic to a universalist Islam“, from
non-European Islam to EuroIslam. (Roy, 2002) The radicalization of British
Muslims stepped up with the first Gulf war - Western soldiers on the holy
land of Hijaz – and with the Bosnian civil war. The official political reaction
both from Labour party and Tories to the mass anti-Rushdie protests of British
Muslims was to stress the common denominator of British political identity,
allegedly shared by British Muslims as well, which entails tolerance for
pluralism, rule of law and respect for free speech. This minimal sense of
Britishness is supposed to support peaceful co-existence between various
ethnic and religious identities.
Many young Muslims – be they young professionals or
poor unemployed feel uprooted from their non-European moorings and, simultaneously,
neither assimilated into European nations nor integrated as “hyphenated”
citizens in the above suggested sense of dual identity. Lacking real ties,
they construct an imaginary, “virtual ghetto” based on the universal umma.
From the point of view of the national security of western states, the worst
scenario is the radicalization of such people, exemplified by the organization
Hizb ut-Tahrir, based in Britain and close in its programme to Al-Qaida.
Many other Muslim associations – both in Britain and elsewhere in Europe
– have much more moderate programmes: they want to be recognized as
a special religious community by the larger society and want to negotiate
their status in it including their habits (e.g. hallal food, dressing habits)
and moral norms. “They may evolve into a sort of Muslim church in Europe,
which would pose little or no security threat, and would advance a conservative
agenda in terms of moral and social values.” (Roy, 2003: 69) The third pattern
is represented by sects such as Tablighi Jamaat, a South Asian organization
with branches in many European countries, which is separatist and fundamentalist,
rejects integration, but on the other hand does not have a militant political
agenda focusing on the larger society. The development of the first and the
third type of Muslim organization in Europe has cast huge shadows on the
possibility of pluralistic integration as embodied in British multiculturalist
and anti-discrimination policies.
II. 4. Germany
II. 4. 1. Immigration Policies
II. 4. 1. 1. Ethnic State as a Country of Immigration
Between 1950 and 1993, net immigration in Germany was
12.6 million, which amounts to 80 per cent of the country’s population growth.
(Joppke, 1999: 62) Germany became one of the largest countries of immigration
while still sticking to its self-conception as an ethnic nation which is
by definition kein Einwanderungsland – not a country of immigration. This
German “idiom of nationhood” (Brubaker, 1992) was reinforced by the division
of Germany after WWII and huge German diasporas in communist Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union. In this context, the Federal Republic conceived of
itself as “a vicarious, incomplete nation-state, home for all Germans in
the communist diaspora. This mandate is expressed in the preamble to the
Basic Law: ‘The entire German people remains asked to complete the unity
and freedom of Germany in free self-determination.’ Much like Israel was
the homeland of all Jews (West) Germany was the homeland of all Germans,
and it prioritized the immigration of co-ethnics. This is enshrined in Article
116 of the Basic Law, which assigns automatic citizenship to ethnic German
refugees from communism. Opening the national community to foreigners would
have posed the risk of a redefinition of national identity, and of diluting
the Federal Republic’s historical obligation to its dispersed and repressed
co-ethnics in the East.” (Joppke, 1999: 63)
Since the ethnic nation was still not covered by one
political roof, the State had to define itself accordingly as a privileged
political instrument of self-determination and protection of German co-ethnics
no matter where they lived. The situation has changed since the re-unification
and the opening of borders in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European
countries: this gave an opportunity for the German diaspora to return and
to the German state to fulfil its ethnic mission. After this “normalization”
the possibility of de-ethnicization of nationhood could step forward, and
with it the chance to open of immigration and integration policies to other
ethno-cultural groups. In the course of the 1990s Germany did indeed seize
this opportunity.
Until 1955, vacancies in the labour market had been
filled by ethnic Germans coming from East Europe, especially from the GDR.
Between 1955 and 1968 Germany signed recruitment agreements (Anwerbeabkommen)
with a number of countries – Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey
(1961), Portugal (1964) Tunisia and Morocco (1965), Yugoslavia (1968). “A
pure form of client politics followed, devoid of parliamentary involvement
or public debate, which involved only employers, the labour-recruiting government
bureaucracy, and trade unions (whose initial reservations were quietened
by securing the primacy of the domestic workforce in the filling of job openings,
and by guaranteeing equal wages and social benefits to the recruited foreign
workers).” (Joppke 1999: 65) The general assumption was that the workers
will return to their sending countries. This guestworker regime was entrenched
in the Foreigner Law of 1965. Only in 1978 were legal conditions specified
under which a foreigner is entitled to apply for permanent residence status
(unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis). Only in 1981 were rules for reunifying
foreign families devised.
The loopholes in the Foreigner Law were made up
for by several articles in the Basic Law which drew lessons from the Third
Reich period by subordinating state power to the rights of individuals and
granting the most fundamental of these rights regardless of nationality
and citizenship. The Foreigner Law of 1990 (going into effect in January
1991) partly adjusted to these constitutional tenets when it limited the
discretion of the state concerning the residence and family rights of immigrants.
It also left out the formula of kein Einwanderungsland which had been an
explicit part of German immigration policies since 1977. Though it was much
more liberal than the previous law, it replicated the fundamental distinction
between ethnic Germans without citizenship and foreigners, conceived of the
recruitment of guestworkers as a “historically unique event” (qtd in Joppke,
1999: 84), and sought to prevent the permanent immigration of non-EU nationals
in the future.
II. 4. 1. 2. Asylum Debate
The relative softening of guestworker-related policies
in the 90s was counterbalanced by a toughening of asylum policies in the
same period. “This opposite movement must be seen in the context of
uniquely impaired state sovereignty in asylum policy. Alone in the world,
the German constitution provides a subjective right for political refugees
to be granted asylum. Article 16 of the Basic Law stipulates: ‘People who
are politically persecuted enjoy the right of asylum.’ In Germany, the right
of asylum is not, as everywhere else, the right of the state to grant asylum,
to be held against the persecuting state, but the right of the persecuted
individual to be held against the receiving state ... It invalidates the
sovereign right of the state to deny access to its territory ... Germany
was the only state in the world that granted not only its own nationals,
but literally the whole world a right of entry. The ‘quick and dirty’
border-screening, practised by all other states in the age of mass asylum-seeking
(...), has not been an option here … Ironically, only European integration
would eventually allow Germany to recover its sovereignty in asylum policy.”
(Joppke, 1999: 85)
In the early 90s especially, after the reunification
of Germany and with the mass inflow of asylum seekers and eruptions of xenophobic
violence, the debate between the German Left and Right focused on the question
posed by Article 16 of the Basic Law: whose is the German State? The dilemma
of each liberal nation state was thus made thoroughly explicit. Is the state
obliged primarily to human-rights principles (protecting all human beings)
and only secondarily to the people who constitute it, or vice versa? Whereas
for the Left, the primary source of obligation and responsibility was universal
humanity, for the Right, it was the German people. Thus, the Left stressed
the liberal side of the nation state, and, accordingly, defended Article
16: the state should be accountable to all humans and give their basic rights
priority over any other value. The Right stressed the national side of the
nation state, and, accordingly, attacked the Article 16: the state should
be accountable to the people by which it is constituted and give its national
interest (including the rights of its members) priority over any other value.
The so-called “asylum compromise” of 1993 amended Article
16 by the insertion of proviso clauses enabling the state to reject apparently
fraudulent asylum-seekers at its borders: the access to territory and to
the constitutional asylum process was restricted through “two interrelated
clauses: first, asylum-seekers arriving through ‘safe third states’ (including
Poland and the Czech Republic) are by definition excluded from the asylum
process and are denied entry or subjected to immediate deportation; secondly,
asylum-seekers from ‘safe countries of origin’ are considered not politically
persecuted and face an accelerated recognition procedure that generally ends
in a rejection of their claims as ‘obviously unfounded’.” (Joppke, 1999:
93 – 94) This amendment helped to solve the political crisis. As a result,
the flow of refugees narrowed substantially to “around 125000 in 1994
and 1995, which is 70 per cent less than in 1992.” (Joppke, 1999: 94)
In the asylum debate, the asylum issue was conflated
with that of immigration, and thus brought to the foreground deeper questions
concerning the definition of the German nation. “The massive exit of ethnic
Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union since the late 1980s, which
occurred exactly parallel to the dramatic increase of asylum-seekers, made
plainly visible that Germany preferred some immigrants over others.” (Joppke,
1999: 95) While the German Right explicitly approved the immediate citizenship
conferral on ethnic Germans as legitimate, the radical fringe of the Left
claimed that they did not deserve any priority treatment. “What may appear
as an obscure struggle over classifications, was a struggle over the soul
of Germany: ethnic and Volk-centred, as in the discourse of Aussiedler advocates;
or civic and post-national, as in the discourse of ‘immigrant’ advocates.”
(Joppke, 1999: 95)
This special treatment was justified with reference
to post-war discrimination and repression against Germans and/or by the
pressure to expulse them – Vertreibungsdruck. That this “expulsion pressure”
is not automatically assumed was the novelty of the Law on Removing the
Consequences of the War (Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz) of 1992. The law
limited the right to claim the status of Aussiedler and “imposed a
limit of 225 000 ethnic Germans to be allowed in every year, which makes
the intake of ethnic Germans appear much like regular immigration. After
phasing out the privileged Aussiedler category, while approximating the reception
of Aussiedler to quota immigration, a window of opportunity has opened up
to transform an ethnic-priority into a general immigration policy.” (Joppke,
1999: 96) This was a part of the asylum compromise accepted by the German
Right: it accepted a small in-migration quota – Zuwanderungsquote – while
still refusing to head toward an adoption of a comprehensive immigration
law – Einwanderungsgesetz – as demanded by the Left. The linguistic distinction
of the 90s was principled: “Zuwanderung, the term preferred by restrictionists,
means unwanted immigration that is tolerated for constitutional and moral-political
reasons. Einwanderung, by contrast, connotes actively solicited, wanted immigration.”
(Joppke, 1999: 97)
II. 4. 2. Integration Policies
II. 4. 2. 1. From Ethnic to Civic Nationhood
The original idiom of the German nationhood is ethno-genealogical.
Membership in nation and its state is acquired by descent and primary socialization
in one’s family. As was said in the previous section, this ethnic delimitation
of nationhood enhanced and was itself enhanced by the position of Federal
Republic as the homeland of all Germans left over in the Soviet bloc – concentrated
in the GDR and scattered in other Eastern European countries. These two
features reinforced each other in the push to the exclusion of immigrants
from citizenship and in the emphasis on the maintenance of their group differences.
When in 1973 the German government attempted to formulate guidelines for
a desirable modus vivendi with immigrants, it came up with the idea of Integration
auf Zeit (temporary integration) whose main point was to assure a stable
niche in the hosting society while helping immigrants to maintain ethno-cultural
traits and links to their homelands so that they could easily be repatriated.
(Geddes 2003: 91) As was shown with the French example, the right to cultural
difference has its reverse side – it may function as a wall against possible
membership. The negative and positive sides of the right to be different
manifested themselves respectively in the positions of the German Right and
of the German Left. While the Right loathed the idea of assimilation out
of a concern for ethnic purity, the Left loathed the same idea out of respect
for different cultures and identities. Except for the anti-assimilationist
disagreement, both camps parted ways sharply as they relied on two contradictory
principles included in the Basic Law: self-determination for the German ethnic
nation on the one hand and protection of the fundamental rights of every
human person regardless of nationality or of citizenship status on the other.
This constitutional contradiction had a decisive impact
on the situation of ethnically alien immigrants residing on German territory.
While the first principle closed the doors to their political membership
in the nation, the second principle helped to ensure their civil and social
rights on a par with German citizens. Thus, “an ultra-restrictive citizenship
regime” co-existed with “a liberal foreigner-rights regime”. (Joppke, 1999:
200) The radical fringe of the Left wanted to extend foreigners’ rights to
the political sphere as well, not giving proper consideration to the need
of membership in a nation: as if there could be political rights, that is,
democracy, without nationhood, and, hence, without duties to one’s
fatherland. This idea is epitomized by the proposal for a Niederlassungsgesetz
(residence law) - presented by the Greens for the first time in 1984 – which
would confer all rights including political ones only on the basis of permanent
residence. Against this idea of severing cultural-political identity (nationality)
from legal-political status (citizenship rights), the German Right defended
their strong interdependence from which, within the paradigm of the ethnic
nation, it followed that immigrants should be given neither political
rights nor nationality.
These political debates notwithstanding, the fact of
the matter was that foreign residents enjoyed the same social rights as German
citizens while not being members of their ethnically defined Nation, whereas
ethnic Germans living abroad in East Europe were members of that nation
while not having access to these rights. (Geddes, 2003: 90) This disjunction
between community of descent and community of residence ceased to be sustainable
after the opening of the Eastern borders in the late 1980s brought into the
country millions of Germans who found themselves face-to-face with millions
of immigrants of the second and third generation: “Now you had the grotesque
dissonance of de facto foreigners automatically classified as Germans and
of de facto Germans still classified as foreigners.” (Joppke, 1999: 200)
Only the introduction of as-of-right naturalization
in December 1992 made a decisive step in the direction of a liberal citizenship
regime. Until that point, citizenship was acquired by descent or by assimilation
as evaluated by state officials. The Naturalization Rules (Einbürgerungsrichtlinien),
passed under a Social-Democratic government in 1977, stated clearly that
“the Federal Republic is not a country of immigration” and that, therefore,
it is not intent on “deliberately increasing the number of German citizens
through naturalization” (In Joppke, 1999: 201) If an alien resident after
ten years of residence and after fulfilling all required formal conditions
wanted to be naturalized, it was at the discretion of the state official
to decide whether the person had been sufficiently assimilated and had a
positive commitment to the German people and state to the extent that it
was in the public interest to accept her as an adoptive daughter of this
people.
The above mentioned shift to the as-of-right naturalization
occurred in the context of the Asylum Compromise: it abolished the absolute
discretion of the state to judge cultural assimilation and let it be deduced
instead “from the applicant’s length of residence ... This means that ‘assimilation’
is effectively void as a criterion for being granted citizenship. Membership
in the German nation-state is no longer premised on being part of the ethno-cultural
nation. This allows two interpretations: first, that state and nation are
effectively decoupled, because membership in the latter is no longer a precondition
for membership in the former; or, secondly, that the meaning of German nationhood
is itself undergoing transformation, because it can no longer be defined
in ethnic terms, but now will have to routinely include and absorb non-German
entrants. Including the factor of time, both interpretations are really
one. If the nation qua ethnocultural nation is no longer the basis of the
German state, this does not mean that the latter is becoming a non-national
state. Rather, it means that, over time, German nationhood will have to
be defined more along civic-territorial than exclusively ethno-genealogical
lines.” (Joppke, 1999: 203) This development was completed on the legal level
by passing a new Nationality Law in 2000 that introduced jus soli [TO BE
COMPLETED]
II. 4. 2. 2. Islam
[TO BE COMPLETED]
II. 5. Convergence of European Policies and EU framework
II. 5. 1. Three waves of Post-War Migration to Western
Europe
We can distinguish three phases or waves of migration
flow in post-war migration to Europe: (1) labour or primary migration between
the 1950s and 1973-4, (2) family or secondary migration in the 1970s and
1980s, and (3) post-Cold war migration with increased asylum-seeking and
illegal immigrants. (Geddes 2003: 17 – 19)
The First Wave: Labour Migration
This wave was in large part driven by the exigencies
of economic reconstruction in western Europe in the aftermath of WWII. At
that time, only France had experience of constant and significant immigration
flow from the first half of the 19th century. For other European countries
this post-war immigration was something completely new and unheard of. It
was, however, desired and promoted by active government policies which,
together with national firms, organized the recruitment of workers abroad.
(The case of Britain stands out from this pattern since most of its migration
in the 1950s was due to the British National Act of 1948 making citizens
out of subjects living in colonies – II. 3. 1. In Germany, labour vacancies
were at first filled by ethnic Germans fleeing East Germany and the recruitment
began only in 1955 – II. 4. 1. 1.) The assumption of recruiting governments
was that migration would be only temporary as it was linked to labour shortages
in specific industries and sectors. Once the demand dropped, the workers
would supposedly go home. This assumption proved wrong. The presumed temporary
guest-workers stayed as permanent settlers. This became clear when the recruitment
stopped due to the oil price rises and the subsequent economic crisis of
1973-74. Not only did those who had already come not leave but many others
were knocking on the doors. As European countries tried to stop the inflow
of new immigrants, the only avenue which remained officially open was that
associated with family reunion.
The Second Wave: family reunion migration
This kind of migration became predominant in the 1970s
and 1980s. It pertained both to spouses and children left in the country
of origin and to marriage partners brought in by already settled immigrants.
As family migration became the main form of migration, the proportion
of women rose hugely in comparison with the mainly male labour migration
of the 1950s and 1960s. In the same period, the second generation of immigrants
made itself socially and culturally visible as they were caught between
the home country affiliations of their parents and the roots which they
had developed for themselves in the receiving country (and its culture).
No wonder that the political debates of this period began to centre on the
social and political implications of permanent settlement by foreigners
and the ways in which they could be integrated (if at all) into the receiving
society. In response to this problem, the liberal and left-wing elites (save
the French neo-republicans – II. 2. 2. 1.) coined the concept of a multicultural
integration while the right-wing elites revived a nationalist and Eurocentric
(if not straightforwardly racist) discourse. Even during the second wave,
however, labour migration did not stop: its channel was merely narrowed
to select high-skilled immigrants.
The Third Wave: asylum-seekers and illegal migrants
The end of the Cold war brought about an increase in
the proportion of asylum seekers and of those trying to enter and/or stay
in European countries without legal permission. The migration issue became
increasingly politicized as there was growing suspicion amongst the (right-wing
segments of the) public that many asylum-seekers were, in actual fact, economic
migrants using the asylum channel as the only available legal avenue. This
period – from 1989-90 up to present – has been characterized both by diversification
in the countries of migrants’ origin and by enlargement of the receiving
zone by Southern European and Central European countries (Spain, Portugal,
Italy, Greece and Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic). (Geddes, 2003: 149 –
190)
During all three periods France, Britain and Germany
retained their national peculiarities in their handling of migration and the
integration of immigrants. Only during the 1990s and, increasingly, when the
decade came to its close, did the differences between their national strategies
begin to fade. Germany began to redefine its identity (i.e. nationhood) so
as to allow it to confer political membership (i.e. citizenship) on the members
of other ethno-cultural groups if they reside permanently on its territory.
Germany, that is, has moved closer to Great Britain and France. These countries
began to formulate their immigration and integration policies in language
reminiscent rather of the language of the classic countries of immigration
such as the USA or Canada. The latter countries, in turn, began to regulate
their entrance gates much more systematically and restrictively than ever
before in their history. In sum, both the difference between “ethnic” and
“civic” nations in western Europe and the difference between the Old and
New World began to wane as the last century came to its close.
II. 5. 2. Last Developments in France
A report ordered by the socialist government of Lionel
Jospin from Patrick Weil Conditions d’application du principe du droit du
sol pour l’attribution de la nationalité francaise et pour une politique
d’immigration juste et efficace (31. 7. 1997) and two statutes stemming
from it – the Law Guigou and the Law Chevenement (1998) – drew to its consequences
the universalist strand of the French tradition with its roots in the ideology
of 1789 and of the Third Republic. This recapture of the republican origins
was consistent with pragmatic considerations: the aim of zero-immigration
declared by the previous government of the Right (and expressed with tough
anti-immigration measures of the Law Pasqua and the Law Debre – II. 2. 1.)
proved unrealistic. Therefore immigration was not to be suppressed but rather
regulated. Measures were adopted facilitating the entry and integration
of desired immigrants such as highly qualified professionals or artists.
Dignified procedures of family reunifications and asylum-granting were established.
Another set of measures was adopted to fight illegal immigration more efficiently.
The reforms tried to strike a balance between the two
contradictory principles of the liberal nation state (I. 2. 1.) It was no
surprise, therefore, that neither the universalistic Left nor the particularistic
Right was satisfied: the reform amounted neither to a complete liberalization
of immigration, nor to the closing of the gates. Rather it opened the borders
to those who can contribute to the cultural and economic development
of France and to those who are persecuted in their own countries or have
a rightful claim via the members of their family; at the same time, it closed
the borders to undesired categories, that is, those who can neither contribute
to the economic or cultural wealth of France, nor can raise a claim related
to persecution. Accordingly, the Law Chevenement (11. 5. 1998) is two-pronged:
on the one hand it eases up on, and simplifies, procedures of entering the
territory so that elite immigrants may enter the country as easily as possible.
New categories specifying the bearer of the carte de séjour (the
green card) are introduced such as scientifique (scientist) or profession
artistique et culturelle (artistic and cultural profession). On the other
hand, the statute gives the state efficient instruments allowing a much tougher
approach towards illegal immigrants, e.g., a prolongation of the length of
administrative retention. (Guyomar 1999: 306 – 309)
Under the Jospin government, moreover, French reluctance
towards a minority-oriented approach loosened. In October 1998, Martin Aubry,
the Minister of Employment and Solidarity, declared the fight against racial
discrimination as one of the government priorities and “the Haut Conseil
a l’Intégration proposed an anti-discrimination body with some similarities
to the UK Commision for Racial Equality (CRE).” (Geddes, 2003: 74) Finally,
“the French government has adopted the June 2000 EU Directives based on
Article 13 of the Amsterdam treaty dealing with direct and indirect discrimination
on grounds including race, ethnicity and religion …. The significant point
is that France accepted EU legislation that brought practices and ideas
that seem to be more associated with Anglo-Dutch ‘ethnic minorities’ policies
into its national legislation.” (Geddes, 2003: 77)
The interior minister of the right wing government,
in power since the summer 2002, Nicolas Sarkosy [TO BE COMPLETED]
II. 5. 3. Last Developments in Britain
Despite the differences in the historical construction
of French and British nationhood, the British White Paper Secure Borders,
Safe Haven. Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain (February 2002)
takes a very similar stance to that taken by the French in 1997-8. As the
title suggests, those who seek refuge in the face of political persecution
should be granted it. Those who jeopardize the security of borders and the
stability of British society are given a clear sign that all measures will
be taken to prevent them from their illegal activities. Migration is recognized
as an unavoidable feature of the contemporary world and immigration as an
inevitable feature of the British society. It may bring significant benefits
as long as it is adequately regulated and the receiving society is sufficiently
sure of itself and its own identity that it can reach out and embrace newcomers.
According to the Paper: “If managed properly, migration can bring considerable
benefits to the UK, including improvements in economic growth and productivity,
as well as cultural enrichment and diversity. ‘Managing’ migration means
having an orderly, organized, and enforceable system of entry. It also means
managing post-entry integration and inclusion in the economy and society,
helping migrants to find their feet, and enabling members of the existing
population to welcome them into their communities.” (Secure Borders, 2002)
Unlike the French documents mentioned above, the British
paper explicitly refers to the concept of desired integration which continues
the line of the Parekh Report (Parekh, 1999). The core of this concept lies
in the idea of ethno-cultural pluralism or “diversity” embedded in a common
civic identity that is based on a shared set of values and loyalty to British
political institutions. The British nation is a multi-ethnic nation, that
is, it is not based on assimilation to a prevailing monoculture. At the
same time it is “one” nation, unified by a common political culture and
the active participation of citizens within it. The necessary condition
of mutual reinforcement of cultural diversity and political unity is social
and economic inclusion, which prevents ethnic (or racial) boundaries from
becoming social (or class) boundaries. All those who have a well-founded
fear of persecution and those who have a contribution to make to Britain
are welcome on British territory. At the same time, their route from residence
to citizenship should be made as easy as possible. The applicants have to
fulfil, however, the basic cultural conditions (proficiency in English)
and moral-political conditions (loyalty and a sense of civic obligations).
As far as economic immigration is concerned, the emphasis
is put on two categories of immigrants: the first encompasses highly qualified
professionals and young people (especially students) of professional potential,
that is, a category of those who are likely to revitalize British economy
and culture. The second category encompasses workers or employees filling
vacancies in specific sectors. The Paper draws on experiences with positive
immigration measures introduced before the 2001 general election. Then,
“the Education Department’s overseas labour division began advertising a
fast-track entry to Britain for people with information and communication
technologies and other specialist skills while immigration rules for other
occupations such as nursing and teaching were also relaxed because of chronic
shortages of labour in these areas. In January 2002, the government announced
a Highly Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) based on a Canadian-style points
system for would be migrants.” (Geddes, 2003: 43 – 44) The Paper stresses
the need to make the recruitment of those workers compatible with the program
of skill-development and the insertion of indigenous unemployed workers.
Immigration should not harm or lessen the job or training opportunities
available to the population.
As far as the asylum procedure is concerned, the main
aim of the reform is to distinguish clearly unfounded from well-founded
applications and to fend off the false claimants efficiently. “The ultimate
aims of the asylum system are to determine who is and is not in need of
protection. Providing a safe haven and integrating quickly into UK society
those who are in need of such protection and to remove quickly those who
are not.” (Secure Borders, 2002)
II. 5. 4. Last Developments in Germany
Similar to Britain, in 2000 Germany reacted to labour
shortages in information and communication technology by opening the gates
to specialists who were offered their own particular immigration track and
“green card”. On July 4, 2001, the Independent Commission on Migration to
Germany, chaired by Rita Süssmuth, published a Report Structuring Immigration,
Fostering Integration. Its guidelines were followed by the Immigration Law,
which was tabled in the parliament first in 2002 and then in 2003. The basic
tenets of the Report were propagated simultaneously by certain speeches
and initiatives of the Interior Minister Otto Schilly and follow the direction
of the French reform of 1997-8 and British reform of 2002.
The Report lists four reasons for the reformulation
of Germany’s policies in the field. Firstly, the growth of the economy is
increasingly dependent on knowledge and new ideas which emerge out
of encounters and exchanges with peoples of different origins. Secondly,
the population of Germany is aging, something which has a negative impact
on the labour market and innovativeness of the economy. Thirdly, despite
a high rate of unemployment there is a large number of high- and less-qualified
employment positions unfilled. The fourth and maybe the most compelling argument
is this: despite the usual disclaimers and anti-immigration policies introduced
since 1973, Germany has been a country of immigration de facto. An active
recruitment policy will simply “structure” immigration so that it corresponds
to the needs of German society. The recruitment policies, however, should
not harm the chances of domestic workers on the labour market.
The shift from the ban on recruitment to controlled
labour immigration amounts to the opening of legal routes for entering the
country and getting a work and residence permit. The logic of the pre-1973
recruitment schemes is reversed: whereas these presupposed the transitory
nature of residence in Germany and the return of migrating workers to the
sending countries, the new regulations anticipate that many (if not all)
immigrants will settle permanently in Germany. The guestworker regime has
been abandoned in favor of the settlement regime. “From the very beginning,
immigrants are to become an integral part of the permanent resident population
and should receive permanent resident status immediately with the prospect
of naturalization. A points system which takes their ability to integrate
into society and the labour market into consideration will be crucial. General
skills will be more important than special skills and short-term demand situations
on the labour market. Candidates scoring the highest number of points should
be chosen from the applications which meet the minimum point requirements.”
(Süssmuth, 2001)
Naturalization is conceived of as the peak of successful
integration. In this respect the new nationality law which introduced jus
soli (place-of-birth principle) in 2000 is crucial. (II. 4. 2. 1.) The last
hurdle on the way towards the liberal naturalization regime consists in
the requirement of having to relinquish the nationality of the country of
origin. This requirement is based on the rejection of dual citizenship.
The commission recommends dropping this requirement and allowing multiple
nationalities.
Like the British White Paper of 2002, the German Report
stresses another route of immigration for persecuted persons - via
family reunification claims. The report weakens the special privileges accorded
to expatriate Germans scattered in the countries of Eastern Europe on the
assumption of their ethnically based discrimination. It introduces an additional
requirement for immediate naturalization – a sufficient command of the German
language as examined by a language test taken in the evacuation area.
Similarly, it specifies the criteria of membership of East European Jewish
communities whose members have so far had privileged access to immigration
and naturalization due to the program of strengthening Jewish communities
in Germany: “the assessment of the membership to the group of people who
are authorized to immigrate to Germany should be oriented towards Jewish
religious law (a descendant of a Jewish mother or conversion according to
the rules of the Rabbinate Court) in order to combat integration problems.”
The possible applicants should be offered German courses free of charge in
the countries of origin and in Germany they should be distributed “in locations
where there is an existing Jewish community or at least one nearby.” (Süssmuth,
2001)
The conception of integration here relies on the assumption
that this is a two-ways process involving both immigrants and the host society:
“Whereas the host society must provide immigrants with the prospect of gaining
permanent residence, access on equal terms to the labour market and to the
educational system, immigrants to Germany are equally required to learn
German. In addition, of course, they are obliged – just like all other residents
– to respect and follow the Constitution and the laws.” The German state
should offer free German courses for immigrants and their children. This
assimilation into the majority language and political culture (knowledge
of and respect for major political and legal institutions) is a necessary
prerequisite for the successful incorporation of immigrants into economic
and political life on equal terms with members of the majority. The majority
society, on the other hand, is required to respect ethnocultural and religious
identities as far as they are compatible with the rules of the liberal-democratic
constitutional system and must introduce special topics or courses into the
general educational curricula which take account of them. Equal treatment
of ethnic and religious minorities should be ensured. Given the massive presence
of Muslims in Germany, optional Islamic religious courses should be included
in the school curriculum.
II. 5. 5. Convergence of National Policies
Despite of initial differences, stemming from different
national histories and identities, France, Great Britain and Germany have
moved toward common ground in their immigration and integration policies
over the last several years. They all have explicitly recognized that they
are countries of immigration and formulated outlines of their policies in
this field accordingly.
For France, this acknowledgement was the least difficult.
Thanks to the universalistic republicanism and mass immigration preceding
the post-war influx, immigration was “normal” for France. In a sense, even
if it is not an immigrant nation, modern France has always been a country
of immigration. The measures of 1997-8 subscribed to the original universalism
of the French republic and acknowledged overtly the experience of immigration
which had characterized the country since the middle of the 19th century.
It was not that simple in Britain and Germany. Rather
than to im-migration, Britain had been accustomed for centuries to colonialist
e-migration, and the post-war influx of non-European immigrants seemed to
be merely an unintended consequence of an effort to maintain an overseas
empire (especially the Old Commonwealth) rather than a normal state
of affairs. While as late as in the 70s and 80s, Britain declared itself
to be “a zero-immigration country”, Germany claimed in the same period repeatedly
that it is kein Einwanderungsland (not an immigration country). In this latter
case, the established tradition of ethnic nationhood together with the fact
of a divided Germany and millions of Germans in Eastern Europe made the Federal
Republic of Germany the homeland for all ethnic Germans and thus excluded
in advance the very concept of the settling and national integration of ethnically
and culturally alien populations.
Only in the 90s did Britain finally emerge from its
post-colonialist “mourning” period and the German state completed its ethno-nationalist
mission by uniting with East Germany and opening its doors to all Eastern
Germans who wanted to use their newly acquired freedom of movement to resettle.
The facts on the ground (that is, the massive presence of second- and third-generation
immigrants and the impossibility of stopping immigration) but also
economic expediency and a series of progressive ideas made sizeable parts
of the political elite in both Britain and Germany re-assess their established
national self-conceptions.
Around the turn of the century, France, Great Britain
and Germany have all explicitly recognized that they are countries of immigration
and formulated quite similar migration- and integration-policy frameworks.
Their migration policies converge on two points. On the one hand, active
immigration policy schemes are designed to attract and recruit young and
high-skilled labour migrants that would contribute to economic growth, fill
labour shortages, compensate for aging home populations, and thereby ensure
sufficient input into the welfare and pension systems. On the other hand,
an extensive apparatus is deployed to restrict and limit the immigration
of unwanted (low-skilled, culturally alien) groups which are portrayed as
liable to disrupt the social order and drain welfare state resources.
For this restrictive purpose, special measures are introduced to fight illegal
immigration. At the same time, asylum-legislation is revised and refined
so that it be able to capture and offset an alleged surge in “bogus asylum
seekers”.
France, Britain, and Germany also converge on the strategic
guidelines for their integration policies. On the one hand, they try
to build a clear procedural line connecting immigration to naturalization
so that the passage from settling and residence to citizenship is as easy
as possible. On the other hand, they have shifted the onus of accommodation
onto the immigrants. There has been a strong tendency in recent years to
temper the celebration of diversity (driven by the liberal multiculturalism
of the 1970s and 1980s) with stress on the obligation of immigrants
to adapt and accept the basic values and cultural givens of the receiving
society. This emphasis on national “unity” over multicultural “diversity”
received new momentum in the wake of “9/11” terrorist attacks which intensified
the perception of the rise and increased threat of Islamic terrorism (if
not outright islamophobia).
II. 5. 6. Common EU Framework for Migration and Asylum
Policy
From the mid-1980s, the European Union began to develop
gradually a common framework for migration and asylum policies which sets
limits to national strategies in the field.
The landmark decision in this process was the adoption
of the Single European Act in 1986, which decided on the creation of the
internal market without border checks on internal frontiers. The Act implied
the following assumption, which was later stated explicitly in the document
from Palma de Majorca in 1989: the lifting of the control on internal borders
must be accompanied by stricter control of external borders and by greater
coordination and mutual adjustments to the migration and asylum policies
of the member states so that they may maintain their security and stability.
In other words, the logical corollary of the waning of internal frontiers
between the EU countries has been the erecting of less and less penetrable
external borders (or to use the current EU vocabulary, the introduction of
“directly related flanking measures”). The forerunners of future EU arrangements
are the Schengen Agreements of 1985 and 1990, concluded among a hard core
of EU countries. These agreements specify the above mentioned link between
the progressive abolition of control on common internal borders and the stepping
up of security measures and control on external borders.
The influx of immigrants from destabilized regions of
post-communist world in the early 1990s underlined the need for enhanced
co-ordination in this field. The Maastricht Treaty from 1992 (in force since
1993) assigned asylum policy and certain aspects of immigration policy to
the “third pillar” of the EU, which was devoted to intergovernmental co-operation
in the fields of justice and home affairs. Five years later, the Treaty of
Amsterdam (signed in October 1997 and in force since 1 May 1999) shifted
migration and asylum policy to the Community pillar (by adding a new Title
IV to the Treaty establishing the EC). In addition, it incorporated the Schengen
acquis into the legal framework of the EU. Thus, the Union set up the framework
for adopting common standards for certain aspects of visa, asylum and immigration
policies. Most concrete measures implementing the new provisions of the Treaty
are supposed to be adopted by 1 May 2004. More in keeping with the intergovernmental
approach though, most of the new instruments shall be adopted by a unanimous
decision procedure. (So far, of the major expected measures, for instance,
the directive on temporary protection and the directive concerning minimum
standards for the adoption of asylum seekers have been adopted.)
As far as migration policies are concerned, the Amsterdam
Treaty put an emphasis on the control and limiting of migration from countries
and regions plagued by poverty and war. This restrictive approach is balanced
by the principles of human rights (particularly the right to asylum for
persecuted persons) and humanitarian considerations (particularly in respect
to family reunification).
The Conclusions of the special European Council in Tampere
(15 and 16 October 1999), the first EU summit, which after the entry into
force of the Amsterdam Treaty discussed the future of asylum and migration
policies, confirm a determined commitment to keep the right to seek asylum
and the principle of non-refoulement. The Tampere Council also requested
“a more vigorous integration policy” and declared the aim of approaching,
as far as possible, the status of the resident third country nationals to
EU citizens. Fighting irregular migration and opening up new migration channels
to migrant workers were also listed among the common strategic goals. The
Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere Council represent turning-points in the
member states’ commitment to work together in the field of migration.
Other important common EU measures, pertaining to the
integration policies of member states, are two “equality” directives issued
in 2000. One establishes the principle of equal treatment irrespective of
racial or ethnic origins, the other specifies this to employment, occupation,
health care etc. The directives mention the possibility of engaging in “positive
action” in order “to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial
or ethnic origin” (Geddes, 2003: 143). The equal treatment directive should
be implemented by July 19, 2003, the employment/occupation directive by
December 2, 2003. Although these directives are not intended to target new
third country immigrants as they do not cover discrimination on grounds
of nationality, they are likely to have an impact on their situation.
The ongoing process of the communitarisation of the
migration and asylum policies will be shifted to a new level with the adoption
of the EU Constitution. The proposal of a Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe, adopted by the European Convention and submitted to the European
Council in Rome on 18 July 2003, presents not only a consolidation of the
existing provisions and powers of the EU in the areas of border checks,
asylum and migration, but offers an ambitious plan to introduce coherent
and more comprehensive European legislation in this area (see Section 2,
Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Migration). The proposed measures include
inter alia the introduction of a uniform status of asylum (“European asylum”),
the uniform status of subsidiary protection and common asylum procedures.
The Constitution also sets the goal of developing a “common immigration policy”,
ensuring the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of
immigrants from third countries and enhanced measures to combat illegal
migration. The EU, in the future, shall also adopt laws “to provide incentives
and support for the action of Members States with the view to promoting
integration of third country nationals”. Such European laws shall, however,
exclude “any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”.
The provisions on the future EU asylum and migration
legislation will undoubtedly be subject to political discussions and controversies.
Nonetheless, one thing seems to be clear. The future discussions will not
concern the issue whether the common EU asylum and migration legislation shall
be adopted, but rather what kind of legislation it will be.
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[TO BE COMPLETED]
Selected Documents
Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Brussels, 18
July 2003, CONV 850/03
Communication on a Community immigration policy, COM/2000/575 of
22 November 2000
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
on Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM/2003/0336 final
Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council 15 – 16 October
1999, SN 200/99
[TO BE COMPLETED]
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