Transformative Corporatism Or Tripartite Façade?
Labour Relations in Central and Eastern Europe
In the immediate breakdown of the socialist system, Central Eastern European (CEE) countries declared Western models of pluralist democracy, civil society, and market economy to be the ultimate transformation goals. In the context of these changes, the previous structure of labor relations had to be modified as well. All CEE countries have introduced tripartite forums for discussion between social partners, and introduced new legislation regarding collective bargaining, labor contracts, workplace representation of labor interests, etc. Countries that have already undergone negotiations about potential EU membership have, as a part of the pre-accession strategy, done the most in terms of changes required in the fields of social and labor policy.
The prospects for EU membership and requirements set for the applicant countries have led many to argue that Western European models of labor relations and social dialogue will be transmitted to the CEE countries. Widely known as (neo)corporatism, a system characterized by an active role of organized social interests in policy-making process and the state that takes only a mediator role, was expected to be implemented in these countries. Having realized that all the components of such a system do not exist in the CEE countries and need long time to be established, the advocates of the "institutional convergence" named the current system of labor relations transformative corporatism (Iankova 1997). Rooted in sociological institutionalist theories of convergence, these approaches assume the transmission of Western European models of policy-making to the CEE realities through three different types of institutional isomorphism: (1) normative isomorphism, i.e. ideological dominance of Western types of policy-making is assured by influencing elites involved in policy-making in CEE; (2) mimetic isomorphism, i.e. non-state actors trying to copy favored models or "best practices"; and (3) coercive isomorphism, which is to be expected once the membership realizes, mainly through supranational legislation (Fichter and Zeuner 1999).
While theoretically well elaborated and intuitively rather appealing, these studies suffer from three major drawbacks. First, they put too much emphasis on the homogeneity of institutions and their practices. By neglecting interactions between actors they miss to recognize specific conditions that modify those institutions and lead to heterogeneity rather than homogeneity of policy-making models. Second, they apply the idea of institutional isomorphism without taking into consideration specific structural and institutional realities of CEE countries that might work against the expected model diffusion (e.g. the depth of economic crisis, political struggles, weak organization of interest representation, etc.). These conditions may work as constraints on actors` preferred options and choice of their strategy. Finally, they are characterized by a lack of solid empirical analysis. While they base the expectations about convergence on the introduction of certain laws or the establishment of institutions necessary for the functioning of the West European models, they fail to question the real implementation of these formal components.
The aim of my project is to shed more light on these issues. More precisely, I will examine: (1) what steps have been undertaken in the CEE countries that might indicate convergence towards West European models of labor relations and social dialogue; (2) to what extent have formally accepted laws and practices been actually implemented in practice; and (3) which reasons can account for the failure of the full implementation of the corporatist model in the CEE countries.
Preliminary evidence show that CEE countries have indeed made changes regarding interest policy and interest regulation; they have established tripartite commissions and introduced new laws on collective bargaining. However, the mere existence of these forms of regulations of labor relations does not mean that all conditions for the corporatist arrangements function properly. While tripartism has achieved some positive results (e.g. by providing a forum for discussion, it has to some extent facilitated peaceful transition and created necessary conditions for the implementation of certain policies), this form of tripartism is still far from the one necessary for the West European type of corporatism. While tripartite commissions in the West actively participate in the policy-making process or have at least advisory role, in the CEE countries these meetings have mainly consultative purposes and they have often been not more than "talk-shops." Although the international standards pushed through by the ILO were included in legislation, in many instances the time lag before their actual implementation in practice proved to be rather long. Furthermore, while the coverage by collective agreements is fairly stable in the West, the same figure for the CEE countries, both at the sectoral and workplace level, shows rapid decline. In general, the transformation of labor relations in the CEE countries looks more like a hybrid process in which two extremes operate side by side: national tripartite arrangements on one hand, and decentralized workplace relations on the other. The main characteristic of the West European models (in particular German model), the intermediate or industry level bargaining is either lacking or very weak.
The reasons for the failure of the establishment of neo-corporatist type of social partnership are numerous: (1) legacies of socialism, i.e. the central role of the state and the existence of institutional and organizational remnants of the old system; (2) the depth of economic crisis and the perception of neo-liberalism as "the only way out", and the consequent weakening of unions through the exclusion from decision-making; (3) the widespread negative belief that unions are the agents of the old system which is partly responsible for the organizational weakening of unions (visible in a drop of density rates, union fragmentation, rivalry, and lack of representational monopoly); (4) an increasing number of small-scale private enterprises which lack unions’ presence; (5) general lack of interest for neo-corporatist arrangements from the employers side; (6) poor organizational skills, a lack of expertise and funds, and weak links between units of trade unions; etc.
To sum up, the break-up with old forms of regulation of labor relations (i.e. state control of unions) opened the way for new forms of expression of interest, but the weakness of social actors, particularly unions, resulted in fragmented organizational configurations. Whether or not neo-corporatist types of social partnership will take root in CEE depends not only on future official government policies, but also on the unions’ ability to strengthen their own constituency, as well as the change in employers’ position regarding labor relations. In order to increase chances for the neo-corporatist arrangements in CEE, I (preliminary) propose following policy measures:
Although the above mentioned factors that work against the establishment of the neo-corporatist type of decision-making are a general characteristic of all CEE countries, the extent to which their respective strength has influenced the outcomes varies from case to case. Preliminary evidence points out that inter-country variations largely reflect the outcomes of interactions between actors who have been either directly or indirectly involved in the policy-formation. In order to prove this, we first have to define actors' interests, strategic considerations, and then examine their role and a set of opportunities they are faced with within their respective institutional environments.
While the outcomes of interactions are constrained by institutions, they are also influenced by less tangible factors such as perceptions of the opponent's strategy, misperceptions, or the importance of timing of certain actions. This is dynamic variable; the nature of interactions is not fixed or given. Rather perceptions of actors change as they interact and respond to each other's strategy. In order to understand and elaborate on this interactionist model, policy network analysis will be used as a main methodological tool for this project. However, the project also has to take into account the questions usually neglected in the studies of network analysis, primarily those related to political choice and strategy.
In order to examine the nature and quality of the transformation of labor relations in CEE, a small-n cross-sectional analysis for most similar cases will be used. I will examine the developments in the three forth-runners for EU membership: Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The actors that come into considerations are respective national tripartite bodies, Ministries of Labor and Social Affairs, trade unions and employers' organizations officials, and finally the officials from the regional ILO center in Budapest. Network data are to be collected through a survey questionnaire conducted as interviews that will hopefully result in a high response rate. The less formal in-depth interviews will be arranged in order to get a clearer picture of the actors' strategies, interests, and their network interactions. Furthermore, the assessment of the quality of labor relations will be compounded by the evaluation of literature on the respective country-cases.
The main advantage of such an approach is that it offers a deeper insight into the policy-formation process in the field of labor relations, an issue that has not been paid enough attention to in the contemporary literature. Moreover, I hope to provide analytical framework as well as a set of policy recommendations that will help studying policy-making in other CEE countries as well.